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ABSTRACT  
The Money Value of Risk: 
Life Insurance and the Transformation of American Public Health,1896-1930 
Megan Joy Wolff 
 
This study examines the engagement of the life insurance industry with the emerging 
field of public health during the Progressive era. By conducting research, promoting 
hygiene, and providing the services of visiting nurses, firms such as Metropolitan Life 
and the Prudential transferred their ideologies and methodologies into the wider medical 
arena. Thus, the collaborations conducted during this period had significant ramifications 
for the future shape of American public health, which drew methods of risk assessment 
and a statistical approach to medicine from the alliance. This dissertation asks why the 
partnerships occurred. Public health and life insurance are not automatic allies, and their 
cooperation took place in a wider context of economic growth, social upheaval, and 
changing attitudes toward the management of risk. The study notes the power of life 
insurance firms as cultural institutions, which derived their commercial success from 
their ability to harness the social preoccupations of the buying public; the most profitable 
companies had a history of adjusting their sales rhetoric to anticipate, match, and 
manipulate public perceptions about which risks were salient and what the best ways to 
manage them might be. The passage of social insurance legislation in Europe provided a 
powerful example to reformers, whose structural approach to social betterment favored 
poverty prevention and legislative change. To prevent such measures from becoming law 
in the United States, insurance firms engaged in a strategy of political capitalism that 
   
included activities promoting public health. By positioning themselves as guardians of 
the nation’s physical vitality (and, by extension, its prosperity), they protected the 
dominance of the private sector, strongly influenced the nascent field of public health, 
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I have heard that it takes a village to write a dissertation, and that was certainly true of 
this one. The number of people who have heard more than they could reasonably be expected to 
stomach about American life insurance at the turn of the twentieth century has been amazing. 
The number who did so with warmth, intelligence, and enthusiasm has been more amazing still, 
and I owe them thanks for making these lengthy years of graduate school into decidedly 
pleasurable ones.  
Among those most on my mind are the de facto members of my “go to” team -- those 
friends and colleagues to whom I brought every conceivable question, from how to write a 
proposal to what color hood to order. I am grateful for their advice, love, and support across 
multiple contexts. Marian Moser Jones and my brother, Josh Wolff, answered the phone every 
time it rang, read everything I handed them, and provided a stream of commentary, humor, 
commiseration, and cooking for years on end. Neal Lesh provided invaluable insight into the 
dissertation process, and irrefutable evidence that there is an exciting life after grad school for a 
person with a PhD and an MPH. Daniel Lang held my hand through the hoops and challenges of 
the first few years. There is no better editor and no finer mind to work with than his, and his 
reappearance as comrade and cheerleader in the final year of this project were among the high 
points of the work. Dena Marger imbued me with an all-important appreciation of librarians, and 
Sean Murray was a thoughtful and sympathetic presence throughout.  It helps that all of these 
people lived at one time or another within blocks (or feet) of my door, but even from great 
distances they have been pillars of support.  
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I would like to thank my mentors, first and foremost David Rosner, who has been an 
unflagging ally, an ideal audience, and a source of inspiration to keep fighting the good fight, 
whatever it may be. In addition to David, I had the tremendous good fortune of receiving support 
from a less formal series of mentors, who took an interest in the work along the way and helped 
to keep me focused and motivated. Amy Schrager Lang’s willing ear and thoughtful 
commentary, and Warren Goldstein’s avuncular prodding have been more useful than they know 
in dissolving my sense of isolation and helping me to stay on task.  
Others who composed the community of scholars who kept these years lively rather than 
lonely include my colleagues in the Mellon Interdisciplinary Fellows Program at the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP). The company and commentary of Alvan 
Ikoku, Mathais Smangs, Rachel Tamar Van, Ansley Erickson, Tali Schaefer, Daniel Fridman, 
Andy Blanton, Jessica Hammer, and Mari Webel made our sub-sub basement a boisterous place 
to be. Thanks as well to the dozen or so fellow guides at Big Onion Walking Tours who became 
friends and colleagues while waiting on street corners in rain, sleet, and sun, comparing tour 
notes and telling dissertation stories. Megan Doherty, Sarah Bridger, Steve Petrus, Siovahn 
Walker, Julia Kraut, Julia Golia have been sources of particularly good camaraderie and support.  
Thanks also to Laura Bothwell, whose gifts as an editor I discovered late but will use to their 
fullest in the future. 
 The appreciation for librarians instilled in me by Dena grew tremendously as I came to 
interact with the staff at the American Jewish Historical Society, the National Library of 
Medicine, and the Columbia Rare Books and Manuscripts Library. At the Metropolitan Life 
Archives, the friendly assistance of Daniel May made visits a particular delight. Even had the 
rooms not been filled with fascinating esoterica such as the historic capes, badges, and bags of 
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visiting nurses, Dan’s personality made the trips a pleasure. The company of fellow researcher 
and doctoral candidate Daniel Bouk made this period of work even more enjoyable. Dan 
approached me after noting the commonalities in our research and became a resource and ally as 
we developed our theses. His invitation to join a panel discussing science and life insurance at 
the 2007 meeting of the History of Science Society Meeting drew me out of my shell and into a 
wider world of academic presenters, and I thank him for that. At the 2009 American Public 
Health Association meeting, I received another boost from co-presenters Marian Moser Jones 
(there she is again) and Robert Harvey, who helped me wrestle my powerpoint lecture into 
submission and overcome my stage fright. Bob later became a stalwart reader of chapters and 
corrector of typos, even when no one else (myself included) could stand to read another draft.  
 Two other cheerleading squads deserve note here. The members of the Institute for the 
History of Psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College, my workplace, never stopped inquiring 
about the progress of this project. Doris Nagel, Rosemary Stevens, Peter Wilson, Larry 
Friedman, Anna Antonovsky, and Barbara Stimmel insisted on finding this study interesting 
despite its vanishing relationship to the history of psychiatry. I will always be grateful for their 
intellectual support. I am also indebted to a body of allies at Judson Memorial Church, where 
overeducated urbanites abound. Donna Schaper, Alice Deakins, Peggy McNamara, and Martha 
Giardina are just some of the people whose inquiries and well-wishings have helped to keep me 
going. Thank you in particular to Grace Goodman and to her partner, Susan Bowyer who, as 
treasurer, attended all the onerous meetings so that I, as vice-treasurer, could “go home and write 
that dissertation!” Rest in peace, Susan.  
Last and most importantly, my gratitude extends to my family and to my partner, Chris, 
who put up with all the messy doubts and setbacks, and were immediately on hand to celebrate 
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the joys and accomplishments. Chris kept the home fires burning with astonishing patience, and 
is the sole reason that the cats, the plants, and I failed to perish from either malnutrition or ennui 
during the final year of writing. It has always seemed normal and natural to me that my brother, 
Josh, should be close at hand, as we are only eighteen months apart, but frankly the coincidence 
of winding up at graduate school together was downright weird. That said, it was also the single 
greatest stroke of fortune of my graduate career, as Josh remains my most admired anchor, 
champion, and friend. Melissa, my sister in law, and Mira, my niece, have brightened every visit 
to his home. Finally, I thank my parents, to whom the credit for enabling this project is most 
thoroughly and obviously due.  The model they presented of intellectual curiosity, 
accomplishment, and enjoyment of life has worked wonders, as has their unwavering support. In 
1983, my mother framed a drawing of mine and hung it on the wall in the back room of her 

















 In April, 1911, the vice president of the Metropolitan Life, Haley Fiske, stood 
before an audience of agents and told the men a series of anecdotes designed to elicit 
tears – and loyalty. “A policyholder in Boston was critically ill with pneumonia,” he 
recalled. “The doctor said the child had only a fighting chance, and this chance only if he 
had a good nurse. A special nurse was put in charge, the boy’s life was saved and he was 
discharged entirely well.” Fiske told another story: “The Superintendent of Nurses in 
Ottawa, Canada, writes a letter from which we quote,” he began. “A very sick patient 
coming out of chloroform said to the doctor, ‘Doctor, I belong to the Metropolitan.’ ‘Mon 
Dieu, madame, your life is saved, then’; and he promptly sent for the nurse.” Fiske 
moved on to another tale, and then another. For over half an hour, he held the attention of 
his sales force with stories about the brave but impoverished policyholders for whom the 
company’s nursing service had signified the difference between life and death.1  
The sales force had a close connection to these policyholders. The Metropolitan 
was an Industrial Insurance company, and marketed small policies to working class 
households, whose five and ten cent premiums the agents collected once a week door to 
door. The policies – worth on average $100 – were just enough to cover the cost of burial 
for the insured, and it was the job of the agents to prevent clients from missing payments, 
as well as to prevail upon every man, woman, and child in the neighborhood to buy more 
                                                
1 Haley Fiske, “A True Picture of the Company: Its History, Aims and Present Position,” Address presented 
to the agency field force as a sequel to the Triennial Address, 1910. This speech contained over a half hour 
of moving anecdotes about successful nursing care. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA. 
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insurance. Fiske’s stories about the illness and suffering of such people were calculated to 
inspire enthusiasm for what was at base a difficult and often unrewarding job. Moved by 
the social good accomplished by their own company, it was hoped that the sales force 
would pass their conviction on to the clientele. 
This dissertation will describe the ways in which the American life insurance 
industry manipulated the discourse of risk as a way to encourage sales and preserve the 
market for commercial policies, in the process influencing the future shape of American 
public health. The history of life insurance is a history of image-making, of firms 
describing their wares as necessary and desirable tools for managing uncertainty, and 
finding ways to do so in culturally palatable terms – tasks intimately related to 
manipulating perceptions of risk.  
Establishing a nursing service was a radical departure from the ordinary business 
for a life insurance company. The primary role of an insurer is the transfer of risk from 
one party to another. By collecting small sums from individuals and disbursing larger 
accumulated amounts at the time of death, life insurance companies spread the burden of 
financial risk from one household across many. On this successful premise, American 
industrial firms had built a vast empire. At the beginning of 1905, the Metropolitan 
claimed assets of over $128 million, and its chief competitor, the Prudential, claimed 
$88.5 million.2 The firms were economic institutions, and beyond meeting the financial 
obligations of their contracts, they did not concern themselves with the details of sickness 
and hazard that colored the fabric of everyday life.  
                                                
2 Testimony Taken Before the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York to 
Investigate and Examine into the Business and Affairs of the Life Insurance Companies Doing Business in 




The new campaign of the Metropolitan changed this. When the company 
introduced the nursing service in 1909, it did so to demonstrate a commitment to two 
great watchwords of the hour: life extension and health conservation. The Metropolitan, 
executives claimed, would henceforth become a social institution, meeting not only the 
financial risks that accompanied death, but the health risks that accompanied life. Life 
insurance agents would serve as health educators and social workers for the families on 
their debits, explaining the laws of hygiene and offering pointers on how to access 
needed social services. Sick policyholders could call on the company to provide free 
nursing care. The “Mother Metropolitan” would look after its clients as children, a 
promise that dramatically altered the company’s image, vastly amplified its cultural 
reach, and would ultimately impact the future shape of American public health.  
It was hoped, as well, that the tactic would expand the company’s sales. The 
cooling hand of the nurse on the fevered brow of the policyholder was a significant 
change from the usual imagery with which life insurance firms sold policies. In the mid 
nineteenth century, those appeals had run to grieving widows and orphans left 
unprotected in a financial storm, and in the late century they had favored the promise of a 
wise investment opportunity. Both enticements rested on the capacity of companies to 
calculate the earning power of the insured, whose wages, it was said, furnished the basis 
of the policies. In their publication, The Money Value of a Man, insurance statisticians 
Louis Dublin and Alfred Lotka explained the way in which the industry had developed 
and utilized actuarial life tables to demonstrate, as nearly as possible, “the money value 
of persons at various ages according to the amount of their earnings.” Such tables had 
been used by American life insurance firms since 1812 to price the financial risk of 
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would-be policyholders, as well as to increase the appeal of policies themselves.3 Life 
insurance agents could apply pressure to a prospective buyer by demonstrating from his 
position on the table “what [a man’s] responsibility really is in his effort to protect his 
family.”4 That responsibility – his wages – should be insured. Thus, the money value of a 
man could be used as a sales tool.  
Or, more precisely, the money value of risk could be used in this way. A changing 
social climate at the turn of the twentieth century generated new concerns in the lives of 
Americans, and necessitated that enterprising insurers adjust their rhetoric to match these 
changing preoccupations. Rapid industrialization had fueled the American economy, but 
had also created a crisis of accidents, urbanization, and social upheaval. The injury rate in 
American cities, factories, and mines was over twice that of Europe, and the poverty rate 
of wage workers was astronomical. Strikes, walkouts, and sabotage gave voice to the 
distress that workers were unable to express in almost any other meaningful way. By the 
1900s a movement was well underway to reduce the burden of suffering and risk that 
afflicted working people. Health officers and other workers in social fields made new use 
of life tables to demonstrate the appalling financial losses incurred by disease and 
premature death. By establishing that wages lost from a preventable disease cost the 
workingman, the employer, and the economy an ascertainable amount, the officers used 
the tables to underscore the need for prevention. They hoped in so doing to provoke 
political willingness on the part of citizens and the state to expand the domain of 
                                                
3 The first American company to do so, the Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting 
Annuities, imported its mathematical techniques from British firms. Daniel Bouk, The Science of 
Difference: Developing Tools for Discrimination in the American Life Insurance Industry, 1830-1930” 
(PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), 37. 
 




government responsibility to include the health and welfare of the body politic. At the 
same time, they incidentally opened a new financial opportunity for far-sighted insurance 
firms, which could point to the preventable loss as an insurable interest, and promise to 
help save policyholders money by working to safeguard their health and prolong their 
lives. In this new climate it was not just the value of the man that was insurable, but the 
risk that the man faced throughout his life.5  
Contemporary scholars such as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky have noted 
that the perception of risk is a fluid process that is highly cultural. It is the construction of 
risk – and not risk itself -- that matters and has meaning.6 To market policies, life 
insurance firms have capitalized on that cultural fluidity by emphasizing the objective 
dangers that have reinforced the moral, political, or religious order; they have sold 
policies by harnessing the preoccupations at the cultural core of the nation’s life and 
weaving them into a convincing rhetoric. The ability to do so has conferred an intriguing 
history upon life insurance firms as cultural institutions, whose actions have invariably 
provoked cultural responses.7 Indeed, through the majority of their corporate history, the 
                                                
5 A note on gendered pronouns: the majority of early policies were in fact marked almost exclusively to 
men, who in middle class households were considered to be the sole meaningful breadwinner. With the 
introduction of industrial policies in the 1870s, women, too acquired access to insurance. As per linguistic 
norms,  however, the language of the industry remained masculine. I have retained that language for 
historical consistency 
 
6 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 
6. See also Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon Embracing Risk: the changing culture of insurance and 
responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 19. 
 
7 Most historians of the industry have emphasized the role of life insurance companies as aggregators of 
wealth, as sites of business innovation, or as distributors of risk. Viviana Zelizer’s book, Morals and 
Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, c1979, 1983, 2008) provided a first departure from the pattern of financial and scientific treatment 
of industry history through her discussion of the influence of cultural factors on insurance sales.  Her 
analysis has since been amplified in articles and monographs touching on the importance of statistical 
methods in bridging the chasm between death and control, including Susan Mizruchi, The Science of 
Sacrifice: American Literature and Modern Social Theory, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1998),  Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America, 
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management of their own cultural image and social position has stood out as a primary 
challenge for insurers, which they have approached through a series of strategies. This 
study will trace these changes, demonstrating the patterns of cultural manipulation and 
reaction that framed and shaped the industry’s control of its market, and eventually its 
engagement with public health.  
 
Shifting Ideologies 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the size and composition of the 
American life insurance market changed continually, and only the most dynamic 
companies could remain competitive. The earliest firms had faced public qualms that 
insurance resembled gambling by generating an image of the practice as a selfless, moral 
and righteous investment. In response, companies cast themselves as responsible trustees 
that operated in conjunction with providence, not against it, by facilitating the moral and 
“good” death that could come only to the breadwinner who had done right by his family 
by leaving them a legacy. As cultural values shifted, forward-looking companies altered 
their rhetoric to embrace the growing prestige of science, progress, and professionalism. 
Reshuffling the role of morality, they described themselves as bastions of scientific 
certainty and mathematical reliability. Life insurance, company spokesmen assured the 
public, was a science that protected the modern family from darkness and uncertainty; as 
institutions, the firms heralded safety and progress. The discourse cast an aura of stability 
                                                                                                                                            
(University of North California Press, CA: 2001), and Brian Glenn, “The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance 
Denial,”  Law & Society Review 34 (2000): 779-808; also  “Postmodernism: the Basis of Insurance,” Risk 
Management and Insurance Review 6 (2003):131–43. Most recently, Daniel Bouk’s 2009 doctoral thesis 
follows strongly on Zelizer’s interpretation of insurance companies as cultural institutions by arguing that 
firms create and deploy classificatory systems that promote profit by innovating discrimination. Bouk, The 
Science of Difference. 
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and exclusivity around the practice that increased sales, and also created a role for 
insurance firms as contributors to the scientific domain.  
Life insurance companies also became facilitators of national prosperity. With the 
economic boom of the gilded age, ordinary Americans looked for ways to share in the 
abundance and maximize their wealth. Enterprising firms took advantage of this cultural 
willingness by describing insurable risk as a speculative entity, one that presented 
opportunities not just for loss, but for gain. Setting aside moralistic reasoning as out of 
date, companies instead placed emphasis on the financial merits of policies, which might 
one day return far more money than customers ever put into them. It was an ideology that 
helped to propel life insurance firms into a place of supremacy within the United States 
economy, where they served as the largest aggregators of wealth and assumed a place 
among the dominant social and political power holders of the day. The family protection 
had become a family investment. 
But the shift in ideology created an internal contradiction for the firms. The 
speculative promises contrasted with the ethos of moral trusteeship said to be at the 
foundation of the life insurance industry. When policyholders did not become the 
recipients of insurance windfalls (and most did not) they began to regard insurers as 
corporate malefactors. In 1905, the depredations came to a head in a New York State 
legislative investigation that revealed greed, financial malpractice, and outright fraud at 
the hands of all of the large insurers. It exposed a staggering degree of political 
capitalism, a well. The firms had manipulated not only the rhetoric of risk with which 
they sold policies, but also the legislators and insurance commissioners responsible for 
regulating their conduct. Worst of all, the inquiry demonstrated the numerous ways in 
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which industrial operators took advantage of the vulnerabilities of the poor, frightening 
them into buying policies with confusing terms and premiums that turned out to be higher 
than those sold to wealthier policyholders, for much small benefits. The investigation 
ended amidst a crisis of public confidence and threats of legislative reform formidable 
enough to shrink the market –and the power – of the leading firms substantially. This 
dissertation will explore these events as nodes in the history of image making and 
manipulation that shaped the firms’ future engagement with public health. Ambitious 
firms would seek recovery by harnessing the political breezes and finding new 
application for their skill as rhetoricians and political operators.  
 
Managing Risk in a Nation in Crisis  
The investigation took place against a backdrop of wider agitation for government 
regulation and social reform in the United States, was generating political will for the 
passage of state-based insurance, an even greater threat to the insurance industry than a 
legislative probe.  In response to the rising social distress, social scientists and others 
emphasized the need for a structural approach to social problems, one that recognized the 
interconnected nature of state governance, economic systems, and human suffering. The 
nation’s conventional organization of social responsibility had rested on a tradition of 
decentralization; individuals were responsible for their own welfare, a principle that had 
enabled the existence of the private insurance sector in the first place.  
The example of social insurance in Europe, however, provided a new model with 
impressively broad and effective results. With government, employers, and workers 
sharing the burden of premiums, state-based insurance in Europe provided money to 
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injured workers to defray the cost of health care and partially replace lost wages. 
Observers found that the system reduced suffering, improved relationships between 
capital and labor, and created a new basis of welfare and security for the working class. 8 
Reformers hoped that a similar program could be established in the United States, an idea 
to which private insurers responded with hostility. If established in the United Sates, 
social insurance would transform the way in which Americans thought about the 
management of risk. It could erode or even eliminate the market for commercial life 
insurance. Most strongly affected would be the industrial companies, whose working 
class clientele would no longer need the services provided by private firms.  
 By introducing new kinds of benefits and participating in the public health 
crusade themselves, firms gained a prized opportunity to defend and define the role of the 
commercial bodies in managing risk. Engagement with public health drew upon the 
companies’ earlier identities as scientific bodies, and also aligned them with the growing 
national preoccupation with resource conservation and business efficiency. Thus, 
manipulating the discourse of risk became part of a wider strategy of “political 
capitalism,” one intended to protect the private insurance market itself amidst a climate of 
social upheaval. By claiming a role in the movement for health conservation and national 
vitality, insurers asserted themselves in the political arena. It was an opportunity they 
utilized to demonstrate that their own capacity to monitor and improve the national 
welfare outstripped that of the public domain. Responsibility for national welfare, they 
asserted, should be left to the private sector. 
                                                
8 American scholars conducted numerous studies of European forms of social insurance. For an overview, 
see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mother: the Political Origins of Social Policy in the United 
States, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap; Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter 3. 
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Between 1909 and 1930, the Metropolitan and the Prudential launched numerous 
programs under the auspices of “welfare work” designed to lend support to the new 
public health, a movement to reduce health risks and prevent disease by teaching 
Americans to recognize and intervene in the chain of infection. While some initiatives 
took the form of direct service (nursing care and health instruction), many more took the 
form of research, which had real and lasting effects on the growth of the field. At the 
Prudential, for instance, company statistician Frederick L. Hoffman directed extensive 
research on workplace hazards, cancer, and suicide, in part by utilizing the exceptional 
trove of data that his company held on file. With decades of records charting the medical 
examinations and death claims of policyholders, the firm possessed one of the largest 
data sets ever collected on American mortality, and its in-house statistical department 
constituted one of the most evolved bureaucracies for cataloguing and analyzing the 
information. When the Metropolitan founded its own statistical department in 1911, it too 
began to conduct demographic research using company records, though it also placed 
emphasis on “sickness surveys” and “demonstration projects,” that carried the research 
into the wider community. These projects were designed to model ways that health 
officers might better combat scourges such as tuberculosis and infant mortality. They 
mimicked efforts of earlier philanthropists to create privately-funded health and welfare 
programs in hopes that government agencies would eventually adopt them. 
Ultimately, the research work of the two insurers accomplished numerous goals, 
both for the advancement of American public health and for the promotion of the life 
insurance industry. For the firms, the involvement re-infused their images with the 
authority, credibility, and prestige of scientific institutions, and created a renewed image 
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of civic participation that allowed the firms to secure their supremacy as the nation’s 
most ideal managers of risk. Through involvement in the research and practice of public 
health, the life insurance firms successfully merged the language of insurance with the 
language of medical science, public health, and national strength. They gained not only 
scientific credibility, but also identities as the very guardians of national vitality. In an 
age during which national strength signified national efficiency, they were once again 
stewards of prosperity. 
The scientific gains were even more impressive. The Metropolitan’s 
demonstration projects became guiding lights for work conducted by the national Public 
Health Service. The Prudential’s research initiatives contributed to wider campaigns for 
health and safety legislation, and served as models for further investigation by other 
scientific bodies. The success of the company’s efforts created pressure for the 
improvement of national statistics, pressure the companies increased by turning their 
political prowess to legislative campaigns for data standardization and federal 
registration. These efforts brought an enormously enduring combination of scientific 
expertise and statistical management to public health research. By the end of the 
twentieth century, statistical risk assessment became a touchstone of medicine, public 
health, and epidemiology, an intellectual transfer with enormous implications for theory, 
language, and practice of healthcare in the United States. Once associated largely with 





The collaboration between life insurers and public health facilitated numerous 
intellectual transfers and linguistic mergers, which had significant implications for the 
fields of public health and medicine. In today’s biomedicine, the use of a statistical 
framework to delineate “risk factors” and “risk groups” is the dominant approach to 
understanding and managing health, but as physician and historian Robert Aronowitz has 
noted, we have rarely asked how or why. As an intellectual approach, thinking in terms of 
risk has simply been accepted, and it is “unquestioned, implicit, ill-defined, and largely 
invisible,” even to its practitioners.9 The use of this risk-assessment framework has had 
profound ramifications on patients and practice, however, an impact that has been subject 
to much discussion and critique in recent decades.10 Nevertheless, the discussion has been 
largely ahistorical, an omission which has made it difficult to fully unpack the nuanced 
                                                
9 Robert Aronowitz, Making Sense of Illness: Science, Society, and Disease, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).  While histories of probability and risk abound, only a handful of scholars have 
treated the history of the risk factor as a biomedical approach. These include Gerald Oppenheimer, who has 
noted that the term “risk factor” first appeared in the clinical literature in 1961, in the context of a cardiac 
heart disease study in Framingham, Massachusetts. Gerald Oppenheimer, “Profiling Risk: the emergence of 
coronary heart disease epidemiology in the United States (1947-70),” International Journal of 
Epidemiology 35:3 (2006): 720 – 730. The otherwise ahistorical treatment makes it difficult to establish an 
in-depth understanding of the impact of this framework on patients or practice, an impact that has been 
subject to much discussion and critique in recent decades.  
 
10 A lively literature exists regarding the paradoxical effects of risk factor epidemiology. The practice is 
among the most powerful and effective tools in the modern medical diagnostic arsenal, but the fact that it is 
by design a classificatory tool has provoked the particular concern of those preoccupied with the effect of 
stigma in medical settings. Beginning in the 1980s, AIDS activists set up a potent warning about the sins of 
risk factor epidemiology, noting that at base, to indicate that an individual is “at risk” reflects less about 
biological susceptibility than about social vulnerability; biomedical risk often maps directly onto lines of 
race, class, and gender. Social theorist Catherine Waldby has called the process of risk profiling 
“classificatory violence,” pointing to its capacity to stigmatize, to reduce, to violate, and to disempower its 
subjects. Controversy persists to the present day. For a sampling of prominent voices in this debate, see G. 
Rose, “Sick Individuals and Sick Populations,”  International Journal of Epidemiology, 14:1 (1985): 32-38; 
N. Krieger, "Epidemiology and the Web of Causation: Has Anyone Seen the Spider?" Soc Sci Med 39:7 
(1994)., Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities : The Modern Plagues, Updated ed. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001); .Catherine Waldby, AIDS and the Body Politic: Biomedicine and sexual 
difference, (Routledge: New York), 1996. See also Trostle, MacIntyre, N. Krieger, "Historical Roots of 
Social Epidemiology: Socioeconomic Gradients in Health and Contextual Analysis," International Journal 
of Epidemiology 30:4 (2001), N. Krieger, "Re: "Who Made John Snow a Hero?"" American Journal of 
Epidemiology 135:4 (1992). 
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influences of the model. In this dissertation I historicize the emergence of risk within 
public health by examining the context in which ideas of risk as a biomedical attribute 
was transmitted from the American life insurance industry to medicine at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  
 One of the few historians to comment on the origin of the statistical framework in 
public health is William Rothstein, who in 2003 identified the life insurance industry as 
the incubator of the statistical methods used to describe biomedical risk. Rothstein, 
however, was unable to identify how the methodology entered into the public health 
arena.11 Subsequent research by historian Daniel Bouk has provided clarification, 
demonstrating that firms such as the Prudential that participated in the early century 
movement to conserve and lengthen human life brought to the task the tools they had 
developed for mathematical risk assessment. As a feature of the work, company 
statisticians collaborated with medical personnel from institutions such as Johns Hopkins 
University Hospital to share and analyze data, and through these collaborations their 
methodologies moved into the arena of health and medicine more generally. Bouk’s 
writing represents an important advance in efforts to historicize medical risk. The 
motives and implications surrounding this transfer, however, remain to be examined.  
One objective of this dissertation is to do just that. If Rothstein demonstrated the 
that and Bouk laid bare the how of the relationship between risk, life insurance, and 
public health, it is my task to examine the why. Notions of risk that emerged through the 
                                                
11 Rothstein posits that insurers’ intellectual methods were transferred into the medical mindset through the 
expertise of physicians hired to conduct life insurance examinations. This assertion is incorrect, as the 
mathematical work conducted to assess risk occurred at the hands of company statisticians, not physicians. 
See also William J. Rothstein, Pubic Health and the Risk Factor: A History of an Uneven Medical 
Revolution (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003). 
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life insurance industry were intimately shaped by the needs of the firms, whose profits 
were dependent on the ways in which they promoted and manipulated their chief product: 
the management of uncertainty. In early years, companies managed risk primarily 
through means of exclusion, catering to a supposed circle of the elite by using patrician 
imagery and high premiums that precluded the participation of those of lesser social 
status. As they began to market more accessible policies, companies found that more 
sophisticated statistical methods could create numerical indices which they could use as 
stand-ins for social factors such as race and occupation in order to justify continued 
discrimination in access to policies. These uses of supposedly scientific methodologies 
were highly political.12  
The construction of risk that the firms brought to public health work stemmed 
from political motives, as well. At the Metropolitan, the engagement with public health is 
most remembered for the company’s sponsorship of the nursing program (an initiative 
whose striking aspects Haley Fiske was at such pains to highlight), which utilized the 
medical and the educational skill of nurses to inculcate habits of hygiene among their 
patients. It was an example of a “privatized” approach to a wider social problem, and 
while useful, it shifted attention away from the understanding that conditions of overall 
social injustice generated poor health, and toward a narrower outlook that located the 
source of illness within the behavior of the individual. For an insurance firm seeking to 
prevent the introduction of socialized insurance, this approach was politically expedient. 
It downplayed the relationship between the individual and the polity, and promoted a 
sense of personal power over disease – if only each person would purchase life insurance. 
                                                
12 See Bouk, The Science of Difference, 1-20. 
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Where health risks were concerned, the insurers argued, the burden of risk had not 
become too heavy for the individual to manage through private measures, and with the 
help of the insurance company, policyholders could learn how. 
All told, both the collaboration between insurance firms and the emerging 
discipline of public health and the insurers’ successful effort to prevent public health 
advocates from reaching their goal of state-administered insurance, were deeply shaped 
by the Progressive era’s social upheaval, economic changes, and technological 
innovations. The contrasts and peculiarities abound, making the story of collaboration 
and contestation between these two unlikely allies a fascinating moment in the history of 
each, and one that remains critical to understanding the paradoxes and inconsistencies in 
the modern American approach to public health.  
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
The first chapter of this dissertation centers on a case study of the way in which 
early life insurance companies in the United States influenced social perceptions of risk, 
and will discuss the work of Frederick L. Hoffman, a young statistician hired by the 
Prudential Life Insurance Company to document a mathematical basis for the exclusion 
of African Americans. In the 1890s, several states passed anti-discrimination laws 
requiring life insurance firms to offer policies to blacks at the same rates as whites, a 
financial parity that companies abhorred due the perceived social incommensurability of 
valuing black lives at the same rate as white. Hoffman, a young devotee of the statistical 
method, had recently published an article in which he used quantitative data in attempt to 
demonstrate the moral and physical inferiority of the African Americans. In the wake of 
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the anti-discrimination laws, he found himself courted by Prudential executives, who 
believed him to be the perfect candidate to “prove” that American blacks were barriers to 
progress. Though scholars such as Kelly Miller and W.E.B. Du Bois wrote strident 
critiques of Hoffman’s misuse of data and illogical conclusions, the publication became a 
chief salvo in the nation’s race debate, and an invaluable tool for the Prudential, which 
used it to exclude “undesirables.” The tract constituted one in a series of cultural 
maneuvers on the part of firms to manipulate the discourse of risk in order to appeal to a 
lucrative range of buyers. The chapter will demonstrate that constructs of risk are 
socially-based and highly politicized, and establish the extended history of risk 
manipulation within the life insurance industry.  
During the mid and late nineteenth century, the industry’s capacity to reshape its 
techniques, both absorbing and reflecting the spirit of the times enabled growth that it 
could not have otherwise achieved, but which also introduced incongruities to its 
corporate model. Chapter Two will chronicle some of those changes, the problems they 
presented, and the larger issues they foreshadowed as Americans reached new 
conclusions about the best ways to promote efficiency and fairness in the sharing of risk. 
To maintain their market share, firms needed to move both with the times and ahead of 
them. 
In the years following the civil war, the life insurance industry evolved into a big 
business. Amidst growing national prosperity, competitive firms correctly deduced that a 
sales approach that emphasized gain instead of loss was more likely to satisfy the 
psychological desires of consumers, and shifted their rhetoric accordingly. Insurers 
placed emphasis on the financial merits of policies; they highlighted their investment 
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potential instead of their ideological purity. But the change in ideology created a serious 
internal contradiction for the firms. The new ethos of competition and growth raised 
questions about the supposedly benevolent mission of the firms, and even about the place 
of such corporations in a free society. If insurance were as essential as the companies 
claimed, then private industry might not be the most efficient supplier. To those who 
studied the question carefully, insurance purchased in the free market –especially 
industrial insurance -- simply cost too much to accomplish the social goals that it 
professed to achieve. The dawn of the twentieth century brought with it perhaps the most 
challenging ideological battle yet faced by the life insurance industry: how to preclude 
the establishment of social insurance in the United States 
A growing atmosphere of crisis and upheaval took hold in the industrial centers of 
the United States at the turn of the century, and its ramifications for the insurance 
industry and the passage of social insurance will be explored in Chapter Three. The 
nation’s prosperity seemed to have come at the expense of the working class, whose rates 
of injury and illness were nearly as appalling as its wages, and the social turmoil that 
resulted created a new series of challenges and opportunities for the life insurance 
industry. On the one hand, the surfeit of risk made the ownership of insurance policies 
more desirable; on the other, risk protection had become such a necessity that many felt 
the government ought to provide it. Moreover, popular unrest could easily turn into 
consumer outrage and anti-corporate vitriol, which would weaken the ability of the 
private insurers to protect their financial interests. To safeguard their own stability, firms 
engaged in what Gabriel Kolko has termed “political capitalism,” covertly influencing 
lawmakers in order to impact the content and volume of legislation affecting their 
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interests. This chapter will demonstrate the alacrity with which the firms protected their 
security, and their increasingly precarious position within the nation’s political economy. 
As traditional conventions for allocating risk (such as the fellow servant law) gave way, 
corporate conservatives expressed alarm about the “creep of socialism” and the need to 
take action to protect the private market.  
Exposure of the firms’ closed-door activities sharply undermined their political 
capacities, however, and Chapter Four chronicles the events of 1904 and 1905, during 
which the writings of muckrakers and a legislative investigation brought to extent of the 
companies’ political capitalism to light. Their illegal relationships with trusts, their 
convenient and nepotistic hiring practices, and their extreme political power became the 
stuff of magazine stories and newspaper headlines. When an internal power struggle at 
one of the largest firms set off a new round of exposes, the New York State Legislature 
responded to popular pressure and launched an inquiry into the practices of the firms. The 
findings revealed widespread financial malpractice and a raft of managerial irregularities, 
and they also confirmed old suspicions that industrial insurers bilked the poor by offering 
few benefits and charging premiums almost double those paid by ordinary policyholders.    
By the end of the hearings, it became abundantly clear that the private insurance industry 
would have to re-invent its relationship to social and political outlets to negate the appeal 
of social insurance, or else perish.   
Chapter Five describes the state of the life insurance industry immediately after 
the 1905 investigations, and the unexpected invitation from social reformers to become 
involved in the movement for public health. The Armstrong Investigations left the 
companies with a media black eye, through which it would be difficult to oppose the 
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passage of laws favoring social insurance. Yet reformers faced challenges of their own. 
Ever under-resourced, their attempts to generate support for a federal health agency, and 
to promote personal and legislative interest in sanitation were meeting frustration. In the 
wake of the Armstrong investigation, however, health workers recognized that the 
machinery of the life insurance industry for creating and distributing social messaging 
constituted a spectacular resource. The industry’s capacity to distribute information, 
influence public opinion, and even impact the outcome of legislation made insurance 
executives into allies worth courting, despite social workers’ history as the firms’ chief 
detractors. Thus, at a time when insurers were most threatened by government regulation 
and a changing discourse of risk, they were invited to participate in the evolution of social 
reform by becoming messengers of the movement, an opportunity that afforded them 
invaluable influence on the course that reform might take.  
The Metropolitan accepted the invitation of reformers, initiating a program of 
public health advocacy that served as a model for other firms and public health bodies, 
and event the federal government. Chapter Six will explore the nature and impact of the 
company’s activities, which included direct service and demographic research, and which 
spurred competition (and critique) from the Prudential. In 1910, Fiske declared that the 
Metropolitan would become a social institution. He endorsed the creation of a visiting 
nurse service and a widening of the responsibilities of agents, who would now double as 
social workers and health educators to the families on their debits. Such efforts at 
corporate welfare work won popular approval for the Metropolitan, and also allowed the 
firm to take part in shaping a new rhetoric of risk. In many ways, they constituted  what 
historian James Weinstein has called “corporate liberalism,” – the adoption of political 
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ideologies to gain or retain support for entrepreneurial activity. But this might not have 
been their only purpose. The direct service and research contributions of the industrial 
insurers constituted only a portion of their engagement with public health. At the 
Metropolitan, work extended to advocating health legislation, facilitating the civic 
participation of policyholders, and creating partnerships with public, private, and 
philanthropic bodies focused on establishing a federal department of health. These 
initiatives, which took place under the guidance of prominent social worker, Lee Frankel, 
reflected the structural goals of the wider reform movement, and complicate the activities 
of the Metropolitan. Though opposed to the passage of state-administered insurance, the 
contributions of the firm to the field of public health were significant, as were those of its 
rival, the Prudential. It is a history that does not lend itself to easy interpretation, and 




CHAPTER 1: “THE MYTH OF THE ACTUARY”1 
 
On April 6, 1895, a young statistician named Frederick L. Hoffman wrote the 
following letter to his wife. 
 
I have copied a large part of my manuscript on the “Tendency of the 
Negro” ... I feel quite sure that it will prove to be one of the most 
scientific contributions on the subject of race tendency and 
deterioration. … [I]n my next article on the Negro I shall present a 
mass of evidence such as no writer past or present has ever done. I shall 
make out an argument so strong and so convincing that even those who 
will be proven in the wrong, will be compelled to admit the soundness 
of my argument. It will be a paper exclusively statistical and as little as 
possible shall I advance views of my own, but I shall so arrange the 
statistical evidence to make clear the present day tendency of the 
mongrel breed who fain would try to make believe that they were 
possessed of some higher innate virtues than the white race. But I shall 
make clear another point, though I shall not say so in words and that is 
the moral justification of the white people of the South in the course 
they have pursued since reconstruction days to maintain white political 
and social supremacy. I shall tell a story and a true story such as will 
satisfy even Miss Bacon and Miss Ludlow that there are a thousand 
things in the race problem of which they never dreamed of in their 
Normal School philosophy. And they shall find that it is always a bad 
thing to hug a delusion after you have once found out that you are 
wrong. 
 
Hoffman’s article became a 330 page tract in the prestigious Publications of the 
American Economic Association which purported to demonstrate with statistical 
reliability that the “American Negro” was uninsurable. Published in May, 1896, Race 
Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro was a compilation of statistics, eugenic 
theory, observation, and speculation, solicited by the Prudential Life Insurance Company 
in response to a wave of state legislation banning discrimination against African 
Americans. Faced with the social incommensurability of Negro and white lives, and 
convinced that the high mortality of such a group would drive up the cost of doing 
                                                
1 Portions of this chapter were published as an article in Public Health Reports. See Megan J. Wolff, “The 
Myth of the Actuary: Life Insurance and Frederick L. Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of the 
American Negro,” PHR 121:1 (2006): 84-91. 
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business, the Prudential sought to circumvent the anti-discrimination legislation by 
demonstrating that its decisions were based on the empirical fact of elevated risk, not on 
social ideology.  
Himself a newcomer to the nation, Hoffman’s interest in racial difference had 
advanced with his time in the United States. Raised in Varel, Germany, he had 
immigrated to the American south in 1884, where for several years he worked itinerant 
and menial jobs, and where he observed American race relations with a curious eye. On a 
trip down the Mississippi river, Hoffman remarked to his diary about the “senseless 
cruelties” practiced upon African American deck hands. On a later journey, he made the 
acquaintance of Frances and Samuel Armstrong, founders of the Hampton Institute, and 
learned with great interest about the origins and ideals of the normal school established 
for the uplift of blacks. Miss Ludlow and Miss Bacon, mentioned in the letter, were 
teachers at the Institute, and although Hoffman retained his friendship with the 
Armstrongs throughout their lives (he and his wife even named their second daughter, 
Frances, after Mrs. Armstrong), his sympathy with the school’s mission apparently 
dissolved.  
Like many immigrants, Hoffman made himself an eager convert to the attitudes 
and loyalties of his adopted country -- one component of which included its white 
supremacy.2 At the time of Race Traits’ publication, thirty-two years after emancipation, 
a significant group of Euro-American social thinkers predicted the demise of the race. 
Others were less sure, noting the apparent increase in the black population of the U.S.; 
some expressed concern that the group might come to outnumber whites and 
                                                
2 Beatrix Hoffman, “Scientific Racism, Insurance, and Opposition to the Welfare State: Frederick L. 
Hoffman’s Transatlantic Journal.” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era,  2:1 (Feb 16, 2004): 
150-190. 
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“Africanize” the nation.3 From all sides, the racial discussion was one obsessed with 
questions of absolute survival, and in which the outlook for African Americans stood at 
odds with the optimistic future predicted for the so-called white race. If, as Hoffman 
came to believe, African Americans were truly inferior and doomed to extinction, then 
efforts to ameliorate their poverty were useless and – worse -- divisive. Hoffman 
concluded that the “delusions” of instructors at the normal schools bolstered tensions 
between north and south, and he sought to put an end to the debate in the most 
authoritative terms possible, using the irrefutable evidence of statistical data.   
In 1892, Hoffman published an article in Arena magazine entitled “Vital Statistics 
for the Negro” in which he projected that high mortality would eventually bring the 
group to extinction. This outlook was a far cry from the hopes embodied by the Hampton 
Institute, but it participated powerfully in the overall race debate taking place throughout 
the United States. It also attracted the attention of the Prudential Life Insurance 
Company, which had recently faced critique for charging higher premiums to blacks, and 
then for excluding African Americans from insurance altogether. Hoffman clearly 
possessed the racial theories and statistical talents to conduct an exhaustive scientific 
study, one that could convincingly frame the company’s practices as scientifically based. 
Such an inquiry would lend credibility to the Prudential as a scientific institution, 
aligning the firm with progressive-era values of rationality, professionalism, and 
expertise. In early 1895, Hoffman bid a temporary goodbye to his young wife and infant 
                                                
3 The preoccupation with the threat of white Americans being racially “overwhelmed” was a longstanding 
one. Emancipation imbued this theory of Africanization with a new urgency. One of the best works 
cataloging this shift is George M. Frederickson The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-
American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914,  (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
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daughter, and traveled from their home in Georgia to New Jersey to take up employment 
at the Prudential. 
When completed in 1896, the publication won accolades for both Hoffman and 
the Prudential. Its statistical might awed supporters. Reviews widely heralded Race Traits 
as a work of monumental importance in addressing the race debate. Admirers praised the 
article as a “mine of statistical information” where “figures culled with evident care from 
the most trustworthy sources … are intelligently and impartially combined and discussed 
in a clear and attractive manner.” 4  Hoffman, some said, was a genius. The Prudential 
seemingly agreed, promoting the young statistician year by year until he eventually 
became a company vice president, and one of the most important counsels to the firm’s 
chief executive. His worth in delineating company policy became indispensable, but in 
1896 Hoffman’s most important contribution to the Prudential was the narrative that he 
compiled about African Americans, which was both powerful enough and timely enough 
to successfully exclude them from the fast-growing field of industrial life insurance, one 
of the most lucrative “scientific” enterprises of the modern era. 
The narrative that Frederick Hoffman compiled told a powerful story about 
African Americans. It was not, however, uncontestable, and the work received critique -- 
even from writers in Hoffman’s own time. African American scholars Kelly Miller and 
W.E.B. Du Bois pointed out that many of the interpretations Hoffman presented about the 
health and welfare of African Americans were based on flawed or poorly evaluated data. 
While it was true that high mortality rates afflicted African Americans, Hoffman failed to 
stratify his findings by social or economic status, which would have shown that black 
                                                
4 Review is quoted in B. Hoffman, “Scientific Racism,” 8.  
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mortality rates differed enormously based on “the conditions of life.”5 The health 
outcomes of African Americans were in fact entirely comparable to those of immigrant 
groups with similar economic resources. “If the population were divided as to social and 
economic condition the matter of race would be almost entirely eliminated,” wrote 
W.E.B. Du Bois in a review of Hoffman’s findings.6  In a 1906 Atlanta University study, 
Du Bois presented actuarial data from thirty-four leading life insurers demonstrating the 
similar outcomes of African Americans and working-class immigrants.  “In fact, the 
Negro makes a better showing than the Irish, nearly as good as the Germans, and better 
than the economic class of laborers in general,” he pointed out.7 Why, then, did insurers 
single out this group for rejection while accepting and even soliciting other groups with 
similar mortality at ordinary industrial rates?   
Insurance, as I will discuss, is a highly lucrative field. In a business atmosphere 
infatuated with progress, efficiency, and competition, the turn of the century life 
insurance industry expanded to become an entrepreneurial super-power.  By 1904, the 
combined assets of American insurers exceeded the total amount of U.S. currency in 
circulation; they surpassed, too, the gross national products of Greece or Norway.8  But 
insurance is also a highly political field, and singling out a segment of the body politic for 
                                                
5 Between 1890 and 1894, the overall mortality of blacks in southern cities exceed the white 1.6 times. In 
1900, overall black infant mortality surpassed white by 240%. See W.E.B. Du Bois, “Review of Race 
Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro,” Annals of the American Academy, (1896): 129; See also 
W.E.B. Du Bois, “Health and Physique of the American Negro,” The Atlanta University Publications, No. 
11 (Atlanta: The Atlanta University Press, 1906), 78. For more on the health status of African Americans 
during the progressive era, see Susan Smith, Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Black Women's Health 
activism in America, 1890-1950, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).  
 
6 Du Bois, “Health and Physique,” 89. 
 
7 Du Bois, “Health and Physique,” 92. 
 
8 Morton Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 1885-1910, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), 14. 
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insurance exclusion was as much a social and political activity as it was an actuarial one. 
Selling policies at a breakneck pace, insurers pushed to expand the market, vying with 
one another to capture share and commercial cachet. Their business was one in which 
trust itself composed a large part of the product being sold, so insurers cultivated careful 
and specific images of themselves, their clientele, and their conduct. With their solvency 
so tightly connected to public perceptions, they took pains to synchronize both their 
image and their contracts with the social concerns of the day. These concerns specifically 
pointed to African Americans as barriers to progress.  
Insurance banks, literally and figuratively, on social anxieties and representations 
surrounding mortality, responsibility, power, and human worth. Moreover, its ventures 
rely on the macabre calculus by which death becomes the basis of commercial action and, 
paradoxically, progress. In this respect, what is in fact a highly subjective social narrative 
can be made to appear to be a mathematical description of risk. Political scientist Brian 
Glenn writes, “Insurers can rate risks in many different ways depending on the stories 
they tell about which characteristics are important and which are not.”  The rhetorical 
situation in which these decisions appear to be strictly objective is what Glenn has 
dubbed “the myth of the actuary.” The statistical narrative that Frederick Hoffman 
compiled about African Americans made dramatic claims about the welfare, vitality, and 
the social role of blacks, but as Glenn warns, “almost every aspect of the insurance 
industry is predicated on stories first, then numbers.”9 The story that Hoffman compiled 
in Race Traits clearly had a statistical component, but this was only a small element of 
                                                
9 Brian J. Glenn, “Postmodernism: the Basis of Insurance,” Risk Management and Insurance Review 6 
(2003):131–43.. See also Brian J. Glenn, “The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial,” Law and Society 
Review 34:3 (2000): 779-808. 
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the insurance industry’s treatment of risk, a treatment based on a complicated and highly 
adaptable social calculus, and on the dynamic meaning of risk itself.  
It would be difficult to overstate the exceptional relationship between the 
American life insurance industry and social ideology, a connection that was often at the 
same time prescient, reflective, and productive. With corporate prosperity so inextricably 
linked to social values, the firm’s continued existence was often predicated on the ability 
of company personnel to correctly identify ascending ideologies, shifting their own 
rhetoric in time with – if not slightly ahead of – popular thought. The vulnerability of a 
sluggish firm was irrefutable. Yet as social actors in their own right, the philosophies that 
American insurance firms endorsed often gained new currency and momentum.10 This 
process of social production was not inevitable, but it positioned the life insurance 
industry as an important node in the dynamics of popular ideology. 
This chapter will evaluate the commission and creation of Race Traits in the 
context of the social and ideological influences of the United States during the 
Progressive Era. Its primary concern is to demonstrate the ways in which the Progressive 
Era life insurance industry manipulated the discourse of risk to legitimize its cultural 
authority and to expand its market share, appealing to its authority as a scientific 
                                                
10 Most historians of the industry have emphasized the role of life insurance companies as aggregators of 
wealth, as sites of business innovation, or as distributors of risk, but this dissertation draws attention to the 
impact of American life insurers as cultural institutions, a topic first explored by Viviana Zelizer, Morals 
and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States, (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, c1979, 1983, 2008). Her analysis has since been amplified in articles and monographs touching on 
the importance of statistical methods in bridging the chasm between death and control, including Susan 
Mizruchi, The Science of Sacrifice: American Literature and Modern Social Theory, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998),  Beatrix Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: The Politics of Health 
Insurance in Progressive America, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press: 2001), and Brian 
Glenn, “The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial,”  Law & Society Review34 (2000): 779-808; also  
“Postmodernism: the Basis of Insurance,” Risk Management and Insurance Review. 6 (2003):131–43. Most 
recently, Daniel Bouk’s 2009 doctoral thesis follows on Zelizer’s interpretation of insurance companies as 
cultural institutions by arguing that firms create and deploy classificatory systems that promote profit by 
innovating discrimination. Daniel Bouk, The Science of Difference: Developing Tools for Discrimination in 
the American Life Insurance Industry, 1830-1930, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2009. 
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institution to reinforce a construction of risk that was in fact economic and social. 
Although the rhetoric surrounding Race Traits appealed to the uninsurability of African 
Americans as a supposedly natural “fact,” the risk that Hoffman presented was entirely 
man-made. 
The primary mechanism of insurance is the transfer of responsibility from one 
party to another, and as products intended for resale or redistribution, risks must be made 
both measurable and palatable for those who wish to lay money down on them. 
Purveyors of insurance must construct what sociologist Francois Ewald has called an 
“insurantial imaginary” – a paradigm or construction of insurance in which profitable and 
necessary uses are made of the technology.11 This includes an articulation of which risks 
– or people -- can and cannot be covered. It is a political imaginary that indicates which 
losses are socially acceptable and which are not. “The methods by which members of a 
polity deal with loss are both intimately personal and highly public,” writes Brian Glenn. 
“They both speak to deeply personal visions of who we are in relation to others and have 
significant policy implications.”12 
As a construct, as something relational, risk is fluid. The peculiar task of insurers 
is to anchor risk in a narrative that seems stable, reassuring, and justifiable. But as 
articulations of the anxieties, relationships, and preoccupations of a particular era, risk 
narratives that are used to guide decisions and policies also serve to embed those 
preoccupations into future action. Frederick Hoffman’s actuarial treatment of African 
Americans reflects much about the ways in which understandings of risk incubated 
                                                
11 Francois Ewald, “Insurance and Risk” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Burchell, 
Gordon, and Miller, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 197-210. 
 
12 Brian Glenn, “Review: Risk, Insurance, and the Changing Nature of Mutual Obligation,” Law and Social 
Inquiry, Vol 28, No 1 (Winter 2003), 295-314. 
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within the nineteenth century insurance industry reflected political ideologies of the 
period -- and ultimately reinforced them. It also reflects much about that rapid change in 
saleable ideology, even across the nineteenth century. The history of the life insurance 
industry is a history of image-making. To fully appreciate the dynamic nature of Race 
Traits and its place in a business reflective of a transforming society, it is useful to 




It could be said that the crucial questions surrounding life insurance began with 
whether the practice was appropriate for people, and evolved to question which people 
were worthy of the practice. Through most of the industry’s commercial history in the 
United States, the provision of life insurance was stratified by race. Expensive, elite 
policies were available at a high premium for white elites, and for quite different rates for 
blacks, usually at separate companies. The early life companies for whites specialized in 
policies to insulate patricians from loss. Such insurers existed in the American colonies 
from around 1760 but remained unpopular for many years, in large part due to ethical 
concerns of the buying public. Those opposed to the practice saw it as speculative and 
entrepreneurial -- as an act in which individuals placed a money value on the life of the 
insured, guessed at the approximate date of death, and positioned themselves to make a 
 30 
profit should their predictions come true.13 In Europe, the practice of insuring human 
lives remained illegal well into the nineteenth century.14  
Though lawful in the American colonies, most people spurned the practice, 
believing that the purchase of life insurance bore too close of a resemblance to gambling 
and seemed like a form of spiritual blasphemy.  Sociologist Viviana Zelizer explains: 
“Putting death on the market offended a system of values that upheld the sanctity of 
human life and its incommensurability. It defied a powerful normative pattern: the 
division between the marketable and the non-marketable, or the sacred and the 
profane.”15 The public felt at best hesitant about, and more often completely opposed to 
the venture, which “challenged deeply institutionalized values relating to death and 
concerning the role of Providence in the social order. It defied as well a set of cultural 
and religious beliefs and ideas on risk and gambling.”16 To lay down money against one’s 
own life was to tempt fate. To have another do so was to tempt assassins. 
Nevertheless, for a specific few, ownership of a life insurance policy provided the 
appeal of a buffer against economic loss. A small number of American firms maintained 
a respectable business selling policies to affluent white adult males, who could purchase 
policies with a minimum coverage of $1000. Premiums on such policies were high, but 
                                                
13 Such a deployment of the technology committed a triple sin: the sacrilege of commodifying life, the 
blasphemy of anticipating the timing of an event known only to the Almighty, and the wickedness of 
gambling. 
 
14 Governments in France, Holland, and Sweden took the step of banning the practice in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries; even within the United States, courts continued to weigh the question of its validity 
until 1815. See Viviana Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United 
States, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, c1979, 1983, 2008), 1, 33. 
 
15 Zelizer, Morals and Markets, 42. An 1875 satirical speech by Samuel Clemens captured the essence of 
the blasphemy of the life contract when the author remarked, “[T]o me now there is a charm about a 
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companies targeted the insurance toward those who had significant financial capital at 
stake by promising to protect against significant economic loss. Naturally, those whose 
lives were not associated with high economic status were excluded from the practice; 
wage-workers, children, and the majority of women could not be considered eligible for 
insurance. An exception to this exclusion of “lesser” lives, however, were those of 
African Americans, on whom policies could be purchased during slavery in the same 
manner in which the wealthy protected other valuable property.  
The initial slave policies may have been closely tied to marine insurance, which 
protected not only the ship but also its cargo. Slavers who insured their ventures paid 
high premiums, but lethal conditions onboard their vessels often justified a high expense. 
In the mainland United States, the insurance of slaves was infrequent but not unknown, 
and most southern companies accepted the business. Slaveholders insured against 
runaways, infirmity, and premature death. Standard policies ranged from 2-3% of a 
slave’s valuation, particularly when the contract involved competent servants or skilled 
workers.17 By a bitter twist of fate, the policies on antebellum slaves were more valuable 
than the policies that later became available to freedmen, or even to the white immigrants 
who worked alongside them in many of the same trades.  A three-month policy in 
Memphis in 1851 insured sixteen slaves at a premium of $85.39; the return totaled $500 
on the life of each of the insured.18 Such costs were assuredly higher than those for 
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whites.19 Nevertheless, (or perhaps as a result) the policies available for slaves signified 
the most literal possible translation of the convention of property protection as applied to 
humans.  
In the mid-nineteenth century United States, firms worked hard to build their 
market by deploying a convincing narrative of moral value, placing substantial creative 
resources into creating an ideal that would appeal to financially powerful buyers. The 
earliest companies conjured images of upper-class Victorian widows and children in their 
advertising materials. “How much do you love them?” prodded one advertisement, subtly 
countering the common accusation that insurance left “blood money” to the widow. 
“Enough to make a personal sacrifice to assure their support and comfort after you are 
gone?”20 Such companies attempted to make virtue out of vice by replacing the image of 
gambling with the threat of loss. They deployed a narrative of risk in which it was not the 
purchase of life insurance but the failure to purchase life insurance that constituted a sin. 
Harm visited on mothers and children in the absence of a life insurance policy was a 
sacrilege that could not be morally tolerated. Advertisements went so far as to label those 
who arrived at their deathbeds without a policy negligent, foolish, and even wicked. “He 
died without even a policy of insurance on his life.” “Stupid, wasn’t it?” “No. We would 
not call it stupidity. We think the very much harsher term ‘wickedness’ fits the case a 
great deal better.”21 
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If those who failed to purchase policies were heartless, those who succeeded in 
doing so were morally enlightened. Clever advertisements managed to invert the amoral 
image of insurance by describing its purchase as an act of generosity. The security that 
policies conferred, they insisted, was the very opposite of usurious; it was unselfish – 
intended not for the breadwinner but for the widows and orphans who were the 
breadwinner’s concern, and who effectively symbolized society’s most innocent persons. 
The noble nature of the contract and the moral purity of those whom it claimed to protect 
conferred a pious aura on the entire transaction, erasing the stigma and the suggestion of 
malefaction.  Capitalizing on the notion of “final judgement,” insurers challenged 
members of the public to prove themselves responsible, loving, and financially 
sophisticated through the purchase of insurance. Themes of altruism and moral good 
dovetailed with claims about moral uplift. In 1865, Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine 
declared the insured to be a moral elite, “the very best class in the community.” The 
purchase of life insurance could “elevate the tone of a man’s moral being, refine his 
nature and render him more beneficent to men.”22 
No matter how appealing an imaginary a firm was able to generate, it could do 
nothing if people were not exposed to it, so selling policies remained a matter of 
remarkable suasion. The work of selling insurance, noted one agent of the Equitable 
Insurance Company, was to “first to create a demand, and then to satisfy it.”23 To meet 
this challenge, life insurers created a marketing infrastructure that was, as one pair of 
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scholars have summarized “sophisticated, spectacular, and pervasive.”24 The more 
effective the companies could become as advertisers, the more sales they could achieve; 
no amount of rhetorical manipulation could sell insurance if the public didn’t know about 
the benefits of the product. To get the word out, companies became innovators of printed 
advertising materials, professional sales techniques, and even urban architecture, erecting 
towering skyscrapers meant to remind potential customers of the security of the firms. 
Everywhere that ordinary Americans looked, reasoned company executives, they should 
be met with a persuasive symbol or message about the utility and worthiness of life 
insurance.  
Almost nothing proved more persuasive than the power of the pulpit, and many 
insurance sales tactics borrowed substantially from evangelical Christianity. The 
architecture of the largest firms’ headquarters used brick and mortal to allude to religion 
and the sacrosanct. The Prudential modeled its Newark home office building on the 
soaring cathedrals of Europe; the president of the Equitable commissioned stained glass 
windows for the lobby of the company’s office tower; New York Life nicknamed its 
multi-story office building the “temple of humanity.”25 The power of the Word was 
seductive, as well. Numerous firms hired clergy to author pamphlets resembling the 
church “tracts” with which they attracted converts and inspired members, a tactic that had 
the double advantage of silencing religious condemnations of the trade.  
Ministers who accepted payment from companies lavishly praised the virtues of 
insurance, comparing and even eliding insurance institutions with Christian ones. One 
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reverend likened the “charity” of insurance to that of “Orphan Asylums, Charity 
hospitals, Poor Houses, Deaf and Dumb Asylums, Sunday Schools and other kindred 
institutions.” No one who considered his or herself a Christian, he exhorted, “should be 
found opposed to Life Assurance.”26 Naturally, the most popular ministers also 
represented the most valuable resources for the companies. In 1871, the president of the 
Equitable engaged popular orator Reverend Henry Ward Beecher, mouthpiece of the 
social gospel, to write and preach sermons favoring life insurance. Beecher badgered his 
audience with questions of whether a Christian man could justify himself in neglecting 
his duty to purchase a policy.27 Invoking an easy and frequent identification with religion, 
insurance personnel made regular reference to the “missionary work” and the “gospel” of 
insurance, noting the “sacred obligation” of life insurance policies as legal contracts and 
promises to loved ones. The power of such speakers harnessed and even co-opted the 
social authority of the church -- the very arbiter of morality. 
Companies also used the rhetoric of Christianity to inspire the sales force of 
insurance agents, the industry’s most important body of crusaders. “It has been said and 
truly said that as the ministry is to the Christian religion so are the agency forces to life 
insurance,” encouraged one underwriter to a crowded lecture hall of colleagues. “In 
working out your career within its ranks you are taking part in a great ethical movement. 
The institution must continue to depend on you to carry its message to the people.”28 
                                                
26 Rev. S.A. Hodgman, Father’s Life Boat. Or: Origin, Uses, and Necessity of Life Insurance, (St. Louis: 
Review Steam Press, 1871). 
 
27 Henry Ward Beecher, Truth in a Nutshell (New York: Equitable Life Assurance Society of New  
York, 1871); Patricia Beard, After the Ball: Gilded Age Secrets, Boardroom Betrayals, and the Party that 
Ignited the Great Wall Street Scandal of 1905, (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 18. 
 
28 Alfred Hurrell, “The Increasing Responsibilities of the Agent,” An address delivered at the 22cnd annual 
convention of the National Association of Life Underwriters, Chicago. Oct 10, 1911. 
 36 
Insurance historians tend to agree that it was the persuasive power of agents that 
ultimately propelled life insurance from an outlier business to a massive financial 
industry. Companies that did not send out agents fared poorly; those that did dispatch 
them saw measurable strides in their business. 
With the encouragement (and salaries) of the companies, agents fanned out across 
all parts of the United States to carry the gospel of insurance as others had carried 
religious appeals. From industrial cities to far-flung ranches, they carried the message 
door to door, often returning again and again to make the message known. Not all agents 
were true believers (though evidence suggests that a reasonable number plied their trade 
with conviction), nor were all of them convincing messengers, but the sales they 
generated demonstrated beyond doubt that the best carriers of the message was the life 
insurance agent.  
Agents introduced a human touch to sales. They imparted information more 
vividly than newspaper ads, and directly countered the doubts of potential customers; 
they also made more personal and aggressive appeals than any circular ever could.29 In 
remote areas agents carried the glamour of travel and faraway places, as well as 
providing company (themselves), gossip, and news. Earnest, relentless solicitation served 
to boost sales in the city as well as in rural areas, especially when infused with humor or 
charisma. The business card of one early agent quipped: “Office in my head. Wherever 
my hindquarters are there you will find my headquarters,” and concluded with the 
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mantra: “prudent people provide preferred protection.”  The ideal agent was morally 
persuasive as well as magnetic.  
Companies touted their agents as teachers who explained the workings of 
insurance to an interested public, though in reality their success was due as much to their 
perseverance as to their educational talents. “The purchaser of life insurance seldom 
seeks out a company; he must be intensively approached by the agent and convinced that 
he should buy,” remarked insurance scholar Maurice Taylor.30 The art of persuasion 
came most easily to those who believed in the virtues of the product they sold, a feature 
which doubtless enhanced the missionary quality of the interaction. Agency handbooks 
emphasized the role of personal conviction in selling policies, and repeatedly reminded 
underwriters that their work was truly important. “Never forget that you are doing a work 
which will bring joy into the deserted home,” urged one guide for underwriters, “and 
cause the anguish of a widowed heart to find much of its relief in the Life Policy which 
was effected by your instrumentality.”31 Insurance underwriting was an honored 
profession, a respectable office, a “sacred occupation.” It could best be undertaken by 
those who truly championed the cause.  
Not only did insurance agents carry the gospel, they in fact served as the engine of 
the industry’s growth. The success of insurance in the United States surpassed that of 
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European nations such as Austria, Denmark, and Germany specifically because of the 
efforts of its sales force. Of the European life companies, only British insurers employed 
agents, and their growth loosely paralleled that of the American companies. The result of 
such outreach and suasion was the creation of an audience that was intellectually 
prepared to purchase life insurance. Between 1860 and 1870, the number of policies 
active in New York State jumped from 50,000 to 650,000; by 1868 the sum of insurance 
throughout the nation exceeded the national debt.32   
Despite such growth, the market for insurance around the time of the Civil War 
remained quite limited, largely as a result of the narrow terms within which the firms 
constructed “insurability.” American life insurance had developed to suit the moral 
sensibilities of a Victorian elite, and the insurantial imaginary cultivated under such 
circumstances included only affluent white men, considered to be the nation’s 
“worthiest” citizens. As a result, regular policies remained beyond the means and even 
the knowledge of many of those who needed them most. No company existed that would 
write a contract for less than $1000. This excluded the vast majority of African 
Americans and even most whites from the market. Despite the convincing rhetoric of 
security and need, main-line insurance remained a luxury item and the majority of sales 
occurred among the social elite. Most policies even included clauses that forbade 
engagement in many kinds of industrial work. A typical policy for a 35 year old man 
read: 
 
The company shall be released from all liability under this policy if the insured shall 
hereafter . . . engage in blasting, mining, or in any business involved in the 
manufacture of handling of inflammable or explosive substances, or be connected 
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with the operation of or service upon steam railroads or sailing or steam vessels, or 
engage in the military or naval service of any kind except the militia when not in 
active service, or be engaged in or connected in any manner with the manufacture or 
sale of ale, beer, wine, or liquor . . . 33 
 
These exclusions notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the urgency and moral 
intimidation with which the companies marketed policies bypassed the notice of the 
working classes, whose need for protection from loss mounted with the insecurities 
brought on by the modern era.  
 
A Society Without a Core 
 In the later decades of the nineteenth century, a series of social and economic 
changes in the United States created a climate of sharply increased risk for a vast number 
of working Americans. In a fast-industrializing nation, relationships of community, 
family, and labor underwent rapid destabilizing changes. The country, as Robert Weibe 
once observed, was a society “without a core,” lacking “those national centers of 
authority and information which might have given order to such swift changes.”34 Over a 
period of barely forty years the nation had experienced the Civil War, the Emancipation 
Proclamation and Reconstruction amendments, and the tumultuous surge of the industrial 
revolution. It also underwent an extraordinary shift of human demographics. Between 
1840 and 1860 the urban population of the United States had doubled, but by 1910 it 
increased almost seven times over.35 For most Americans, the fast-changing, 
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industrializing landscape brought a heady mix of opportunity and vulnerability, a mix 
that would increase the desirability of affordable insurance as risks and uncertainties 
expanded. 
Modern life seemed fraught with hazards that had not troubled earlier generations. 
Crowded conditions and low wages resulted in high rates of illness, and the dangerous 
jobs available in the industrial sector fostered a large and expanding accident rate.36 
“Thousands of wage earners, men, women, and children, [are] caught in the machinery of 
our record breaking production and turned into cripples,” reported one observer. “Other 
thousands are killed outright.”37 One observer estimated that at least 42% of railroad 
workers in the state of Colorado were injured on the job each year. Nationwide, one in 
three hundred was killed annually; among freight brakemen the death rate expanded to 
one in one hundred.38 The accident rate in the United States was twice that of Europe.39  
The United States faced an accident crisis without equal—even in places undergoing 
similar industrial economic growth.   
 Restructuring the urban household around the family wage added another level of 
risk and insecurity to the lives of American workers. Where entire families had once 
worked together to share the tasks of agrarian life, they now looked to the family member 
most able to command a high salary or wage in an industrial economy (usually an adult 
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male), a reliance that placed an enormous financial burden on the one member of the 
household most likely to be injured or killed on the job.40  The urban landscape 
complicated and sometimes even dissolved the family ties and social networks that had 
provided support in small villages and towns. Shut out of life insurance policies by the 
hazards of their trades, wage-earners created alternative structures. They turned to an 
older and less formalized technology for managing risk: cooperative and fraternal aid 
associations.41   
Based on the principles of cooperation and reciprocity, cooperative societies 
worked to meet the social and economic needs of their members, doing so by pooling 
small amounts of money and large quantities of social dedication. Association 
representatives traveled door to door immediately after payday, collecting dues of five or 
ten cents from each member before the money could be devoted to other uses in the 
household economy. It was a system that recognized the hand to mouth existence of 
many industrial wage-earners, for whom low pay and towering expenses made it 
impossible to set aside savings. It also recognized the near-inevitability of at least one 
period of privation in the life cycle of any working family, for whom the nation’s uneven 
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economic development made periods of dependence a normal fact of life.42 While many 
working class individuals would have refused as charity any help from outside of the 
immediate family, assistance from fraternal groups carried an element of reciprocity that 
eliminated stigma and strengthened social ties.43 The protection thus contained a social 
element as well as the promise of economic safety, in that it shielded those in straitened 
circumstances from the humiliation of resorting to charity. 
Between 1870 and 1920, more workers joined such associations than in any 
previous period in American history. The market for fraternal protection increased in size 
thirty times over; between 1880 and 1900, one in three workingmen belonged to a 
fraternal or mutual association.  In 1895, workingmen’s mutuals guaranteed over $6.6 
billion of insurance -- $4 billion more than did the commercial insurers.44 The sheer 
proliferation of such organizations may have been the most impressive feature, since 
many cooperatives maintained tiny memberships and dealt with small financial sums. It 
was a period during which mutual aid organizations served as the leading form of social 
insurance in the United States, a period that some scholars have called “The Golden Age 
of Fraternalism.”45 
Nearly all segments of the working class found such structures desirable, but by 
nature and necessity the real power of fraternals lay in their exclusivity. To prevent the 
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self-interested departure of low-risk individuals from the financial pool, fraternal 
associations found creative ways of fostering a sense of belonging. Often, they appealed 
to the American attraction to rituals. They created rites and taboos; they employed secret 
passwords, handshakes, and initiation ceremonies, and maintained stringent membership 
requirements.46 This attention to patrolling the borders was an especially appealing 
attribute to those who looked to such societies as a social buffer against a hostile new 
environment – and many did.47 One observer on New York City’s lower east side noted 
that his father “loved the ritual of the lodge meetings, the secret passwords, the gold and 
purple sashes and white gloves, the theatrical ceremonies.” House painting, the man’s 
profession, was drab, “but at night life became a wonderful lodge meeting.”48 In the 
dangerous and uncertain urban climate, such gatherings offered security and a sense of 
belonging. 
Focal points for organization seemed to exist in never ending supply; cooperative 
associations developed around ethnicity, religion, neighborhood, gender, trade, and a 
bevy of other commonalities. Once defined, however, associations strictly limited their 
mutual support to those on the inside – of social divisions as much as membership lines.49 
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Native-born organizations excluded immigrants, immigrant groups barred other 
immigrant groups, most societies prohibited women, and almost all excluded blacks. The 
Ancient Order of United Workmen, for instance, often cited as the first American 
workingmen’s cooperative, declared in its constitution that “only white male persons 
should be eligible to membership.” The founders thought the clause important enough 
that they took the care of adding, “This provision shall never be altered, amended, or 
expunged.” An 1891 survey of Connecticut mutuals found that 97% explicitly barred 
blacks from membership.50   
African Americans, quite naturally, supported societies of their own, oftentimes 
exceeding their white counterparts in membership and participation. This was true before 
emancipation and even more so after it. Historian C.A. Spencer notes, “The exigencies of 
hunger and illness and the dread of a pauper’s grave soon produced a proliferation of 
benevolent societies which were dedicated to providing funds and services to sick and old 
members, and to families of deceased members.”51 The necessity for such societies was 
particularly acute for African Americans, so much so that among fraternal circles, blacks 
came to be regarded as “joiners,” as a people more likely to take advantage of the 
available opportunities and benefits of actively participating in society governance.52 A 
survey by the Society of Friends in Philadelphia found that one half of adult blacks in the 
city belonged to mutual benefit societies, often maintaining multiple memberships so as 
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to increase the amount of aid available in case of misfortune.53 In communities steeped in 
hazards and protected with few tangible resources, mutual aid societies provided support 
that was immediate, personal, and materially invaluable, and numerous persons availed 
themselves of it to the greatest possible extent.  
Whether organized for African Americans, immigrants, or native born Americans, 
all societies maintained similar practices with regard to burial, which comprised the 
central feature of most organizations. For those who fared poorly in life, honoring the 
dead constituted an obligation stronger than the threat of bankruptcy. Few shirked it, but 
the results could be financially devastating. To avert disaster, the majority of fraternals 
provided burial benefits to the families of their members. Most benevolent associations 
required attendance at funerary rituals such as Shiva, wakes, and interment; some even 
provided parade dress, which added to ceremonial formality. The need for proper burial 
fueled the existence of fraternal organizations, and ultimately it would even help to bring 
respectability to the socially delicate sale of main-line life insurance policies. 
Desite their popularity, fraternal aid establishments faced formidable financial 
risks which belied their safety and ultimately undermined their attractiveness. Lack of 
business expertise on the part of managers could make aid organizations financially 
vulnerable in the best of times, and periodic economic depressions destroyed many of the 
ones that were competently managed. In addition, fraternals suffered greatly from a 
phenomenon known in insurance circles as “moral hazard,” whereby young and healthy 
individuals can afford to shun mutual aid associations, while the ill and badly-paid seek 
membership in large numbers. The danger of supporting such a lopsided constituency 
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could threaten a mutual aid society with ruin. Some fraternals dealt with bankruptcy by 
ceasing pay-outs until the situation improved; many folded altogether, taking with them 
the contributions of dedicated members, much to the horror of their clientele. A stronger, 
more reliable model was needed for the many thousands of American workingmen whose 
financial lives teetered one injury or episode away from disaster.  
 
Traits 
In some respects, the ideology of life insurance during the late 1900s differed as 
much between the affluent and working class whites as it had between slaves and 
aristocrats at the beginning of the century. Even in their successes, the two remained 
stratified. The non-profit aid organizations of the working class existed to fill modest but 
important demands: proper burial, care, and a modicum of financial safety. They 
responded to basic needs so pressing that where associations did not exist or could not be 
joined, communities created them. The institutions of the wealthy, in contrast, derived 
from the desire of their clients for status and the security of goods. Insurers strengthened 
demand for their product with varied contracts and clever advertising methods. At base, 
the resources and motivations that the two groups brought to the venture were perfect 
opposites. The spirit of group achievement governed the fraternal associations; the spirit 
of the individual achiever dominated the life insurance industry. The solidarity of 
workers allowed them a certain cooperative capital, which they invested in part to steady 
their struggling financial resources. The wealth of the upper classes endowed them with 
strong financial resources, which they invested to safeguard their comforts and their 
social standing. The result was two vastly different systems, and a gap between them that 
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structured the development of the industry in its biggest era. The continuing tensions 
between the poor or “undesirables” and mainline companies persisted even as the 
commercial insurers moved from denigrating the fraternals and their clientele to co-
opting their rhetoric and poaching their policy-holders. Even then, however, African 
Americans remained outside the scope of the “lives” the commercial insurance industry 
accepted as valuable enough to insure.  
The philosophy of life insurance underwent a shift in late nineteenth century, one 
that would eventually make some forms of commercial insurance available to blacks, if 
only for a short time. A changing economy and post-war urbanization helped to move the 
locus of social anxieties from the moral to the financial, and the vision that mainline 
insurers projected of themselves shifted accordingly. This rhetorical shift also helped to 
alter the conception of the “good death,” which life insurers imbued not merely with 
moral significance but with financial importance, as well. Insurance advertisements rarely 
dwelled on the spiritual aspects of loss and death, except insofar as ownership of a policy 
offered the dying himself the peace of mind with which to face death more comfortably. 
Instead they focused on the financial ramifications to the estate. Life insurance fit neatly 
within an increasingly rational, formalized set of practices around death. Professional 
undertakers and the formalization of estate planning trace their roots to the nineteenth 
century. In cities and among the well to do, death took on the contours of a major 
financial episode, and life insurance offered services to contend with it.54 
This worldly and secular approach made convincing claims about the protective 
benefits of insurance, and it also appealed to the ideology of American classlessness, 
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whereby the property of the rich could belong to the poor through hard work and sound 
investment. Less privileged families continued to purchase insurance in the only form it 
was available to them, but the demand for main-line insurance had been seeded in the 
working class, blacks as well as whites. The desire to safeguard earnings in a precarious 
economy, to increase them through sound investment, and to live (and die) in a manner 
that suggested affluence, constituted a major component of working class ambitions. As 
the 20th century approached, the rising middle class would increasingly seek access to the 
benefits of mainline insurance. In the meantime, however, their earnings restricted them 
to the self-insurance plans available through fraternals and mutual aids.   
 Yet these institutions were always innovating. In 1868, an adaptation within one 
of these mutual aid societies made policies of life insurance available to workingmen for 
the first time, albeit in small amounts. The Ancient Order of United Workingmen 
(AOUW), founded in that year, offered privileges that extended beyond burial 
arrangements to the provision of actual insurance. Death benefits consisted of 
approximately $1000, and their availability catapulted the AOUW into popularity.  By 
1902, the group had more than 450,000 members, and hundreds of other organizations 
had added life insurance to their roster of benefits. Hundreds more sprang into existence 
specifically to provide such protection.55  Dollar by dollar, industrial workers contributed 
dues and assessment fees to societies that safeguarded not only their burial but also their 
earnings. 
 The tremendous allure of this market captured attention not just from the wage 
earners who invested in it but also from the commercial insurance firms, to whom it 
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represented both a brilliant innovation and a dangerous form of competition. Half of all 
life insurance in the United States was on the fraternal plan by 1895.56 To the mainline 
companies, the fraternal market segment was coming to represent a fantastic new source 
of revenue, and its popularity among wage earners would not go unchallenged for long.  
 
“The Element of Evolution” 
The industry represented an enthusiastic adherent to the doctrine of “progress” 
and “advancement,” and by the late nineteenth century had come to steer significant 
aspects of their corporate strategies by it. “Whatever has the element of evolution in it 
lives,” celebrated an 1890 editorial in the Insurance Times. “Only so far as the principle 
of insurance is capable of development is it entitled to continued existence.”57 Titans such 
as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie joined in the chorus of support. “The 
growth of large business is merely a survival of the fittest,” reported Rockefeller in a 
Sunday School address. “This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the 
working-out of a law of nature and a law of God.”58  
Ever a man of the moment, Rockefeller’s comments reflected the powerful 
optimism of a strain of late-century scientific thinkers, who believed the workings of the 
natural world were pattern-based and quantifiable, and could be used to model society in 
the same way that they modeled the laws of physics or chemistry.59 By charting the 
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patterns of the natural world, observers believed they could discern a moral and orderly 
rule of life. The possibilities were breathtaking: observed facts would deliver a window 
on all social order; nature’s grand plan could be established through irrefutable laws. The 
hope of such insight had long inspired scientific thinkers. In an 1850 Report of the 
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts, one statistician wrote, “Could we see clearly the 
operation of cause and effect, we should see laws wisely administered in every event that 
takes place in the universe.”60  By the dawn of the gilded age, it seemed that these ideals 
were coming true. Scientific discourse was embracing a quantitative mentality that used 
the precision and objectivity of numbers to turn theory into fact, and guesswork into 
science.   
 Within the American life insurance industry, these ideals were best expressed 
through the use of mortality tables, which had been required by the business since 1868 
and from which commercial firms subsequently derived enormous social authority. By 
charting the average number of deaths per life-year of the population, life tables 
demonstrated the “laws of mortality,” which insurers argued were so fact-based as to 
make the accuracy of company-calculated premiums and benefits irrefutable. Those who 
came to study the mortality tables agreed on the stability of their predictions, and their 
utility in the market. The establishment of laws of mortality placed insurance on a newly 
stable footing. One journalist observed that “life insurance has been a science” that 
                                                                                                                                            
identify – through observation and counting – the lawfulness of the natural environment. In both the United 
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“could not possibly fail… An accurate mortality table, common honesty, and good 
executive judgement – with these as capital no life insurance company could possibly 
collapse.”61 
Studies in political arithmetic published in Europe helped along the shift toward 
life tables by establishing a means of attaching economic worth to the scientifically-
charted life stages of a wage-earner. Touched off by the 1876 writings of British 
statistician William Farr, such writings enabled a socially-acceptable manner of assessing 
the worth of non-slave individuals.62 Subsequent publications in England and Germany 
expanded on the insurable value of individuals. While attempts to evaluate the 
sentimental value of a person had generally proven futile, the costs incurred and wealth 
generated at each point in the human life cycle were in fact quite calculable, and yielded 
a straightforward numerical picture of a nation’s political economy. “There is no novelty 
in the idea of setting a price on a human individual,” remarked Louis Dublin and Alfred 
Lotka, statisticians for the Metropolitan Life in 1930.63 For over half a century, the 
central innovation of the industry that employed them had been the utilization of modern 
political arithmetic to place financial value on the earnings of free labor.  
Insurers rapidly adopted these calculations, using them to bolster a new rhetoric 
of risk that appointed value not to the family patriarch, but to the patriarch’s wages. The 
shift helped to move the onus of insurance from the hallowed to the worldly, vastly 
increasing its acceptability among affluent Americans. To the wealthy, the money value 
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of slave lives would have been a familiar fact of economics, and the financial valuation of 
free (or white) lives would have been correspondingly anathema. Political arithmetic, 
however made clear that while the value of the head of the household was not to be 
interpreted economically, the wages delivered in support of the family could be easily 
quantified. It was they, not he, which insurance guaranteed.    
The use of scientific life-tables conferred bragging rights that extended beyond 
the claim of actuarial certainty; they also offered heretofore unattainable levels of 
efficiency to the business, an aspect that carried great appeal within the increasingly 
bureaucratic mindset of the Progressive era.64 Historian Samuel Haber has noted that the 
years surrounding the turn of the century “gave rise to an efficiency craze – a secular 
great Awakening.” During this period, adherents preached the benefits of efficiency to all 
who would listen, from business professionals, to teachers, and doctors, to workingmen 
and housewives.  Even preachers received the sermons.65 Efficiency in the Progressive 
Era connoted competence and objectivity. Its benefits touched on several realms, 
promising what seemed like direct, bare-bones productivity in each one. As a personal 
attribute, efficiency implied discipline. As a feature of mechanics, it referred to the 
energy input-output ratio of a machine; as a matter of commerce it connoted a similar 
input-out ratio of dollars. As a social feature, efficiency referred to a system of social 
harmony achieved through leadership of the “fit” and the “competent.”66 Like other 
natural laws, it was said that the laws of efficiency could be derived from studied 
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observation. Like those laws, they would be unbiased, their impartiality implying an 
inevitability that resonated with the doctrine of progress.  
The ideology of business that came to ascendancy during the gilded age 
incorporated a doctrine of progress that equated profit with evolution, and which acted as 
one of the key imperatives behind the expansionist policies and cutthroat business 
practices that came to be the hallmark of the industry during the Progressive Era. Notions 
of progress also infused the philosophy by which the companies described and marketed 
their policies. In the rhetoric of the marketplace, the replacement of social contracts with 
business ones represented a new level of civilization; it represented a freedom from the 
transient, unsteady trust relationships of an earlier day due to the creation of more 
rational, secular conventions. The United States Insurance Gazette boasted that the use of 
life contracts, “raises the entire level of society . . . and confers new dignity upon the 
human race.”67 The incorporation of science into life insurance contracts meant that 
rather than representing a source of risk, the market now came to be a buffer from it, a 
source of safety. With the advent of late-century life insurance, security itself could be 
purchased for a simple premium fee.  
The insurance industry in this era displayed many strengths, craftiness above all 
else. Compelling sales appeals made up an important piece of the corporate strategem, 
but beyond them lay a fount of clever, ruthless, cunning that came to characterize all the 
major companies, and which seemed to know no limits. Insurers took the values of 
competitive survival to their logical extreme, challenging anything that seemed to impede 
their access to profit: regulation, their claimants, and especially each other.  
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Many of their acts were brazen, earning them notoriety and the publicity of 
scandal. In the absence of non-forfeiture clauses, for instance, policyholders who failed to 
meet billing deadlines lost the value of their entire policies. Companies were said to take 
advantage of this vulnerability by absorbing the payments of their forgetful clients into 
their already-ample profit margins. One chronicler described: “Members forgot the day of 
payment; and would wake up, a week or so after, and find that the savings of years had 
been swept away.”68 Customer absentmindedness and unpunctuality proved so lucrative 
that insurers encouraged the habit. Policies included rigid payment deadlines – 12 noon at 
a certain date – and refused to tolerate the interference of any exigency, including illness, 
slow mails, or even passengers or crew detained at sea. Some insurers dispatched agents 
to spread vicious gossip smearing their own company’s reputation, frightening 
policyholders into forfeiture. Enormous sums could be recouped from these practices. 
One 1906 muckraker article reported that Mutual Life reaped a fortune during the Civil 
War when southern customers forfeited their policies, and during the 1860s was rumored 
to have paid all its own expenses based on lapses.69 
Devious practices earned the insurance industry an appalling reputation, but failed 
to damage sales. The solvency of the industry (whose larger companies flourished even 
through the depression of the 1870s), the fearsome prospect of finding oneself 
unprotected in an emergency, and the lure of a lucrative investment kept pocketbooks 
open even while their owners cursed the business. Corporate leaders of the late nineteenth 
century insurance field were educated, vocal, and articulate, commanding respect as 
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much through their polished appearance as through their business abilities.70 The political 
and public relations sophistication of the industry’s managerial elite helped to mollify its 
doubters and detractors. By the mid 1870s, the three largest companies – New York Life, 
the Equitable, and Mutual Life – had expanded into a corporate oligopoly which 
dominated sales in the cities of the northeast United States and maintained impressive 
reputations worldwide. Smaller competitors and new ventures would have to carve out 
their own niches in the field. And they did.  
 
An Industrial Model 
In 1875, young businessman John F. Dryden successfully evaded the strangle-
hold of the “big three” by founding a company whose market share consisted of the long-
neglected, vast, and relatively untapped industrial working class. Dryden’s company, the 
Prudential, peddled “Industrial” policies at prices that ordinary workers could readily 
afford. Agents went door to door on payday collecting premiums of between three and 
ten cents for policies worth about $100.71 Such tiny sums did little more than cover the 
cost of burial for the insured, but the threat of injury and death dogged working class life, 
and funerary costs for any member of the family might bankrupt the entire household. 
“Since death is likely to happen to any member of the family,” noted Dryden, “and since 
the burden of funeral expenses would fall equally on the survivors, a small policy of 
insurance on the life of every member is evidently, for this object, a better provision than 
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a large sum upon a single life.”72 Knowing this, Prudential sold policies to all comers: 
women and children as readily as men, white, immigrant, and black, a practice that 
increased commerce substantially. Industrial insurance dealt literally in nickels and 
dimes, but the sheer volume of sales turned a profit for Prudential, and inspired 
companies such as John Hancock and Metropolitan Life to develop industrial branches of 
their own before the year was out.   
Industrial insurance – which combined the small-scale financial model of the 
fraternals with the corporate hierarchy of mainline insurance  -- competed directly with 
the working-class mutual aid societies, but the contest proved one-sided. The polish, 
prestige, and in particular the scientific rhetoric of the commercial companies made them 
enormously attractive to the poorer sector. Moreover, participants of mutual aid societies 
found the logic of family insurance to be familiar and unobjectionable.73 Agents pitched 
many of their solicitations to housewives, whom they believed to be more sentimental 
than men, and whom they often persuaded to take out policies, sight unseen, on every 
member of the family.74 In many wage-earning homes, commercial insurance came to 
coexist with or else to replace the older, less formal forms of fraternal aid. 
To its champions, industrial life insurance was stronger, more bureaucratic, and 
more reliable than mutual aid. It harnessed the late nineteenth-century ideology of  
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A sample industrial policy for the Metropolitan Life.75 
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Company, 1908) 
 58 
progress; it had no element of quaintness. “This is a business done in a business-like 
manner,” stated one supporter. “Each one pays his share and does so because it is for his 
interest to do so.”76 Promoters of industrial insurance appealed strongly to the “scientific” 
foundations of their commercial business. “It is upon the science of mathematics that the 
science of insurance rests,” explained one company statistician, expressing a conviction 
that harmonized well with the practices and outlook of Progressive-era business, and 
allowed Industrial insurers to claim managerial superiority over their non-scientific 
counterparts, mutual aid associations.77 
Happy to lure more customers away from informal aid and into the commercial 
market, industrial companies re-described the manner in which fraternals managed risk in 
such a way as to make fraternal aid appear to be more hazardous than it was protective. 
Playing on the aspirations of the rising middle class, and on the ideology of progress and 
civilization, insurers disparaged fraternal associations as backward, un-businesslike, and 
unsteady – a series of traits that commercial insurers claimed to have conquered through 
their own mathematical and contractual elegance. Industrial insurance personnel alleged 
that fraternals had “small regard for the contract or business nature of its implied 
obligations.” Prudential statistician Frederick Hoffman called the practices of fraternal 
aid associations “weak and inherently false” because they charged all members the same 
premium. “Unless the laws of human mortality, of sickness and finance are properly 
recognized and rigorously applied,” Hoffman asserted, insurance ventures were doomed 
to fail. Anyone familiar with the science of life insurance, he claimed, would agree that 
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fraternal aid was an irresponsible indulgence. 78  In 1898, Haley Fiske, vice-president of 
Metropolitan Life, was even more hostile to the practice, pronouncing fraternal societies 
to be “extravagant, unsafe, unfair, and full of abuses.” Organization meetings, he 
claimed, were characterized “mainly by the amount of beer consumed.”79 
To further convert the industrial clientele to the purchase of commercial policies, 
agents and advertisements spread gossip intended to erode the trust that wage-earners had 
placed in their mutual aid societies. “Countless millions of hard-earned money have been 
sunk in Fraternal Orders or other forms of workingmen’s insurance associations, for 
which neither a fraternal or financial return has ever been made,” they cautioned.80 The 
depression of the 1870s, they pointed out, had destroyed many of the smaller insurers. In 
truth, commercial insurance firms undergoing such trials had failed at comparable rates, 
but the besieged fraternals lacked the marketing machinery with which to broadcast this 
fact in their own defense. Taking aim at their competitors, Industrial personnel 
announced that fraternals had proven financially vulnerable due to lack of business 
expertise, the moral hazard caused by the departure of able-bodied members, and the 
viscitudes of the economy. By focusing on the risks faced by fraternal organizations, 
industrial firms attempted to create an association between fraternal aid and loss itself, 
casting the brotherly aid associations as yet another of the unfortunate hazards faced by 
workingmen in the modern world. 81   
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This was effective. Those members who had experienced the trauma of losing 
years of contributions to bankrupt mutual aid societies proved eager to place their 
earnings into the promise of a more stable venture.82 “The usual appeal to the emotions, 
feelings, instincts, and habits of prospective purchasers,” noted one onlooker, “strikes an 
even more responsive chord in the bosom of a class which desires, above all else, 
security.”83 
Industrial insurance maintained the added competitive advantage of having 
dispensed with the social restrictions of the fraternals, at least at its inception. The drive 
to efficiency required innovation. As part of the tactic to sell policies in volume, 
industrial insurance eliminated the requirement of a medical inspection, an omission that 
saved money by dispensing with doctors’ fees. It also attracted a segment of workingmen 
who had been excluded from cooperative insurance plans due to the health screenings 
conducted by those organizations. The removal of medical exams attracted enough sales 
that it largely recouped losses made from insuring “unhealthy risks.”84  
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The bare-bones structure of industrial insurance thus identified the business as 
among one of the strongest adherents to the efficiency craze. Rejecting social rituals and 
ethnic exclusions, Industrial insurers extracted the single most important prerogative of 
the mutual aid societies (burial costs) for use in a business contract which, modeled on 
those available to the elite, contained only one condition: payment. With the availability 
of insurance reduced to matter of revenue divorced from social standing, industrial 
policies represented the first insurance accessible to both African Americans and whites, 
an equality that lasted for approximately six years, from 1875 to 1881.  
Members of the working class bought into industrial policies in numbers that 
surprised even Dryden. Within less than a year, wage-earners by the thousand had 
purchased policies. Between 1876 and 1880, the amount of industrial insurance in force 
rose from $400,000 to over $19 million.85 A rising middle class of African Americans 
proved especially eager to purchase industrial insurance, a development that directors of 
industrial firms had failed to foresee, but which evidence suggests would have struck 
black mutual aid groups as unsurprising. When fraternal organizations began to offer life 
insurance policies, African Americans bought the protection in unusually high numbers.86 
In contrast to traditional fraternal aid, life contracts held out the potential of higher 
economic returns, and offered a form of security that was simpler and less expensive. To 
fund the pageantry and rituals of social solidarity, brotherly aid associations often 
demanded extra payments in the form of added taxes and fees, a practice for which 
                                                
85 Taylor, The Social Cost of Industrial Insurance, 27. 
 
86 Contemporary surveys indicated a strong correlation between ethnicity and the acquisition of life 
insurance. While between 75 and 85% of most groups purchased policies, black insurance rates were often 
much higher. A 1917 study of black migrant families in Philadelphia indicated that 98% held life policies. 
In Chicago, nine in ten families did so. See Beito, From Mutual Aid to Welfare State, 24-25. 
 
 62 
African American were particularly notorious. One observer noted that members of black 
societies could expect to pay “joining fees, local dues, grand lodge dues, supreme lodge 
dues, endowment assessments, extra assessments now and then, general expense taxes, 
pass-word taxes, educational taxes, building taxes, initiation fees, grand lodge degree 
fees, supreme lodge degree fees, and special fees which conferred "the right to run for 
any supreme lodge office."87 Many of these extra costs were the result of catering to a 
population afflicted with a particularly heavy burden of risk. The billing austerity of a 
commercial policy could be quite seductive when compared to such an assessment 
schedule.  
Yet despite the claims of industrial insurers that their firms could peddle to all 
comers, the solvency of the companies still depended on the exclusion of certain 
individuals. Insurers took pains to avoid selling policies to individuals who seemed 
manifestly more likely to die before enough premiums could be collected to justify the 
cost of doing business. In conformity to their carefully-cultivated insurantial imaginary, 
they also took care to exclude those whose social position presented a threat to the 
political construction of the risk pool; that is, they sought to reject those whose status 
contradicted the ideals and values that the firms sought to symbolize.  
As dedicated apostles to the notions of competition and advancement, insurers 
steered significant aspects of corporate strategy by the ethos of social progress, an 
approach that included powerful adherence to the era’s shifting racial thinking. Firms 
advertised their product as one that would fulfill numerous social goals. It was a moral 
obligation, a scientific innovation, a social responsibility, an economic efficiency; most 
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of all the purchase of a policy could provide a source of uplift for the downtrodden. One 
company officer declared Industrial insurance, “the most beneficial social institution 
which has been developed by the genius of man.”88 But the circle of munificence stopped 
short at inclusion of African Americans. 
At the turn of the century, popular ideas about race rapidly transformed a 
somewhat abstract social Darwinism into a set of eugenic theories intended to more 
directly guide social realities. Numerous turn-of-the-century tracts stipulated minority 
racial groups to be not only inferior but also barriers to progress, a progress which was 
explicitly pecuniary. 89 “Because such traits as thriftiness, intelligence, and the 
willingness and ability to work were all thought to be distributed unequally among the 
races, race became a significant economic variable and came to play an important role in 
many economists’ analyses,” writes economist Mark Aldrich.90 Despite their financial 
capacity to purchase policies, executives within mainline firms felt that the social status 
of African Americans was incompatible with the primary market the Industrial insurers 
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were seeking to attract, and in 1881 Prudential executives took steps to exclude this 
group. 
In accordance with company interests, the actuarial department cast African 
Americans as an unjustifiable actuarial hazard, and established new guidelines intended 
to steer agents away from such clients. The practice of articulating “risk profiles” to 
delineate potentially unprofitable groups was somewhat common among insurance firms, 
though it was unusual to exclude a native-born population solely on the basis of race. 
Most ratings focused instead on habits of life, geographic location, industrial occupations 
deemed particularly dangerous, such as boiler-makers and railroad workers.91 One survey 
recounted, for instance: 
Agents are instructed not to solicit business from persons who occupy 
unhealthful quarters or who live in an unsanitary environment. The prohibition 
extends to persons who are inmates of charitable institutions or who are known 
to be in receipt of public or private relief. Applicants who are poor moral risks, 
such as those of intemperate habits, users of drugs, inmates of houses of ill 
fame, or those engaged in the manufacturer or sale of intoxicating liquors, are 
not to be considered.92  
 
Many of these exclusions contradicted the stated purpose and values of industrial 
insurance itself. By excluding those who worked at injurious occupations, for instance, 
so-called workingmen’s insurance disqualified an extraordinary number of actual 
workingmen. The exclusion of so many categories of people doubtless caused the 
rejection of numerous souls whose long lives and material prosperity would have 
enriched a life insurance company, but the exigencies of efficiency minimized the 
importance of such contradictions for insurers such as the Prudential. Risk profiles 
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compressed the salient information about a potential applicant into the single criterion of 
“risk.” Six years after the launch of industrial insurance, African Americans found 
themselves excluded from commercial insurance because, as the Prudential would later 
argue, their status as “poor moral risks” made them actuarial hazards too dangerous to 
insure. African Americans, the company would claim, not only displayed “intemperate 
habits;” their very racial make-up ensured biological degeneration. The group would soon 
fall prey to the apotheosis of biological risk: extinction. 
 
A Policy of Uplift? 
In 1881, the Prudential had announced its plan to reduce life benefits to African 
Americans by a third, though black policyholders would continue to pay the same 
premiums as whites. A memo from John F. Dryden cast the decision as purely economic 
and scientific. “Under adult policies the sum assured will be one-third less than now 
granted for the same weekly premium … these changes are made in consequence of the 
excessive mortality prevailing in the class above named; they do not apply to other 
persons.”93 Citing elevated mortality rates among blacks, company officials insisted that 
its decision was “equitable” and based “solely on the basis of facts.”  The high cost of 
doing business with blacks, they claimed, damaged finances so badly that it threatened to 
drive up the cost of premiums for whites. Although the inequity played out on the basis 
of race, spokesmen insisted that it was the inherent (if unfortunate) inferiority of blacks 
that caused their elevated mortality, a quality beyond the control of either Prudential or 
African Americans. “The color line is not drawn simply because the applicants are 
                                                




Negroes – the world is too progressive for that,” assured the medical director of the 
Prudential. By that very rationale, to deny the company the right to acknowledge and plan 
for the constitutional defects of African Americans was itself a grave injustice. Editorials 
in the insurance press vigorously defended the company’s position. “Fire insurance 
companies are not prohibited from charging higher premiums on frame than brick or 
stone-built properties,” asserted the Indicator, a popular insurance periodical, “and yet 
they are in just the same position as life assurance companies.”94 By the end of the year, 
Mutual Life followed Prudential’s example and also reduced benefits to black policy-
holders.95  
African American policyholders responded vigorously to the companies’ 
discrimination. Many dropped their coverage; others demanded that companies reduce 
the premiums by a third, commensurate with the reduction in benefits. Few seemed 
willing to accept that exclusion was a scientific mandate, as the company claimed, and 
several prominent voices demanded that the firm at least be forthright about the nature of 
its discrimination. The Prudential “is not anxious for the colored patronage,” observed the 
editor of a black newspaper in Philadelphia. “If so, they should come out and say, or else 
in justice to the large number of faithful applicants of color, reduce the amount of weekly 
dues.”96  
In an attempt to have the decision reversed, African Americans with political ties 
in New Jersey lobbied their allies in public office, a tactic that had met with success when 
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used previously in other states.97 In 1884, the Massachusetts legislature had passed an 
anti-discrimination law forbidding the custom of providing fewer benefits for the same 
premiums between black individuals and white. Connecticut passed a similar law in 
1887, as did Ohio in 1889, and New York in 1892. In New Jersey, Prudential’s home 
state, African American interest groups pushed aggressively for the passage of anti-
discrimination laws, and by 1893, the state legislature had debated such bills nearly every 
year for a decade. A measure finally passed in the spring of that year, only to face the 
veto of Democratic Governor George Werts.98 In his veto message, the governor stated 
that the open market had ample capacity to solve any ratings inequalities that might exist. 
“If there be companies that do discriminate, the competition of the others will soon 
compel an equalization of rates, unless such discriminations be founded upon substantial 
grounds,” he remarked.99 The market, presumably, could be relied upon to be more 
objective and therefore more fair than the New Jersey Senate.  
Residents of New Jersey felt differently. “The veto is a direct insult to every 
colored person in the State of New Jersey,” stated a letter to the New York Times.100 
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Partisan politics and a series of scandals further diminish the governor’s power and 
credibility.  Within a year the statute arrived on the floor again, this time to be passed 
over the governor’s veto on May 3, 1894.101  
Prudential responded to the law with the barest form of capitulation. To avoid 
illegal discrimination in rates, it called for the cessation of all sales to African Americans. 
“In the states where such legislation is enacted… its agents are forbidden to canvass for 
such applications, and no commissions whatever are to be paid on premiums collected 
from colored persons,” wrote company vice president Leslie Ward to the Indicator. 
Confident and defiant, he continued to justify the company’s decision on the basis of 
science and statistics. “[W]e are quite sure that mortality, even amongst the best of 
colored lives, would not compare favorably with the mortality amongst whites.”102 To 
make the point substantially clear, the company took Governor Werts’ suggestion and 
enlisted the services of Frederick L. Hoffman to demonstrate the “substantial grounds” on 
which their discrimination policy was based.   
 
The Sway of a Document 
“In the plain language of the facts brought together the colored race is shown to 
be on the downward grade, tending toward a condition in which matters will be worse 
than they are now, when diseases will be more destructive, vital resistance still lower, 
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when the number of births will fall below the deaths, and gradual extinction of the race 
take place,” pronounced Hoffman in his statistical opus.103 Presenting demographic 
figures, morbidity and mortality tables, miscegenation rates, and incarceration, trends he 
“proved” it to be true. 104   
 “Only by means of a thorough analysis of all the data that make up the history of 
the colored race in this country can the true nature of the so-called ‘Negro problem’ be 
understood,” Hoffman pronounced. In his tract, Hoffman considered the struggling 
economics and poor health of African Americans and located their causes in the racial 
make-up of the group. He declared blacks to be inherently “degraded” and “lazy,” and 
insisted that the race possessed an innate racial inferiority that had brought about “a 
moral deterioration such as is rarely met with in civilized countries at the present time.” 
105 As a result, claimed Hoffman, the group was dying out. Yet Hoffman’s work would 
prove to be neither as “fact-based” nor “neutral” as its author had hoped. 
Readers greeted Race Traits as a statistical opus, but Hoffman’s descriptions of 
racial dissipation were often so speculative that they omitted any reference to numerical 
evidence at all.  Reiterating salacious and unsubstantiated rumors about African 
American sexuality, Hoffman described orgiastic bonfires that he supposed were 
conducted on Louisiana plantations late at night. To explain this supposition, he raised 
the “well known” specter of black rape against white women, a type of sexual 
misconduct that he believed illustrated the race’s lack of sexual control. “There is 
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something strangely alluring and seductive to the Negro in the appearance of a white 
woman,” he explained luridly; “they are roused and stimulated by its foreignness to their 
experience of sexual pleasures, and it moves them to gratify their lust at any cost and in 
spite of any obstacle.”106 Buried within a document that had been vetted as a model of 
statistical objectivity, such comments failed to provoke comment or critique. They 
instead became accepted features of the argument that the social and economic status of 
African Americans was irremediable.  
In the pages of Race Traits, Hoffman appealed to almost every racist ideology 
popular in the late 1890’s, from the celebration of natural Aryan supremacy (not just over 
blacks, but all races in the world), to the belief that slavery had indeed been a protective 
institution, without which blacks were deteriorating, body and soul.  “Hoffman’s 
invective against American blacks was nothing new,” remarks historian Beatrix Hoffman 
(no relation), “but Race Traits received a particularly warm welcome because his use of 
statistics brought racist ‘science’ onto a modern, supposedly quantifiable plane.”107  
Hoffman’s infusion of alleged statistical analysis and scientific objectivity into the debate 
imbued the extinction theory with a new and potent authority. By leaning heavily on 
numerical data, Hoffman located his argument in the realm of science, contributing a 
supposedly objective voice to a debate that had been composed largely of philosophic 
and eugenic speculation. Race Traits was the first book-length treatment and the first 
“scientific” analysis of its subject, and almost immediately became a central element of 
the era’s racial debate. 
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The particular ideology of race dominant in Hoffman’s work – in which 
superiority and  inferiority became embedded in concepts of racial difference – had its 
roots in the 1830s in the hands of representatives of cotton and plantation interests. In 
rebuttal to the charges of immorality rendered by abolitionists, slaveholders asserted that 
slavery was not a sin because servitude was a necessary stage of human progress – an 
especially important stage for blacks, who they claimed had acquired poor and indolent 
habits through years of servitude. By this rationale, they asserted, slavery was a positive 
good for a race not yet ready for freedom.  
The theory rested on a logical slippage between acquired traits and hereditary 
ones. It presumed that African Americans had acquired what supremacists referred to as 
slothful habits through long-time exposure to slavery, and as a result were in no way 
prepared to face the challenges of freedom. Slavery must continue in deference to the 
indolent properties of the slaves themselves. Historian George Frederickson summarizes: 
“It was thus in tandem with the concept of slavery as ‘a positive good’ that the doctrine 
of permanent black inferiority began its career as a rationale, first for slavery itself and 
later for post-emancipation forms of racial oppression.”108  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, concepts of black inferiority had drifted far from their original economic and 
social moorings, and had become accepted by white supremacists as defining attributes of 
African Americans themselves.  
The social science theories that gained ascendancy in the latter half of the century 
served as the final medium through which superiority and inferiority became embedded 
in concepts of racial difference. Scientific certainty, suggests Frederickson, provided the 
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final shift. “For its full growth intellectual and ideological racism required a body of 
‘scientific’ and cultural thought which would give credence to the notion that the blacks 
were, for unalterable reasons of race, morally and intellectually inferior to whites…”109 
Social Darwinist versions of evolutionary theory, and articles by scientists such as 
Francis Galton (who coined the term “eugenics” in 1883) provided this body of thought. 
The impulse to quantify, classify, and theorize a newly scientific social order asserted 
itself powerfully in the late nineteenth century. “’Insights’ into … racial character, 
personality traits, behavior, intelligence, language, and a host of other related categories 
were transmitted into subsequent attempts at a science of classification and became more 
fixed than the races themselves,” observes historian John S. Haller.110 Regardless of 
whether or how fixed race was found to be, attempts to classify it produced a force with 
more substantial and seemingly real effects than race itself: scientific, contemporary 
racism.  
Hoffman appealed to this movement toward numbers and science, repeatedly 
challenging his readers to scrutinize his data. “By making exclusive use of the statistical 
method and giving in every instance a concise tabular statement of facts, I believe that I 
have made it entirely possible for my readers to arrive at their own conclusions, 
irrespective of the deductions I have made,” stated Hoffman at the beginning of the 
document.111 Three hundred and forty pages later, having provided dozens of tables and 
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literally a ream of interpretation, he concluded, “From the standpoint of the impartial 
investigator, no difference of interpretation of their meaning seems possible.” 
Hoffman stated his determination to devote “scientific attention to the relationship 
between the superior and inferior races,” but the race question that he pursued was 
packed with meaning before he penned a single line. 112 “Under this vague and general 
designation are gathered many social problems and many phases of the same problem,” 
remarked W.E.B. Du Bois in 1911.113  Perhaps the race debate’s most unifying feature 
was that it addressed what Du Bois later called “the question of the future status of ten 
million Americans of Negro descent.”114 Late-century writers interchangeably used the 
terms “Negro question” and “Negro problem,” each of which indicated a slightly 
different set of preoccupations. When framed as a question, the discussion turned on the 
vitality of the Negro: whether the race was increasing or decreasing, and why. When 
framed as a problem, concern hinged on the implications of the basic fact the “ten million 
Negroes” lived inside the United States.115  
Hoffman concluded that “the central fact deducible from the results of this 
investigation into the traits and tendencies of the colored population of this country, is 
plainly and emphatically the powerful influence of race in the struggle for life.” For him 
(as for many authors) the race question collapsed into a simple tautology: Negroes died 
because they were inferior, and they were inferior because they died. “It is not in the 
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conditions of life, but in the race traits and tendencies that we find the causes of excessive 
mortality,” resolved Hoffman, a statement which represented both the central tenet of his 
text and, to those who have criticized it, the piece’s most glaring logical fallacy. 116  
But these concerns -- vitality versus sheer physical existence -- were not mutually 
exclusive. As Du Bois pointed out, the debate could encompass many phases of the same 
problem, and concern with the presence of African Americans often overlapped with 
pessimism about or fear of the group’s vitality, a subject which for many served as a 
marker for what amount, and what kind, of resources would have to be expended on this 
part of the U.S. population. 
To many minds, therefore, the Negro problem was an economic one.  Racial 
progress, while biologically-based, was also explicitly pecuniary. Adherents to such 
ideology shuddered to think of an entire race of people, inferior and dependent on whites 
for moral and material uplift, cast adrift and unprepared by the sudden “burden” of 
emancipation. Such thinkers looked at the squalid conditions in which many freedmen 
lived, at the evidence of poor health and high mortality, and at the lowly position of 
African Americans in the workforce, and concluded that the group constituted an 
enormous economic liability.  
Fretting over the “annual cost of the Negro problem,” Hoffman, too, found the 
race to be a hindrance to economic progress, and a threat to its own and even the white 
population’s future. Bitterly, he opined that the heritage that African Americans left to 
their offspring was “the poison of scrofula, tuberculosis and most of all syphilis.” 
Miscegenation, he claimed, made the young all the more vulnerable by diminishing their 
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vital capacity and reducing their social and economic efficiency. Invoking the tenets of 
social Darwinism, Hoffman described a race that cared little for uplift, spurned economic 
opportunity, and on whom education, philanthropy, and religion had no effect. Industrial 
insurance had no function for African Americans, whom Hoffman and a chorus of like-
minded individuals saw to be beyond deliverance. 
 
Dissent 
W.E.B. Du Bois let his pen fly after reading Race Traits and Tendencies of the 
American Negro. Hoffman’s method, he fumed, “is after all nothing but the application of 
logic to counting, and no amount of counting will justify a departure from the severe 
rules of correct reasoning,” chastised Du Bois. 117 Scholar Kelly Miller was equally 
scathing. In an 1897 occasional paper to the United Negro Academy he scoffed that it 
was “passing strange that it escaped the attention of a statistician of Mr. Hoffman’s 
sagacity that, even granting the accuracy of the eleventh census, the natural increase of 
the Negro race was greater than that of the whites during the last decade.” Miller pointed 
out the numerous flaws in logic, data, and interpretation, crowned by the spurious claim 
that the group’s social and economic condition reflected heritable traits. “The Jews in 
Egypt labored under circumstances remarkably similar to those of the American Negro,” 
he observed. “Luckily for the Hebrews, there were no statisticians in those days.” 118 
 Both critics attacked the very concept that a “race trait” could have the power to 
affect the fate of an entire population. Even in the very unlikely case that so-called racial 
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degradation truly had caused the problems which African Americans faced, and even if it 
were possible to inherit indolent habits and an immoral demeanor, such degeneration 
could not have happened within the time frame that Hoffman proposed. “It would seem 
incumbent on [Hoffman] further to prove that these race traits after being held in 
abeyance for at least a century, first took decisive action in the decade 1880 to 1890,” Du 
Bois wrote dryly.119 “The capriciousness of this new factor,” echoed Miller, “in that it 
may suspend operation indefinitely or break loose in a day, does not seem to have 
occurred to the author . . .” 120 In rejecting Hoffman’s declarations of racial inferiority, 
Du Bois and Miller saw greater consistency and merit in an historical, anti-reductionist 
approach to African Americans’ social problems, an approach which gave weight to the 
effects of poverty and hundreds of years of enslavement. 
Miller and Du Bois leveled serious critiques at what they saw as Hoffman’s 
mishandling and misapplication of data, which extended to the fraught and unreliable 
sources from which he selected his figures. The very foundations of the work were 
unsteady; Du Bois noted significant flaws in the majority of Hoffman’s main statistical 
sources. Miller, a talented mathematician and professor at Howard University, surmised 
that the use of such data was a convenience for an author who had already selected the 
outcome of his investigation. “Mr. Hoffman having on hand a theory, was spared the 
pains of inquiring further into the causes which led to this deplorable state of things.”121 
To Miller, Hoffman’s analysis was very much “shaped to a theory,” and he found the 
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actuary’s a priori conclusions apparent everywhere: in the footnotes, the selected 
quotations, the “general drift,” and “between the lines.” 
Modern critics have been similarly exasperated with Hoffman’s text. In her 
exhaustive review, social theorist Susan Mizruchi summarizes Race Traits as “an 
eccentric blend of social psychology, liberal philosophy, reformism, statistical analysis, 
ethnographic description, and racist dogma.”122 In spite or perhaps because of these 
features, Race Traits is arguably, as Frederickson remarked, “the most influential 
discussion of the race question to appear in the late 19th century.” 
Perhaps it is ironic that the one entity on which Race Traits appears to have had 
no effect at all was insurance law. Though much reviled by insurers, the 
antidiscrimination laws of the 1880s and 90s never again came up for legal review. 
Companies instead instituted the much more efficient measure of refusing sales to 
African Americans outright. Prudential fined agents who wrote policies on black lives. In 
1907 Metropolitan Life published a special mortality table for black policyholders, but 
made explicit to its sales force that agents would receive no commission for writing such 
contracts. Officially, insurers continued to base the discrimination on the notion of 
empirically elevated risk. It would be unfair, they insisted, to subject the low-risk white 
lives to the high-risk influence of black policyholders. Such a contamination of the risk 
pool would be socially – and financially – irresponsible.123   
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Brian Glenn points out that insurance policies rely on a series of narratives about 
risk and responsibility, which can be used to open tremendous opportunities for 
entrepreneurial insurers. They do so by claiming mastery of the most credible (and 
therefore powerful) paradigm of social thought: science. “The myth of the actuary,” 
writes Glenn, “is the idea that there is a reality in the world that can be captured by 
rational choice models and statistical analysis – and that insurance companies do this 
ethically, objectively, and ‘correctly.’”124  
The Prudential statistician’s attempt to justify the exclusion African Americans 
from life insurance represents a revealing moment in the creation of a risk narrative. The 
Prudential and other insurers singled out blacks for rejection not because of their elevated 
mortality – they accepted and even solicited other groups with similar statistical profiles 
– but because the maintenance and expansion of their market share depended on their 
ability to manipulate the discourse of the product that they packaged and sold: risk. The 
profile, therefore, that Hoffman constructed to describe the prospects of African 
Americans was infused with the debates and challenges of the political moment: those 
regarding progress, degeneracy, and competition, as well as the moral worth and social 
standing of several portions of the body politic. Hoffman’s category responded to them, 
and it also embedded them into future action.  
Figures such as Hoffman serve to scientize Ewald’s “insurantial imaginary.” By 
demonstrating that inclusion of an “inferior” race gave the company an inferior 
competitive edge, the article reflected a confluence of the social and scientific influences 
of the late nineteenth century. In a very real sense, Hoffman stood at the collision point of 
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several Progressive-era discourses. His opus drew together racial ideology, statistical 
science, progress, efficiency, profit, and risk. 
To consider Hoffman’s tract in the context of Progressive Era social concerns is 
to make clear that the risk perception surrounding African Americans had little to do with 
morbidity outcomes; it had much to do with social ideologies and the position of African 
Americans in American society. “Some people are more affected than others by the 
distribution and growth of risks, that is, how social risk positions spring up,” notes Ulrich 
Beck. “In some of their dimensions these follow the inequalities of class and strata 
positions.”125 Described through the contemptuous lens of white supremacy, relegated to 
the lowest rungs of the economic ladder, and condemned as barriers to racial and 
economic progress, African Americans were flatly profiled as socially unacceptable long 
before Hoffman set pen to paper.  
Because the offerings of insurance are derived from social beliefs, what is 
covered by a policy is highly contingent on what the public expects and will accept or 
demand.126 Players in the insurance industry went to great lengths to robe both 
themselves and their product in a mantle of trust, wealth, grandeur, idealism, and uplift. 
Associations incommensurate with the life insurance image -- such as greed, poverty, and 
recklessness -- had to be expunged. The myth-making of life insurance was the most 
powerful and lucrative aspect of the business, and it was therefore crucial that messages 
surrounding the practice synchronize with the social imaginary, changing as quickly as 
social anxieties changed, and reflecting the smallest nuance in perceived risks. The 
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emergence of industrial life insurance was predicated on a changing narrative of risk in 
the United States, one that casts light on the treatment of African Americans at the hands 
of Prudential, and further light on the origins of “risk profiles” as they are understood 
today. As industrial firms continued to compete for economic primacy and expanded 
market share across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ideological rhetoric they 
deployed closely reflected – and often anticipated – the changing discourse of risk in the 
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CHAPTER 2: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND AUDACITY 
In 1868, insurance company president Henry Hyde infuriated the directors of his own 
firm by breaking ground for a building that cost $4 million – 80% of the Equitable’s worth, and 
an expense that was surely inappropriate to the company’s image as a conservative financial 
trustee. Newspapers called the building at 120 Broadway “Hyde’s Folly,” but Hyde preferred to 
think of his endeavor as “building buildings for glory,” a glory which the edifice certainly 
attained when it was completed in 1870. At seven stories and 142 feet, the new headquarters rose 
to twice the height of most commercial buildings.  Its iron cage construction and lightweight 
fireproof materials placed it among the newest wonders of the modern world. From the time that 
it opened, visitors queued to ride the $29,657 gilded elevators (the first elevators ever to be 
installed in an office building) to its famous roof.1 Eye-catching and noteworthy, the Equitable 
headquarters proved to be a triumph in public relations, and its audacity served as the template 
for other insurance firms which followed suit, advertising their fabulous wealth and growing 
prestige with similarly palatial structures.2 The Equitable, which by 1865 was writing over $13 
million in new policies each year, was a forerunner of corporate grandiosity, but its bravado – 
and profit margin - was soon matched by that of other companies. For the industry at large, 
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soaring edifices came to serve as symbols of manifest destiny.3 The firms were no longer simply 
moral guardians; they were emblems of the financial growth of the American gilded age.   
The substantial growth, however, exposed deep-seated ideological problems in the 
foundation of the insurance model. By presenting themselves as semi-public institutions, insurers 
had adopted a delicate identity as a business that was in but not of the market. Its financial 
successes were therefore incriminating, and left members of the industry with the conundrum of 
how to manage their extensive power without appearing to transgress their roles as sober and 
cautious trustees. Though they advertised themselves as bastions of security and social benefit, 
the tremendous funds stewarded by the firms made them in fact the largest aggregators of wealth 
in the United States, and as such they were deeply integrated in the nation’s economic structure. 
Numerous companies partnered with banks to raise and apply capital needed for the growth of 
American industry, often serving as the leaders or chief financial backers behind major projects 
such as building factories and funding railroads.  All told, the investment function of the large 
insurers easily dwarfed that of insurance contracts, in profitability as well as sheer scale. 
Most company executives took care not to broadcast these financial involvements to the 
wider public, lest the contradiction between market involvement and moral trusteeship become 
hazardous to the industry’s public image.4 Insurance presidents handled corporate profits with 
considerable discretion. Rather than disbursing cash dividends among their stockholders, 
companies quietly ploughed the majority of their earnings back into the market, widening their 
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investment portfolios and increasing their financial supremacy without creating the public 
appearance of greed. In effect, nineteenth century insurers avoided the stigma of profit-making 
by seeking economic growth rather than financial returns. The excesses of the gilded age, 
however, ushered in a new ethos of corporate expansion. Already key players in the nation’s 
economy, insurers’ role in investment finance swelled, and the rapaciousness with which they 
pursued economic growth attracted the attention – and increasingly the ire – of the buying public. 
Unscrupulous acts committed by insurance agents, the financial bravado of executives, and a 
swirl of rumors about company stinginess toward the insured undermined the promises of the 
firms’ founding charters, and often the promises of their living personnel. Company brass found 
themselves faced with a dual problem: how to reconcile the contradictions of the business model 
and at the same time promote sales that would keep up with the atmosphere of headlong growth? 
This chapter will examine the ways in which the life insurance industry addressed the 
conundrum, expanding sales while also managing the serious internal contradictions caused by 
the corporate devotion to laissez-faire. Their burgeoning financial power exposed incongruities 
that would come to dominate the public concerns and eventually the business model of the life 
insurance industry for the next several decades, including the way that the firms described and 
packaged their key product: risk. To protect themselves from public censure, and to widen the 
market for life insurance, firms altered their construction of risk to better manage moral 
contradictions and to meet changing financial expectations of the buying public. They gradually 
shifted the marketing focus from that of moral guardianship to the use of insurance as an 
investment strategy. It was a strategy that enabled them to manage their burden of contradictions 
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without losing sales appeal, by transforming the image of their product into one that was once 
again valued and socially desired.  
As technologies designed for managing risk, not all insurance technologies serve their 
purchasers the same way. Some deploy an ideology of risk that is protective, others advertise one 
that is productive. Early nineteenth century insurance companies presented a concept of hazard 
that connoted a potential for injury, for a loss instead of a gain.5  This pessimistic and defensive 
concept of risk was socially pervasive at that time, and proved enormously lucrative for insurers 
who emphasized the hazards of the unknown. As sociologist Ulrich Beck has noted, when an 
individual becomes focused on risk, “one is no longer concerned with attaining something 'good,' 
but rather with preventing the worst; self-limitation is the goal which emerges.”6 Thus, purveyors 
of insurance presented policies as a buffer -- from the increased personal responsibilities of urban 
living, and from the hazards posed by accidents, and from the financial ruin of disease. They 
deployed an interpretation of risk that emphasized the potential for mischance or peril, and their 
policies were strictly protective.  
In the heady market of the late nineteenth century, however, several firms turned to a 
concept of risk that harmonized better with the true concerns of the firms. This re-casting of risk 
was an attempt to resolve the contradiction between the firms’ self-presentation of moral 
guardianship and their reality as financial institutions. Distancing themselves from the language 
                                                       
5 For recent writings on conceptualizations of risk within the insurance industry, see Dalit Baraboff. Shaped by Risk: 
The American Fire Insurance Industry, 1790-1920. Doctoral Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, Oct. 2003; and 
Klasien Horstman, Public Bodies, Private Lives: The historical construction of Life Insurance, Health Risks, and 
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of moral responsibility, life insurance companies began to advertise policies as entrepreneurial 
ventures, as opportunities to invest. 7 Contracts that had once minimized the potential for loss 
now maximized the potential for gain. By purchasing a policy, advertisements claimed, 
customers could receive regular dividends and become shareholders in a broad financial empire. 
Firms promised as well that investment in life insurance would be more lucrative and stable than 
accounts with savings banks. Moreover, they would be more productive for the nation at large, a 
feature that transformed not only the investment but also the investor, who became a wise and 
cautious individual with a patriotic stake in the growth of the nation. The gains to be had from 
life insurance were thus both moral and financial, both public and private. “We include business, 
not for private gain, not to heap up great individual fortunes, but for the general good, for the 
welfare of millions,” pledged Darwin Kingsley, the loquacious president of New York Life; 
“and, in this, our incentive is as keen as that which drives men to accumulate millions for 
themselves.”8 Such promises vastly enlarged the demand for insurance, bringing the industry 
millions of dollars of newfound revenue.  
The shift captured the financial spirit of the moment, but it also pushed the firms into a 
pattern of financial over-reaching. With the bravado supplied by millions of dollars of new 
contracts, company directors strained for ever-higher levels of economic growth, a goal that 
                                                       
7 This was a notion of risk that drew upon the speculative aspects of uncertainty, generally popular in gambling. 
Economist Frank H. Knight drew a now-famous distinction in 1921 between risk and uncertainty, noting that risk 
refers to situations in which mathematical probabilities can be assigned to the randomness one is faced with; 
uncertainty, by contrast, applies to situations in which it is impossible to apply mathematical probabilities. The link 
between risk and probability implies chance; it imputes a reasonable expectation that an event will occur, and the 
opportunity for gain. See Frank L. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (New York: Century Press, 1964, 1921). 
 
8 “Life Insurance and the American Business Man,” Eighth annual dinner of the $200,000 club, NY Life Insurance 
Co., West Baden, Indiana. 21 Sept.,1904 in Darwin P. Kingsley, Militant Life Insurance and Other Addresses, (New 
York: New York Life Insurance Company, 1911), 42. 
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stretched the credibility of the charter of aid and protection on which the companies had been 
founded. President Winston of the Mutual Life recognized the delicate balance of corporate 
objectives when he declared, “In the future, the struggle will be between conservatism and 
audacity.”9 Not surprisingly, audacity took the lead. The continued financial bluster further 
exposed the incongruities and contradictions in the industry’s moral identity, and eventually 
came to threaten the very legitimacy of the firms. 
This chapter will chronicle some of those changes, the problems they presented, and the 
larger issues they foreshadowed as Americans reached new conclusions about the best ways to 
promote efficiency and fairness in the sharing of risk. If the fissures in companies’ moral 
identities were destructive for the image of mainline insurers, they were even more perilous for 
the industrial branch, which advertised itself not only as a guardian of widows and orphans but 
as a steward and benefactor of the working poor. This mission contrasted uncomfortably with the 
race for corporate glory, and highlighted the contradictions between the wealth of the companies 
and the poverty of their clients. When social workers challenged the companies, insurers found 
themselves faced with not only formidable opponents but also a formidable set of wider threats. 
In 1895, a series of hearings in the Massachusetts legislature brought the fears of 
industrial insurers to a point of crises. The proceedings challenged the practice of child 
insurance, which reformers claimed incited caregivers to murder, but they served in many ways 
as a forum for a wider discussion of the shortcomings of private insurance, a discussion that 
opened the way for an alternative that insurance personnel viewed as a profound threat: state-
sponsored social insurance.  
                                                       
9 Kingsley, “Life Insurance and the American Business Man,” 1904.  
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Of all the proposals to reach legislative ears, state sponsored insurance represented the 
greatest menace to the industrial insurance industry. A government-controlled system would 
contain none of the contradictions that so threatened the commercial firms’ moral identity. It 
would incur lower administrative costs, affording lower premiums for similar or improved 
benefits. Alone among reform propositions, it had the power to threaten the financial supremacy 
of the business.  The passage of social insurance bills Germany in 1884 had already provided a 
distressing model, which American industrial insurers were anxious to invalidate, yet rumblings 
of approval for state insurance reverberated among American social reformers during the 1890s. 
To social reformers, public insurance represented an ideal solution to the long-standing problem 
of low-cost insurance; to private insurers it represented the possible destruction of the insurance 
system on which a financial empire was based.  
Confronted by incriminating and widely-publicized testimony about their conduct toward 
the poor, and faced with the increasing potential for state action, the life insurance firms needed 
more than ever to reconcile the contradictions between their eleemosynary charter and their 
competitive reality. The crisis of legitimacy that the industrials faced as a result of their own 
internal contradictions served as a harbinger for the troubles – and changes – to come as they 
struggled to market a notion of risk that would be both socially palatable and commensurate with 
their expansive practices. 
 
The Racers 
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 To writer Mark Twain, who coined the term “gilded age” as the title of an 1873 novel, 
the period after the American Civil War was one of ostentatious display, an era defined by the 
graft, materialism, and corruption that seemed to him endemic in public life.  On their own 
merits, as well as by Twain’s personal estimation (he sold policies for the Hartford Insurance 
Company), the presidents of the major American life insurance firms were the quintessence of 
the age.  To drive the growth of their firms, leading executives engaged in rivalries, 
manipulations, and exploitations. Energetic in their goals and rapacious in their business 
practices, they were individuals who saw financial returns without limits for any executive bold 
and committed enough in his pursuits. “Aggressive, self-confident, filled with a desire for large 
and momentous achievement, they were the conflux of forces that turned their enterprises into 
massive corporations; they were the necessary agents of the firms’ maturation into a society of 
companies at the century’s end,” describes historian Morton Keller.10 It was not just money but 
power, pride, and daring that attracted many of them to the field. They were, in short, the 
embodiment of the corporate spirit of the time, and with the moneyed coffers of the insurance 
industry at their disposal, they committed acts that so drastically contrasted with the original 
ethos of insurance as to defy all sense of ethics. Moreover, the more firmly the firms identified as 
financial institutions instead of moral ones, the more license the executives seemed to take to 
devote their attentions to the competitive market. It was a pattern that placed a tremendous crack 
in the foundation of the business, and did so in the most public of possible ways.  
Yet moral impeachability remained the banner under which companies marched. “In all 
things its methods and conduct must surpass all the wives of all the Caesars – in being beyond 
                                                       
10 Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 16. 
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suspicion,” remarked John Hegeman of the Metropolitan Life in 1882. Most company presidents 
agreed with this statement rhetorically, but their behavior reflected other ideals. Though officers 
filled their letters and speeches with proclamations about the virtues of the business and their 
own moral worth, many of their acts were brazen flirtations with the boundaries of legality and 
business ethics, earning them notoriety and the publicity of scandal. By the early 1870s, the 
reality of the industry was one in which the moral identity it promoted was becoming 
outmatched by the ethos of the business world. 
Perhaps the most audacious of all the life insurance presidents during this period was 
Henry Hazen Hyde, who is widely recognized as having set the tone of impudence and bluster 
that guided the industry’s development across the late nineteenth century. One turn of the 
century magazine eulogized him as the creator of the methods and character of modern life 
insurance, adding facetiously that he was “as honest and sincere as P. T. Barnum”11 In 1859, 
Hyde launched one of the fastest-growing insurance corporations of the century on the strength 
of a scandal that lifted him into the gossip channels of the New York elite. Dismissed from the 
Mutual Life for attempting to start a rival business, Hyde rented a back room on the second floor 
of the Mutual building and unfurled a garish banner lettered “The Equitable Life Assurance 
Society” directly above his former employer’s sign. Hyde was twenty five years old, but within 
two decades his company grew to be the most relentless competitor ever to afflict the Mutual 
                                                       
11 World’s Work is quoted in Andy Logan, “Building for Glory,” 148. 
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Life. He remarked about the rivalry: “It was a matter of sentiment to me to have my office 
directly over that of Mutual Life.”12  
Such bravado made for memorable press. Newspapers referred to the three largest 
insurance companies as “the racers” and followed their activities with enthusiasm, as much for 
the drama as for their financial impact. The presidents of the “Big Three,” Frederick Winston of 
the Mutual Life, William Beers of the New York Life, and Henry Hyde of the Equitable,  
maintained the attitude that luxury, not parsimony, should define the industry’s public image, 
and they competed with each other for displays of prosperity that would best advertise their 
financial worth.13  
 The architecture of the companies’ home office buildings was one of the most ready 
symbols of such a message, serving as potent evidence of material worth and civic position. Mid-
century life insurance firms erected headquarters in close proximity to commercial hubs, where 
they could easily participate in the city’s mercantile life, and where nearness to financial 
institutions and municipal structures yielded an association with civic stature.14 Some companies 
opened offices directly within buildings of social importance, but as the nineteenth century 
progressed, firms increasingly built their own dedicated structures, joining banks in their desire 
to erect buildings geared to the conduct of their trade. Like banks, the edifices of life insurance 
companies were heavy with architectural symbolism: the wide foyers, vaulted ceilings, 
                                                       
12Hendrick, The Story of Life Insurance, 240; Beard, After the Ball, 25-26; O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance  
541-543; Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 16-17. 
 
13O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, 533.  
 
14 Liz McFall and Francis Dodswoth “Fabricating the Market: The Promotion of Life Assurance in the Long 
Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Historical Sociology 22: 1 (March 2009), 30-54. The Equitable’s location on Lower 
Broadway, for instance, afforded easy access to banking houses and commercial firms. 
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Upper view of the “Marble Court” inside the Metropolitan’s home office building.15 
 
                                                       
15 The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: Its History, its Present Position in the Insurance World, its Home 
Office Building and its Work Carried on Therein, (New York: The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1908). 
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decorative arches, and ornate windows and statuary that adorned insurance structures were 
intended to conjure associations with churches and government buildings. The Prudential, for 
instance, erected a cathedral-like building which its president hoped would, “typify and 
symbolize the character of the business of the Prudential, exemplify its all-pervading spirit of 
beneficence and its ingrained love of the golden rule.”16 Metropolitan Life spared no expense in 
the construction of its headquarters at Madison Square, which boasted the tallest tower on earth 
and a staircase inspired by the Paris Opera.17 Company president John Hegeman, whose office 
contained $90,000 in furnishings, explained that the firm had erected the skyscraper, “for the 
sake of inspiring local pride, getting a local hold, securing the local business.”18 Between 1870 
and 1900, the three largest life insurance firms in the United States spent more than $100 million 
on grandiose office buildings, the central purpose of which was the creation of cultural 
credibility and symbolic authority.19 
Though awe-inspiring, the buildings were rarely profitable. No insurance company was 
big enough to utilize more than a fraction of the office space, and the buildings depreciated at a 
staggering rate. They were also expensive to maintain. In 1887, the cashier of the New York Life 
noted that the company’s $7 million building did not earn enough money to pay the taxes and the 
cost of keeping it clean.20 To combat the fears of board members and investors, company 
                                                       
16 Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 39. 
 
17Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 39. See also The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: Its history, its 
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1908). 
 
18 Keller, The Life Insurance Enterprise, 39. 
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directors offered inflated predictions of the buildings’ future earnings. They also worked 
aggressively to fill their buildings with paying tenants. 21 The passenger elevators that Henry 
Hyde ordered for the Equitable building, for instance, were in fact implements for his courtship 
of prosperous renters, who would never sign a lease above the third floor unless otherwise 
enticed. For Hyde, the plan bore fruit; from the time that it opened, the Equitable building 
housed “a fountainhead of lawyers,” whose presence soon attracted that of bankers, financiers, 
and businessmen of all stripes. “The lawyers were the first to appreciate the upper floors,” 
marveled the Tribune, “full of light and free of dust and far above the noise of the street; and 
bankers are now following their sensible example.”22 The prestige of such tenants enhanced the 
cachet of the Equitable and improved its business relations writ large. The insurance firm could 
also make ready use of the services of the lawyers and financial institutions that now inhabited 
their building, and those who dropped by to pay a visit to a lawyer or a bank were likely to note 
the stature of the insurer. Numerous firms followed the example of the Equitable, and the soaring 
multi-use buildings they constructed placed the life insurance industry at the physical center of 
social and economic affairs.23  
Company officers continued to preach messages of obsequious trusteeship, missives 
whose hypocrisy was in some ways obscured by status and grandiosity of the firms. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 Metropolitan Life directors projected a return of 7% on the tower constructed by the company in 1909, estimating 
that it would enhance the rental value of the entire property by 1%, or approximately $200,000 a year. Officers 
planned to rent out approximately 40% of the tower’s floor space. See Haley Fiske, “Tower Light that Never Fails.” 
Speech delivered to Triennial Convention of Underwriters, 1910, Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, 1911-1929, 
MLICA. See also Nick Yablon, “The Metropolitan Life in Ruins: Architectural and Fictional Speculations in New 
York, 1909-19,” American Quarterly 56:2 (June 2004): 309-347.  
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companies looked like trustworthy stanchions, and though hardly humble, their enormous 
presence was at least financially reassuring. Presidents reinforced the sense of public trust by 
offering a rhetoric of shared ownership of company assets, insisting that the construction of the 
buildings had occurred collectively, through the contribution of thousands of lowly nickels. To 
deflect critique, they insisted that life insurance investments were “essentially a social 
commodity,” and the contributions of so many individuals meant that the companies belonged to 
the people; the tremendous assets of and the majestic buildings belonged to the public, not to 
tycoons.  “I want you to understand that tower is yours – built with your money, as an 
investment,” pledged the vice president of Metropolitan Life to a gathering in 1910.24 Officers 
such as himself, he insisted, offered only selfless stewardship. One journalist noted that “their 
directors are trustees in the most sacred sense.”25 
Yet the executives’ involvement in internecine warfare stood at odds with the warm 
image of collective effort.26 Companies routinely hired journalists to slander their rivals, as well 
as to promote their own success. In the 1870s, Mutual Life developed a “public relations 
counsel” headed by a gentleman remembered as “Dollar-a-Line Smith” to write articles about the 
Mutual’s righteousness and success. Smith’s articles appeared in over thirty newspapers, and 
often attained a second life as pamphlets that agents delivered to policyholders’ homes. 27  Other 
companies followed the example. All liberally placed sales messages in the guise of news, 
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rewarded friendly journals with paid advertisement, and freely sued opposing trade journals for 
libel. The costs were passed along to policyholders in the form of increased premiums, causing 
consternation among customers. “Life insurance is about the only modern enterprise in which 
competition has increased the cost of the product,” one journalist remarked bitterly.28 
Among those who found themselves squeezed the hardest in the companies’ struggle for 
growth were the lowliest individuals in the corporate hierarchy: the traveling life insurance 
agents. Insurance executives owed more than a debt of gratitude to their agency forces, but the 
pay structure with which they remunerated them fostered desperation and abuses instead of good 
will. Disgruntled and underpaid, sales staff recouped their money by engaging in financial capers 
that directly exposed the public to the widening contradictions of the insurance field, sowing 
waves of popular distrust toward both the companies and their solicitors.  
Training manuals and motivational speakers encouraged underwriters to think of 
themselves as missionaries dispelling the “gospel of insurance,” but the lived experience of the 
agent was anything but Godsent, and the paltry wages associated with the work made financial 
exigency a more potent motivator than missionary zeal.29 The majority of life insurance agents 
performed their jobs under conditions of frank exploitation. Agency heads summarily dismissed 
those unable to write an acceptable level of new business. William Beers, the aggressive and 
uncompromising president of New York Life, once allegedly declared, “What’s an agent? A 
                                                       
28 Hendrick, The Story of Life Insurance, 62-3. 
29 “It has been said and truly said that as the ministry is to the Christian religion so are the agency forces to life 
insurance,” encouraged one underwriter to a crowded lecture hall of colleagues. “In working out your career within 
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lemon to be squeezed and thrown away after you have exhausted him.”30 Company employment 
rolls offered evidence that wringing agents was a popular practice. Of every hundred new 
underwriters, those familiar with the business expected barely ten to succeed. Given the industry 
pay scale, few of those ten would earn an affluent living.31  In 1883, a talented underwriter of 
ordinary policies received an income that compared to that of an industrial workingman (who 
happened to be ineligible for such a policy) -- on average, $11 per week. The typical underwriter 
stayed with the occupation for only four months.32  
The pressures brought to bear on agents inspired persistence bordering on desperation. 
Handbooks recommended that in approaching prospects, agents adopt a dogged pushiness. 
“Never let up,” urged one publication, suggesting that the thought become a motto: “Nil 
desperadum.” - more accurately translated as “never despair.”33  Agents found that most 
individuals required considerable persuasion before signing up for policies, and that shyness had 
no place in insurance sales, as it could easily take as many as fourteen visits to persuade a 
prospect to sign an insurance contract.34 “The life insurance salesman must be preeminently a 
                                                       
30O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, 540. 
 
31 Philip Sayle, Jr., Practical Aids for Life Assurance Agents (London: Simpkin, Marhsall, & Co., 1870), 48; 68. 
 
32 Agent turnover at Met Life in 1877 was over 300%. See Marquis James  The Metropolitan Life: A Study in 
Business Growt,h (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), 84. 
 
33 Sayle, Practical Aids for Life Assurance Agents, 22. 
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fellow who is not afraid of his fellows,” the handbooks advised.35 Veterans of the business 
suggested that agents consider dismissive requests that they call back “next week” or “next 
month” to be agreed-upon engagements. “These words, ‘call back,” mean that the agent will 
never leave you until you insure with him or welcome him upon one of his periodical visits with 
a shot gun,” reminisced an agent to a New Jersey paper in 1892.36 The presumption that most 
potential policyholders wanted nothing to do with underwriters dominated the sales advice – for 
good reason, as every new agent discovered.  
Life insurance agents became known pests in the communities where they solicited. The 
more persistently an agent peddled his wares, the more enduring became his status as a 
nuisance.37 Company literature referred to this hostility as “sales resistance” and mentioned it 
only rarely, but it dominated the interactions of almost every underwriter. One agent recounted a 
typical reception at a home in West Philadelphia, where a voice from the rear of the household 
commanded:  “Shut the door, Mary! Shut the door in his face; he’s only one of them darn 
insurance men, drat ‘em.”38 Tales of forcible ejection served as war stories that agents sent to 
magazines and traded among themselves.  In Covington, Kentucky, an agent making back door 
calls on a hot day slipped through the open door of a private kitchen where a woman toiled at the 
stove.  
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My stunt was to leave the paper inside the house, so I stepped in and laid it on the 
table where she was making pies. She offered no protest, so I ventured to open the 
paper and show the list of claims that had been paid recently in her neighborhood. 
I had got just that far when I heard a voice behind me: “You came in the back door 
and I’m going to throw you out the front door.” I didn’t even get a chance to look 
around, but I knew instinctively that I was dealing now with the head of the house. I 
felt myself firmly in his grasp. One great hand clutched my collar, the other the seat 
of my trousers. With a rush he had me off the floor and headed down the hallway for 
the front door.”39  
Closed doors, irritated sighs, and curt comments were frequent replies to an agent’s 
rapport. “House to house canvassing [was] conducted under such discouragements as, at the 
present time, can scarcely be imagined,” recalled Charles Weidenfeller.  Hired as a 
superintendent for Metropolitan Life in 1896, he had spent his early career defending his calling 
“from calumny and abuse… public criticism and private contempt.”40  As he and many seasoned 
agents understood, the task of “forcing the reception of the doctrine of protection” (as one 
pamphlet put it) was thankless indeed. 
By the turn of the century, the life insurance agent had become a figure that Americans 
loved to hate, a person who was as persistent as he was mercenary and incompetent.  
“Apparently, no citizen exits, in the companies’ estimation, who does not possess abilities in this 
direction,” one journalist exclaimed. Just as any person could be an insurance prospect, anyone, 
it seemed – “Broken-down clergymen, superannuated college professors, briefless lawyers, 
bankrupt business men, cast-off politicians, actors, reporters, artists” --  could become an agent.41 
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To inspire enthusiasm and to boost morale, life companies offered incentives to agents 
such as scarf pins, watches, and diamond rings, and sponsored competitions with lucrative 
prizes. In 1875, the Equitable held a competition among its fifteen leading agents for which first, 
second, and third prize were $3000, $2000, and $1000.42 At agency conventions (some costing as 
much as $125,000), company executives extolled the work of underwriters. “They have taught 
the people their duty; they have popularized the doctrine of protection; they have so tilled and 
cultivated the land that the harvest from now on will be full and certain.”43 To make their 
appreciation clear, companies held lavish banquets and recognition galas at fancy resorts. In 
September, 1905, the Equitable treated its agents to an outing to Manhattan Beach. Presumably, 
the hard-working solicitors enjoyed themselves tremendously; the affair cost $50,000.44 But 
many of the agents so feted that day would probably have preferred their thanks in cash. Though 
well-intended, these offerings did nothing to raise the wages of the average underwriter, and 
irritated the public as a form of profligacy whenever they were made known.  
Capitalizing on the precarious position of the door-to-door underwriters, companies 
freely poached each other’s agents, promising extravagant commissions to those willing to defect 
from a rival sales force. At the Equitable, Hyde raised commissions from fifty per cent to 
seventy-five per cent of the first year’s premiums on any new policy. During the depression of 
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1894, he doubled the bonuses to the agency sales force to prevent valuable men from departing.45 
Other companies increased their own commissions and bonuses in turn, setting in motion a race 
that was difficult to decelerate and even more difficult to pay for. The aggressive growth of the 
large insurers had “Barnumized” the business. These retention tactics were enormously 
expensive, failed to solve the problem of underpayment that agents faced, and further 
undermined the industry’s image of responsible frugality. Americans were coming to hold the 
life insurers in such low esteem that its human messengers had become a pariah class. It was a 
reception that contrasted too sharply with the ethos of trust – or even responsible finance – to be 
sustainable for long.  
 
An Investment in Risk 
As they had once adopted an ethos of moral purity and cautious trusteeship, American 
life insurance firms in the 1870s and 1880s once again adjusted their cultural image-making, 
deploying a notion of risk that more closely matched the economic preoccupations of the era. 
Those that had once labored mightily to promote themselves as righteous benefactors now 
dismantled their religious and charitable aura, reaching instead for the mantle of lucrative 
business methods. They began to rely on a more speculative notion of risk, one that placed 
emphasis on the financial merits of policies rather than their protective nature, highlighting each 
contract’s investment potential instead of its ideological purity. In the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century, companies advertised the financial benefits not just for the bereaved but also 
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for the insured, who could use an insurance policy as an annuity or as a form of high-interest 
savings. The process transformed the idea of risk that the insurance companies presented to their 
customers, and transformed as well the emotional and financial cachet of the firms. 
Where they had once avoided financial language, insurance businessmen now elevated it, 
openly broadcasting the money-making potential of insurance. One 1870 handbook on insurance 
sales advised that agents not merely describe insurance as a provision “for a future emergency,” 
but also “argue the matter under the head of investment.”46 Rather than serving as a basis for 
embarrassment, profits became one of the industry’s legitimate – and public – aims.47 Insurers 
boldly advertised their premium rates and the money-making, commercial role of the business, 
emphasizing its superiority over other forms of investment. Printed advertisements for many 
companies boasted about the size of their surplus, and agents tempted customers by describing 
the large dividends that could follow the purchase of a policy. Ordinary saving, they claimed, 
was too slow. Life insurance, by contrast, was better than savings banks, because money accrued 
faster. The enticement to seek fast, large sums of ready cash was a radical departure from the 
advertising techniques of an earlier era, though insurers did retain some appeals to security by 
describing their companies to be “free from serious disaster,” a reference to their financial rivals, 
the savings banks.48 Indeed, companies even began to publicly eschew their role as guardians 
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and stewards, appealing instead to their role as financial institutions – as businesses.  A writer 
remarked in the Insurance Journal in 1880, “We do not claim that life insurance is a charity or a 
benevolent institution, it is a business as much as banking or farming.”49 In 1883, New York Life 
trustees took note of the shift and raised the maximum insurance available on a single life from 
$50,000 to $75,000. In 1884 they raised it again, to $100,000.50 In the new speculative framing, 
family protection had become a family investment; risk had become the basis for gain.  
 Agents who responded to this advice discovered that the prospect of being a participant 
in a successful, growing enterprise was even more salable to the public than the principle of 
virtue and duty to provide had been. Whether the investment was personal or patriotic, the 
creation of wealth was alluring to potential buyers. To attract customers, insurers increasingly 
linked insurance policies with statecraft and national expansion. Darwin Kingsley, president of 
New York Life, delivered speeches in praise of economic opportunity. He spoke at length about 
the material well-being that insurance could offer, both to the individual and to the nation. 
“[M]oney, or wealth, is the very substance of civilization, and the very essence of virtue. It 
means comfort, freedom, health, leisure, -- if not all, certainly most of the things that make life 
worthwhile.”51 Like many executives, Kingsley called on the ideology of progress and 
civilization to defuse public anxiety. Time and again, he enumerated the “lofty ambitions” that 
characterized both his company and the consumers who purchased its insurance policies. The 
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agents of New York Life, he declared, offered  “unparalleled opportunities” to all who they 
approached.  
The act of refocusing of the ideology of risk worked to transform the outlook of the 
insurance salesman, who might now find candidates for insurance among those who had once 
been disqualified. Anytime and anywhere a debt had been incurred or a significant financial 
transaction had been made, a new opportunity to write life insurance presented itself, as the new 
philosophy held that all liability could reasonably be backed by capitalization.52 Valuable quarry 
could thus be found in places long destitute of promising marks for insurance sales.  Training 
materials instructed agents to scan newspapers for announcements of promotions, appointments, 
salary increases, marriages, deaths, births, and even real estate transactions – anything that might 
alter a person’s economic prospects. The widened definition of risk made nearly everyone into 
an insurance prospect, at least as the agency handbooks told it. Friends, neighbors, relatives, and 
debtors all constituted potential marks. 53 Prospects could be found on train platforms and at 
dinner parties, through word of mouth or during church services and funerals – a practice which 
particularly irked attendees.54 “Do you know I’ve been dodging insurance men in New York for 
six months?” complained an exasperated prospect to an agent who had engaged him in 
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conversation during a long train ride. “It got noised around some way that I was figuring on 
making a little investment and I’ve had no peace at my office since the news leaked out.”55   
The speculative ideology of risk allowed insurance agents to capitalize not just on actual 
liabilities, but also on the pervasive middle class fear of downward mobility. Drawing on the 
social psychology of failure, agents conjured images of austerity, poverty, and, perhaps most 
uncomfortable of all, loss of face. “If the unexpected should happen, you would not want her 
[your wife] to give up certain associates, friends and clubs – lose social caste, so to speak,” 
confided one agent to a prosperous doctor;  “nor would you want her to consume in a few years 
that which you had taken a life time to accumulate – destroy your monument.”56 Such 
solicitations often irritated those who they were intended to entice, but they worked. 
 
An Industrial Model 
The deployment of a sales rhetoric compatible with both an image of benevolent 
stewardship and a devotion to economic growth provided an even greater challenge to the 
industrial branch of insurance than it did to ordinary firms. Founded in the midst of the gilded 
1870s, industrial firms were competitive institutions from their inception, despite the charitable 
claims that surrounded the industry’s marketing and lore. Industrial companies claimed an 
eleemosynary role, but the origins of the branch lay in Prudential President John Dryden’s desire 
to carve a new niche in the spirited life insurance market, and the business methods of the branch 
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were aggressive from the very beginning. “In the grand race for success across the continent,” 
vowed Dryden, he would never cede an inch.57 The young executive was as good as his word, 
carving out commercial market share by mimicking the business model of fraternal aid 
organizations even while he denigrated their practices. Moreover, Dryden chose his moment 
well. He launched the Prudential at precisely the moment that a wave of speculative ambition 
had begun to sweep buyers in the fraternal market, fostering the most dramatic period of growth 
in the history of mutual aid and the perfect opportunity for commercial competition.  
In the 1870s, a handful of fraternal aid associations had begun to demonstrate commercial 
potential by supplying an innovative form of life insurance policies to their members. These 
policies expanded the services of fraternals from burial and camaraderie to actual dollar sums, 
and though small they constituted one of the first (and only) potential windfalls available to 
wage-working families in the late nineteenth century. Most contracts stipulated sums of one to 
two thousand dollars in the event of death, a modest amount compared to that offered by 
commercial insurers, but still a much larger sum than most able-bodied workingmen could make 
in a year. The arrangement sharply expanded the fraternals’ financial role, altering their handling 
of risk in the same way that it had been altered by the commercial life insurance industry, and it 
had similar results. The policies proved wildly popular. Association members bought into them 
in droves, and new members flocked to fraternal insurance providers for a chance to buy. 
Numerous associations that did not provide insurance created policies of their own, with some 
lodges even shifting their primary function from burial and social support to the provision of 
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insurance. It was a market that expanded at breakneck speed, and which commercial insurers 
such as Dryden found ripe for exploitation.   
As earlier described, when the Prudential began to offer commercial policies at industrial 
rates, working class patrons purchased them eagerly. The stability, prestige, and scientific aura of 
commercial contracts filled a niche in the market and harmonized with working class ambitions. 
For the less well to do, the purchase of commercial insurance appealed to the ideology of 
American classlessness. The desire to safeguard earnings in a precarious economy, to increase 
them through hard work and sound investment, and to live (and die) in a manner that suggested 
affluence, constituted a major component of working class ambitions. Industrial firms such as the 
Prudential described their product not just as a means of protection but also, like the policies of 
the rich, as mechanism on which to pin hopes of advancement.  Industry executives accurately 
presumed that workingmen would respond as powerfully as the well-off to the alluring prospect 
of taking part in a growing enterprise, of being associated in some way with the growth of a vast 
body of wealth. Despite the tiny sums actually paid out by industrial insurance, industry 
personnel adopted a powerful rhetoric of investment, nation-building, and personal uplift that 
linked the aspirations of wage-workers with those of their financial betters. Harnessing the 
economic spirit of the day, industrial firms thus appealed not just to wage-earners’ financial 
fears, but also their economic ambitions.  
The impressive sales figures achieved by the branch demonstrated that the ideology of 
industrial insurance resonated with the preoccupations of the working class, but to attain a secure 
market, executives understood that the tenets of industrial insurance needed to harmonize as well 
with the preoccupations of the upper classes -- particularly with social reformers, whose views 
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on the corruptibility of the poor, and whose suspicion toward big business placed the industrial 
branch in a precarious position. To manage the risk of social opprobrium, the Prudential and 
similar industrial insurers constructed a dual rhetoric of risk, one which on its surface advertised 
the protective – and acceptable – nature of commercial risk management, but which also 
contained a speculative message nuanced enough to appeal simultaneously to the moral 
sensibilities of the well-to-do and the economic ambitions of the working poor. Though perhaps 
subtle to a modern audience, the class distinction drawn by the separation of ordinary insurance 
and industrial policies was unambiguous to turn of the century contemporaries. The salaried 
upper classes and wage-earning workingmen were well understood to handle money differently, 
and to manage risk differently, as well. Long after financial speculation became acceptable 
among the middle and upper classes, the investment of a workingman’s dollar into a speculative 
venture remained unseemly.  
To appease the industry’s socially-minded critics, industrial insurers cultivated a rhetoric 
describing industrial policies as investments that, while protective, were specifically educational 
for the lower class. Industrial insurance, they ventured, was a speculative mechanism in that it 
schooled members of the working class in how to better manage the cash that they received in 
their pay-envelopes.  Industrial insurance had the capacity to train the lower classes into modern 
habits and secular enlightenment by inculcating habits of thrift and regularity. It could create 
financial opportunity for wage-earners by inducting them into the economic life of the middle 
class. It is unlikely that the assertion was aimed toward the working class, who would probably 
have bridled at the assumption of their own moral inferiority. It appealed greatly to the 
paternalist sensibilities common among affluent social reformers, whose sense of propriety 
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demanded guidance for the downtrodden and patronage for the weak, and who might otherwise 
have taken a dim view of harvesting cash from the poor.  
The educational claims of the industry rested on the assumption that wage-earners were 
poor custodians of money, a notion frequently challenged by social workers, but one that allowed 
insurance companies to hold forth on the progress that could be attained by those who devoted 
their pennies to insurance premiums. “Without doubt,” declared one 1868 article on industrial 
insurance, “the penny of the poor man is to have its place in life insurance accumulation as well 
as the dollar of the capitalist…”58 Firms sweetened the argument with the justification that 
industrial insurance provided a service that would otherwise fall to the shoulders of public 
charity, and thus it saved the municipality a burdensome expense. Like the poorhouse, they 
argued, industrial insurance could inculcate habits of steady work, but unlike the poorhouse it 
was not funded by public coffers, nor did it constitute a form of charity with the associated threat 
of pauperizing the poor through handouts.  
In addition to elevating the financial station of its owner, promoters of industrial 
insurance insisted that policies had the potential to lift the moral status of the person insured.59 
Americans in the middle to late nineteenth century interpreted poverty as the result of low 
character and moral failing. To middle class residents, the individuals afflicted with indigence 
constituted a “lazy, idle, and immoral” few who were too improvident to take advantage of the 
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nation’s opportunities.60 The “deserving poor” numbered even fewer. Reform ideology focused 
on redeeming those fallen by checking their demoralization and inculcating a work ethic. In 
1911, Lee Frankel, head of the welfare department at Metropolitan Life, explained to a 
conference of social workers that his firm was preoccupied not just with insurance but also an 
“additional” responsibility, “in that it comes in contact with millions of individuals, many of 
whom are illiterate, uneducated, and in many instances do not even speak our language.” Frankel 
asserted the company’s intention to “attempt to improve their condition during life itself,” a 
sentiment which may or may not have been appreciated by those who purchased policies, but 
which was highly regarded by his philanthropic audience. 61  
Not everyone believed the rhetoric of the life insurance industry. Social workers, clergy, 
and visiting medical personnel eyed the policy expenditures of the poor with misgivings, 
particularly when they encountered such spending in households already in need of charitable 
aid. When a regular wage allowed a decent standard of living, insurance seemed a reasonable 
piece of the household economy. For individuals and families living close to the margins, 
however, the payment of the weekly premium could mean doing without meals, coal, or 
medicines, omissions that social workers believed constituted not thrift but privation. Religious 
and charitable onlookers reacted with particular irritation when they encountered cases of 
“overinsurance,” situations in which policyholders supported more insurance than their budgets 
could possibly be stretched to pay. In one example, an observer reported a man in Philadelphia 
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who resided in a basement “unfit for human habitation.” Despite his poverty, the man had little 
fear for the future, as “he belonged to three fraternal orders and carried two [industrial] insurance 
policies, all of which guaranteed him a $275 burial, concerning which he spoke with much 
pride.”62  
When instances came to light of impoverished policyholders unable to keep up with 
weekly payments, industrial insurers insisted that such persons were among the lazy, idle, and 
improvident, and had only acquired policies through some tragic mistake.  “It was never the plea 
of Industrial insurance companies that they were soliciting risks of paupers or the lowest poor,” 
insisted Prudential statistician Frederick Hoffman in 1900, “but from the start they made an 
effort to reach the industrial masses – if it be so, the industrious poor.”63 Agreeing that the line 
between paupers and the deserving was often blurry, insurance firms asserted that in those cases 
in which industrial policies wound up in the wrong (i.e., most destitute) hands, the problem was 
not the cost of the policy or activity of the firm, but the degeneracy of the client.  Insurance 
policies offered such fantastic opportunities for self help, they claimed, that only undisciplined 
drifters could lose money to industrial insurance firms. Everyone else stood to gain, including the 
keepers of public coffers, who were relieved of many of their burdens due to the role that 
industrial insurance played in preventing the poor from becoming dependent. “Shall we attempt 
to maintain self-respect and dignity and thrift through insurance,” enjoined Frankel to the 
meeting of social workers, “or lacking this, shall we encourage dependence on private or public 
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philanthropy?”64 By this logic, if a person among the “low poor” purchased industrial insurance, 
at least he or she may still be amenable to self-help; if that person turned to public aid, the 
hopelessness of the case was all but guaranteed. 
The language of financial gain also captured interest among those for whom the United 
States was an adopted land, and for whom participation in the cash economy served as a mark of 
success, progress, and assimilation. “If the Old World has used their labor to convert raw 
materials into finished goods, here they confronted the industrial marketplace where money and 
wages were the key to survival,” notes historian Elizabeth Ewen.65 Only through the cash market 
could newcomers access the world of factory-made goods and modern services, a fact not lost on 
the agents who peddled industrial policies in immigrant neighborhoods. Offering descriptions of 
the material goods that could be had through the financial sophistication of policy-ownership, 
agents openly targeted the acquisitive dreams of newcomers. They pitched their sales especially 
strongly toward immigrant women, who often faced criticism for being “old fashioned,” and who 
responded robustly to the industry messages that life insurance policies provided a stepping stone 
to progressive, modern living.  
Wherever newcomers proved eager to participate in the culture of investment and 
financial power that was part of the promise of America, industrial agents did a brisk business. 
The tenements of Boston and New York were notorious debits. The assimilationist appeal crafted 
by purveyors of industrial policies corresponded with the economically prosperous atmosphere 
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and did much to boost the sale of policies. Between 1880 and 1900, industrial insurers increased 
their policies in force by 243%. At the turn of the century, industrial companies were responsible 
for nearly $1.5 billion in insurance.66 Their solvency placed the industrials on a near-equal 
footing with their sister companies in the ordinary branch, and brought insurance officers reason 
for celebration. On a stray piece of paper, Metropolitan Life Vice President Haley Fiske 
observed to himself that his company was blowing its own horn. “Yes we are and we are going 
to continue to blow it and why shouldn’t we?” he jotted. “We are the next to the biggest Life 
Insurance Company on earth and we are going to be the biggest and we don’t care who knows it 
– in fact we are going to talk about it until everybody knows it and then they’ll help us blow.”67 
Though cause for excitement among company executives, it was a solvency which ultimately 
called into question the image of industrial policies as humble mechanisms of self-help for the 
modest working man. 
 
“Surplus is Strength” 
The precarious ideology of the firms succeeded for a time. It obscured but did eradicate 
the contradictions of the business, which continued to grow despite the moral incongruities 
within the firms’ foundations. Financial bluster diminished public acceptance of the “missionary 
purpose” of the business, but the protection from loss promised by the companies, with the 
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additional enticement of possible  economic gain, appealed to American notions of risk enough 
to keep the industry in strong financial standing.  
In characteristic fashion, it was a dramatic stroke of Henry Hyde’s that provided the final 
tipping point from a product that was based on trust to a product that was based on financial 
speculation, and it was this same stroke  -- taken to excess – that undermined the firms’ public 
legitimacy. Greedy for revenue, Hyde popularized  a form of investment policy that was so risky 
that nearly every customer who purchased it  experienced a loss. The popular outrage that ensued 
placed a lasting crack in the moral foundation of the industry that would one day inform the shift 
from financial guardianship to direct service in the form of engagement in public health. 
Policyholders had failed to imagine that such losses could result from an insurance contract. 
They were no longer willing to accept speculation as an acceptable form of insurance risk.  
In 1867, Hyde had driven the Equitable’s surplus to the brink of ruin through his 
expensive competitive strategies, and he needed a robust infusion of funds to save the firm from 
financial embarrassment. In a feat as hazardous as it was effective, he revived the speculative 
“tontine” scheme that had first been used in France in 1689 to raise money for the insolvent court 
of Louis XIV. Participants in a tontine contributed money to a pool, which accrued interest for a 
set interval of years and was then redistributed to those left alive after the passage of time. It was, 
in effect, a lottery that could only be won by out-surviving the rest of one’s tontine class. In 
1869, French widow Charlotte Barbier gained spectacularly by collecting 74,000 livres on an 
initial investment of 300. Hyde’s tontine achieved near equal celebrity when the life president 
advertised her story, creating the biggest sales boom in life insurance history. The success 
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prompted Hyde’s competitors to adopt tontine policies of their own. The availability of tontine 
insurance created a gamble that nearly everyone was willing to take.  
The tontine came with significant hazards, which companies willingly hedged against the 
enormous accumulation of funds that the policies brought in.  The overwhelming danger for 
most investors was that they would not receive as much money as they had bargained on 
(certainly not as much as Charlotte Barbier), but Hyde devised a new slogan to entice customers 
to buy --  “Surplus is strength” --  and spread the motto widely.  In the hands of the Equitable, 
surplus surely was strength. Money that accrued from the new policies swelled the company’s 
ailing surplus and allowed the Equitable to jump ahead of its rivals in the Big Three; by 1880 it 
was the largest life insurance company in the world.  
The engorged surplus appealed particularly to the investment psychology of 1870s 
consumers. Actuaries for the Equitable divided tontine subscribers into classes whose policies 
would mature in intervals of ten, fifteen, or twenty years. During this period, policyholders 
received no dividends on their policies; the interest that accrued from their premiums remained 
in hands of the company, which could make an even greater profit by reinvesting it.68 Those who 
lapsed their policies forfeit all payments and interest into the pool; those who died received the 
full face value of the policy, but none of the speculative benefits; only those who faithfully paid 
their premiums and also managed to out-live their peers could look forward to collecting the 
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astronomical dividends promised when their policies matured.69 The scheme was, in some 
senses, a gamble with the very insecurity that life insurance had been designed to guard against.  
The tontine craze was not without its detractors. Some denounced tontines as a profane 
form of taking bets. Insurance reformer Elizur Wright called the practice “life insurance 
cannibalism” and predicted that mayhem and insolvency would erupt in the industry should it be 
allowed to continue. “It is as if a temperance society should endeavor to promote its cause by 
establishing a liquor saloon under its lecture-room, or a church should support its minister by a 
lottery," he brooded.70 Insurance officers retorted that it was the right of individuals to take 
personal financial risks.  “That is the law of every business enterprise,” insisted New York Life 
president Winston Beers: “—free choice at the outset; risk in any course and the greater 
prospective gain attended by the greater risk.” Beers also repudiated the implication that profit 
on an insurance contract could be morally degrading.  “It is neither new nor wrong to link duty to 
others with profits to one’s self.”71 Hyde, too, deflected moral attention from the lottery-like 
aspects of tontine insurance. He referred to tontine dividends merely as “investment returns,” a 
strategy that proved as effective for insurers' profit margins as the introduction of the tontine 
itself, at least for a time. 72 
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The companies that embraced tontine insurance did not drop into insolvency, as Wright 
had predicted. They did, however, drop into a sort of competitive mayhem. The high-revenue 
tontine policies prompted a newly energetic wave of competition among the Big Three, which 
focused special energy into discrediting one another. They printed defamatory circulars, poached 
each other’s underwriters, and looked the other way while their agents “twisted” policies from 
consumers by spreading rumors designed to frighten customers into lapsing.73 When the first 
class of policies matured, however, a chilling financial reality prompted an armistice among the 
companies. Wright’s prediction of financial havoc came true; the dividends received by the first 
generation of policyholders fell far short of consumer expectations. Some brief calculations 
indicated that payments based on early promises would have bankrupted the companies. 
Insurance executives blustered in response that at the time that the policies had been sold interest 
rates had been higher, the future rosier, the economy more robust. Few believed these claims, 
and even if they had, the justifications destroyed company credibility by suggesting that 
executives and actuaries had fallen prey magical thinking in the projection of tontine returns. The 
lapse was serious; an industry that advertised its most fundamental strengths to be scientific 
credentials and conservative investment skills had been exposed in the midst of fairytale 
accounting.  
Consumers made their outrage known. “Thousands had adopted this method for 
providing for old age. Inevitably, when they found themselves so badly deceived, they sought 
redress. They bombarded the Equitable and New York Life with protests, and personally stormed 
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the offices,” reported journalist Burton Hendrick.74 Policyholders dispatched a barrage of mail to 
insurance officers and settled themselves outside their office doors. Lawsuits, accusations, and 
recriminations became the standard method of communication  between companies and 
customers. The legislatures of Ohio and New York launched public inquiries into the scandal, 
but no one outside the insurance industry seemed able to obtain much satisfaction. “Hyde, Beers, 
and the rest repudiated all the agents’ promises; and triumphantly pointed out that the estimates 
had never been incorporated in the policy,” described Hendrick.75 Like other investigations of 
their kind, the inquiries launched by the Ohio and New York legislatures quietly ended without a 
single report.76  But the companies were not invincible, and the tontine crash offered a harbinger 
of what was to come. “As their self-image changed,” notes sociologist Viviana Zelizer, “the 
nature of public criticism against life insurance companies also shifted from ideological censure 
to economic indictment. There was a growing demand for legislative protection against the 
companies’ business methods.”77   
The demand was seeded in the courts. In 1884, retired dentist Austin Allen Fuller filed a 
lawsuit against Metropolitan Life in regards to a $10,000 tontine policy he had taken out in 1874. 
Promotional literature provided by the company had promised “on conservative assumptions 
$1,635 dividends beginning in 10 years,” but in 1884 Met Life offered a dividend of only $387. 
Telling a story of aggressive solicitation on the part of Met Life agents, Fuller sued for an 
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accounting. The company refused to oblige, although in court the firm’s actuary testified that 
payment of dividends as large as the one promised to Fuller would have bankrupted the 
company.78 The court found in favor of Fuller and ordered an accounting, which company 
counsel Haley Fiske avoided by negotiating to pay the plaintiff $4,500 and costs. No accounting 
was ever made, but the Metropolitan Life ceased to write tontine insurance.  
Other companies were slower to shift their practices, and some responded to requests for 
accountability with outright denials and brazen ideological reversals. When the avalanche of 
lawsuits rained down upon the Equitable, the company defended itself from charges of fraud and 
failure to keep public accounting by repudiating the very premises on which it had sold its 
policies. Renouncing the status it had claimed as a benevolent institution and custodian of the 
public trust, the Equitable denied that it was a trustee of policyholder premiums at all.  
The plaintiffs, as policyholders, have no rights which entitle them to bring this action. 
The policy-holder is not cestui que trust. And neither the directors nor the company are 
trustees. The policy-holder is not a partner. He is not a creditor. He is not a member of 
the company. The fund produced by the payment of all the premiums does not in any 
sense belong to the policy-holders, but belongs exclusively to the company.79  
Despite decades of company advertisements pronouncing insurance firms to be trustees, the 
courts sustained this view. To further protect the Equitable from legal action, Hyde pushed 
through a law in 1890 requiring that suits be brought through the attorney general. No individual 
policyholder would again be able to demand an accounting, or otherwise pester insurers. For the 
time being, the companies had attained shelter from exposure. The privacy lasted only briefly, 
however, and when it began to erode, the industry found itself in a limelight difficult to darken. 
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Over the coming decade, one disclosure after another increased the industry’s exposure, until in 
1905 events at the Equitable would catalyze a crisis.  
The new construction of risk had worked too well. Policyholders now saw themselves as 
jilted investors with a claim on the company coffers. To allay consumer passions, the insurance 
industry would eventually formulate a new ideology of risk that could deliver on the promise of 
security and wealth without financially implicating the companies. As chapter 4 will show, they 
did this by engaging in the field of preventive medicine and public health, but not before popular 
fury against the companies boiled over.  
 
The Penny of the Poor Man 
 Much as the rapacious spirit of the ordinary insurers outraged middle class policyholders, 
Americans reserved special indignation for the hypocrisies incurred by the industrial branch, 
whose rhetoric of benefaction toward the poor touched off popular outrage when contradicted by 
industry practices. The tremendous profits accrued by industrial insurers contrasted dubiously 
with the poverty of their clients, and resulted in frequent accusations by clergy, social workers, 
and ordinary onlookers that industrial insurers bilked the poor. The Metropolitan Life tower at 
Madison Square, for instance, attracted hostile comment from many who noted that its marble 
façade and glittering heights had been built on the backs of the working class.80 At pains to 
                                                       
80 Metropolitan life fielded frequent accusations that the tower was “built out of lapses;” that is, that the funds to 
build it had been derived of the forfeited insurance of policyholders unfortunate enough to miss a payment.  
Company vice president Haley Fiske defended the tower in front of numerous audiences in the years immediately 
surrounding its construction. “A good deal is said, in discussing industrial insurance, about the apparent wealth of 
the companies,” he noted before the National Civic Federation in 1908. “One looks at our marble building on 23rd 
Street, and that tower, which I hope you will agree is a noble specimen of architecture, and he says: ‘Look at the 
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explain the disjunction between the opulence of their corporations and the poverty of the clients, 
industrial insurers turned again to the rhetoric of social uplift and a notion of risk as a basis for 
gain to legitimize their product.  
In part, the need for such consistent re-legitimization stemmed from the fundamental 
problem that insurance companies sold a product that did not sit comfortably in the commercial 
market. Despite the insistences of industry personnel that policies opened financial opportunities, 
encouraged thrift, and uplifted the downtrodden, the basic fact remained that those who needed 
protection the most were in the worst position to attain it. For social reformers, the very success 
of the industry revealed its deepest flaw: insurance marketing appeals had been so effective that 
Americans not only scraped to buy policies, they refused to lapse them even under profound 
financial duress. The more the insurance industry failed to measure up to its promises of social 
good, the more abuses emerged at the hands of supposedly responsible trustees, the more 
incumbent it became for industry executives to banish the contradictions and re-describe their 
firms’ social legitimacy. And because the inconsistencies happened most brazenly in the 
industrial branch, it was there that the industry faced its most incriminating adversaries. 
Little evidence exists to suggest that social reformers were ever truly persuaded by the 
arguments that industrial policies could transform ne’er do wells into upright citizens, safeguard 
charitable coffers from unworthy beggars, or put an end to the destitution of the working poor, 
but for the most part they tolerated the boasts of the industry and gave patient audience to 
company speakers. After all, in at least one crucial way industrial insurance was quite effective.  
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Setting aside the rhetoric of social uplift, moral enhancement, or speculative gain, industrial 
insurance policies were successful in their fundamental management of risk: protection from 
loss. The importance of a dignified funeral weighed heavily on the working class, for whom 
burials occurred with crushing frequency. Regardless of any other function that the policies were 
touted to serve, industrial insurance met an immediate and pressing need among the working 
poor, and the majority of reformers countenanced its sale – that is, until the abuses became too 
egregious to escape official condemnation.81  
Most visible of all insurance personnel, and most directly involved with acts (or failures) 
of social persuasion, it was insurance agents whose actions most immediately triggered public 
ire. Like their cousins in the ordinary branch, industrial insurance companies placed the burden 
of expanding the market on the shoulders of their sales force, urging agents to increase their 
transactions by hook as well as by crook, and the methods that resulted often represented the 
worst of both. Like ordinary firms, managers and insurance journals inundated industrial agents 
with enconiums about the importance of their public role, and like the ordinary firms they paid 
them badly. “The agent is the life of the business,” remarked Prudential president John F. 
Dryden. “The agent is indispensable.”82 Supporters reiterated that agents were ambassadors of 
the company,  that they served as envoys who did immeasurable good. “[The industrial agent] 
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approximately 5% between 1885 and 1901, representing a savings to taxpayers that he estimated at $250,000. See 
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spreads the doctrine of optimism wherever he goes,” insisted a columnist in one industrial 
insurance periodical. “He usually brings with him sunshine and an atmosphere of optimism, and 
often an idea and good advice.”83 However improbable such a statement may have been, the 
ideology it represented linked the agent intimately with the virtuous side of the business. If 
executives embodied the spirit of corporate competition, it was hoped that agents would embody 
the spirit of morality and public service.  
For some, these lofty ideals were occasionally a reality. Companies made a practice of 
matching the ethnicity of their agents whenever possible to the ethnicity of the neighborhoods in 
which they worked, a tactic designed to improve the measure of trust (and sales) between the 
agent and the customer. At times such cultural commonalities may well have prompted more 
genial exchanges. More likely, if a friendship was to be had, it was the sheer familiarity of the 
agent that provided the impetus. Visiting clients weekly over extended periods of time, agents 
were in a position to know a great deal about the lives and concerns of those on their debits, 
including when they might be home, and how to best pressure them into buying a policy.  
Intimacy might have lead to friendships, but more often it bred contempt. Most 
descriptions of industrial agents present the solicitor in a dark light, as a nuisance and even a 
villain. Despite their rhetoric to the contrary, industrial companies did not treat agents like 
envoys who did immeasurable good, but rather handled them with the same hypocritical 
disregard that incubated abuses – and public scorn – in the ordinary branch. Industrial salesmen 
made, on average, about $8 a week, scarcely more than the earnings of the households they 
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visited.84 To assemble even these diminutive sums they went from door to shabby door, chasing 
down premiums of a nickel apiece on an average of 500 policies.85 “I find that by working hard, 
being faithful and honest, I cannot make $6 a week, and it is the same with every other agent,” 
complained one individual who had worked for Metropolitan Life and Prudential for ten years.86  
Most remuneration came from commissions on new business; industrial companies, for instance, 
offered a salary consisting of only 15% of the premiums collected.87 Since the rest of an agent’s 
earnings came from the rewards of new contracts, those who proved the most persuasive were 
also the most well-paid.  
 The lived experience of the agents contrasted so sharply with the ideal of public service 
that numerous agents became violators of thrift and trust rather than its guardians. To make a 
living at all, many resorted to corruption and fraud, sometimes petty but often significant and 
seriously damaging to clients who trusted them. When they could, industrial agents forged or 
invented the names of new customers, supplying premiums out of their own pockets in return for 
the substantial bonuses that companies offered for new business. The omission of medical 
exams, which would have proven the existence (or lack thereof) of aspiring policyholders, 
allowed such hijinx to flourish. One company experimented by offering agents of special 
bonuses for signing up newborn babies, and received in return a deluge of fraudulent policies.  
“[W]e got a great deal of business on streets in which there were no homes at all, and it was 
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interesting to see the originality of the agents in the way of the invention of names,” recalled the 
superintendent.88 Agents were also known to forge signatures on applicants from asylums, 
orphanages, and inebriate homes, sometimes even taking names from head stones to generate 
policies.89 
While prankish, these practices were cousins to the more serious and morally rousing 
abuses. One poignant scheme involved the writing of contracts for persons obviously ineligible 
for insurance. Assuring the prospect that all was well, the agent would falsify, a disqualifying 
detail (perhaps by lowering an age or omitting an infirmity) and initiate the contract, collecting 
premiums from the policyholder, until death brought attention to the fraud. The companies 
routinely refused payment to the bereaved.90 Occasionally, agents would destroy old contracts 
and issue new ones for the purpose of collecting a second bonus, assuring trusting customers that 
their policies had been fully paid up. “Eight or nine weeks [later] her husband dies,” explained 
the Indicator  to illustrate the deception, “and then she awakens to the fact that, instead of being 
a member of two years’ standing, she is only nine weeks insured and not even entitled to a 
quarter benefit, and this wicked act is done by a man to gain $2.25.”91 When customers asked 
questions about their contracts, they often received answers that were more convenient than 
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truthful. Eager to make a sale, unscrupulous agents were willing to promise nearly anything to 
policyholders. 
Industry officials privately groused at the infamy of their agents, but the pressures 
remained, and in truth, the sheer number of solicitors needed for company operations 
necessitated lax oversight. The average industrial firm maintained a sales force of ten to fifteen 
thousand. In New York City alone, five thousand agents canvassed the populace. The task of 
overseeing such an army of workers, all of whom labored beyond the sight of the home office, 
plainly overwhelmed most companies, who were in any case more focused on profit than service. 
Training manuals, corporate memos, and the occasional company dinner constituted the majority 
of contact between executives and agency staff, leaving scant opportunity to correct the widening 
breach between the image of rectitude that companies hoped their agents would convey, and the 
behavior that resulted from their contact with the voracious market of the gilded age.  “Soap, 
water, blacking, a pen-knife, and a tooth-brush are all cheap in this country,” inveighed 
Metropolitan’s Joseph Knapp to the field force, in the hope that they would express a stronger 
message of excellence. 92 The comment may have been as wishful as it was stern. Agents 
composed the foundation of the system of American insurance, but given the pressure toward 
corruption, incompetence, and surrender, they formed a shaky bedrock.  
Public rumblings of discontent with the practices of American life insurance industry 
grew louder as the nineteenth century drew to a close, and in fact seemed to reach a crescendo as 
industry sales attained greater heights. Cases of “over insurance” so easily dismissed in the 
1870s and 1880s attracted the scorn of charity and social workers in the 1890s, when the nation’s 
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first full-scale industrial depression thrust thousands out of work and underscored the industry’s 
failure to insulate wage-earners from risk.  
By the 1890s, social workers constituted the industry’s most formidable detractors. Their 
claims against the industry were even more disturbing than the public’s denunciation of 
insurance agents, or the newspapers’ condemnation of the Racers’ profligate spending. Social 
workers asserted that insurers cruelly overcharged the poor. For every dollar of industrial 
insurance, they noted, policyholders typically received only forty-five cents of protection, while 
wealthier families purchasing ordinary policies collected sixty-eight cents on the dollar.93  
Moreover, while industrial premiums were small, the benefits were also small, and the tight 
economy of a working class household could scarcely justify the expenditure. This, to social 
workers, was not uplift but predation. Even some insurance agents conceded the point. “I have 
some families that I collect from who would go without food or fire rather than neglect paying 
their weekly insurance dues,” an underwriter in New Jersey told the Trenton Times. “No, sir; you 
may write it down for a fact that the large industrial insurance companies exist and gather their 
huge assets from the money paid in by the poorest of poor people.”94  Such statements supported 
the widespread belief among charity workers that industrial companies preyed upon those who 
could least afford their attentions. The central feature of industrial insurance was not the 
elevation of the working class, as the companies claimed, but rather the exploitation of the 
country’s poorest citizens.  
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Better off Dead: The case for social insurance 
In 1895, social workers mounted one of the greatest challenges to date against industrial 
insurance by filing a motion in the Massachusetts legislature to ban the insurance of children 
under ten, a motion that brought numerous issues surrounding industrial insurance to public 
attention. In the hearings that followed, testimony considered whether commercial insurance 
truly provided indemnity against loss, inculcated habits of thrift, uplift, or whether it instead 
served as a manner of commercial exploitation by appealing to the speculative ambitions of those 
who could least afford to gamble. Launched by the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children, the measure brought to the fore the social contradictions inherent in placing 
security from risk on the open market, begging questions of whether the private industry could 
equitably and efficiently spread risk, or whether it merely exploited the poor. Testimony hinted 
that other mechanisms for managing risk might be more appropriate, either through voluntary 
societies or through the mechanism of the state.95  
Industrial insurance had opened a niche for insuring the lives of minors. The earnings of 
children in wage-working households were often significant to the welfare of the family, and 
their mortality rate was significant, as well. The death of a child was a common and 
heartbreaking occurrence in working class households, where it not only deprived the family of a 
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measure of income, but caused the incursion of debt for the cost of a burial appropriate to mourn 
the loss of a young and innocent life. Industrial policies constituted the first tools available to 
such families with which to manage this liability, and as such policies sold vigorously. By 1896, 
parents had purchased policies for 1.5 million children. But as quickly as child insurance became 
normative for the working class, middle class reformers rose to condemn it.  
Formal resistance had begun in England early in the century, where courts regularly 
heard testimony from social reformers determined to end the practice of gambling on the lives of 
minors. 96  Challenges in the United States usually took only the shape of vague warnings about 
the danger of making death profitable, and the temptations of exploiting the pauper innocents, 
but in the late 1880s American opposition commenced in earnest, buoyed in part by the struggle 
against child labor and the wider drive to halt the commercial exploitation of young lives.  
Affluent onlookers argued that children’s lives were priceless, and viewed the intrusion 
of commercial value with horror. Significantly less burdened by the costs of caring for 
dependents, and able to adequately run their households without the income of children, 
members of the middle class viewed minors as a population whose worth was sentimental and 
symbolic, not economic. To many members of this class, the placement of a financial valuation 
on the life of a child eroded the moral bond between the innocent and the caregiver. Some feared 
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that it could even incite murder. Reformers argued that insofar as children’s earnings aided 
struggling families, the insurance policies on their lives dangled sums far greater than their labor 
was worth, making the economic value of a deceased child higher than that of a living one. In the 
darkest scenarios, they claimed, craven or merely desperate parents might neglect, starve, or 
“accidentally” suffocate the weakest members of their broods, if not merely to enjoy the bounty 
then to spread the windfall of resources among other household needs. The family – such minds 
might argue – would be better off if the little one were dead. Between 1889 and 1902, opponents 
made over eighty legislative attempts in thirteen states to ban or restrict insurance on children.97 
With the exception of Colorado, state legislatures uniformly rejected calls to ban policies on 
minors. In 1895, however, the hearings in Massachusetts brought national attention to its apex.  
For six weeks beginning in March, industry representatives sparred with charity workers 
in a packed legislative hall. Petitioners opened the hearings with testimony so compelling and 
macabre that the number of observers grew from 150 at the hearings’ inception to 300 by the 
time the industry presented its defense. Clergymen, doctors, lawyers, bankers, and even members 
of the legislature itself submitted outraged statements alleging that child insurance served as an 
incentive for parents to starve and neglect their offspring in order to collect benefits on the 
insurance. Although only a small percentage of households became sites of such suspected 
diabolical behavior, detractors maintained that policies on children served as a ready enticement 
to the desperate. Social workers and charity doctors spoke passionately about the suffering and 
loss of sickly children who received no care, but whose parents paid regularly for their insurance. 
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They castigated insurance executives and particularly agents who “pursue their calling without 
any regard to the misery they create or who pays the premium.”98 One cleric who echoed this 
perspective noted, “Insurance companies say their system encourages thrift, but they know 
better. Shall I tell you, gentlemen, what has increased since industrial insurance came to Boston? 
The undertakers, that’s all.”99 
The claims of the petitioners were socially provocative, but factually weak. When Haley 
Fiske, the newly-appointed vice president of Metropolitan Life, rose to speak on the twentieth of 
March, he opened his defense by chastising the petitioners for seeking legislation without first 
obtaining a thorough knowledge of the subject. Infanticide, he noted, was a monstrous charge 
that no person should bring without proof, and Fiske pointed out – accurately -- that despite the 
concerns of those in favor of the bill, the petitioners had failed to present the legislature with 
anything more substantiated than rumors. No state legislature had ever conceded to pass such a 
law, as a genuine instance of child murder for the collection of insurance money had never been 
demonstrated. The only real point left to contend, surmised Fiske, was whether “the whole 
system of industrial insurance leads to extravagance.”  
Fiske had opened his defense with the umbrage of the unjustly accused, but he quickly 
shifted into the simple logic and plain speaking that had won him success as a trial lawyer as 
well as a man of business.100 To the Massachusetts committee, Fiske restated the issue of 
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industrial insurance in an alternative moral garb. A sum of barely thirty dollars constituted the 
average return on a policy of child insurance, which was just enough for a humble burial. Fiske 
insinuated that the petitioners were not really charging the poor with neglect so much as they 
were alleging that poverty precluded the right to a decent interment, and that the desire for 
dignity on the part of the poor constituted an immoral extravagance. “[T]hese poor people pay 
more for funerals than the ladies and gentlemen who have come here think they ought to,” he 
summarized. Rhetorically he asked whether the bill should read: “Be it enacted, that persons 
getting less than ___ dollars a week shall not insure the lives of their children.” Fiske wrested the 
question of sales to the poor back from one of exploitation to one of moral integrity, winning the 
argument before the committee. Fiske’s oratory was so powerful that at times his audience in the 
legislative chamber met his statements with open applause.101 He ended his case by skillfully 
addressing the terrible accusation implicit in the subject of the proceedings: that the poor, unlike 
the rich, were so corruptible as to be craven.  Yes, industrial companies insured in the slums, he 
confirmed. “We insure people who live in the poor districts frequently, for people do not cease to 
be respectable when they become poor.”102  
Exposing the moral hypocrisy of the bill’s supporters helped to solidify the company’s 
ethical standing. But it did not close the wider issues brought out at the hearings, which raised 
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serious questions about the capacity of private insurance to uplift or even protect the working 
class. The opposition and defense spent several sensational weeks presenting arguments about 
the practice of child insurance. Ultimately, their contentions reflected a much wider set of issues 
about the role of industrial insurance in American society. 
 
The High Cost of Living and the Cost of High Living 
Although the hearings quelled many of the allegations surrounding insurance and 
infanticide, they laid bare a set of concerns that were ultimately even more damaging to the 
companies: by publicly exposing the contradictions of the business model and the failures of 
companies to be equitable or efficient in the management of risk, they gave voice to the popular 
suspicion that the free market and social welfare were simply incompatible. The discomfort of 
several of the witnesses with the role of private companies in the network of charity provision 
constituted a lingering theme throughout the proceedings. Testimony reflected widespread 
mistrust of private profits acquired through the provision of a public good, and reflected 
condemnation of corporate inefficiencies and greed at the expense of the working class. The 
conflicting goals – financial versus custodial – of the commercial insurers clearly led to 
conflicting applications of funds, both by the companies and by the charities whose goals they 
ostensibly shared. The revelations paved the way for a larger critique than any the commercial 
insurers had yet faced, as observers began to question whether the public weal, not the private 
sector, might be the best protector of public indemnity, and the best manager of funds invested in 
risk.  
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Not only did firms earn profits from their undertakings, but the moneys were derived in 
part from siphoning other funds intended for public aid. Reverend Burr of a Roxbury Baptist 
church was scandalized to find that money distributed for charity relief to members of his 
congregation had been used in part to pay their insurance premiums. “[I]t dawned on him that he 
was paying the salaries of the agents and officers of these insurance companies, for a large part 
of the money distributed went to these companies,” reported the Boston Daily Globe.103 At the 
legislative hearings, Burr testified that nearly three fourths of those the church assisted carried 
industrial insurance, presenting what he and other clergy interpreted as a disgraceful waste of 
consecrated funds. The pastor’s dismay reflected a common dilemma among charity workers. 
Cash relief had educational value in helping the morally righteous poor learn financial 
competence, but the corrupt poor might spend it badly, on luxuries and foolishness instead of 
necessities. That to Reverend Burr insurance represented a corrupted purchase indicated a 
fundamental disagreement with the companies’ self-appointed moral status. The industry was not 
being trusted to provide a moral necessity; their type of assistance was not public aid.  
To those who studied the question carefully, industrial insurance purchased in the free 
market simply cost too much to accomplish the social goals among the poor that it professed to 
achieve. Social workers and reformers increasingly took issue with the contention that insurance 
taught thrift, and that those unable to meet their premiums were too shiftless to learn. The 
epigram coined by railroad executive (and insurance director) J.J. Hill that poverty was caused 
not by the “high cost of living” but by the “cost of high living” incensed social reformers. 
Nevertheless, it found its corollary in lectures and statements of insurance personnel. In an 1898 
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speech defending the cost of industrial insurance, Haley Fiske demanded to know what evidence 
existed “that money not spent for insurance would be saved in other ways?” Existing evidence, 
he insisted, was to the contrary. “Would it not rather go for beer or ribbons or newspapers or 
fraudulent insurance?”104  
An increasing quantity of evidence – including testimony from the hearings themselves -- 
challenged the presupposition that working households enjoyed an economic surplus sufficient to 
pay for beer or ribbons. Witnesses before the Massachusetts committee reported that in 
numerous homes, commercial insurance imposed a final burden on budgets already stretched to 
breaking. “There are times when five cents will save a family from starvation…” testified 
Reverend Burr. “These people are frightened into paying these five cents to the insurance 
companies. They fear the insurance agent as they do the sheriff.” 105 Social workers and clergy 
who encountered such families boiled with indignation at industrial insurers – and they came 
across such families often. Dr. Helen Mack testified poignantly about a mother of eight who 
“informed her that she had no money to buy medicine, as it required all the means she had to pay 
for the insurance on the lives of the children.”106 Dr. Florence Leach presented the committee 
with notes from medical visits, which included passages such as the following: “Family of five, 
father lazy and shiftless, wife goes out washing, children half grown, emaciated and thinly clad, 
no food in the house …  were paying 25 cents weekly for insurance, which they refused to give 
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up.”107  An agency system that induced employees to make sales no matter what the cost 
exacerbated the plight of precarious households, and while companies officially forbade agents 
from soliciting paupers, only the blurriest line existed between the “honest poor” and those in 
financial desperation. 
Social workers commenting on the proceedings insisted that insurance company 
solicitations in fact extended well beyond the line separating the poor from the desperate. The 
head-worker of New York City’s University Settlement reported that agents approached all 
dwellers of his quarter to peddle insurance -- “the tenant of the damp, unwholesome basement 
quite as much as the tenant of the airy, well lighted rooms on the third and fourth floors.” 108 
Some observers speculated that industrial underwriters intentionally tapped members of the 
lowest economic stratum, because fraternal aid associations, their closest competitors, refrained 
from soliciting the truly impoverished. Unhindered by social scruples, commercial agents were 
said to tempt paupers with stories about windfalls they would otherwise never receive. Wealth 
that would take a workingman eleven years to save, explained agents, might be attained after 
merely three months of payments to an insurance company – that is, if there happened to be an 
untimely (or timely) death.109 The commentary of social workers made it increasingly clear that 
any suffering incurred on behalf of industrial insurance had its origins squarely and purposefully 
with the tactics of the firms. It was not the parents who deprived their children of necessary 
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sustenance, but the insurance companies whose rapacious actions effectively murdered the 
weakest of the poor.  
Legislative exoneration notwithstanding, no industry could afford to let such damaging 
assertions go unaddressed, particularly a business whose growth and legitimacy hinged so 
strongly on its moral identity. In an 1898 article to the widely read Charities Review, Haley Fiske 
met the industry’s detractors head-on, publishing an exposition intended to clarify – and 
exonerate – the relationship between industrial insurers and the poor. “The time has come for 
charity workers and industrial insurance workers to understand each other,” declared Fiske. 
Explaining that insurance corporations functioned entirely on the safe principles of business, he 
stated that they “are not, and can not be, charitable institutions.”110 Industrial policies, he 
insisted, constituted nothing more coercive than a square and straightforward economic 
opportunity, a statement insinuating that social workers were themselves attempting to deprive 
the poor by opposing the practice. “The business springs from the desires, nay, the demands,” he 
wrote, “of the people and is not a business created by speculators and forced upon them.” Charity 
personnel and the industrial sales force, he continued, did not work among the same classes. 
Agents were forbidden from canvassing in the slums, and had been thoroughly trained to 
consider sanitary conditions, morality, and any other factors affecting the probable continuance 
of a policy. Industrial underwriters, he insisted, were vigilant gatekeepers who understood that a 
lapsed policy represented a loss to the company. 
Fiske was well-regarded for his oratorical success in the courtroom and in front of 
laymen, but his address to the Charities Review did not have the hoped-for mollifying effect on 
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American social workers, who responded to the article with months of agitated commentary. 
Even overseas commentators found Fiske’s reasoning unpersuasive. “The argument may seem 
more ingenious than convincing,” remarked one prominent British charity worker.111 Irritated 
New York City personnel rejected the contention that the companies provided insurance only to 
those who demanded it. Quoting the instructions issued to agents of Fiske’s own firm, one social 
worker reminded readers that insurance salesmen were expected to visit every family in their 
allotted district, “going from house to house, from floor to floor, from room to room, and 
repeating his visits till every person is secured.” “Does this sound as though the people were 
demanding admittance to industrial insurance?” she asked tartly.112  No wonder the slums were 
insured. The only means-testing that salesmen appeared to apply was the capacity of clients to 
pay the first premium, a sum that enterprising agents occasionally extracted from their own 
pockets.  
Much as charity personnel condemned the activity of agents, they directed the bulk of 
their scorn toward the firms themselves, noting the ways in which the policy of “squeezing” 
agents made the exploitation of customers implicit in the corporate business model. “The 
treatment of the people by the agents, and the treatment of the agents by the companies are two 
phases of the same question,” one writer noted.113 That agents peddled insurance to dwellers of 
slums – and did so by hook and by crook -- was a matter not of accident but of design. To some, 
this came as no surprise. The firms, after all, were businesses, and sentimental rhetoric to the 
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contrary, their status as financial institutions and profit-making corporations determined their 
economic bottom line. One Charities editor chastised his readers that companies did not make 
decisions based on moral grounds. “No business man would suppose for an instant that these 
corporations felt any obligation in the matter other than that of responsible business firms. So 
long as they can carry on their business legitimately and make money on it, it is of little interest 
to them, and of little interest to any similar corporation, whether the persons who buy their 
goods, in this case, their policies, are really benefited or not.”114 But others found the practice 
more inflammatory, reasoning that a system of private insurance that was unable or unwilling to 
pay for its own intelligent administration could not justify a continued existence. “We might 
have immediately an investigation of their present condition by the government,” suggested one 
settlement house director, a measure that the firms took great pains to avoid.115 
Regardless of who held the blame, the manipulation of the poorest poor on the part of 
industrial agents undermined the moral identity of the company and belied claims that industrial 
policies taught uplift through thrift. “Thrift by compulsion is not thrift at all,” noted one 
exasperated social worker.116 Indeed, discussion after the hearings lingered on the findings that 
“thrift by compulsion” lead to abuse of the charity system, and was not only educationally 
useless but socially corrupting. “I know a case where a policy was taken on the father of a 
family, and the children were sent out on the street to beg for money to pay the premiums,” 
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reported one incensed social worker. 117 Other writers submitted similar anecdotes. “I know of 
cases where the agent has had the ‘nerve’ to apply to a charitable society to pay the second 
week’s premium when he learned the society was helping the family.” 118 The stories prompted 
investigations by social work leaders such as Edward Devine, who reported with dismay that 
between 8 and 39 per cent of individuals whose families had recently received industrial claims 
were listed on the rolls of city charities. Many had been receiving assistance for several years. 
Moreover, the fact that all had succeeded in carrying their policies – lapse-free – to the end of 
their days, indicated that they were among the “better class” of the insured, and their numbers 
hinted ominously at the size of the population facing true hardship.119 Implied by the numbers 
was the enormous volume of charitable funds that had been used to pay premiums on policies 
that had lapsed, a colossal sum of money that now sat in the vaults of the mighty insurance 
companies.  
The child insurance hearings thus vastly reinforced public awareness of insurers’ 
iniquities in the handling of wealth, and challenged industry claims that private insurance was 
the best method to aid the struggling poor. “An observer can not but see that somewhere or other 
there has been an enormous profit in the industrial insurance business,” remarked one more mild 
observer.120 Policyholders of both branches had long understood that they paid far more in 
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premiums than they ever received in benefits.121 Company accounting indicated that some of the 
money went to administrative costs, some went into the surplus, and some was distributed to 
stockholders as dividends. All such uses represented valid uses of industry funds, but the stinging 
fact remained that money collected in the name of widows and orphans had been disbursed in 
other capacities, and that only a fraction of it reached the beneficiaries for whom it was intended. 
“Without entering into statements of percentages which might be disputed on technical grounds, 
it may be said to be evident that the insured pay to the companies as a class far more than their 
survivors receive back on the surrender of their policies,” noted a writer in the Tribune.122 Such 
facts were damning enough in the context of ordinary insurance policies, which were held by a 
class of people understood to possess the financial stability to keep together hearth and home, but 
the financial iniquities between industrial firms and the working class highlighted during the 
hearings stirred deeper public hostilities. In the industrial branch, administrative costs alone 
could consume a minimum of 40% of company earnings.123 To the offended onlooker, it 
appeared that the companies were outright bilking the poor.  
Even when the companies could prove that their high premiums did not intentionally 
swindle the poor, critics continued to point up illicit cash cows being milked by greedy insurers. 
Social workers compared the predation of insurers to that of pawn shops and chattel mortgages. 
A common accusation contended that industrial insurers turned a profit by encouraging lapses 
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among the working class. On its face, the claim held merit. The financial instability of industrial 
consumers caused buyers to drop their policies so frequently that one agent called it axiomatic 
“that the lapse usually begins with the sale.”  In 1901, 41% of industrial policies lapsed in their 
first year; in 1905, 51% of all Met Life policies lapsed.124 Though the company had collected 
premiums on each of these policies, it never paid back such funds to beneficiaries, resulting in a 
surplus of moneys in favor of the firm. Infuriated social workers argued that the companies thus 
preyed on the precarious fortunes of the poor, using money forfeited from lapses to build their 
tremendous office towers and to over-pay their prosperous executives.   
No amount of exonerating evidence or declarations of corporate innocence could put such 
accusations to rest. Industrial insurers argued that the administrative costs of opening a policy 
were so high that the company in fact lost money on lapses, and that the frequent collections of 
premiums made it easy for an industrial policyholder to miss a payment. “When it is considered 
that an industrial policyholder has fifty-two opportunities in a year in which to lapse, whereas in 
the large policy companies he has only from one to four times… we have no hesitation in saying 
that a comparison between the two systems is favorable to our business,” asserted Haley Fiske.125 
Nevertheless, the public harbored enduring memories of agents who earlier in the century had 
encouraged customers to default by giving out false information spreading rumors about 
company insolvency. Those practices had unequivocally turned a profit for insurers, and they left 
behind an aftertaste of suspicion that was reawakened (and enhanced) by the findings 
surrounding the Massachusetts hearings. 
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The intangible nature of insurance contracts compounded popular skepticism. While 
other products purchased by the poor could be seen and touched and placed on shelves, insurance 
policies remained largely conceptual. Those who spent their weekly pennies on policies and 
received only a slip of paper to symbolize the investment viewed the companies with deep 
suspicion. Executives found themselves at pains to remind buyers that insurance itself 
represented a commodity, and that customers had purchased security for their cash. At the 
Massachusetts child insurance hearings, Haley Fiske attempted to offer an analogy. “Just as the 
man who has bought a loaf of bread and has eaten it up; he has had his money; he has had his 
insurance.”126 To a person such as Fiske, who was accustomed to thinking of risk as a 
commodity, such an explanation would have been fair and satisfying, but it sat badly among 
laymen. Many policyholders felt that they had “lost” by outliving their policies, a sense that 
renewed long-held misgivings about the relationship between insurance and gambling.  
In defense of Industrial Insurance, Haley Fiske employed the analogy that industrial 
policies served as insurance sold at retail, whereas ordinary policies were purchases made at 
wholesale. The difference in cost and benefits between the two was a matter of economics, he 
claimed, not greed.  Affluent consumers who paid for their protection in quarterly or annual 
installments generated fewer administrative costs, and did not require the services of an agent to 
collect payments at the family home. Industrial policies, on the other hand, allowed consumers to 
pay out smaller sums but were enormously labor-intensive. Industrial agents made a minimum of 
fifty-two visits per household per year and conducted at least as many transactions, each of 
which had to be monitored and catalogued. A legion of clerks labored to chart the financial 
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exchanges of every agent and policyholder. The process was expensive, but it was also the only 
practice that had ever made insurance accessible to the poor at all.127 Increasingly, social 
reformers cast about for what seemed like fairer and more affordable alternatives to commercial 
insurance, and increasingly they suggested the potential benefits of state sponsored insurance.  
 
A Federal Damacles 
The hearings concluded to the advantage of the insurers.128 While they won the battle, 
however, industrial companies had not settled the point that industrial insurance could serve as 
the best possible method of safeguarding the poor. Massachusetts turned down legislation 
prohibiting child insurance, establishing a precedent (as insurers had hoped it would) among all 
other states to accept the morality and legality of industrial insurance. But the seeds of doubt had 
been planted as to whether private insurance represented the best method of providing the 
resource. When the Massachusetts inquiry concluded, a former candidate for state governor 
noted to the Boston Globe that the course “most in the line of evolution” and most logical to 
pursue was for the state “to absorb the insurance business of all the companies, and supply the 
people with insurance at cost.”129 It was the type of suggestion likely to provoke a seismic 
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rebuttal on the part of the private insurance industry, and evidence -- both during and after the 
hearings -- indicated that it did.  
While the Massachusetts hearings delved primarily into public anxieties surrounding 
child welfare, their predominant theme was a wider indictment of industrial insurance on a 
commercial basis – an indictment that officers of the large industrial companies both feared and 
predicted. Though poorly organized and sporadically trained, social workers constituted a 
formidable opponent to the life insurance industry, as the moral legitimacy of the field was 
stronger than that of insurers. No matter how well it managed its rhetoric, the contradictions 
between corporate profit and social uplift remained moral liabilities for the industry; no such 
fissures plagued the moral career of social workers. In private, Haley Fiske referred to his 
opponents as “the long haired men and the short-haired women” and as “busybodies who do not 
know what they are talking about,” but like his colleagues, Fiske was well aware that no group or 
individual could have had more credibility than employees of a social service agency and that the 
criticisms aired at the hearings were likely to have tremendous weight. Twenty-seven years later 
he recalled that the six most terrible weeks he had ever endured “were passed in Boston in 
1895.”130 These were the weeks he spent deflecting and delegitimizing the evidence submitted by 
welfare personnel that the hazards of industrial life outstripped the capacity of private insurance 
to manage working class risk. Commercial policies were at best a stop-gap measure (and at worst 
a form of economic exploitation) until more comprehensive solutions to the problem of 
spreading risk could be attained. 
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The most damning of all potential solutions electrified Germany in the 1880s when the 
Kaiser passed a series of national insurance programs for workers that provided burial and 
sickness benefits to the majority of workers. As nothing else could, the example of social 
insurance resolved the contradictions posed by commercial insurance in the competitive market 
place, prompting policy discussions among reformers across north America, Europe, and 
Australasia.131 In the United States, analysis of the practice began in earnest as early as 1893, 
when scholars and reformers began to investigate and publish on the successes and failures of the 
German system.132 Most businessmen and many reformers dismissed such developments as 
anathema to the American spirit of self-reliance -- not to mention the nation’s Democratic 
process -- but the example that it provided thrust a troubling shadow over the insurance debate. 
To private insurers, social insurance represented a federal Damacles, poised to destroy the 
market entirely if it were to gain enough favor to pass into law in the United States.  
Evidence suggests that the Industrial Three went to great lengths to prevent onlookers 
from reaching the conclusion that government insurance might be a more efficient or equitable 
means of managing risk. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the 
Massachusetts complainant against the firms, was so materially under-resourced that it possessed 
only one lawyer, its own counsel. Nevertheless, the three leading insurance firms pooled 
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resources to defeat it. Together, John Hancock, the Prudential, and the Metropolitan Life 
dispatched six trial lawyers to defend the industry and prevent “unfriendly” legislation, selecting 
Haley Fiske to head the team.133 Although no industry spokesperson would have publicly stated 
the wider importance of the proceedings, the senior executives of all three companies remained 
in attendance in Boston for the hearings’ entire duration, occupying prime seats in a gallery 
packed with “earnest, pushing agents,” a statement stronger than any other on the wider 
importance of the hearings.134 
Some of the firms’ efforts to distract attention and credibility from their opposition went 
beyond what was visible – or acceptable -- to the public. Allegations drifted across the hearings 
that the Industrial firms harassed or intimidated witnesses. One doctor who had testified in favor 
of the bill reported under oath that she had been followed by detectives after her appearance at 
the legislature, a possibility which the insurance companies vigorously denied.135  Other 
accusations circled that the companies had bribed members of the House to cast votes in 
opposition to the bill.136 Under oath, Haley Fiske later admitted to having paid the Boston 
newspapers a dollar a line to print the testimony of his defense, protesting that newspapers 
sympathetic to social reformers had printed all the evidence against the firms “in flaring 
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headlines.”137  The firms believed that in order to win the dispute, they would have to make sure 
the papers printed their own testimony. Of a total expenditure of $40,000 on the hearings, Fiske 
estimated that the majority went to the newspapers, a sum that demonstrated the determination of 
the industry to control the debate surrounding industrial insurance, no matter the cost.  
Firms dismissed suggestions for social insurance as “socialist” and uninformed, but they 
represented an attitude of thought that was gaining ground. Worldwide, nations sought solutions 
to the growing industrial misery of the working class, and increasingly they tested solutions that 
were state-based. Injury compensation laws in Austria (1887), Hungary (1891), and Norway 
(1894) leant validity to the German insurance model, and before the end of the century they 
would be adopted by Finland, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark, France, Spain, and New Zealand.138  
Haley Fiske, like all the industrial executives, kept closely abreast of these developments, 
and spoke out against them. He described the German system as “naïve” and “a complete 
failure.” Late in the century, when Massachusetts adopted a resolution to investigate the national 
insurance systems of several countries, Fiske stated that he hoped the resolution would pass so 
that “a competent and trustworthy commission” could “put an end, for many years, to any notion 
of government insurance in this country.”139 When such investigations did occur, however, they 
rarely pleased the industrial firms. In fighting against state legislation and in stifling discussion 
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of state-sponsored insurance, the large firms found themselves swimming ever harder against a 





CHAPTER 3: THE BURDEN OF RISK 
In 1897, Harvard professor Francis Peabody remarked to his class of future social 
workers that modern forces had created “a new world.” The new American landscape, he 
observed, was composed of “complexity and intensity, of shifting populations and industrial 
agitations, of enormous increases of wealth and alarming congestions of poverty.” To Peabody, 
as to his students, the new world was beset “with problems so unprecedented that no wisdom of 
the past can be sufficient to interpret them.”1 
Mass manufacture and industrial processes had introduced abundant goods and services, 
but they had also created difficulties of astonishing scope. The United States, for instance, had 
become one of the most dangerous nations in the world in which to be an industrial worker. 
Accidents caused over 57,000 fatalities in 1901, 8,000 of which occurred on the railroads, where 
conditions were so dangerous that they resulted in tens of thousands of additional injuries.2 Some 
of the maimed included passengers and managers, but the majority of accidents befell wage-
earning employees, who endured a disproportionate exposure to risk in nearly all of the 
industries that fueled the industrial economy.3 In addition to the devastation it wreaked on human 
workers, the industrial economy had created belching cities, denuded countryside, and growing 
piles of offal from meatpacking processes. Onto this landscape poured a stream of bewildered 
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new arrivals from other lands, who took up residence in cities and mining towns, and went to 
work in factories, foundries, and on farms. In New York State alone, one million immigrants 
settled into new homes in the years between 1890 and 1910.4 The languages and customs of the 
newcomers, together with the rapid urbanization of the native population, fostered changes that 
Americans had never before faced.  
The solutions of the past seemed as insufficient as its wisdoms. Wage workers and their 
supporters sought a voice of protest against the social inequalities that troubled their lives, 
creating a backdrop of labor upheaval. Membership in unions increased precipitously. In 1890, 
trade unions numbered 250,000. By 1899, that number had jumped to 600,000, and from there it 
tripled by 1904.5 Workers engaged in 23,000 strikes between 1880 and 1900, a rate that averaged 
three new strikes a day for a period of twenty years.6 In the early 1890s, National Cash Register 
had its factory set ablaze three times.7 Employers responded to the unrest by mounting defenses 
that were sturdy and often provocatively militant. The Pittsburgh Coal Company employed up to 
308 police officers at a time, spending over $670,000 on security in two years. Blacklisting, 
strikebreakers, and the assistance of hired thugs served as additional methods to subdue the 
demands of labor, as did the marshalling of state troops. While these tactics were at times 
effective in suppressing individual sites of employee resistance, they were of dubious utility in 
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quelling the wider demands for reform. Into the new century, trade unions continued to 
proliferate and workers continued to mobilize. 
 The social climate created a paradox for the life insurance industry. On the one hand, the 
risks and vulnerabilities that suffused the lives of American workers greatly assisted in the sale 
of policies. Lacking traditional structures of support, immigrants and urban dwellers turned to 
organized forms of insurance in vast numbers, quadrupling the membership of fraternal orders 
and boosting sales of commercial insurance to unheard of heights. By the 1890s, the life 
insurance industry had achieved almost unprecedented wealth and size. Yet the atmosphere of 
unrest also worked against the industry. The size and strength of the commercial firms provoked 
populist misgivings. The long hours and low wages of ordinary workers juxtaposed poorly with 
the wealth of big business, and although the insurance companies described themselves as 
“good” corporations, their stature curried little favor among citizens who felt their own political 
and social power diminishing. Moreover, the competitive and audacious conduct of the firms did 
not square with their claims of public munificence. As consumers and employees alike turned 
their anger against large corporations, the life insurance firms found that the very milieu that so 
increased their sales also undermined their public standing and corporate stability. 
This chapter will examine the shadow cast over the life insurance industry by the late-
century social upheaval and subsequent reform efforts, and the ways in which the firms sought to 
counter these threats by attempting to maneuver both with and ahead of the times. Historians 
have commented extensively on the efforts of business to create stability during the tumultuous 
years surrounding the turn of the 20th century.8 In The Triumph of Conservatism, Gabriel Kolko 
                                                       
8 Much of this commentary arises in response to questions about the nativity and purpose of reform efforts during 
the progressive era, a conundrum which reaches back almost to the era itself. In The Age of Reform: From Bryan to 
 152 
famously theorizes that the control of business over politics served as one of the most enduring 
legacies of the period. “In the long run,” Kolko remarks, “key business leaders realized, they had 
no vested interest in a chaotic industry and economy in which not only their profits but their very 
existence might be challenged.”9 Among those who felt the challenges most distinctly were the 
life insurance firms, which took abundant measures to protect first their business autonomy and 
then the sanctity of the private insurance market itself. Hoping to create conditions of security 
and predictability, the firms engaged in what Kolko has termed “political capitalism.” Rather 
than give the appearance of self interest by openly fighting measures that might impinge on their 
financial freedom of overall prosperity, insurers went to elaborate lengths to work within the 
political structure, sculpting regulation that would best benefit the firms. For insurers intent on 
preserving their public image, the best way to thwart change was to channel it.  
Skillfully and often with considerable delicacy, insurers utilized political outlets to 
improve their long-term interests. In the 1890s, one of the fundamental aims of insurance 
executives was to protect their companies’ investment autonomy. Despite their identities as 
public institutions, devoted to the protection of widows and orphans, the main economic task of 
the life insurance firms was the aggregation of capital. To safeguard the freedom with which they 
engaged this function, firms engaged in advanced political practices, complicated public 
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relations, and impressive marketing techniques. Companies forged ties with figures such as 
judges, party bosses, and elected officials. They also evolved an investment structure so intricate 
that it could barely be traced by outsiders. Utilizing their image as benevolent trustees and public 
servants, they monitored and managed public sentiment, adjusting corporate policies to meet 
changing consumer expectations. To reduce public skepticism about their conduct, they moved 
away from habits of cutthroat competition, demonstrating more effective capacities for 
cooperation and restraint by developing habits of coordinated action. For a time, these efforts to 
bolster stability protected the life insurance business from political attacks, and rationalized the 
existing political economy.  
The strategy was not effective indefinitely, however. Following trends seeded in Europe, 
American reformers began to suggest that the management of risk should be shifted from private 
industry to the public domain, where it could be administered more widely and more efficiently. 
Claiming that the hazards of modern life and the inequities of wage work created a structural 
burden too heavy for ordinary citizens to support, reformers noted that the benefits of insurance 
were so crucial that administration of the practice should not be left to the commercial market. 
Experiments with social insurance in Europe were already providing examples of a better 
system. To those who favored it, the system promised to redistribute risk so that no class of 
citizen would have to struggle under crushing wages and uncertainty, constituting a permanent 
underclass, while a lucky few enjoyed security and wealth. Thus freed, all citizens could 
participate equitably in democratic processes. Proponents of social insurance believed that such 
measures would assuage labor unrest and alleviate the problems of industrial society. Opponents 
argued the opposite, claiming that state insurance would undermine democracy by opening the 
floodgates of socialism. Labor upheaval, they argued, would become more pronounced, because 
 154 
a show of weakness by the state would release the energies of the dangerous hordes. Officers in 
the American life insurance industry took an even dimmer view. For them, state insurance 
presented the possibility of total ruin. Government intervention in the insurance market 
constituted not only a challenge to free market capitalism, but for the Industrial branch, the 
possible annihilation of the private market itself. In this shifting intellectual atmosphere, new 
strategies of social and political action would be required to preserve their business autonomy. 
 
Influencing Government Oversight 
Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, hardly any commercial life insurance firm in the 
United States existed solely for the protection of orphans and widows. The real potency of the 
business came from returns from investments made from policyholders’ cash, and the principal 
goal of most companies was not consumer trust but investment freedom, not profit but growth. 
Companies advanced as the dividends they received from investments increased. The influx of 
capital in turn amplified a firm’s powers as an investor, which increased its dominance within the 
investment market. The more capital a company was able to control, the more power it gained to 
create the best investment opportunities. To become the biggest player in this competitive world 
suggested the possibility of controlling the market itself, a prospect that made financial 
supremacy the plum for which executives strained.10  
                                                       
10 Policyholders groused justifiably about the companies’ greed, but several of the largest and most powerful 
companies were, strictly speaking, not concerned with making a profit. A large proportion of life insurance 
companies were mutually held, meaning that policyholders controlled the company, and no stockholders existed to 
whom officials were responsible.  Theoretically, all such a company needed to do to remain viable was to meet its 
obligations to policyholders. If its actuarial tables were sound and its investments secure, this represented a modest 
goal, particularly given the amount of time during which the company accrued interest on its customers’ premium 
payments. With the exception of fraternals, no insurance endeavor ever operated this way.  
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In the 1890s, a series of conglomerations in American business expanded the nation’s 
economy exponentially, and with it the financial power of the life insurance industry. Railroads, 
shipping, and extraction industries such as copper and steel underwent sizable reorganizations, 
including horizontal and vertical integrations that increased their efficiency and cut costs. 
Between 1893 and 1900, 4277 firms fused into 257, a series of consolidations that generated 
astonishing wealth and ample opportunities for further investment.11 Such conglomerations 
required financing, however, including the flotation of significant securities. Life insurance 
firms, whose funds were not subject to call for long periods of time, proved especially attractive 
as sources of capital to investment bankers seeking to take part in these transactions.12 The 
courtship was mutual. Close connections with banking houses helped the firms to acquire or 
create financial subsidiaries that could purchase stocks, make collateral loans, and participate in 
syndicate operations in securities – operations that they were prohibited by law from engaging 
in, but which executives realized could be transacted by alternative corporations. The financial 
affiliations widened investment opportunities, enhanced the firms’ stability, and expanded their 
reach and power.13 Already a key source of capital undergirding America’s second industrial 
revolution, the financial capacity and business connections of the insurance firms in the 1890s 
made them significant powerbrokers in the largest industrial economy on the face of the earth. 
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The business alliances forged during this time involved many of the nation’s most 
powerful economic figures, including such titans as J. Pierpont Morgan, E.H. Harriman, Thomas 
Fortune Ryan, Chauncey Depew, and J.J. Hill. A formidable group, these men had amassed their 
fortunes and honed their skills through the management of one of the railroads, the earliest and 
most sophisticated of American corporations. Rail managers worked within an enterprise that 
was complicated, diverse, and spanned great distances, and thus which provided a fertile training 
ground for future insurance magnates, who developed the skills and shrewdness necessary to 
oversee major concerns.14 Having cut their teeth on the roads, they moved to the life insurance 
industry, a similarly challenging (and lucrative) field. They quickly found their footing. Between 
1896 and 1904, the assets of the life insurance industry doubled from $1.2 billion to $2.4 billion, 
outpacing even the railroads that had schooled their management.15 Jointly, by 1905 the 
companies had in force approximately $14 billion of insurance, a sum equal to 12% of the total 
national wealth, and exceeding the total value of all manufactured products, as well as the value 
of the railroads.16 At that time, one half of all American savings were tied up in the life insurance 
industry, which had become the most important backer of the nation’s corporations.17  
For some Americans, the presence of railroad executives and men of high finance on the 
boards and administrative rolls of insurance firms provoked misgivings. The moral imperatives 
of life insurance juxtaposed uncomfortably with the negative reputation of Wall Street and the 
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Roads, (which had become notorious for their undemocratic rates), a contrast that helped to feed 
popular anxiety about the honesty of the firms. Vast accumulations of wealth created disturbing 
opportunities for corruption, and often appeared unseemly to Americans accustomed to 
associating virtue with hard work. The sentiment invited unfavorable comparisons. Their 
gigantism of the life companies placed them on par with the size of the more notorious business 
amalgamations of the era, and even their wide spatial dimensions struck many Americans as 
overwhelming. In their impersonality, the companies clashed with the national ideal of the 
yeoman farmer as the model citizen, and in their reach they seemed inescapable to persons 
yearning for a simpler time.18 
The realities of the late-century economy did little to quell popular unease. Mounting 
inflation through the 1890s created a burden on the budgets of ordinary citizens, and the 
industrial combinations increased the cost of living. Popular magazine such as the Nation, and 
Arena reflected an increasing agitation over concentrations of wealth. In 1891, the Forum 
published an article entitled “The Coming Billionaire,” in which author Thomas G. Shearman 
estimated the aggregate wealth of seventy Americans to be $2.7 billion, and pointedly noted that 
four fifths of American families earned less than $500 a year. Other writers of the period warned 
of imminent catastrophe, which they predicted would be delivered by the social unrest created by 
such financial inequity. The growth of populism in the West bolstered their position, as did the 
activity of eastern unions and the rise of what some considered to be labor radicalism. By the 
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presidential elections of 1896, supporters of William Jennings Bryan were issuing calls to 
Americans to protect the Republic against plutocracy and centralized wealth.19 
The managerial activities of the firms did little to mollify detractors. In 1891, the New 
York Times exposed a raft of irregularities at the New York Life when it investigated allegations 
against the company’s president, Winston Beers.20 A subsequent inquiry by the New York 
Insurance Department revealed that Beers had paid himself $2,800 for attending trustee meetings 
and had compensated himself with annual $50,000 bonuses in addition to his salary of $75,000. 
Numerous well-paid positions at the New York Life turned out to be staffed by brothers-in-law 
and sons-in-law of company executives, prompting writers to the New York Times to ask 
rhetorically whether Beers’ actions were truly the result of the “high and lofty motives” he so 
often claimed to possess. Disclosures also involved the “services of a well-known lobbyist,” 
whom Beers had retained in Albany to influence life insurance legislation.21 Newspapers 
condemned the executive as “crafty, cunning, and avaricious,” and even New York Life’s own 
board of directors admitted that the business of the company had “outgrown the methods and 
checks now in use.” 22  Citing ill health, Beers tendered his resignation, but his removal did little 
to eradicate “Beersism” from the life insurance business – or any other corporate field.  
It did, however, satisfy his critics. The disclosure of New York Life’s irregularities 
created an outcry, but like many such instances the incident was ultimately a tempest in a teapot, 
salved for the most part by rhetoric and resignations. It would be a mistake to assume that 
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Americans of the progressive era (or any era) were anti-business. The entrepreneur served as a 
figure of romance and progress in the cultural mythos, which included a promise of class 
mobility.23 Most residents hoped to participate more fully in the economic prosperity; they 
sought to benefit from the means of production, not to destroy them.24 In the pro-business 
atmosphere of the United States, social anxiety about the power of large corporations mounted 
only slowly, and the censure directed toward corporations remained largely periodic. Although 
public disapproval could be inflamed by episodes of corruption, the deeper implications of policy 
and business jobbery were not yet widely considered, or grasped. 
In any case, only a loose network of supervisory laws existed for firms to transgress. As 
historian Richard McCormick has noted, regulation in the 1890s “was more argued than 
practiced.” Regulatory policies were discrete and piecemeal, and those involving insurance firms 
focused almost exclusively on company solvency.25 Political leaders found it increasingly 
expedient to tap corporate wealth as sources for election funds (laws to the contrary 
notwithstanding). In 1897, 95% of the campaign contributions that helped Frank Swett Black 
into power as governor of New York State were derived from corporate sources.26 Businesses 
found that this arrangement had reciprocal advantages. Donor companies received government 
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favors, such as the public franchises and privileges that allowed them to prosper. McCormick 
explains: “Corporations that needed privileges but abhorred effective state regulations offered to 
buy the policies they wanted. Those in power sold them willingly and secretly, while at the same 
time they forestalled measures of regulations and administration through which the government 
might have recognized an industrial society’s conflicts of interest.”27 Few citizens had more than 
a rudimentary understanding of the alliance between businesses and politicians, and fewer still 
seemed to care. Even Theodore Roosevelt remarked in his autobiography, “It was not until I was 
elected governor that I myself came to understand it. We were still accustomed to talking of the 
‘machine’ as if it were something merely political, with which business had nothing to do.”28 
Even those who apprehended the relationship often sympathized with business. 
The forbearance of states in establishing regulation was a grace that corporations hoped 
to preserve.29 One measure of doing so involved setting aside the internecine battles and 
cutthroat competition that had once been so common. Inter-company warfare was wasteful, and 
demoralizing to all involved. Within the life insurance industry, the Big Three engaged their 
legal counsels in joint efforts to broker arrangements for peace; in 1895 they signed an anti-
rebating agreement, and later attempted to establish “regulated competition” by setting a limit on 
the amount of insurance written each year, a move which would cut burdensome costs.30 Few of 
these covenants lasted long, but the willingness of companies to engage in them at all signaled an 
important shift in competitive practices. Firms also reevaluated their negative advertising 
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campaigns, particularly those that enlisted the insurance press to belittle competitors. Buying the 
press was an expensive endeavor, and rarely a lasting one.31 The abandonment of libelous 
practices freed money for other uses and aided in alleviating public suspicion.  It also helped to 
demonstrate the capacity of large insurers to patrol themselves, obviating the need for states to 
impose additional legislative oversight. 
Mild though their efforts may have been, states did promulgate supervisory legislation, 
each generating a skein of laws that came together into a knot of legal angst for the large 
insurers, whose agents conducted business nationwide. “At the beginning of every year,” 
remarked one insurance president, “I daresay it is the feeling of every executive officer… that… 
we shall be badgered and harassed to death in every state of the Union by the introduction of bad 
bills of every kind.”32 In both branches of the industry, firms called upon the new ethos of 
cooperation to meet such threats together. In the industry’s industrial arm, the main firms 
clubbed together to coordinate an organized lobbying system, each firm contributing according 
to its size. John Hancock donated 1/5 of the expense, while Metropolitan Life and the Prudential 
contributed 2/5 each. The lobbying activities involved influencing politicians and “motivating” 
company shareholders to vote in desired ways. “[W]e have found it more economical and more 
efficient,” remarked John Dryden of the collaborative system; “instead of working at cross 
purposes there is a concentration and uniformity of effort.”33 Collaborative or not, the economics 
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of the endeavor remained formidable. By 1904, the struggle against supervisory and legislative 
challenges had expanded the Prudential’s legal budget to more than $49,000, from less than 
$16,000 in 1899. Between 1896 and 1905, Metropolitan Life expended $48,000 in the same 
way.34 
Much as executives groused about the laws, their complaints focused more on the 
diversity of the measures and the cost of meeting (or defeating) them than they did on evitability 
of supervisory legislation. Most officers in big business, notes Gabriel Kolko, understood that a 
degree of state oversight was inevitable, even beneficial in that it would help to stabilize markets. 
“It was never a question of regulation or no regulation, of state control or laissez faire,” Kolko 
writes; “rather, the questions of what kind of regulation and by whom.”35 For the life insurance 
industry, the most desirable legislation would have been federal, as it would have reduced 
oversight to a single source. An 1869 Supreme Court decision, however, had removed life 
insurance from federal control by classifying life policies as contracts, not commerce. The 
decision left regulatory action up to the states, whose diversity of laws could be difficult to 
predict or track, and whose statutes could be far more destructive to industry interests that 
statutes passed at the federal level. Most state regulations, remarks Kolko, “were either 
haphazard or, what is more important, far more responsible to more radical, genuinely 
progressive local communities.”36 In 1896, executives in the industrial branch came together to 
lobby for federal regulation of the industry, hoping that centralized authority would reduce 
extremist proposals and eliminate the duplication of effort required to defeat them state by state. 
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The battle, however, was a losing one. State-based regulation would remain a bugbear with 
which the firms would contend, meeting legislative challenges with a continuing evolution of 
social and political suasion.  
When an economic downturn in 1893 intensified the financial anxiety of American 
workers, the importance of that suasion was tested yet again. In that year, a series of bank and 
railroad failures and the bankruptcy of nearly 15,000 companies pushed the unemployment rate 
to over 10%, ushering the nation into its first full-scale industrial crisis. Relief efforts in cities 
fell drastically short of the needs of the struggling population, and Americans seemed newly 
galled by the high cost of living that industrial combinations seemed to generate.37 When large 
insurers raised their premium rates in the midst of the turmoil, the increase struck policyholders 
as particularly impudent, and aroused a fresh wave of antagonism. “Not only do those damn life 
outfits make it difficult to collect on but now they go and jack up their charges,” complained the 
mayor of Ellington, Missouri to a local journalist. “I find that hard times cause people to be 
concerned about the cost of everything,” added the mayor, “and I know that it will only be a 
matter of time before the people will band together and take their fists and go after those evil 
insurance men if they don’t mend their ways fast.”38 Vitriol toward life insurance companies was 
nothing new, but the latest maledictions harnessed a change in the popular political philosophy 
that would significantly threaten the companies if they did not find a way to mitigate it. 
 
Consumer Unrest 
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The consumer outcry after 1893 highlighted not merely greed but the victimization of 
citizens at corporate hands, a preoccupation that reflected a wider movement for justice against 
the power of conglomerates. Newspapers shrilled about agents who disappeared with paid-up 
policies, leaving behind jilted customers with nothing to show for years of payments and no way 
of claiming benefits.  “You can find hundreds of victims in New York City alone who were 
defrauded and cheated out of their money by the Met Life Insurance Company,” reported a local 
to an informant for the insurance department. “There is a poor woman in 10 Forsyth St. who had 
her policy taken away from her on a flimsy excuse and in a few weeks was given a policy for 
half the amount, the poor woman did not discover the fraud until it was too late.”39 Already 
notorious for their stinginess, by the late 1890s the failure of insurance companies to engage in 
fair dealing or to deliver on promises of aid to the bereaved caused many to regard them as 
thieves. “The insurance companies are the highway robbers of the nineteenth century,” declared 
one politician.40 Theodore Roosevelt included insurance executives among his “malefactors of 
great wealth.”41 Rather than contributing to national progress, it seemed that the insurance 
corporations were diminishing the boundaries of freedom. 
The sentiment was of a piece with the 1890s democratic push for social equity, a 
campaign fostered in part by the populists and which encompassed significant enlightenment 
tropes regarding liberty and the rights of man. Reform-minded Americans increasingly 
maintained that the poor were not to blame for their poverty, echoing the theories of Rousseau 
that the responsibility for unemployment, destitution and illness lay not with the individual, but 
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with society. Questions of ethics became questions of policy; the burdens of the afflicted were 
not merely matters of misfortune, but of oppression. Amidst these circulating currents, 
Americans seemed to develop a heightened awareness of their own political power, 
demonstrating an increasing willingness to take action against unjust oppressors through 
mechanisms such as unions and courts. The abuses perpetrated by insurance firms found 
increasing scrutiny in the high offices and courts to which citizens drew their attention. In 
Kansas, policyholders sent bitter complaints to the Insurance Department, asking that the 
excesses of insurance executives be checked by placing limits on their salaries. Kansans 
objected, as well, to the outrageous commissions paid to agents, which sometimes composed as 
much as 90% of the first year’s premiums.42 In their entreaties to commissioners and politicians, 
such Americans displayed increased consciousness about the need for financial reform and 
government regulation of business. 
Insurance personnel were not insensible to this shift, and recognized that new strategies 
of social and political action would be required to preserve their business autonomy. Even agents 
expressed concern that the prevailing climate would lead to a stiffening of state oversight. “If we 
do not shortly start to mend our ways, the powers that be will bend us into a most confining 
mold,” noted William Lucas Benton, an underwriter for New York Life. “Policyholder 
opposition to the present marketing situation might well force the various state legislatures to 
take hasty and undesirable actions.”43 Company officers attempted to prevent the imposition of 
that “confining mold” by reinvigorating their aura of disinterested public service, a strategy they 
pursued especially vigorously in the industrial branch. In 1896, Haley Fiske introduced what he 
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called “the most generous offer… which the insurance world has ever known,” an agreement to 
loan policyholders the money to pay premiums that were in arrears. In 1898, the company 
answered long-standing criticism about its slow payment of benefits by opening a telegraph 
service for the payment of uncomplicated claims, and promising to deliver imbursement even on 
Sundays. Even these concessions paled in insurance circles in comparison to a joint measure 
initiated in 1897 by the Metropolitan and the Prudential to pay dividends to industrial 
policyholders whose contracts included no terms for such payment. Beginning that year, 
companies granted a disbursement to industrial customers every five years in the form of a 
week’s premium paid up on a company policy.44 Prudential, too, made certain that its 
munificence received public attention, a practice of publicity which the companies applied to 
every act of largess committed through the coming decade.  
When policyholders perished in national disasters, the industrial firms took pains to 
broadcast the extent of their “service” to the afflicted, assistance which generally constituted 
swift payments on the policies of the victims. The Johnstown Flood (1888), the San Francisco 
earthquake (1905), and the Triangle Shirtwaist fire (1911), constituted three such occasions.45  
Executives expected that these and other activities would provide evidence of a corporate 
commitment to social justice. The delivery of aid to the victims of disasters was intended to 
affirm their commitment to the equality of human condition. Such an egalitarianism was the 
foundation on which ordinary Americans based offers of aid and assistance to one another, and 
the efforts of life insurance firms to harness it constituted a notable effort to channel social 
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hostilities.46 That the attempt was ineffective reflected less on the capacity of the life insurance 
industry to impact social thought than it did on the occurrence of wider shift in the American 
social ideology, in which the burden of responsibility and the management of risk were shifting 
from the private to the public domain.  
 
The Atlantic Exchange 
As the groundbreaking work of Daniel Rodgers has established, the American critique of 
the social order was not an entirely indigenous process. In part, it had its origins overseas.47 
Beginning in the 1870s and cresting in the 1890s, a significant wave of American students 
traveled to the Continent to attend foreign universities, where their exposure to European social 
politics helped to infuse new ideas into the American social discourse.  
From the mid nineteenth century, European cities had been faced with the same casualties 
of industrialism that later afflicted in the United States, and alert citizens had grappled for 
solutions among the lights of science, professionalism, and natural law. Their observations of 
human suffering accentuated the significance of social interdependence, and reinvigorated a 
sense of enlightenment idealism that personal independence and the practice of democracy were 
contingent on basic equity. The grinding poverty of urban centers contravened theories of social 
equality and ran afoul of the natural dignity of human nature. In England, observers came to 
believe that the poor had been “unfairly and inadequately dealt with, their spirit of independence 
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crushed.”48 By late century, similar perceptions in France, Denmark, and England led to changes 
in the poor laws reflecting concerns about democracy. One onlooker summarized that the law 
“must not (as of old) violate the sense of independence among the poor.”49Asserting that the 
“fear of want” used to frighten paupers out of the work house impinged upon the spirit of human 
freedom, reformers petitioned for legal changes which would admit among citizens’ legal 
entitlements the “right to work.” It was hoped that the sense of security and fortune afforded by 
such guarantees would appeal to the natural dignity of the individual, moving him or her to 
surmount poverty. Supporters maintained that social solidarity should be the aim of every 
democratic government, that caring for the poor should be a public duty in recognition of the 
necessity of social equity.  
For many, the disturbing findings of Charles Booth reinforced apprehensions that poverty 
and equity were intertwined. From 1886 to 1903, Booth conducted a systematic investigation 
into the wages and costs of living of London’s working class, the final edition of his published 
work (Life and Labour of the People of London) stretching to seventeen volumes. The inquiry 
uncovered a harrowing sea of material want in England’s capital city, and demonstrated that a 
structural lack of opportunity lay behind much of the human misery. The evidence it provided 
did much to overthrow the assumption – inscribed in British poor law since 1834 -- that poverty 
resulted from personal failure.50 Booth’s findings “seriously disturb the comfortable belief of 
those who sometimes speak as though old age pauperism were largely the fault of the paupers” 
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noted one observer.51 Quite simply, the cost of living was no match for the wages of the working 
class under industrial conditions. A Cambridge professor exclaimed, “Can we expect such thrift 
from the unskilled laborers in towns whose average wage in consequence of irregularity of 
employment is scarcely, if at all, above that of the agriculturalists? Manifestly we can not.”52The 
report helped to transform social interpretations of destitution, as well as public understandings 
of the power and utility of scientific research methods.  
Booth’s findings and the responses they provoked fed into a growing critique of laissez-
faire that swirled through the intellectual centers of Europe. Visiting American students were 
startled to find that European thinkers did not give primacy to the system, and that they 
considered it to be one economic frame among many. American economic orthodoxy privileged 
laissez-faire as a product of “natural law,” a science like any other. Europeans, however, focused 
attention on the rights of man. While Americans sought the domain of natural law in the 
workings of the free market, Europeans sought it in the natural expression of human dignity and 
the exercise of human freedoms -- assets that they did not believe could be reliably or ethically 
delivered by the free market. German economists, in particular, challenged the American 
orthodoxy that laissez-faire was morally just and economically natural, or that it constituted the 
most efficient of financial and social systems. Insisting that the system be contextualized within 
its historical setting, they emphasized the theory’s origins in a British export economy. 
“Manchester economics,” they maintained, was not a universal approach to economics, and it did 
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not necessarily deliver the ethical social order with which Americans credited it.53 Economic 
function, they warned, ought be evaluated according to scientific tenets, to which end European 
mentors trained their students to utilize social investigation as a tool of political economy. 
Americans returned to their home universities steeped in reform idealism and scientific ideology. 
Their new habits of scrutiny and investigation contributed to the vogue and authority of social 
science, and set a model for academic engagement in the creation of national policy.  
Back at home, many of the foreign-trained academics argued for an increased role for 
government, collaborative with the economy. Professors such as Richard Ely assumed posts in 
American universities in the mid 1880s, from which they emphasized the importance of 
government as a tool through which social betterment could be achieved. The state was not, as 
classical economics held, an arrangement apart from society, but rather one that could (and 
ought) to serve as the ethical core that was absent from laissez-faire. More radical than some, but 
by no means alone in his philosophy, Ely suggested that the state be viewed simply as a 
“compulsory cooperative community,” similar to the cooperative associations so prevalent 
throughout the nation – although, of course, larger in scale. “The doctrine of Laissez-Faire is 
unsafe in politics and unsound in morals,” he pronounced in 188554 It was a statement seconded 
by numerous economists of his generation, and which set the group apart as one of the first 
significant groups willing to be antagonistic toward the market sector.    
Such economic theories did not always meet with the approval of established economists, 
nor were they strongly embraced by University presidents, who found themselves answerable to 
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trustees whose fortunes (and gifts) were derived from the free market. At leading universities 
from Cornell to the University of Michigan, anxious provosts and traditional economists rebuked 
their junior colleagues, in some cases even extracting ideological retractions.55 The social 
authority of American academics was clearly dwarfed by the power and scale of industrial 
capitalism, and for the sake of continuing their employment numerous younger economists 
softened their critiques.  
Nevertheless, their subsequent writings and scholarship fed into a shift in the American 
conscience about the role of the nation state in the national welfare. As it had in England, 
American responsibility for the poor rested on the local level, occupying the energies of parishes, 
families, townsmen, and friends likely to have contact with destitute individuals.56 This 
decentralized approach had excluded the federal government from responsibility for social 
welfare, a debarment that had opened the niche – ideological and economic – for self help 
mechanisms and, eventually, for the commercial life insurance industry. By placing 
responsibility for reform with federal government, the new outlook challenged the existing 
distribution of power and authority, an imposition guaranteed to attract a strong response from 
life insurance personnel seeking to preserve the vitality of their market.  
 
The Birth of American Social Work 
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Among those to most thoroughly embrace the imported methodology and ideology was 
the newest generation of American social reformers. Exposed at university to training in the 
scientific method, a rising generation of American charity workers came to see social 
investigation as a guiding light – one which often led to a critique of unbridled capitalism that 
was not unlike the one rendered by the era’s economists. By 1897, instructors such as Frances 
Peabody were encouraging students to “go behind the immediate problem of relief to the more 
serious inquiry as to causes,” and pointing to Charles Booth’s statistical study as an example of 
superior work.57 Newly hired to charity posts, graduates of such programs applied their 
quantitative skills in ways that fundamentally changed the focus of social reform. They 
scrutinized data on conditions affecting the poor such housing, wages, and health, searching for 
ways in which to make charity work more effective and efficient. The rigor and training required 
for such tasks encouraged the development of courses – and later schools – in the administration 
of charity. In the process, the avocation of providing social aid would become a profession and 
receive a new name: social work. 
The records examined by young social workers demonstrated social forces operating on 
many sides to breed poverty. Their study of social conditions confirmed the European finding 
that the sources of destitution adhered to recognizable patterns. A bout of illness often led to 
destitution among wageworkers when the incapacitated breadwinner was unable to purchase 
medicine or meet ordinary expenses. Poor diet and inferior housing conditions helped to bring on 
illness by enervating workers, and these were likewise often caused by insufficient wages. It 
was, some maintained, as though human society were itself an organism, adhering to a natural 
“law of development” that displayed its own rules for healthy functioning. If interrupted or 
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disordered, the social organism displayed malaise in the form of crime and poverty. Turning 
away from the philosophy that identified poverty as the result of personal failing, charity workers 
increasingly embraced a model that was structural, not moral, and that placed the workings of 
“natural” law outside of the competitive domain of laissez-faire. 
Such a theory presented significant challenges to businesses devoted to the free market, 
the life insurance industry in particular. By highlighting the role of wages and working 
conditions in the welfare of the body politic, the theory contributed to the sense that the laissez-
faire capitalism of large corporations was harming the poor. Moreover, it directly contradicted 
the version of risk that life insurers were selling. Companies based their sales appeals on the 
notion that risk occurred mainly at the level of the individual, through weak will and moral 
failings. Locating risk at the structural level absolved the individual of moral responsibility, and 
also called into question the efficacy of personal attempts to manage risk. Just as significantly, 
by rejecting the ethical presumptions of laissez-faire, the attestations of social workers eroded the 
moral presumptions on which the industry based its social identity. Insurance officers already 
understood that social workers could be a powerful foe. Members of the profession had 
demonstrated at the Massachusetts child insurance hearings in 1895 they were not afraid to be 
antagonistic toward the private sector. To the chagrin of company leaders, the outlook of social 
workers was one that received widening popular support.58 
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  Though the proceedings of 1895 had concluded in favor of the insurance industry, the 
issues they raised about the cost of living and the capacity of the working class to adequately 
manage risk persisted in the minds of many. Commercial life insurance companies sold policies 
to working class households with the assertion that setting aside weekly premiums was a simple 
matter of financial economy, declaring that the habits of thrift instilled by the custom would help 
to elevate the poor. Testimony from the hearings had contradicted these claims, but the proof 
was anecdotal, and without the reinforcement of demonstrable fact it could serve as only a 
starting point for the innovation of better methods. The decade following the hearings, however, 
saw a dramatic increase in the use of social science techniques by American reformers. Members 
of the social work profession increasingly engaged in formal conferences and investigations to 
explore solutions to social want. A series of small reports on working class households and the 
cost of living began to emerge in the pages of professional journals in the first years of the 
twentieth century, piquing the interest of those for whom the household budgets of the poor 
seemed to provide a key to wider solutions to the problem of poverty.59 
In 1906, the New York State conference of charities and correction convened a special 
committee on the standard of living to establish definite answers about what size income could 
reasonably enable private individuals to manage risk by setting aside insurance premiums or 
laying up money for a “rainy day.” Tasked with investigating “what constitutes the essentials of 
a normal standard of living,” the committee sent examiners door to door much in the style of 
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Charles Booth.60 In the report completed in 1907, the committee estimated conservatively that 
$825 was sufficient to support an average family of five, and that $900 - $1000 presented a 
“normal” American standard, allowing a family “to get food enough to keep the body and soul 
together, and clothing and shelter enough to meet the most urgent demands of decency.” Below 
such a standard, families manifestly did not have enough to meet their nutritional needs, and the 
few who succeeded in setting aside savings truly did engage in the “extravagant thrift” alluded to 
in the Massachusetts hearings. Such a family would be “unable to make any provision against 
accident or to lay by anything for a rainy day,” noted Frankel, adding to the committee’s 
conclusion that it was strictly impossible to live on less than $600 a year in New York City, 
“without deprivations and hardships compared with which race suicide, charitable relief, or 
strikes would be welcome alternatives.”61 A subsequent investigation of all available sources of 
American wage statistics found that fully one half of adult males in the industrial sections of the 
United States received less than $600 per year, and that wages had been practically stationary 
since 1890. The man on the street, noted a commentator, “will be loath to admit the fact that 
three-quarters of the male workers and 95% of the female workers earn less than two thirds of 
the amount necessary for physical efficiency and decent existence.”62 Earnings were barely 
enough to cover expenditures, a circumstance that Frankel had characterized not merely as 
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“absolutely squalor and misery,” but even less acceptably, as a “dearth of reasonable 
opportunity.”63  
For the claims of the life insurance industry, the data were damning. Under the conditions 
that prevailed, few members of the working class could be expected to meet their financial 
demands in an honest way, much less rise into a more comfortable class station. Social workers 
repeatedly noted the cleverness and thrift with which working class households squeezed “one 
hundred cents out of every dollar,” an observation that further belied industry claims that their 
policies curtailed waste. On the contrary, they seemed to confer the claims of Massachusetts 
social workers that such policies were waste. In an exhaustive analysis of the social utility of 
insurance, reformer I.M. Rubinow observed, “It is a selection between a possible deprivation in 
the future and a certain serious loss in the present which the payment of the premium requires.”64 
Under these conditions, industry claims about the affordability of their product and its important 
social function began to collapse. Solutions to the problem of poverty and destitution would need 
to take a broader, more systemic approach to the plight of the poor, and would have to contend 
with the economic realities a wage system that did not provide revenue commensurate with the 
prices of daily necessities.  
 
The Fellow Servant Law and the Distribution of Risk 
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 “There is no such thing as an American system of charity,” noted Harvard’s Francis 
Peabody in 1897.65 His was not a statement about benevolent impulses or attempts to relieve 
suffering, but about the lack of structure and organization of the American system. Peabody 
mused that modern reformers found themselves heir to a “confusing variety of types of relief,” 
and a “hopeless diversity of administration.”66 Government energies were restricted to foreign 
relations and to matters of national concern such as currency and the military, and authority over 
charity work extended little further than the municipal level. What centralization late-century 
social workers required, they would have to create themselves. 
Difficulties of reformers in extending he safety net were complicated by a theory of 
jurisprudence known as the fellow servant law that offered little recourse for the individual 
suffering created by industrial injuries. Common law practices based in England and passed 
down through American law stated that the employee was as likely as the employer to know 
about the dangers posed in the workplace, and was in a better position to guard against them. 
Legal statutes maintained that workers injured due to hazards that were obvious (exposed gears, 
boiling fluids) had only themselves to blame, and that those harmed through a misstep of a 
fellow employee should have corrected the maladroit coworker, and were therefore guilty of 
contributory negligence.67 In 1842, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw reinforced the standard by ruling 
that the employee assumed responsibility for “natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the 
performance of [the] services” as a normal part of entering into an employment contract. Risks, 
Shaw stated, included “the carelessness and negligence of those who are in the same 
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employment.”68 This standard placed the onus on the worker to demonstrate an employer’s 
negligence at the same time that it sharply restricted the responsibility of the employer for 
workplace risk. “The general principal of American law,” remarked Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
1881, “is that loss from accident must lie where it falls.”69 
The criterion made sense in the context of small workshops staffed by skilled laborers, 
but in the  impersonal and dangerous factories, mines, and railroads of the late nineteenth century 
it could seem ludicrously weak and unfair. The blast furnaces of modern steel mills could stand 
155 feet high and contain 600 to 1,000 tons of molten metals, dwarfing their human operators. 
The perpetual darkness of nation’s mines rendered the hauling mules blind.  Regular reports of 
severe accidents filtered out of both, piquing the audiences who paid attention to such details. 
One 1907 article, “Making Steel and Killing Men,” included a photo essay of the vault-like 
factory and imposing equipment responsible for numerous fatalities in United States Steel’s 
South Chicago plant, as well as the story of one young worker who received third degree burns 
on his face, neck, arms, forearms, hands, back, right leg, right thigh, and left foot, resulting in an 
agonized death three days later. Warning that no official figure accounted for the number of 
workers who were “merely” burned, crushed, or maimed, the journalist delivered a conservative 
estimate that 598 men were thus killed or wounded in 1906.70 The fellow servant law’s fey and 
fatalistic handling of blame contrasted so starkly with the gruesome violence of workplace 
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accidents that it provoked anger in those who witnessed it firsthand, and horror in those who 
heard and read about it. 
Public antipathy was compounded by the sense that, under modern circumstances, the 
fellow servant law reinforced inequalities. Though it may have been effective within the 
egalitarian limits of the small workshop, in a system of mechanized factories and surplus labor, 
few workers maintained control over their workplace conditions, rendering moot the fellow 
servant law’s demand for worker caution. Even those with an intricate understanding of the risks 
they faced had little opportunity to create safeguards. Because injury nearly always fell to the 
laborer, the fellow servant doctrine placed wage workers at a visible disadvantage. Few 
employees understood the law well enough to argue on their own behalf, and fewer still 
possessed the financial might with which to engage employers in a court battle in hopes of 
recovering damages.71 In a 1909 article in the Atlantic Monthly, social worker Frank Lewis 
estimated that only fifteen per cent of injured employees received any form of compensation for 
their injuries, though 70 percent of injuries were either the result of employer negligence or were 
due to inevitable risks of the work.72  
Onlookers who witnessed the hardship created by the fellow servant law under industrial 
conditions expressed alarm over the growing injustices heaped upon wage-earners. As one 
observer noted, the old rules of employee liability for personal accident seemed “grotesque in 
their unfitness to present facts.”73 For the mathematically-inclined, the law contradicted the 
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realities of randomness and probability. The fellow servant law presupposed that accidents 
occurred with an inevitable randomness, or else as the result of personal incompetence, but the 
patterned nature of workplace accidents suggested that there was nothing “natural” in the 
distribution of workplace risk.  Statistical surveys and even casual observation demonstrated that 
many industrial accidents occurred with predictable regularity, and could be avoided through 
simple safety precautions or improvements in manufacturing processes. This being the case, the 
question of fault or moral responsibility shifted from the laborer to the industrial system itself, 
making the burden placed on workers by the fellow servant law particularly odious. “Twenty 
years’ experience under the German act has made it clear that more than half of the industrial 
accidents are neither the fault of the employer nor of the employed,” stated one well-known 
minister and writer. Accidents, he declared, occurred “with the regularity of the tides,” and 
should be dealt with in a more regular manner.74   
The magnitude of suffering, combined with the increasing critique of laissez-faire and 
awareness of the structural determinants of risk prompted numerous Americans to question the 
justice and fairness of such a system, and to wonder whether government could serve as an 
appropriate tool for social betterment. In professional journals such as the Charities Review, 
social workers questioned the “ultimate obligations” of the government, which some maintained 
extended to the social welfare of the populous. In one 1898 editorial, reformer Frederick Wines 
warned that private philanthropic efforts might even be undermining social goals by relieving the 
government of its responsibilities. Schools, roads, monuments, and “other necessary or beneficial 
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acts” were natural government obligations.75 It was an outlook that many social workers and 
philanthropists would come to share.  
Some reformers even came to wonder whether the government might not possess a duty 
to offer succor. The fellow servant law, for instance, affected the poorest segments of the 
population so negatively under modern conditions that government inaction seemed 
undemocratic. Industrial accidents bolstered inequalities, and they happened among the poor 
with incredible frequency and terrible consequences. Self-help mechanisms such as industrial 
insurance seemed laughably weak if a single accident could thrust even an industrious and 
morally upstanding worker into lifelong dependence. Some onlookers noted that those who 
carried the greatest workplace risk seemed likely to become permanent economic inferiors, a 
possibility that challenged the American ideal of upward mobility and raised disturbing questions 
about the role of risk in an ostensibly free society. It was a rationale that linked the vitality of 
democratic governance to social reform, and which gained significantly in prominence through 
the early twentieth century. When it was first posed at the end of the 1890s, however, it was 
muffled amidst the piecemeal system then evolving into the social work professional 
infrastructure.  
 
The Creep of Socialism 
Commentators during the progressive era often referred anxiously to the existence of a 
radical or immigrant class that threatened to erode society, a class that suffered so greatly from 
the hazards of industrialism that  it harbored the impetus for class warfare. Magazine items 
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described urban centers as cauldrons of destitution, that were often as not “swarming” or 
“seething” with uneducated paupers and the down at heel, many of whom presented the nation 
with a radical menace.76 Actual immigrant communities rarely bore these warnings out, but it 
seemed to some that the labor movement did.  
Union membership and labor upheaval reached an all-time high in the decades 
surrounding the turn of the century, both in activity and in exposure. Strikes over sub-standard 
conditions came to seem like a regular feature of American life, and the muckrakers who 
reported on factory and mining practices established the industrial workplace as a battleground in 
an of itself. “A Greater number of people are killed every year by so-called accidents than are 
killed in many wars of considerable magnitude,” noted one writer in the journal Outlook. “It is 
becoming as perilous to live in the United States as to participate in actual warfare.”77  Not only 
did it seem to many that the masses were rising up, but to some it seemed that their rebellion was 
deserved, considering the horrendous conditions in which they toiled. In a 1903 article, captain 
of industry Andrew Carnegie remarked on the troubling relationship between capital and labor, 
and the number of Americans able to see for themselves that commercial conditions were not 
sound. “What increases their anxiety is the knowledge that in every part of the country working 
men are growing daily more dissatisfied and are girding up their loins for another great struggle 
with capital.”78 He warned about the great “menace of a labor revolt and a war with capital that 
will bring business to a standstill.” According to Carnegie, the first shots had already been fired 
by labor, and had been met in a most unsatisfactory manner by government injunctions intended 
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to prohibit men from striking. Many Americans (including authorities in the life insurance field) 
joined Carnegie’s outcry against labor’s attacks against the nation’s businesses. Orators and 
press outlets riled their audiences with warnings about the “socialist menace” brought about by 
labor unrest. By 1905, even Theodore Roosevelt expressed public concern over the supposed 
growth of Socialism.79 
Yet not all public sympathy fell to the preservation of free market capitalism. Though 
they condemned the militancy of the labor movement, many citizens expressed significant 
apprehension about the attitude of the country’s corporations toward the casualties of production. 
Too many companies failed to create their own provisions for injured workers, at the same time 
that they resisted state protections. Such neglect, noted critics, created an incubator for social 
upheaval and the growth of socialism. Even social scientists of European training, who had 
absorbed the lessons of the Atlantic Exchange and the rationale for government regulation of 
economic affairs, sounded alarms about the growth of socialism.  
John Graham Brooks, an outspoken Unitarian minister who had studied in Germany in 
the 1880s, authored one of the first American studies on social insurance in 1893, but warned in 
1903 of an impending American slide into socialism.80 The socialist sentiment of the working 
class, he cautioned, “strengthens day by day for many reasons, but for no reason just now more 
than this: the refusal of so many quasi-public corporations to accept proper social control.”81 
Brooks singled out the importance of viable forms of insurance with which to spread the risks 
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faced by workingmen and alleviate their plight. Injuries that deprived individuals of their 
capacity to earn should be justly compensated. Of all available remedies, he speculated, 
insurance had the greatest potential to satisfy “the growing ethical sense of society,” and yet the 
American method of indemnifying accidents by private contract was “as crude as it is abnormal.” 
Brooks looked to Europe for solutions, pointing out that most “civilized communities” outside 
the United States had already passed juster social legislation that adequately relieved the problem 
of industrial unrest. Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Norway, England, Denmark, England, 
France, and Italy had instated policies of social insurance that promised to mark what Brooks 
referred to as an “era of social improvement.” In the interest of averting socialism, he hoped that 
the United States would do the same. “While we await results, our task… is chiefly that of 
‘regulation’” he wrote; “to subject these forces to such control that human and social interests 
shall not be too much endangered.”82 
Proposals such as Brooks’ struck many as radical, and numerous onlookers held to the 
assertion that corporations could reform themselves. A growing body of reformers, however 
seemed convinced that the time for such actions had passed. Industrial accidents, noted one 
writer, could no longer be left to the capricious generosity of corporations. “An injury that 
deprives a man of half his working power should be recompensed in like proportion.”83 Either 
way, change was in the offing. “To sit idle is to rest on a volcano while underneath the fire 
burns,” warned Brooks. A contemporary added ominously, “Those four hundred thousand votes 
cast for Debs meant something.”84 Until large employers acknowledged their interdependence 
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with labor, the burden of risk they placed on private individuals would be too great to be socially 
supportable.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL CAPITALISM EXPOSED 
When former stockbroker Thomas Lawson decided to grind an axe against his erstwhile 
colleagues, he did so with astonishing effect. In his new hat as a journalist, Lawson took his 
grievances to Everybody’s Magazine, where, in salacious monthly installments, he exposed the 
misdeeds of the nation’s well-placed financiers. The popularity of the series defied all 
expectation. Whenever an edition contained one of Lawson’s reports, the magazine sold out in 
under three days. Throughout 1904, Lawson bent the ear of the American public with stories 
about the transgressions of Wall Street, and in mid-year he created a new stir by announcing that 
the American life Insurance industry was collusive with the Street’s lotharios. The carefully 
entrusted money of the nation’s policyholders was being used to fuel financial intrigues of 
colossal proportions.  
Lawson’s writing came amidst a wave of popular journalism known as muckraking that 
exposed and challenged corporate excess, often championing consumer justice. The movement, 
which crested between 1902 and 1912, paralleled the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, and 
came amidst rising demands for stronger state regulations for privileged corporations (though 
historians have noted that there was little new in their grievances).1 Though it extended back 
through the century, popular denunciation of “privilege” gained mainstream prominence through 
the efforts of muckrakers. For the life insurance industry, Lawson’s series proved to be merely 
the first in a parade of exposes in high-circulation magazines, exposes that generated a 
catastrophe in public relations and initiated a sea change in the way in which the companies 
would interact with regulators and the buying public. When even the mainstream press became 
interested in the issue, the alliances and exploitations described by newspapers shocked the 
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reading public, and in 1905 led to calls for a legislative probe to investigate charges of financial 
mismanagement and political collusion leveled by muckrakers.  
The subsequent proceedings exposed extent of the firms’ engagement in political 
capitalism, which included political engineering of titanic proportions. They also demonstrated 
that commercial insurance as it was practiced in the United States was a poor agent for the 
equitable management of risk, particularly for the working class. The weeks of the investigation 
laid bare almost every conceivable abuse of corporate power, including price fixing, insider 
trading, accounting malpractice, and a small fortune in contributions to the Republican Party. In 
addition, the findings revealed appalling inefficiencies and outright swindles in the 
administration of industrial policies. Nearly every element of the firms’ public rhetoric 
unraveled. They were no longer credible as trustworthy protectors or as refined financial trustees; 
they had betrayed both the protective and the speculative ideologies of risk on which their 
marketability had been based. In the industrial branch, overpriced policies had outright defrauded 
the poor, a finding that leant credence to the growing sense that the poor were indeed 
overburdened, and that social responsibility for their risk should be shared on a wider 
government level.  
 
The Era of Muckraking 
Muckraking was more a popular movement than an ideological one, and the writing that 
it engendered was at the same time less political and more conspiratorial than articles by social 
scientists like Brooks. Its main authors interrogated the relationship between politics and 
business and gave voice to the anxieties and frustrations of American consumers. Most 
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muckrakers, notes one historian, “were not socialists, utopians, anarchists, or labor leaders.”2 
They were not even necessarily anti-business. Many found support among civic-minded 
businessmen, who shared their concern about the behavior of their compatriots and hoped in 
some way to check it, if not through self-regulation then by some mild form of government 
intercession. While almost never self-identified champions of the poor, most muckrakers 
possessed an abiding sense of justice for the “common man.” While they claimed to seek change, 
however, they did not write policy. They were agitators, not reformers; journalists, not politicos. 
One pair of historians has called them “publicity men for reform.”3 
Daniel Rodgers posits that perhaps the gain in popular momentum stemmed from the 
ubiquity of the perceived abuses. The perpetrators of muckraker lore included the common 
carriers of urban life: the streetcar companies and gas and electric networks on which turn of the 
century city dwellers had become dependent. With essential services closely tied to the caprice 
of “untamed private companies,” ordinary Americans increased their wariness toward 
“unnatural” concentrations of wealth.4 In New York State, a 1904 investigation of the 
consolidated gas works exposed tax evasion, fraudulent bookkeeping, grossly inflated rates, and 
illegal monopolization of New York City’s utilities, a series of wrongdoings that directly 
affected the general public.5 Most major life insurance companies had their headquarters there, 
and the attentions of muckrakers eventually settled on the firms. 
                                                       
2 Louis Filler, Crusaders for American Liberalism, (Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1964), xi. 
3 Arthur and Lila Weinberg, eds., The Muckrakers, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), xviii.  
4 Daniel Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10:4 (December 1982): 113-132; 124. 
See also Richard L. McCormick, From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893-1910, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 32.  
5 McCormick, From Realignment to Reform, 195. 
 189 
First, however, they took aim at Wall Street, where brokers were earning an increasingly 
unsavory reputation. “[T]here was almost nothing in the reigning conceptions of political 
economy to prepare middle class Americans for the sudden, turn-of-the-century ascendancy of 
finance capitalism,” observes Rodgers, “except to decry the agglomerations of big business as 
‘unnatural’ and conspiratorial.”6 The vast sums of money made (and lost) in a single day on 
financial transactions baffled and discomfited ordinary observers. Educated and progressive-
minded Americans in churches, colleges, and the professions associated “the street” with 
dissolution and gambling, and it became a ripe subject for the articles of muckrakers. By late-
century, a stereotype emerged in national periodicals of the broker as a crafty pleasure-seeker, “a 
nervous dandy with watery eyes and a muddy complexion” who schemed on the market floor by 
day and caroused in the clubs by night. He was neither a family man nor an ideal American, and 
he had ample contact with the financiers who sat on insurance boards of directors.7  
Insurance involvement in high finance was no secret to highly placed personnel and New 
York financiers, but to the public, the companies denied taking part in any activity that could 
possibly deviate from their position as social guardians and moral trustees. The fiction was only 
mildly believable. A flourishing population of financiers sat on insurance boards of directors, 
belying companies’ insistence that they did not involve themselves in speculative transactions. 
Firms contended that the presence of such men brought needed expertise for cautious investment 
decisions, and that neither the firms nor the individuals profited from the intimacies. 
Nevertheless, such close “downtown” connections brought the “taint of Wall Street” into 
insurance transactions, and eventually attracted the interest of muckraking journalists. 
                                                       
6 Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” 124. 
7 Cedric Cowing “Market Speculation in the Muckraker Era: the Popular Reaction,” The Business History Review 
31:4 (Winter, 1957): 403-413.  
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When Thomas Lawson made his accusations that the life insurance firms were involved 
in unseemly dealings with “the Street,” insurance spokesmen did everything in their power to 
discredit him and distract attention from their investment activities. The New York Life sent 
letters to policyholders containing enclosures that refuted his claims and contended – spuriously 
-- that Lawson had been turned down for a life insurance policy and was merely seeking 
revenge.8  Insurance journals branded him a “would-be-reformed-speculator” and a “financial 
blackmailer.” “Any attempt to connect the life insurance companies with Wall Street 
speculations or with the financing of any of the so-called ‘trusts’ is absurd and ridiculous,” railed 
The Spectator.9 Lawson responded to his attackers with enthusiasm, expanding his series to 
include a thorough expose of the Big Three. Throughout the fall of 1904, he treated readers of 
Everybody’s to detailed descriptions of life insurance investment syndicates, and sensational 
accountings of the personal profits realized by executives involved.  
Other authors joined the assault on the industry. In November, Era Magazine opened a 
series by John W. Ryckman provocatively titled “The Despotism of the Combined Millions.” 
The following year McClure’s initiated a series authored by Burton Hendrick. Their attentions 
ranged across a variety of ills, from the harassment of policyholders to the expensive 
mismanagement of the firms, but overwhelmingly they returned to the two preoccupations that 
the large insurers had most vigorously attempted to channel and subdue. To the consternation of 
company officers, they lingered on the unlawfulness (and hypocrisy) of company-sponsored 
syndicates, and on the dangerous concentration of financial power in the hands of executives 
who were, in effect, answerable to no one.  
                                                       
8 Thomas Lawson, Frenzied Finance (New York: The Ridgway-Thayer Company, 1905), 430. 
9 The Spectator, Oct 17, 1904. 
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The articles of the muckrakers overturned the claims that the life insurance industry was 
not associated with Wall Street, describing in intimate detail the nature and purpose of the firms’ 
speculative activities. Insurance companies, explained Lawson, “use the billions the people have 
placed with them to buy or create banks and trust companies, the stocks of which are a large part 
of their assets. They then use these banks and trust companies, which exist because of the 
people’s savings, in stock gambling enterprises…”10 Laws prohibiting insurance companies from 
using policyholder money for speculative purposes made this a lucrative, if ethically dubious, 
alternative, one which Burton Hendrick described as a “raid on the surplus.” The most popular 
companies, Hendrick noted with disgust, “have largely ceased to do a life insurance business at 
all…”11 They had become mere lending institutions; their image as “noble philanthropists” was a 
sham.  “The trust company is the irrigating canal of Wall Street, the insurance company the 
reservoir,” pronounced Lawson, an image that helped make very clear the financial role of the 
insurers.12  
Even more compelling to readers than the sting of hypocrisy was the startling and 
dangerous power that muckrakers claimed big business had accrued over politics. With their 
endless dollars, insurers held sway not only over financiers but over legislators, whom they 
influenced with campaign contributions, lobbying, and occasional bribery. In Era magazine, 
John Ryckman declared that insurance companies “not only own trust companies and banks and 
railroads and telegraph lines, but they own legislatures.”13 Significant contributions to legislators 
and party bosses helped to ensure the passage or demise of laws in which companies took an 
                                                       
10 Lawson, Frenzied Finance, 415-16. 
11 Hendrick, The Story of Life Insurance, (New York: McClure, Phillips & co., 1907), 36. 
12 Lawson, Frenzied Finance, 458. 
13 John Ryckman, “The Despotism of Combined Millions,” Era Magazine Vol 14/15 (1904-1905). 
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interest. The presence of insurance men such as John Dryden and Chauncey Depew in elected 
office further guaranteed the protection of insurance interests. Muckrakers pointed out that the 
crux of company concern rested on guarding their power as investors. “They have uniformly 
used their influence in such cases against the public good and in favor of privileged interests,” 
charged Hendrick. “They have amended the investment law twenty times in thirty years, not for 
the sake of protecting their policy-holders, but to permit investments along lines that guaranteed 
private profit to themselves.”14 
These legislative efforts were both thorough and wide-ranging. Ryckman, Lawson, and 
Hendrick noted that the firms monitored not just insurance regulation, but any legal activity 
having to do with banks, trust companies, safe deposit companies, railroads, and any other 
financial institutions. The breadth and depth of their influence gave them seemingly unlimited 
authority.  “The Equitable, the NY Life, and Mutual Life Insurance Companies, and their 
affiliated institutions and individuals, are to-day by all odds the greatest power in the world,” 
warned Lawson, “greater by all odds than any power than can possibly be gathered together from 
those outside themselves, a power so great that the effort of no man nor party of men outside 
themselves can possibly prevail against their wishes.”15 Company presidents had routinely 
bragged about the size and strength of their corporations, but the descriptions of muckrakers 
located the center of this strength beyond the market and within the legislative halls of the United 
States.  
The sensational journalism created a stir, not only among policyholders but in the wider 
press and in the halls of finance themselves. “The relations of [the insurance] companies with 
                                                       
14 Hendrick, The Story of Life Insurance, 664. 
15 Lawson, Frenzied Finance, 422-23. 
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prominent banking houses, members of which were active in the directorates of the big insurance 
companies… form a subject of discussion which is constantly irritating and agitating Wall 
Street,” remarked the New York Herald.16 Sensing their own vulnerability, companies such as the 
Metropolitan initiated new measures to protect themselves from allegations of abuse of power. In 
an act calculated to give the appearance of diffusion of corporate power, the Metropolitan 
granted voting rights to all of its policyholders. At meetings and in memos, officers increasingly 
spoke of mutualizing the company, an act that would curtail the appearance of private profit by 
ending the payment of dividends to investors. Few other companies took such measures, 
however, and calls for reform remained shrill. “Don’t let up,” wrote one reader to John 
Ryckman; “publicity is the thing: keep hammering away at them. I doubt exceedingly if either of 
the ‘Big Three’ could stand a thorough investigation. I bet they are rotten to the core.”17   
 
The Battle for the Equitable 
It was into this public relations tinder box that a final spark fell. The young vice president 
of the Equitable Insurance Company, James Hazen Hyde, hosted a dinner party of astonishing 
extravagance, and the rumors it sparked ignited fatal public attention. Hyde was the possessor of 
the 502 controlling shares of stock in the Equitable, an asset he had inherited from his father, and 
which was being held in trust by the acting president, James Alexander, until Hyde attained the 
age of 30. Tensions between Hyde and Alexander were notorious, however, and in 1905 Hyde 
was but one year away from the stipulated age of majority. Despite his dawning responsibilities, 
                                                       
16 New York Herald, 16 February, 1905, 4. 
17 H. Roger Grant, Insurance Reform: Consumer Action in the Progressive Era, (Ames, IA: Iowa State University 
Press, 1979), 32. 
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Hyde harbored an enthusiasm for clothes, coaches, and all things French that imputed him with a 
reputation for frivolity, and caused regular consternation for his trustee.18 In this instance, the 
censure was general. A display of ostentation considered to be too frivolous could come off as 
wasteful and elitist, a fate endured by Hyde for the ball thrown at the apex of the insurance 
muckraking. 
On January 31, 1905, Hyde hosted a lavish French Ball intended to impress the New 
York aristocracy, but which ultimately attracted unwanted attentions to the company he served. 
Held in the ballroom of Sherry’s Hotel, the party glittered with ladies in jewel-encrusted gowns 
and white-wigged waiters dressed as footmen.19 One writer called it “the most sumptuous, the 
most elaborate, and the most beautiful [ball] of the early days of the twentieth century.” “No 
historical accessories were lacking – it was as if the cream of New York’s society had suddenly 
been transported back to the days of Louse Seize.”20 The Metropolitan Opera orchestra 
serenaded the guests. After the ball, the pages of The World, The Herald, and the New York 
Times twittered about the dresses, escorts, decorations, and food. They also speculated about the 
event’s price tag, which they judged to have been somewhere between $100,000 and $200,000, 
and assumed had been charged to the account of the Equitable Insurance Society.21  
                                                       
18 Norris has argued that Hyde was not the playboy that the media made him out to be, arguing that his behavior was 
similar to that of other young men of his station among New York millionaires, for instance the Gould and 
Vanderbilt progeny. Hyde himself protested to an investigating committee, “If it is an offense to drive a coach, or to 
give entertainments out of my private means, it is one that is committed by many men of means and by officers 
identified with the Society.” See Norris, Voices from the Field.  This interpretation is echoed by Patricia Beard, After 
the Ball: Gilded Age Secrets, Boardroom Betrayals, and the Party that Ignited the Great Wall Street Scandal of 
1905, (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).   
19 Invitations to the mid-winter fete instructed Hyde’s 400 – 600 guests to dress in the style of eighteenth century 
French aristocracy. 
20 “The Famous Hyde Ball at Sherry’s,” World Magazine, 19 February, 1905, 1. 
21  The true cost of the evening, $100,000, was footed by Hyde using personal funds.  
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All eyes turned to the Equitable, and it happened that scrutiny could not have arrived at a 
more revealing moment. At the end of the century, the Equitable had become one of the 
wealthiest financial institutions in the country. It possessed over $400 million in assets, and was 
one of the most tantalizing resources for Wall Street investors. Directors and trustees of this 
company wielded impressive control over one of the fattest wallets in the financial world, 
conferring status on themselves as the great power brokers of American business.22 To control 
the Equitable was very nearly to control finance itself, and in the early months of 1905 the 
leadership of the company was becoming unglued, the 502 shares of controlling stock owned by 
James Hazen Hyde potentially up for sale. The power struggle between the vice president and his 
trustee had begun to spill over into the management of the company, with Alexander circulating 
a pair of petitions calling for the mutualization of the Equitable and the removal of Hyde as vice 
president. More than thirty-five officials and employees signed the documents, touching off an 
imbroglio. If Hyde vacated his position at the Equitable, one of the most powerful seats in 
American finance would become open to some ambitious taker, but if Hyde prevailed, those who 
stood by him would have preserved a powerful ally. Overnight, the company roster of directors,  
                                                       
22 Anyone who doubted this need look no further than the make-up of the Equitable’s board of directors to be 
reassured of its prominent place in American finance. Financial luminaries such as George Gould, John Jacob Astor 
IV, Alexander Cassatt, and August Belmont, held positions on the board, where their presence guaranteed a strong 
relationship between the Equitable and high finance. Beard, After the Ball, 35. 
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James Hazen Hyde of the Equitable caricatured for his “French Ball.”23
                                                       




officers, and trustees became a register of shifting alliances, cunning, backstabbing, and 
ambition. After the French Ball, it became headline news.  
On February 15, The World published the story of the Equitable’s internal strife, 
announcing on its front page: “Hyde must get out or all Equitable Life’s officers will resign.” 
The paper reported, “The fight in the Equitable Insurance Company, the greatest single financial 
power in the United States, exceeds in bitterness any struggle that has ever developed among 
kings of finance in this country.” If Hyde refused to retire, it warned, “the consequences might 
be the most remarkable in the financial history of the country.”24 For a full week, the World and 
other papers supplied news about the Equitable, following the struggle through every new 
revelation. The “Alexander Faction,” they reported, continued to demand Hyde’s resignation. 
Members of the “Hyde Faction,” they noted, offered concessions, but opponents remained 
unmoved. But Hyde was not the only target of blame and disparagement; disclosures about 
numerous hidden business practices wracked the society. Jacob Schiff, head of the Finance 
Committee, had authorized the purchase of $22 million in bonds from his own banking house in 
1904, a transaction in which he had apparently acted as “both buyer and seller,” brazenly 
flaunting both company regulations and New York State law. In another instance, it became 
known that a blacklist of candidates rejected for policies had been maintained and circulated 
among all the large insurers, a practice that legal authorities suggested might be classified as a 
criminal conspiracy.25 The revelations cast a pall over entire insurance industry; the acts of 
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dishonesty exposed by the press were uglier and more widespread than the industry’s detractors 
had alleged. 
The dissension at the Equitable made undeniable what muckrakers had been exhorting 
their readers to believe: that the involvement of the life insurance industry with Wall Street was 
not a matter of suspicion, but a simple fact, and that many of their business customs were 
brutally underhanded. Newspapers and magazines of all kinds took up the story, explaining the 
workings of the Equitable and their hazards and consequences to newly credulous readers. 
“While it is primarily an insurance company, it is in reality a great savings corporation, with 
assets amounting to over $400 million, and with an annual income of about $80 million,” 
clarified the popular magazine Outlook. “To have such a gigantic savings bank come to financial 
ruin not only would mean disaster to an army of policy-holders, but might precipitate a panic 
which would affect banks and bank depositors… to the remotest parts of this country.”26 In point 
of fact, the Equitable and all the large insurers were financially solvent, though their affiliations 
with the hazard-loving and easily ruined “plungers” of Wall Street may have somewhat 
undermined their stability.  
 Personnel at the Equitable scrambled to contain the damage. In April, the company 
authorized an internal inquiry to be headed by Henry Clay Frick, who had served on the 
Equitable board of directors since 1901. Shortly thereafter, the New York State Insurance 
department launched an investigation of its own. Both sought to make a systematic study of the 
charges of mismanagement and misconduct at the Equitable. A month later, the Frick Committee 
submitted a damning if predictable report. Among other misdeeds, the report concluded, 
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excessive salaries had been paid to officers, excessive commissions granted to agents, and 
company funds had been used in syndicates whose activities personally benefited the 
participants. The Committee ordered that those who had profited from the syndicates should 
repay their earnings to the company, and condemned the “injudicious intermingling of two 
essentially different lines of finance.” Lastly, it recommended the immediate resignations of 
Alexander and Hyde.27 The New York State Insurance Department report echoed the Frick 
findings, charging the Equitable with gross financial malpractice. The report noted outsized 
contributions made to political figures such as Senator Chauncey Depew, who in addition to his 
governmental responsibilities held a seat on the Equitable’s Board of Directors. Its authors 
recommended complete mutualization of the company and suggested that the next state 
legislature should ban investments in subsidiary corporations.  
It seemed to insurance officials that the most damaging of all possible revelations had 
finally come to light. Officers through the industry confronted the very real possibility that the 
loss of face would undermine the industry’s capacity not only to sell policies but to influence the 
social and political outlets necessary to preserve their autonomy. At the Metropolitan Life, 
company president John Hegeman observed, “We are confronted with this certain prospect: if the 
attempt upon the Equitable is successful, it will be the severest blow ever dealt to the business of 
life insurance. It will tend to unsettle public confidence. Suspicion will be abroad. It will be 
asked, what is the next company liable to be turned aside from the faithful and prudent 
                                                       
27 Marquis James  The Metropolitan Life: A Study in Business Growth (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), 140; 
Beard, After the Ball, 238-250; “The Frick Report,” Outlook (10 June, 1905): 359. 
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management of trust funds for the benefit of those who have built them up, to be made the 
football of speculators.”28 
The popular response to the reports bore out John Hegeman’s fears. Appalled by the 
corruption at the Equitable, policyholders could see no reason for the dishonesty to be confined 
to a single firm. One writer fretted, “There is every reason to believe that practices which have 
brought trouble to the Company are common in other companies, and that the methods by which 
insurance is generally conducted need further legal restriction.”29 An editorial in the New York 
World added, “The man in the street suddenly comes to see how ‘high finance’ has been 
fattening off his scanty savings – of the savings he laid by for the support of his widow and 
children in case they were left alone. He sees how government has been debauched to protect 
year after year these highly respectable criminals. He sees how they have been able to purchase 
immunity from prosecution or publicity.”30 Public agitation soon commenced for a state 
investigation of the industry at large. Even former president (and business ally) Grover 
Cleveland expressed concern that “what has overtaken [the Equitable] is liable to happen to other 
insurance companies and fiduciary organizations as long as lax ideas of responsibility in places 
of trust are tolerated by our people.”31  The intolerable irregularities exposed at the Equitable had 
prompted a consumer demand for government oversight of business that was too strong to be 
stifled by a single firm’s housecleaning, no matter how thorough. 
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The Most Tremendous Job in the United States 
On August 20, the New York Legislature adopted a resolution to appoint an investigative 
committee. The congressmen selected Senator William Armstrong, the “watchdog of the senate,” 
to act as Chairman. Aware that insurance firms could be adroit at overcoming the consequences 
of investigations, Armstrong set a tone for the proceedings that focused more on truth-telling 
than it did on reprimand.32 “Our object will not be to punish anybody for wrongdoing in the 
past,” he stated. Instead, the investigation would aim to “get at all the salient features of the 
modern insurance business, so as to suggest to the next legislature an adequate law that will… 
protect the policyholders in all life insurance companies.”33 Because the purpose of the 
proceedings was to examine instead of to prosecute, the firms would have scant need for legal 
counsel. Senator Armstrong announced candidly that he would offer no “formal rights” to the 
attorneys of any company. “We will for the present assume… that counsel who are here… have 
no rights, but are entitled to every courtesy,” he declared. The Committee’s time was simply “too 
limited” to open the floor to industry lawyers.34 The exclusion enhanced the contrast between the 
Armstrong hearings and those that had preceded them, helping to create an atmosphere so 
productive as to set the 1905 investigation apart.  
Business historian H. Roger Grant has observed that the Armstrong investigation “can 
best be regarded as a consumer’s probe of a great American business – the quintessence of public 
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outrage during the progressive era.”35 The scrutiny to which it subjected the practices of the 
major insurance corporations was unprecedented, but so too was the boldness with which those 
corporations had behaved. Historians have called the investigation a “well-wrought drama,” and 
pointed out that it brought about a “catharsis” that was almost as important as the legislative 
reforms it helped to trigger.  The hearings, after all, provided a forum for the airing of popular 
anxieties. Increasingly dissatisfied with the vast and impersonal bureaucracy, and resentful of the 
poor treatment they received at its hands, the public looked on hopefully as the committee 
investigated its complaints. The hearings brought official attention to the importance of 
curtailing the size and power of firms for the sake of social equity and consumer justice. They 
also exposed one of the most disturbing effects of the ideological contradictions inherent the 
private insurance model. Claiming the protections of semi-public status, commercial insurers had 
used the freedoms of the open market to invest the money of their policyholders in hazardous 
financial schemes, ultimately manipulating the economy in such profound ways as to place the 
economic security of much of populace in jeopardy. In so doing, the firms had ceased to be 
protectors from risk, and had instead become architects of it. Considering their size and 
economic reach, their actions placed them among the most prodigious generators of risk in the 
corporate world.  
The industriousness of the sessions was further increased by the choice for chief counsel 
of Charles Evans Hughes, a young lawyer who had recently achieved great success in a similar 
investigation of the Consolidated Gasworks. It was hoped that such a performance could be 
repeated, and when Hughes received word of his selection he curtailed his vacation to honor the 
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appointment. “[The investigation] would be the most tremendous job in the United States,” he 
explained to his family as he hastened back from the Alps.36 
Hughes was widely respected for his independence and his integrity, and for his 
remarkable analytical talents.  Unlike many men in public service, he had no alliances with 
finance or insurance, and no political entanglements. “No one held a mortgage on his ability,” 
remarked Ida Tarbell.37 Journalists noted that Hughes possessed a “card-index” mind and a 
standing reputation as a keen, able, and resourceful lawyer. “He has an unusual memory, which 
he supplements with the most thorough preparation,” observed one magazine writer. He 
“displayed qualities of courage and efficiency invaluable in carrying out a public inquiry.”38 
Those who observed him noted above all a remarkable skill at handling witnesses. “His 
treatment of the witnesses who appear before the Committee is eminently fair, courteous, and 
considerate; but stubborn and unwilling witnesses find him hard to evade,” reported Outlook.39 
In addition to extracting difficult information, Hughes made certain that his spectators grasped 
the details of the testimony, meeting separately with reporters after each day’s proceedings to 
make sure they understood the disclosures.40 His devotion to clarity made him almost uniformly 
popular with the press and the public alike.41  
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Hughes made clear from the beginning of the hearings that the crux of his concerns with 
the life insurance industry were structural. Individual acts of wrongdoing abounded among the 
firms, but it was the organization and government of the companies that attracted his greatest 
attention. He posed most of his questions in such a way as to investigate their structure and 
nature as corporate institutions, probing the firms’ management, efficiency, investment 
strategies, and political performance.  
Conflicts of interest emerged as an area of foremost concern. Insurance laws made clear 
that companies could use policyholder money only to invest in stable assets such as federal, 
state, or municipal bonds. Firms could not purchase stock, nor could they engage in speculative 
purchases such as real estate. Syndicates such as James Hazen Hyde and Associates, which 
operated on behalf of company executives but not, they claimed, of the company, violated the 
spirit and probably the letter of such law. Likewise, proprietary interests such as the Fidelity 
Trust Company, a banking house whose controlling stock was owned by the Prudential and 
which in turn held the controlling stock of the life insurer, trespassed heavily on insurance 
regulations. The Equitable, too, owned 65% of the stock of Equitable Trust and two other large 
banks, keeping a total of between $28 and $36 million invested in those institutions – sums far 
larger than the balances kept in any bank by any other company.43 “This scheme of each owning 
the other is the most remarkable example of financiering the insurance world yet has offered,” 
marveled the Chicago Daily Tribune when Hughes brought the practice to light.44 Hughes also 
explored the activities of several individuals who served simultaneously as insurance men and 
                                                       
43 Armstrong Testimony, 1:98, James, The Metropolitan Life, 153. 
44 “Prudential Next to Face Inquiry,” Chicago Daily Tribune 23 Oct, 1905, 1. 
 206 
banking executives, such as George Perkins and Jacob Schiff. The findings did not exonerate the 
companies. Firms that had advertised themselves as paragons of righteousness proved more 
duplicitous than even a shrewd public could have allowed itself to believe. As Vice President of 
New York Life, George W. Perkins had authorized the purchase of $39 million in securities from 
J.P. Morgan, a transaction in which – like Schiff – he had represented both buyer and seller. He 
received a hefty commission for his labor. Beyond the obvious moral implications, Hughes 
provided the Committee with insight as to the institutional repercussions of such actions. 
“Through the control of subsidiary corporations, by means of stock ownership, [some life 
insurance companies] have practically transacted the business of banks and trust companies,” he 
explained. This gave insurers a proprietary interest in another business.  
  [Thus insurers are] brought… into close relations with railroads, banks, trust companies, 
banking houses, and the floatation of new enterprises… involving them in manifold 
transactions of the financial world, not in their normal relation as creditors through 
suitable investments, but as co-owners… They have weakened the sense of official 
responsibility, multiplying the opportunities for gains… to officers and directors through 
the use of the company’s funds and making easy the exercise of official discretion at the 
promptings of self-interest.45  
This being the case, noted Hughes, insurance companies must either be barred from such 
alliances or regulated with the same stringency as banks.  
Hughes did much of his thinking on his feet, as the request to lead the Armstrong 
investigation had come so suddenly that there had been little time to prepare. On September 8, 
the third day of the proceedings, a small amount of missing money captured his attention. While 
questioning Edmund Randolph, treasurer for New York Life, Hughes noticed that $48,000 from 
the sale of a railroad stock was unaccounted for. As he put the mystery to one witness after 
another, their systematic lack of knowledge piqued his curiosity. Just before taking the stand on 
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September 15, George Perkins approached the chief investigator. “Mr. Hughes, you’re handling 
dynamite,” Perkins admonished. “That $48,000 was a contribution to President Roosevelt’s 
campaign fund. You want to think very carefully before you put that into the evidence. You can’t 
tell what may come of it.”46 Hughes accepted the risk, and found himself opening the public eye 
to a startling collusion between business and politics. The $48,000 campaign contribution had 
been one of three major expenditures for presidential races.  During the “free silver” contest of 
1896, New York Life had donated nearly $50,000 to the Republican party as a contribution to a 
McKinley victory, a gift which, if not illegal, was at the very least highly irregular for a fiduciary 
institution. 
That evening the nation’s telegraph lines hummed with the transmission of newspaper 
stories, and in the morning the industry was greeted with a new and dramatic public outcry. 
Reports that “widows’ and orphans’ money” had been used to swell political coffers dominated 
the news. Headlines roared about the “buying of public office” with corporate funds, and articles 
lauded Hughes as a national champion for his role in uncovering the truth. “If no further 
information about the life insurance business were elicited by the Armstrong committee, the 
ordering of the inquiry would be fully justified,” pronounced the New York Times.47 But like 
Hughes himself, the public had now become curious as to the full extent of the industry’s 
misdeeds. Newspapers demanded more information, and the coming sessions provided a deep 
and bounteous well.  
The weeks that followed laid bare a small fortune in contributions to the Republican 
party, sometimes to legislators but more often to presidential candidates. It was a practice that 
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had begun in 1896, when officers justified it by arguing that Bryan’s free silver platform 
presented a threat to the monetary standard that could destabilize and destroy the companies’ 
assets. This, they argued, would constitute a negative outcome for policyholders, who trusted the 
insurance companies to maintain their financial safety. Mutual Life and the Equitable adopted 
both the strategy and the logic, engaging in hefty campaign contributions on behalf of their own 
policyholders.  Though the currency question was no longer at issue after 1896, all three 
companies continued their gifts to Republican coffers in 1900 and 1904. James Hyde explained 
to the Armstrong Committee that his company’s officers feared that a Democratic win would 
bring “a recurrence or a return to their very unfortunate monetary and financial standard.” To 
prevent this, Equitable executives had resolved “to keep the Republican party in power, which 
the other life insurance companies and a great many other large corporations considered a wise 
thing to do.”48 Persistent questioning by Hughes gradually exposed that the insurance companies 
had donated approximately $340,000 to republican campaigns across the three presidential 
elections, a collective sum that may have purchased enough power to threaten the basis of a 
republican voting system.  
The firms maintained control of the legislatures in a variety of ways, from helping to 
elect Republican congressmen to maintaining congenial ties with the party bosses to whom the 
lawmakers answered. The New York machine boss of the Republican Party, Senator Platt, 
openly acknowledged having received cash contributions from the life insurance firms. “They 
invariably sent the money over by a special messenger who came to my office and delivered a 
package of money, and I could only tell what it was, and I immediately turned it over to the State 
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Committee, either the chairman or secretary or treasurer,” he declared with remarkable candor.49 
Platt also received deliveries from the Mutual Life of $10,000 in unmarked packages “from time 
to time,” when President McCurdy needed a favor.50 To clarify the nature of the transactions to 
those not cynical enough to take their meaning, Hughes asked Platt what advantage the insurers 
received from such donations. “They get it through me being connected with the State 
Committee,” Platt replied. 
Hughes: Is not that the way it really comes about, Senator, that the use of these 
contributions in the election of candidates to office puts the candidates under more or less 
of a moral obligation not to attack the interests supporting? 
Platt: That is what would naturally be involved. 
Hughes: That is really what is involved, is it not? 
Platt:  I should think so. 
Hughes:  And that is what you meant when you said that they would expect you, through 
your relations to the State Committee, to defend them?” 
Platt: Yes.51 
Yet political contributions constituted only one portion of the companies’ undertakings to 
prevent government interference with the insurance industry. As an additional measure, 
companies kept a close and careful watch on the activities of the nation’s legislative bodies, 
guarding themselves against “unfavorable” laws in a well-organized and deliberate manner. As a 
group, the Big Three divided the nation into four districts. Each firm accepted responsibility to 
“kill” unwanted legislation in its own assigned territory, while in the fourth they policed new 
legislation collectively. At the hearings, New York Life president John McCall justified this 
vigilance with the claim that unscrupulous lawmakers frequently introduced “strike bills,” laws 
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so ornery that legislators invited corporations to offer bribes to have them rescinded. “I might 
even continue with that further and say that I believe that ¾ of the insurance bills introduced in 
the United States are blackmailing bills,” he informed the chamber. “The management of these 
companies really tremble at the beginning of a year as to what they have to encounter during the 
following six months of the year.”52 McCall related that insurers found themselves thrust into a 
position of victimhood, from which it was incumbent upon them to take drastic steps defend their 
interests – and those of their charges, the nation’s widows and orphans. 
Much of this work was accomplished surreptitiously by middlemen, who accepted large 
sums of money to influence lawmakers on the companies’ behalf. Between 1895 and 1905, New 
York Life paid over $1.1 million to Andrew Hamilton, a key lobbyist in Albany said to possess 
great skill in doing away with “bad bills.”53 Hamilton, who had absconded to Paris for “health 
reasons,” could not be induced to testify at the hearings.  After considerable questioning, Hughes 
nevertheless managed to uncover several disbursements paid to him by the company. Attributing 
the charge to “legal expenses,” New York Life had transferred $708,000 to Hamilton’s care. It 
sent another $59,390 through J.P. Morgan and Company, and a final $235,000 under the guise of 
a real estate transaction.54 Continued questioning revealed that Hamilton did business with the 
other titans, as well. The Equitable had paid out at least $45,390 that Hughes was able to trace. 
Hamilton’s habit of making payments with cash made the precise nature of his spending difficult 
to uncover, and the companies had been likewise chary of creating records of their contact with 
Hamilton, or the purpose of their dealings. When Hughes peppered John McCall for records 
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about how the New York Life had financed its lobbyist, the insurance president could present no 
receipts or reports demonstrating any payments to Hamilton at all. “Have you any memorandum 
showing the bills that have been opposed, the action taken on various matters of legislation in the 
various states?” asked Hughes. No. “Did you make a report to the Board as to what attorneys and 
counsel had been employed and what legislation had been opposed and why it had been 
opposed?”  No. “And nothing was said by the company or in the Boards as to the importance of 
an accounting as to the monies already given to Mr. Hamilton?” The witness answered, “no.”55 
Although Hamilton had clearly had tremendous influence over the lawmaking activity of 
numerous elected officials, it was hard to know just who those officials were, or precisely how 
he had captured their loyalty.  
Matters were more straightforward in regards to the activities of a second sought-after 
lobbyist, Andrew C. Fields. Using funds from all three companies, Fields maintained a mansion 
in Albany for the “entertainment and pleasure of our dedicated public servants.”56 Nicknamed 
the “House of Mirth” by the press, the residence served as a sumptuous retreat, and was as 
lavish, boisterous, and conducive to “good legislation” as the companies could make it. 
Lawmakers who visited the house routinely won at cards, and were welcome to stay in its well-
appointed rooms for as long as it convenienced them to do so.57 Enormous sums of money went 
into maintaining the house. In 1904, the Equitable listed Fields as head of the “supply 
department” and diverted $363,254 into his hands, cataloguing the funds as an expenditure for 
“stationary.” The amount of money that Fields received from the other two insurers is unknown, 
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but presumably the funds bought diligent work. Officers from all three companies forwarded 
numerous memoranda regarding legislative bills to Fields, including instructions and comments 
such as, “as the three companies are opposed to it, it seems to us that it should be killed,” and 
“We are opposed to this measure tooth and nail.”58 The firms did not confine their interest to life 
insurance measures, but devoted attention to nearly all forms of regulation, including banking, 
real estate, tenement conditions, railroad companies, water rights, trust companies, and even 
child labor.59 “The net result,” notes one historian, “was that the simplest measure affecting life 
insurance needed industry approval before it stood a good chance of becoming law.”60 The 
powerful interest that insurers took in questions of legislation not only consumed enormous 
amounts of cash, but also made it nearly impossible for states to enact meaningful reform.  
The Big Three were not alone in their efforts to influence lawmakers. Between 1892 and 
1905, Metropolitan Life expended $84,585 on lobbying, $35,295 of which went to Hamilton. 
Like the Big Three, the main Industrial companies shared in the task of legal engagement. While 
the mainline insurers divided the nation into sections, the smaller firms came together to monitor 
legislation collectively, with the Metropolitan and the Prudential contributing two fifths each and 
John Hancock one fifth to a general fund for legislative battles.61 Like the Big Three, they did 
not confine their attention merely to bills involving insurance, but extended consideration to 
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topics so general that John Dryden, Prudential’s president, found himself unable to list them in 
front of the committee.62 And while the Industrial Three dedicated far less money than did their 
mainline counterparts, the sums they paid out nevertheless represented a fortune to their 
policyholders.  
 Americans responded to the revelations with continuing dismay, but also with a sense of 
shock. Hughes’ questioning had exposed a standard of corruption that was more widespread, 
more intentional, and more venal than his audience had thought possible. Many experienced a 
sense of surprise and betrayal, similar to the feeling of having been tricked. “To the simple 
citizen who has not been initiated into the mysteries of high finance the amazing thing about the 
revelations made by the Armstrong committee in New York is the modern development in the art 
of bookkeeping,” mused the Hartford Courant. “Books, it seems, are kept for the purpose of 
clouding transactions and concealing profits and losses, and of preventing a disclosure of what 
the money of a corporation is being used for… It is certainly an astonishing revelation.”63 
Unpleasant as the findings were, not everyone responded to them pessimistically. Some 
individuals regarded their new insight as a wake-up call, an opportunity to renew the social 
commitment to ethical behavior.  “The shock with which most people have read the confessions 
of life insurance officials has unquestionably been a moral stimulus,” reported the Outlook. ”It 
has been a dash of cold water upon the face after a time of moral drowsiness. It has set the public 
conscience stirring.”64 For some, an aroused conscience resulted in renewed demands for 
enhanced government oversight industry reform, the very purpose for which the hearings had 
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been convened.  For others, however, it produced an even greater sense of rage, which found an 
outlet in the pages of newspapers across the country.  
The ink ran with vitriol. Newspapers stormed at the illegal nature of the activities of 
insurance officers “This money was abstracted unlawfully from a trust fund – stolen, taken 
covertly in part from the pockets of men who never in the world would have given it up for the 
purpose it was made to serve,” declared the Springfield Republican.65 “A more flagrant betrayal 
of trust could not well be imagined,” added the New York Evening Post.66 The Philadelphia 
North American pronounced that the “lofty personages” of the life insurance presidents were not 
merely common thieves, “but uncommon thieves. Their morals “are those of the pickpocket and 
the burglar, but that their skill in robbing and in spoiling honest men is immeasurably greater 
than that of other men in the brigand class.”67 One author pointed out that the denunciations were 
so strong that they could have been considered libel had the crimes referred to not been true.68 
But the transgressions were true, and the newspaper condemnations reflected a dawning sense 
that the persons whom they censured were not metaphorical criminals, but real ones. The Boston 
Herald compared McCall and Perkins to officers of a savings bank or trustees of an estate. “How 
would courts in these cases have regarded the diversion of $48,702.50 of funds entrusted into a 
campaign fund?” it demanded.69 Numerous papers asserted that criminal law ought to be 
invoked. The testimony of the insurance officers “affords quite a sufficient platform for the 
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democratic party in the next presidential campaign,” suggested the Macon Telegraph, “and quite 
a sufficient platform, also, for the policyholders having in view placing of the malfeasants in the 
penitentiaries.”70  In light of the enormous sums of money and the profound hypocrisy involved 
in the companies’ legislative entanglements, such papers urged the Armstrong Committee to set 
aside the goal of reform in favor of punishing the wrongdoers. It was a committee, they claimed, 
that had been called together to improve a troubled industry, not a criminal one.  
Hughes, however, obstinately refused participate in criminal proceedings. The 
investigator’s biographer, Merlo Pusey noted, “His job was to diagnose the sickness of the 
business and to prescribe a remedy, and he refused to be diverted to the building up of criminal 
cases.”71 Senator Armstrong supported the decision of the chief counsel. The purpose of the 
hearings, he maintained, was to explore the features of the insurance business necessary to 
suggest laws to protect both policyholders and company management from abuses.72  Life 
insurance was not on trial, nor were its administrators, though many onlookers wished it were.  
 
Investigating the Industrial Branch 
 Hughes took aim instead at the inefficiencies rumored to plague the business, a 
shortcoming which became particularly poignant in the Industrial branch of the industry, where 
policyholders scraped together nickels and dimes to insure against a pauper burial. That their 
policies were guaranteed by men with gold-tipped walking sticks and gilded coaches carried an 
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aura of impropriety that disturbed many onlookers, and the facts that Hughes uncovered on the 
matter did little to set minds at ease.  
 Examination of the ordinary branch ran long, and Hughes did not have nearly the time he 
had hoped to investigate the Industrial insurers. It did not require much probing, however, to 
demonstrate that  popular doubt about the integrity of the Industrials had basis in fact. Even the 
physical appearance of the executives reinforced the sense that, given their purpose, the 
Industrial companies were inappropriately patrician. The Metropolitan’s president, John 
Hegeman, served as a striking example. Known for his mane of curling, chestnut hair, 
Hegeman’s baronial demeanor received reinforcement from the diamond he wore in his 
shirtfront, and from his aristocratic sense of distance from the details of running the company.73 
When questioned by the Armstrong Committee in 1905, Hegeman found himself in the 
uncomfortable position of being able to answer few of the chief counsel’s questions. Again and 
again, he deferred to Fiske, to whom he had ceded most of the administrative work of running 
the company in the 1890s. Hegeman’s naivete suggested an awkward distance between the 
president and productive work at the firm, an unseemliness that increased in proportion to the 
chief executive’s salary. Hughes found that the President’s compensation from the Metropolitan 
was $100,000 annually, a figure that compared favorably to the remuneration of other life 
insurance presidents, but unfavorably to popular conceptions of justice and fairness, particularly 
for a man who handled the savings of the poor. The president of the United States received half 
the rate of Hegeman’s salary for his duties to the nation. The chief justice of the Supreme Court 
earned $13,000. A middle class teaching salary consisted of $2100 per year, and the workingmen 
who the company insured earned an average of about $600. That the head of a “semi-public 
                                                       
73 James, The Metropolitan Life, 151.  
 217 
trust” was paid so well while his trustees scraped by on so little undermined the branch’s claim 
to philanthropy with staggering efficiency.74 
 Hegeman’s salary was legal, but other financial findings proved less so. Hughes 
uncovered a series of extremely dubious personal loans from the funds of the companies to high-
ranking corporate officers, including some in the Industrial branch that further undermined their 
standing as eleemosynary benefactors. Metropolitan director Silas Dutcher had received a loan of 
$65,000 at the astonishingly low interest rate of 2%, an advance that officers were unable to 
justify except as a favor in return for “service to the company.” Hegeman himself borrowed 
$40,000 from the firm’s coffers at 1.5%, a benefit that officers found equally inexplicable.75 Of 
the 39 dubiously legal syndicates uncovered by Hughes within the Metropolitan, Hegeman had 
participated personally in eighteen, netting $64,601. Inscrutably, he had donated more than 
$16,000 of this money back to the company in the spring of 1905. When Hughes asked why, the 
President explained that the money had been a “gift” that “grew out of … Equitable matters.”76 
“Of course,” queried Hughes, “you understand that it is undesirable for an insurance official to 
be making money through the purchases made by his company?” Hegeman replied that he could 
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not say. “You say you consider it inadvisable or undesirable?” Hughes repeated that it would be 
undesirable, his polite euphemism for illegal. “It does not seem to me that I was doing a wrong 
and if I had,” retorted Hegeman, “I would not have done it.”  
Because the officers of the companies were not themselves on trial, Hughes allowed the 
matter to rest, moving on to the general expenditures of the company, and with them, the 
question of whether the Industrial firms intentionally bilked the poor. With inquiries that echoed 
old policyholder complaints against the industry, he probed the features of policies and the 
methods of sales. Did they offer fair terms? Were they inexpensive enough? Did they perform as 
promised? What about the other costs of doing business -- was the cost of obtaining new 
customers excessive? Did agents receive exorbitant commissions? The mainline insurers faced 
searching questions about rebating and tontine or “deferred dividend” insurance, two practices 
that had already attracted significant attention and calls for regulation. Industrial insurers had 
endured less scrutiny, as their working class clientele lacked the resources to bring abuses to 
attention. When Hughes broached his questions in front of the Armstrong Committee, many of 
his inquiries brought policyholder mistreatment to official light for the first time.  
The Industrial firms had a reputation for being tricksters, in part because of the dealings 
of their agents and in part because the language and phrasing of their policies’ terms was 
notoriously opaque. The task of differentiating among  “paid up” insurance, “term” insurance, 
and “whole life” insurance, for instance, routinely confounded policyholders, usually to their 
financial detriment. The amount of time it took to clarify their meaning to the Armstrong 
Committee suggested that the confusion may have been intentional. Posing questions that 
resembled word problems, Hughes endeavored to untangle the values of various policies. “Take 
the increasing life and endowment table of rates in the Industrial Department,” he posed to the 
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actuary of the Metropolitan, “and take age 35 and ten cents a week, and tell me what is the 
maximum amount of insurance payable under that policy at the end of the endowment period at 
age 80?” The actuary replied, “$146.” 
Q. Please tell me how much a man insured at the age of 35, paying ten cents a week, 
would have paid during that endowment period?  
A. He paid $234. 
Q. Now, take the increasing life and endowment table in the Industrial Department and 
age 40, what is the maximum amount at ten cents a week which the insured would get at 
the end of the endowment period at age 80?77 
The actuary’s response was prompt (“$127”), but at the winding sets of questions demonstrated 
roundly that the average industrial policyholder, having very little education to begin with, could 
never have managed to arrive at the sum. Some industrial policyholders never understood the 
financial basis of life insurance at all, an innocence that agents were instructed to address but 
that, in many poignant cases, they clearly allowed to slide. One octogenarian protested that after 
so many decades of premiums, he had paid in nearly $400 on a $189 policy and could not get 
back the extra money, a discrepancy he felt was unjust. Is this, asked Hughes, “simply his 
misfortune at having lived so long?” Haley Fiske, the Metropolitan vice president, replied that on 
the contrary, it was the good fortune of others for having died sooner and collected more. “That 
is the theory of life insurance.” Theory or not, the example brought home the age-old social 
discomfort with the practice itself, and the younger and more immediate uneasiness with 
marketing the practice as a strategy of thrift, to a working class that possessed no margin with 
which to gamble.  
Even if the client were exceptionally talented at mathematic riddles, more often than not 
the company had failed to print the true terms on its policy forms, or else had made an error, or 
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else had been inexcusably slow to answer correspondence that pressed for clarification. To 
interrogate the point, Hughes presented John Hegeman with a letter from the legal aid attorney of 
“a hard-working Swedish woman in straitened circumstances” who had been denied payment 
after the death of her daughter. The letter had been addressed to the Metropolitan in April. Six 
months later, the company sent a reply stating that nothing could be done about the matter. No 
Metropolitan officer was able to explain the delay to the audience of the Armstrong hearings. 
Following up, the investigator presented a second poignant case, drawing attention to an elderly 
gentleman who had not been paid the endowment contractually promised by the company. “I am 
now past 80 years old,” wrote the man, “and when I spoke to [the company representatives] they 
would not listen to me, but set me back another year, and I am still paying premiums every 
week.” Hegeman insisted that the case could not be true, and asked to be given the letter.  In one 
of the only moments of emotion that he would display throughout the hearings, Hughes 
responded heatedly. “I shall be glad to give you the letter, so that one of these men of 80 years 
old that you have not been able to find may be able to get whatever may be coming to him.” 
Then he added, “I do not understand how it is if a man over 80 to whom you are willing to give 
these concessions is carrying his premiums, that you cannot locate him and see that he gets back 
this money that you say he is entitled to.”78 It was a reprimand that gave voice to what 
policyholders could not attract audience enough to say: that the industrial firms were giants who 
could not be troubled to deal fairly with the common poor.  
As a result, the poor often lapsed their insurance. Interrogation in the aldermanic chamber 
established the reality behind the agents’ saw that “the lapse begins at the point of sale.” Within 
three years of purchasing a policy, 58% of the Metropolitan’s industrial customers dropped their 
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insurance. At the Prudential, the figures were even worse; between 62 and 66% of the firm’s 
clientele lapsed their policies before the end of three years.79 All told, more than half of the 
insurance to the working class lapsed before the year was out.80 Onlookers believed that the 
companies encouraged these lapses in order to make money on the forfeited premiums, though 
the Armstrong Committee found the opposite, noting that the Metropolitan had lost $800,000 on 
lapses in 1904. The discovery, however, did little to exculpate the companies. Such severe losses 
from lapse drew attention to an even more distressing feature of the Industrial business: though 
their customers dealt in nickels and dimes, the expenditures of the industrial companies were 
astronomical, higher even than the expenses of the ordinary firms.  
 The financial incursions could barely justify the business. Hughes found that in 1904, the 
administrative expenditures of the Metropolitan Life were nearly $20 million, higher by far than 
those of the nation’s largest ordinary firm, the New York Life. Thirty-nine per cent of the 
Metropolitan’s premium income went to running its offices and paying its staff, whereas 25% of 
the moneys collected by the more “profligate” ordinary firms went to cover these costs. More 
perturbing, while the office tower of the Metropolitan glittered and its executive staff prospered, 
the salaries of the office workers and especially the agents were disturbingly low. Hughes 
himself remarked that the company’s clerks could hardly have been overpaid, as the $1,636,938 
disbursed for their salaries in 1904 had to be split 2112 ways.81 Agents fared even worse. The 
lowly agent, if enterprising, earned scarcely $12 a week, a wage insufficient to meet the costs of 
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ordinary life. Company executives, however, saw this figure as a bragging point, and used it to 
demonstrate the economy with which they administered the company. Our agents, noted a 
satisfied Hegeman, “earn on average less than the mechanics and people among whom they 
go.”82 The statement was designed to show that the Metropolitan handled its money – the money 
of the poor – with such care and parsimony as to be beyond reproach, and that its agents were as 
one with the people among whom they spread the gospel of thrift.  
Hughes seemed unconvinced, but in the short time allotted to investigation of the 
Industrials, he was unable to uncover a more reasonable means for improving the business or 
reducing expenses. The high lapse rates, small premiums, and poverty wages spoke for 
themselves, yet witnesses uniformly agreed that they were inherent features of the Industrial 
business, which required door to door solicitations 56 times a year to families of precarious 
means. With the exception of executive salaries (which officers defended has a business 
necessity), there seemed few obvious points of excess in the companies’ expenditures.83 When 
Hughes explored the point with Haley Fiske, he addressed the question as a matter of 
practicality. 
Hughes: You have stated that your management is constantly engaged in 
endeavoring to cheapen the administrative expenses of your company? 
Fiske: Yes. 
Hughes: Is there any affirmative legislative action that will assist you to do that? 
Fiske: I do not think legislation is needed at all, sir, in the industrial business. I think 
if left alone we will work out these problems better than any legislature can. We are 
                                                       
82 Armstrong Testimony, 2: 1941-1942. 
83 Richard McCurdy, the well-compensated head of the Mutual Life, insisted to the committee that the life 
executives were “entitled to what they are worth and what they have proved themselves to be worth.”  When Hughes 
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in the business…. And we have not any other work to do in the world than work it 
out, and we will do it if we are left alone.84  
It was an exchange that would become famous in the oratory of Metropolitan executives in 
future years. The State, company officers would claim, could do nothing to improve the business, 
because the inefficiencies of the Industrial branch were derived from – and could best be solved 
with – the Invisible Hand. If the premiums were too high and the compensations too low, the 
problem was one for men who’s experience lay in navigating the challenges of the open market, 
not in passing meddlesome and ill-conceived legislation. Given time, Industrial insurers would 
innovate ways of addressing their problems themselves, if strictly because of market 
requirements then because of the necessity of protecting the existing political economy. 
 
The Report of the Committee 
 The Armstrong Investigation lasted 57 days, at the end of which the ax came down on the 
life insurance industry in the form of Hughes’ 337 page report, written with the collaboration of 
consulting actuary Miles Meander Dawson. The document abstracted the findings in regards to 
each major insurance company, and then presented recommendations for remedial legislation to 
correct the transgressions of the firms. The report concluded that close relations with banks, trust 
companies, railroads, and others had “weakened the sense of official responsibility, multiplying 
the opportunities for gains… to officers and directors through the use of the company’s funds, 
and making easy the exercise of official discretion at the promptings of self-interest.”85 In 
addition, heated competition between firms had made the cost of obtaining new business 
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unreasonably high, in part due to commissions offered to agents. In their legislative 
recommendations, Hughes and Dawson suggested that a limit be placed on the expenses of the 
companies, and on the amount of new business that could be conducted each year. They 
recommended the abolishment of syndicate operations and of investments in common stocks, as 
well as of contributions to political campaigns. Lobbying expenditures regarding individual bills 
should be carefully accounted for, and the yearly reports of the companies should be made more 
thorough. The writers chastised the existing insurance department and called for an increase in 
its responsibilities and power.  
 The Industrial branch received its own attentions. The sins of the Industrial operators 
were less glaring than those of the Ordinary insurers, but because their infractions were 
committed against the poor they presented a disturbing edge. The report of the committee 
damned the Industrial firms with faint praise. Dawson and Hughes wrote that they were not 
prepared to make recommendations with reference to the Industrial branch “further than to say 
that the subject is one deserving of special investigation.” “The most serious evils to wit, the 
excessive premiums, the enormous lapse rate, and the hardships of agents, seem to be inherent in 
the system,” they noted, but added that they themselves were without information by which to 
suggest or compel corrections. “The alternative seems to be presented either of prohibiting 
altogether industrial insurance by private corporations or of permitting its continuance 
substantially upon the present basis, subject to those regulations designed to secure economical 
administration applicable to all companies alike.”86 As an official statement, it was extremely 
open-ended, and deeply threatening to any operator of Industrial insurance. The companies could 
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either resolve the problems in their business models themselves, or they could cede the market to 
control by the state, as had recently happened in Europe.  
By the time the report was published in early 1906, the public mood toward private 
insurers was hostile enough to make the passage of government insurance a more realistic 
possibility than it had even before been. Though Americans had long been ambivalant – and 
often antagonistic – about the activities of large insurers, the revelations of the Armstrong 
hearings promoted an even more embittered understanding of the relationship between business 
and politics. As Richard McCormick has noted, it was no longer possible to consider 
businessmen to be the harmless victims of venal lawmakers.87 The conspicuous greed and 
financial malpractice that suffused the industry were bad enough, but the manipulation of the 
government itself on the part of life insurance firms was beyond pardon. “If custodians of trust-
funds, such as are the insurance officials, can divert the money entrusted to them to influence 
elections, it requires no special foresight to see the early overthrow of free government by an 
interested plutocracy,” declared muckraker B.O. Flower.88 His comments were echoed in 
editorials and letters in newspapers across the nation. The activities of the private insurers 
constituted “a form of public criminality, for which there is no excuse or palliation,” one writer 
simmered.89 Another averred that the money he had been paying on his insurance policy for ten 
years had been used “to fight my people and my country.”90 To a significant proportion of the 
voting public, the political offenses of the insurance industry touched a chord that was deeply 
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personal. A newly angered populace was now willing to consider government insurance, unless 
the firms could find a way to use their considerable resources to divert it.   
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CHAPTER 5: A MACHINERY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
 In early February 1909, Yale University professor Irving Fisher stood before the 
bi-monthly meeting of the Association of American Life Insurance Presidents and made 
an unusual proposition. Addressing a body of men who understood their business to be 
chiefly financial, he suggested that the companies join together to participate in the 
growing movement for American public health, where their influence might prevent 
untold burdens of illness and even prolong human life. “Concerted action by the life 
insurance industries would mark, I believe, one of the greatest steps, if not the greatest 
step, ever taken toward the extension of human longevity,” stated the professor.1 Life 
insurance companies, he suggested, should utilize their vast machinery of corporate 
advertising, visiting agents, and legislative influence to promote social legislation and 
habits of personal hygiene. The money and power they could contribute to such a cause 
would be immense, and the returns in human longevity and public regard would be larger 
still. 
Some of Fisher’s hearers met his suggestion with incredulity. “The possibility of 
spreading the gospel of preventive medicine and good health by means of a body of 
trained men, very conservatively estimated as 100,000 in number – do you realize what a 
stupendous proposition that is?” sputtered John Gore, the Prudential’s chief actuary. 
Joining in the public health movement represented a major departure from the firms’ 
identity as economic institutions, and would have broadened their responsibilities 
considerably. Life insurance companies, most agreed, served a financial purpose, not a 
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humanitarian one. Moreover, the scandal through which the industry had recently passed 
centered precisely on its social and legislative over-reaching. Though it be for a 
commendable cause, warned Gore, action involving the expenditure of large sums was 
“improbable.” Individual company charters would probably prohibit carrying out most of 
the suggestions anyway, as would the strictures of various state laws. 2 Staff members at 
the Metropolitan were equally pessimistic, casting doubt upon the capacity of preventive 
measures to reduce the mortality rate in a financially meaningful way.3  
But Fisher’s proposal had much to distinguish it, and the members of the 
Association of Life Insurance Presidents gave it considerable attention.4 Within a week, 
the head of the Association appointed a group of ten to compose a “Life Extension 
Committee,” and in December the association welcomed Fisher to speak before a larger 
audience at the national meeting, where he engaged the room by casting doubt on the 
bedrock on which insurance revenues were made: the law of mortality. The human life 
span, pointed out Fisher, did not conform to an iron law; it varied greatly depending on 
the practice of public and private hygiene. If they engaged in disease prevention 
campaigns, the companies would not simply manage the risks of everyday life; they 
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would help to reduce them, to excellent human and financial effect. Insisting that the 
insurance men whom he had already consulted on the issue had shown tremendous 
enthusiasm for the work, Fisher remarked, “So obvious does this seem that the question 
arises, why have insurance companies never attempted it before?”5 
The press responded to Fisher’s proposal with an enthusiasm uncharacteristic of 
its treatment of the life insurance industry. “Germ of a Great Movement,” “Staggers the 
Imagination,” “Well Qualified for the Work,” trumpeted the headlines of papers as 
diverse as Colliers, the Boston Transcript, and the Halifax Recorder.6 Some journals 
published Fisher’s comments in their entirety.7 Nearly all discussed the social necessity 
of the work proposed, as well as the insurance industry’s unique aptitude for undertaking 
it. The insurance firms, remarked the New York Tribune, have “a peculiar and legitimate 
interest in the public health.”8  The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 
concluded that the companies might indeed “be of great service in prolonging life.”9 
Numerous sources speculated that the task of improving American public health might 
best be tackled by the life insurance industry, not the government or health reformers, 
since it alone possessed the machinery to approach such a vast project. “If in America in 
the spring of 1909 there should be 80 millions of preachers of the gospel of cleanliness 
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and purity, the subject would not be overworked,” remarked the Cleveland News.10 
Professor Fisher, it seemed, had lit upon an idea with the potential to transform 
Americans’ relationship with health and longevity. And significantly for the life 
insurance firms, it might remake the image of the life insurance industry itself.  
At subsequent meetings of the insurance presidents, issues of public health and 
human welfare became a chief topic of discussion consuming one quarter of the body’s 
proceedings. Settlement workers such as Lillian Wald, public health authorities such as 
US PHS Surgeon General Walter Wyman, and sanitarians such as Dr. Alvah Dohty 
addressed the association on multiple occasions, helping to generate an impressive 
partnership between the life insurance industry and health reform. By the late nineteen 
teens, industrial firms such as the Prudential and Metropolitan Life had become heavily 
invested in public health work, supporting services, demonstrations, and research studies 
that strongly impacted the shape of the movement. They contributed hundreds of 
thousands of dollars and invaluable access to their business machinery to a cause that 
was, at base, substantially removed from their financial bottom line.  
The engagement of life insurance with public health created a powerful synergy 
of forces – and also an exceedingly strange one. In becoming benefactors of public 
health, the firms aligned themselves with the goals and projects of social reformers, many 
of whom had been among the industry’s chief antagonists and detractors. The 
collaboration was unprecedented, and begs questions as to why and how two such 
disparate groups became such productive bedfellows. 
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Most historians who have addressed the involvement of the life insurance industry 
in public health point to the discrediting effects of the Armstrong investigation as the 
motivating force.11 This explanation has merit, but it does not go far enough to explain 
why a series of firms that had defined themselves as financial institutions became so 
quickly and deeply involved in direct service. Firms had traditionally handled public loss 
of face through high-profile resignations and the appearance of embracing reform, but the 
alliance with public health indicated that executives no longer felt that resignations and 
reform were satisfactory solutions -- a change in public relations policy that requires 
additional explanation. 
This chapter will discuss the ways in which the industry’s embrace of public 
health was in fact a response to the larger climate of social change involving the 
perception and management of risk in the United States. As Gabriel Kolko has noted, to 
assure stability in financial affairs, it is necessary for a firm to address the social 
atmosphere surrounding the market itself. The early years of the twentieth century 
heralded new understandings of the meaning and management of poverty and longevity -- 
two features saliently associated with insurability. Distressed by a towering rate of 
industrial accidents, illness, and wage-worker destitution, a heterogeneous constituency 
of social actors sought means of reform. Though comprised of figures as diverse as social 
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workers, public health doctors, and even socialists and industrial manufacturers, a 
significant portion of this growing movement evolved a theory of societal 
interdependence that proved alarming to the life insurance industry.12 It was an appraisal 
that questioned the capacity of the free market to deliver an ethical or efficient social 
order, and it threatened life insurers at a structural level. Life insurance personnel 
watched with growing apprehension as American reformers increasingly leaned toward 
state-based solutions such as workmen’s compensation and sanitary laws. Such measures 
threatened to place the management of personal risk outside of the commercial domain, a 
menace that stood apart from the revelations of the Armstrong hearings, and required a 
very different kind of response if the firms desired to preserve their market.  
To properly grasp how the insurance industry intervened in this discussion and the 
redefinition of risk, it is necessary to consider the new directions that the charity and 
public health movements were taking – directions that led them toward support for the 
very legislation that the industry had most reason to fear. By 1900, scientific 
advancements and a growing acceptance of the germ theory of disease were changing 
American perceptions of social accountability and personal risk. A rising consensus 
among social workers and charity personnel held that poverty was structural, caused less 
by moral failings than by tears in the social tissue. In an interdependent society, illness 
and injury, not extravagance, caused the majority of cases of American poverty. This 
contention stood at odds with the sales rhetoric of industrial companies.  
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American economists further enhanced the argument for regulatory measures by 
noting that the hazards created by laissez-faire conditions were simply inefficient. 
Together with social reformers, economic theorists demonstrated that a day’s labor often 
returned a deficit on workers’ physical health that was greater than the wages received – 
moreso if that worker were injured on the job. In the modern world, such an imbalance 
meant that the industrial status quo was worse than inefficient, it was threatening to the 
country’s international standing. The argument succeeded in catapulting the debate about 
the management of risk into the politics of national efficiency, capturing the attention of 
the life insurance presidents as well as the president of the United States. By 1908, 
Theodore Roosevelt had embraced the issue of national vitality, embedding it into the 
national preoccupation with conservation and efficiency.   
Against these developments, the recent failures of the free-market insurance firms 
became all the more incriminating. The Armstrong investigations had undermined 
popular faith in the capacity of commercial insurers to manage risk in a fair and efficient 
manner, enhancing the danger that Americans would support legislation transferring the 
management of risk to the public domain. Increasingly, the public began to believe that 
the crisis of the American worker was a financial issue, and it was one that private 
measures did not or could not solve. To control or even adjust to the new discourse of 
risk, insurance firms would need to assume a role in the movement – the more prominent 
a position, the better.  
For the firms that seized on it, the invitation to join the movement for American 
public health could not have come at a more opportune time. Involvement allowed 
insurers to claim that they were not simply moral trustees or financial guardians, they 
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were stewards of the nation’s most precious resource:  the American public health. In the 
process, they co-opted the language of national resource conservation. The Armstrong 
hearings revealed but did not dismantle the sophistication and efficacy with which life 
insurance firms engaged in political capitalism. Ultimately, this chapter will argue, the 
firm’s engagement in the fight for social responsibility constituted the latest of such 
maneuvers.  
 
The Boons of Prevention 
When Irving Fisher requested that the Association of Life Insurance Presidents 
join in the fight for public health, he made no appeal to sentimentality, relying instead on 
the economic reasoning most likely to attract the interest of the financial titans who 
controlled the companies. A noted political economist from a distinguished University, 
Fisher couched his proposal in attractively businesslike – and lucrative – terms. “It has 
been established that the loss in dollars and cents from premature deaths of wage earners 
and from sickness amounts to a billion and a half dollars per annum,” he observed. Why 
not follow the example of fire insurance companies by working not just to redistribute 
losses, but to prevent them altogether? Prevention, he noted, had become a key economic 
issue in other branches of insurance. The professor had calculated that a third of all 
American deaths were preventable, and that the average lifespan in the United States 
could be extended fifteen years – to 60 – without significant difficulty. Such a change 
would save the lives of 1700 people a day, whose contributions to the American economy 
totaled $500 million annually. Expenditures for the life insurance industry could be 
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reduced 15%. It was an appeal calculated to resonate with the nation’s efficiency craze – 
and more specifically with insurers’ bottom line. “Even if the most meager returns could 
be secured,” he urged, “the gain would pay.” The largest cost of the insurance business, 
after all, was not management nor fees to agents, but the cost of mortality – a fact that 
insurance executives had been at pains to point out to the Armstrong committee, 
especially in regards to the industrial branch. “Life insurance is not philanthropy,” Fisher 
reassured his audience. “The conclusion seems safe that here is a rich unexploited field 
for saving money.”13 
As an economist, Fisher was well-versed in the boons of prevention, but he was 
perhaps even better acquainted with them from his position as a social reformer. The 
catastrophic rates of accident and illness present in the United States in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century had galvanized a sense of crisis among Americans. The United 
States possessed very little legislation regulating the hours, conditions, and wages to 
which industry subjected its workers, a lacuna that contributed sharply to the tensions 
between labor and capital.14 Sociological investigations demonstrated that enormous 
numbers of wage earners in the modern city hovered desperately close to insolvency, and 
navigated a fragile financial course that placed them one accident or illness away from 
calamity. They also hovered unnervingly close to radicalism. To some, the tremendous 
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rate of industrial accidents, and the deaths and maimings they produced furnished proof 
that capitalism was incapable of serving the interests of the working class. As the rise of 
socialism among the poor seemed to demonstrate, few forces could be as radicalizing as 
financial desperation. The working class constituted an enormous population of people, 
whose chances of slipping into penury made their well-being a matter of significant 
concern to those hopeful of preserving a just and orderly society. 
Reformers and manufacturers alike were experiencing an urgency to ameliorate 
the problems of workers and the threat of class conflict. Though wary of reforms that 
offered expensive concessions to workers, entrepreneurs were themselves undermined by 
the loss of efficiency caused by worker unrest, and were significantly threatened by 
industrial upheaval. They could not countenance challenges to laissez-faire, but they 
faced difficulty within the system as it existed. As a political economist, Fisher 
understood this position well, and his address to the Association of Life Insurance 
Presidents constituted an attempt to bridge their political differences by creating a place 
for them within the heterogeneous movement for industrial welfare. To the extent that 
“life conservation” could be located in the seemingly apolitical sphere of business and 
efficiency, the movement could harness the energy and resources of a powerful new set 
of allies.  
His efforts in 1909 constituted one of several attempts by social workers, 
economists, public health personnel, sanitarians, and others to create meaningful ties of 
cooperation  across class and political lines. The alliance promised to be uneasy at best - 
the conflicting interests of participants ranged from palliations of the present conditions 
to radical critiques of capitalism – but the importance of change was undeniable for 
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nearly all observers of the industrial order at the turn of the twentieth century. Most 
advocated some form of state intervention in the form of accident and illness prevention 
standards or the provision of aid, but these goals proved enormously contentious to the 
more conservative members of the coalition, in particular the life insurance industry 
courted by Irving Fisher. In forging such alliances, he and others struggled to steer a 
course that could win the approval of as many constituents as possible while still 
delivering relief to workingmen in some substantial way.  
Innovations in Europe provided American observers with what seemed like the 
most radical example of measures that could be taken to assuage social distress before it 
generated political upheaval. Fearing the onset of a political crisis, the German Kaiser 
initiated a series of policies in the early 1880s calculated to mollify socialists. The 
measures were intended to “bribe the working classes,” noted the Kaiser to a visiting 
British national, “or, if you like, to win them over to regard the State as a social 
institution existing for their sake and interested in their welfare.”15 In 1883 the nation 
adopted a system of sickness insurance for wage-workers, and in 1884 it launched 
insurance legislation to compensate those mauled by industrial accidents. A compulsory 
old age and invalidity act followed shortly thereafter, along with proposals for a pension 
fund for disabled wage-earners. The German system sought to “socialize a portion of the 
risks of labor” by pooling employee and equivalent employer taxes, and also created an 
incentive to employers who controlled the workplace to make it safer. Financial pay-outs 
to ill and injured workers were notoriously low, but the measures proved effective 
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enough to palliate the clamor for an improved social order.16 The success of German 
social insurance was suggestive of the utility of government intercession. Under modern 
industrial conditions, some measure of social aid was increasingly necessary to retain the 
loyalties of those who suffered most under the system.  
Efficacious or not, such a solution was politically untenable in the United States. 
Decried as heresy in the 1880s, the assertion that poverty ought to be checked at its 
economic source continued to antagonize political conservatives, who opposed the 
extension of “state interference” beyond the absolute minimum posited by Adam Smith. 
“How can we possibly justify the assumption of new functions which rest upon no better 
principle than the vague idea that the state ought to do something?” demanded one 
professor of political economy to the readers of Popular Science Monthly.17 To the 
orthodox, natural law ensured the success of the free market, and the imposition of 
regulatory measures represented an awkward and unhelpful intrusion. A smooth social 
order could only come from obedience to a higher domain. But competing ideologies 
placed increasing doubt as to which “natural forces” were truly supreme. The natural law 
said to guide laissez-faire intruded directly onto the natural law said to govern the rights 
and freedoms of enlightenment-era man. Reformers countered that the unbridled activity 
of the open market was capable of producing poverty so crushing as to intrude on the 
natural human sovereignty necessary for participation in a democratic society. 
By the late 1890s, doubts about the limitations of laissez-faire had become 
common among American economists preoccupied with social unrest, particularly among 
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those who had studied at German academic centers. Irving Fisher had himself taken 
courses in Berlin during the winter of 1893-1894, and when he joined the faculty at Yale 
in 1895, his colleagues in the department of economics included Henry Farnham and J.P 
Norton.18 In a 1907 article in Science, Fisher noted that the past fifty years of American 
experience with laissez-faire had demonstrated some significant problems. The 
“cumulative effect of experience,” remarked Fisher, “in hundreds of individual cases has 
brought men face to face with the practical limitations of the let-alone policy.”  The 
system, he pointed out, existed on the premise that the existing social order was “nearly, 
if not absolutely, the best world possible,” but evidence indicated otherwise. Recent 
decades had belied Adam Smith’s insistence that the best interests of individuals always 
served the best interests of society, and the radical corrective for this disjuncture, 
socialism, had gained in esteem. “We are moving toward socialism dangerously fast,” 
Fisher warned. The hazards of “live and let live” could be partially ameliorated through 
the efforts of district nurses, college settlements, and preventive hygiene associations, but 
even these voluntary interventions “would be regarded by the Manchester School as 
unnecessary and harmful.”19 A change of power, speculated Fisher, required a change in 
theory of power. In the modern era, economic efficiency and social order required the 
presence of a strong government. 
Such theories were deeply unpopular among industrialists and entrepreneurs, and 
even many reformers hesitated to embrace them, but the efforts of a growing movement 
of social workers who focused on preventing poverty demonstrated a possible avenue of 
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reform that did not threaten the economic status quo. The central concern of such 
reformers was not with the abject and destitute but with those who had not yet tipped into 
destitution, for whom prevention measures might yet be an effective and efficient use of 
resources.20 The indigent were plentiful, but the near-poor constituted an even larger –  
potentially politicized -- class. In the interests of efficiency, the energies of reformers 
should be directed toward those who could be saved rather than those who had already 
fallen. Their efforts would touch a much greater number of people, and were far more 
palatable to devotees of laissez faire.21  
 Determined to contribute their talents (and voices) to the relief of industrial 
misery, numerous American academics joined or helped to found investigative 
committees dedicated to framing efficient social policy.22 In 1885, for instance, Johns 
Hopkins’ Richard Ely led in the establishment of the American Economic Association. 
Ely hoped that an organization seated primarily in the university would lend greater 
influence to American economists -- particularly those who recognized the shortcomings 
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to identify those who were most likely to benefit from assistance, and to identify forms of aid that might 
offer uplift without the demoralizing side effect of breeding further dependence. Lowell is quoted in Robert 
H. Bremner, American Philanthropy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 103. 
22 While the German professoriate enjoyed considerable prestige in their nation’s public sphere, American 
academics possessed very little voice in the creation of social policy. 
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of laissez-faire.23 It was a goal shared by numerous German-trained academic 
counterparts, who joined investigative committees in prodigious numbers in the final 
decade of the nineteenth century. The National Consumers’ League, the National Child 
Labor Committee, and the National Association of Charities and Corrections – 
organizations that thrived during these years -- were densely populated with academics, 
who provided their intellectual engines. Such associations provided information and 
advice to a growing audience of progressive state administrations that were hungry for 
information on which to base social policy.24 
Among the most influential was the American Association for Labor Legislation 
(AALL), founded in 1905 as an off-shoot of its European counterpart, the International 
Association for Labor Legislation.25 Under the initial guidance of Henry Farnham and 
Adna F. Weber (themselves German-trained economists), the Association’s main task 
was to ease the tension between capital and labor through the advocacy of uniform labor 
protection standards. From its beginnings, members of the AALL investigated, discussed, 
and agitated for methods of accident prevention, though ultimately the group was far 
more ameliorative than radical in its pursuits. With a letterhead that bore the slogan 
                                                       
23 John G. Gunnell, “The Founding of the American Political Science Association: Discipline, Profession, 
Political Theory, and Politics,” American Political Science Review 100:4 (Nov 2006): 479-486. 
24 By 1908, the American collaboration between academic experts and government policymakers reached a 
high point, with forty-one faculty members from the University of Wisconsin alone occupying seats on 
official state commissions. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 62; 86;110. 
 
25 The discussion of how to ameliorate industrial conditions was by no means confined to the United States; 
it found place in most nations on the North Atlantic. At the first International Congress on Labor 
Legislation, convened in Berlin in 1890, delegates discussed the thorny issue of labor protection standards. 
Under the German system, the financial incentive to reduce industrial accidents had prompted an employer 
investment in safety devices, drastically lowering the accident rate.  
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“Social Justice Is the Best Insurance Against Social Unrest,” the AALL attracted the 
chariness but not the wrath of the business interests it hoped to influence.26 
Social workers delighted in the participation of academics in the struggle for 
social welfare. “It is apparent that teachers of economics and sociology have traveled far 
in the past decade,” remarked Lee Frankel, manager of the United Hebrew Charities, in a 
1906 editorial in Charities and the Commons. The United States courts, he applauded, 
had come to look to economists “even more than to the judicial precedents, to find out 
what ‘ought to be.’” Though they had long influenced the thinking of social reformers, 
economists were now becoming the “best guides and counselors” to the political process 
writ large, a phenomenon that Frankel observed could be seen clearly in “messages to 
Congress, legislative debates, discussions in the daily press, and even in the 
magazines.”27 Ever on the alert for useful allies, members of the newly-professionalizing 
field hoped that economists could have the persuasive appeal that social workers lacked. 
The difficulty of convincing legislators or even individual manufacturers of the 
importance of labor protection was immense, however, and to many observers it seemed 
that a more necessary – and feasible – approach to the industrial accident problem was 
not the prevention of injuries but the compensation of injured workers. Manufacturers 
staunchly resisted the intrusion of standards and inspections. Given the inevitability – 
political or otherwise – of so many accidents, the true core of the “social problem” 
attendant to industrial capitalism boiled down for many to issues of compensation that 
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would prevent poverty. Workers deprived of a limb or a faculty due to an industrial injury 
needed to be reimbursed in a manner that approximated their reduction in future wages. 
While investigative groups continued to discuss ways to implement accident prevention, 
they devoted increasing time to the matter of how to compensate the damaged – and to do 
so efficiently.28 
Despite the acrimony of conservative Americans toward government social 
insurance, the most successful example of workmen’s compensation systems existed in 
Germany, and a small handful of American researchers took pains to stay abreast of the 
contours of the discussion happening overseas, travelling abroad to research for 
themselves the effects of the German system. Under the method enforced by the 
Reichstag, injured workers received funds to pay for medical care and stave off poverty, 
and employers received financial incentives to reduce industrial accidents. The stimulus 
proved effective enough to prompt a voluntary investment in safety devices, which 
drastically lowered the accident rate and the number of injuries to be compensated in the 
first place. In 1893, Unitarian minister and social scientist John Graham Brooks 
published the first sustained analysis of the system in the United States.29 Five years later, 
William Willoughby, a statistical expert for the Department of Labor, issued 
Workingmen’s Insurance, a second in-depth volume on the subject.30 Shorter works in the 
form of articles and lectures circulated widely among academics and reformers, capturing 
                                                       
28 Gaston V. Rimlinger, “Welfare Policy and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical 
Perspective,” Journal of Economic History 26:4 (Dec, 1966): 556-571; See also Rodgers, Atlantic 
Crossings,  226. 
29 See John Graham Brooks, Compulsory Insurance in Germany, (Washington: Govt. Print. Office, 1893). 
30 See William Willoughby, Workingmen’s Insurance (New York: TY Crowell and Company, 1898). 
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the attention of organizations such as the National Conference of Charities and 
Corrections, an assemblage of experts on social welfare that in 1902 appointed its own 
committee to study social insurance.  
The Charities and Corrections commission included Brooks and left-leaning 
Professor Charles Henderson of the University of Chicago (who had recently completed 
three years of study on social insurance in the United States and abroad), but in the hopes 
of securing broad collaboration it also boasted conservative members with ties to 
business, including Frederick L. Hoffman, statistician of the Prudential. Hoffman’s 
personal research interests clustered around industrial disease, and the statistician kept 
abreast of developments pertaining to workers’ safety and accident compensation. Proud 
of his role as “an insurance man,” however, he took an absolutist stance on the subject of 
public compensation, and his hostility to the practice served to deadlock the findings of 
the Committee’s report. When the group reported back to the main association in 1906, it 
was unable to make any definitive statement for or against social insurance. Away from 
the Committee, however, individual members spoke out stridently about the boons of 
social insurance and the inadequacies of the private system of lawsuits and commercial 
insurance policies. Henderson declared industry to be “a parasite” and “a pauper” “which 
does not replace the worn-out machinery and care for the worn-out men.” Manifestly, a 
system needed to be implemented to provide not only accident prevention, but financial 
compensation. “We ask you to go out into your states and influence the different 
 245 
legislatures to work out this problem,” he urged the gathering.31 By 1909, even the AALL 
had shifted its advocacy from prevention to compensation.  
For all such associations, however, the change in focus brought the assemblage to 
almost immediate – and formidable -- loggerheads with the private life insurance 
industry, which had a vested interest in preventing the passage of legislation that shifted 
the management of risk away from the commercial domain.32American commercial 
insurers – whose assets were nearly $3 billion in 1906 -- played a formidable role in the 
nation’s economy, and possessed a powerful stake in the creation of any social policy that 
might interfere with its financial bottom line.  In June, 1908, Prudential statistician 
Frederick Hoffman urged the company’s president to pay closer attention to American 
rumblings about social insurance. “Only those who have very carefully observed the 
trend of events appreciate how strong an effort is being made throughout the different 
States to secure by legislative enactment some form of state insurance in opposition to 
private enterprise,” he warned. The efforts, which existed in Florida, Maryland, 
Wisconsin, and Illinois, had received practically no attention in the insurance periodical 
press. “It seems to me that it would be a very short-sighted policy on our part to underrate 
the seriousness of these efforts, which sooner or later may suddenly assume proportions 
which would find us unprepared to defeat drastic legislation.”33 Hoffman urged his 
employer to oppose public insurance both at home and at the 1909 International Congress 
                                                       
31 “Workingmen’s Insurance,” Charities and the Commons 16:9 (June 2, 1906), 289. 
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Association for the Study and Prevention of TB, May 1916.  
 
33 Hoffman to John Dryden, 22 June, 1908, Frederick L. Hoffman papers; Box 2 , Volume 6: Letters to the 
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of Actuaries in Vienna, which was scheduled to consider “The Economic Relations 
between National Insurance and Insurance by Private Companies.” As Hoffman 
considered it, the presence of social insurance in Europe constituted an international 
threat, which was best confronted as early as possible. 34 
From his post at the Prudential, Hoffman kept a troubled eye on the activities of 
reformers who favored state action. In 1908, he reported uneasily to the president of the 
Prudential that Lee Frankel had been commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation to 
conduct an investigation of German and Austrian methods of Government insurance. 
Frankel would be assisted by the analytical eye of Jacob Riis and the mathematical skill 
of Miles Dawson, the freelance actuary who had aided Charles Evans Hughes during the 
Armstrong investigation. The investigation, surmised Hoffman, was intended to “amplify 
the report made upon Government insurance for the US Bureau of Labor by Mr. John 
Graham Brooks in 1893,” an individual, he cautioned his employer, who “from that time 
to this, has never ceased in his agitation” for social insurance.35  
Hoffman issued warnings as well about the activities of Professor Henderson, 
whose articles in the American Journal of Sociology had helped to keep the “agitation” 
before the public.36 Although they were of eminent respectability, opined Hoffman, such 
                                                       
34 When the Kaiser introduced his plans for state compensation in 1884, commercial insurance had only a 
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ideology of profit encroach on the nation’s social provisions. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 223. 
35 Emphasis original. Frederick Hoffman to John Dryden, 22 June 1908,  Box 2, Volume 6: Letters to the 
President on Life Insurance in France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, England, Scotland 1909, 
FLH Collection. 
36 Hoffman explained to the Prudential’s vice president that Henderson’s extensive writings about 
Industrial Insurance were in fact “a plea for government insurance after German methods, first in the state 
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men were “badly informed and poorly qualified” to comment on the efficacy of state 
insurance, and their views were “decidedly prejudiced.” Their goal of alleviating 
workers’ economic distress had caused them to overlook the fact that government 
involvement was “certainly contrary to democratic principles.” Moreover, they had flatly 
failed to consider the solution friendliest to insurers such as the Prudential. “[T]he matter 
which requires to be most carefully considered,” stated the statistician, “is, first, whether 
private enterprise can not be relied upon to solve this problem more in harmony with the 
moral and economic development of the people.”37 From Hoffman’s perspective, the 
surfeit of hazard in American industry was the product of oversights and laxness that 
could best be addressed through the voluntary action of employers. The “real problem,” 
was not how to insulate American workers from financial risk – a problem which he 
believed that commercial forms of industrial insurance were adequate to solve– but how 
to keep agitators from pressing the state into active competition with the private sector.  
Yet even if American workers did not require new protections from economic 
risk, Hoffman was willing to contend that the nation itself did. In an address to the 
American Academy of Social and Political Science, Hoffman captured the interest of the 
majority of conference attendees when he estimated that the economic value of a 
workingman’s life was not less than $300 per year. A man who worked for fifty years 
contributed $15,000 to the American economy, but when accident or illness incapacitated 
him, the economy itself was robbed of his productivity. Hoffman declared that the social 
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significance of such a loss was “more important than the loss to the man himself,” and 
was particularly offensive given that – as he estimated – one half of male deaths between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty-five were preventable. The social aim of industry should be 
to maximize industrial efficiency while facilitating the longest possible human life, 
Hoffman maintained. Employers, he warned, needed to be more alert.38  
Hoffman framed the vitality of workers as a type of capital – a human capital -- 
which, like the machines and factories that turned out manufactured goods, required both 
upkeep and investment. For an insurance statistician, there was nothing new about 
placing economic value on human life, but few within the reform movement were 
audacious enough to place a price tag on the value of an individual, and Hoffman’s 
comments attracted the undivided attention of his hearers. They also opened space for 
improved articulation of an aspect of the compensation debate that had received short 
treatment: the industrial wear and tear on human workers was financially significant. 
Beyond the jolting spectacle of accident and death, industrial processes extracted a 
human cost in ill health, which was not accounted for within the financial cost of 
production. Maximum industrial efficiency required the maintenance of the human 
workforce just as it did the good repair of factory machines. Like machines, human 
workers possessed natural limits beyond which they tended to break down, and 
respecting those limits would ultimately lower the costs of production. The financial 
benefits of doing so were real. 
Onlookers noted that the costs of not maintaining workers’ vitality were real, as 
well. When the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences adjourned, a flurry 
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of editorials reflected on the implications of Hoffman’s speech. “We have come to ask 
whether, as we reduce the financial cost of production, the human cost is not rising,” 
remarked a subsequent editorial in Charities and the Commons. “The industrial 
statisticians… who tell us how far the burning of a sheet of writing paper will carry a 
locomotive, or the money cost items which enter into a completed machine, have not 
gone to the bottom of the matter.”39 That bottom line was the deficit on workers’ physical 
vitality that was not accounted for in the day’s wages, nor was it embedded in any other 
aspect of the cost of production aside from the replacement of human “machinery” with 
newly hired workers. Observers commented bitterly about the exhaustion and dissolution 
of faithful, hardworking employees. “Speeds have increased, tools cut deeper, old men 
have disappeared,” griped the president of the International Association of Machinists, 
“and the youth, fresh from school, hopeful, elated, ambitious to enter this world of levers 
and flying wheels, faces an inevitable collapse if there is no loosening up of the 
tension.”40 The resulting fatigue and ruined health played havoc on workers and their 
families, and although, as the speaker indicated, “pathology has not yet entered into the 
machine shop,” disease and its social costs were very much a product of the factory floor.  
It was likely distressing to Hoffman that the majority of his hearers reached 
conclusions that seemed directly antithetical to the interests of the life insurance industry, 
and resulted in further support for the state involvement that he opposed. Hoffman’s 
solution to workplace danger included the suggestion that employers conduct periodic 
medical inspections, barring “unfit” workers from further engagement in tasks that could 
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lead to accident or disease. His answer rested on the voluntary initiative of private 
employers, and did little to compensate workers or redistribute risk, but his own 
contribution to the debate succeeded in adding urgency to the push for workmen’s 
compensation, making listeners impatient for rapid and systemic solutions. A system that 
did not remunerate employees for the drain on their strength was not only economically 
inefficient; it presented a drain on the nation as a whole. In a competitive world order, the 
need for economic and social efficiency was so great that the fiscal advantages of a state 
involvement might outweigh its political drawbacks.41 
 Many reformers agreed that the conservation of human resources required lasting 
and efficient investment in capital, and numerous voices continued to suggest should be 
attained through employer’s liability. The current system of litigation was expensive, and 
encouraged the use of financial resources for fighting law suits rather than lessening 
accidents.42 Prescribed rates of compensation would put an end to such waste, especially 
if the charges were borne by the employer, who controlled the conditions in their own 
factories and were in the best position to steward human resources. Advocates maintained 
that if the cost of conserving human resources were thus charged to the employer, worker 
efficiency would be drastically improved. Some suggested that the system would be even 
more effective if the sacrifice of human life or health were considered part of the regular 
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cost of production. Ultimately, the cost of production would be reduced, as the German 
example had already demonstrated. It was a view that increasingly permeated the 
membership of organizations devoted to social welfare, whose campaign successfully 
attracted the attention of the nation’s chief executive. In the summer of 1907, Theodore 
Roosevelt adopted workmen’s compensation as a doctrine of importance. “It is 
humiliating that at European international congresses on accidents,” remarked the 
President in his annual message in 1908, “the United States should be singled out as the 
most belated among the nations in respect of employers’ liability legislation.”43 It was 
also a point of national vulnerability, which the President made clear that he intended to 
relieve.  
But the concern for national vitality extended beyond accidents, and the extended 
scope of life conservation work turned the page to a new chapter in the management of 
risk. If the industrial inefficiencies that failed to protect against accident were also 
generating illness, then the conservation of human resources was a matter not just of 
accident prevention but also health conservation. Investments in human capital should 
include disease prevention.44 In the absence of a central public health agency, however, 
only the government possessed the reach and authority to efficiently implement the 
insights of modern bacteriology, no matter how compelling and effective the germ 
theory’s life-saving capacities seemed to be -- as sanitation experts lamentably 
discovered. Voluntary effort was not enough, and they turned to the politically unpopular 
expedient of compulsion.  
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From Fisher’s perspective, the wisdoms of the germ theory and modern public 
health solidified the need for government regulation. “We are carrying toleration too far 
when we refuse to correct errors which science demonstrates to be false,” he declared in 
1907. Many individual actions, he reminded his audience, benefit the individual while 
harming society, an aspect that laissez-faire doctrines overlooked but which were 
demonstrated well by natural systems. The destruction of forests, for instance, influenced 
the climate, water supply, and livability of distant locales. No system, however, 
demonstrated it more clearly than the scientific findings of medical science. “The 
bacteriologist knows what the ignorant do not know, and every effort should be made to 
pass down this knowledge to the masses as soon as possible after it is discovered,” stated 
Fisher. “We cannot let any dogma of laissez faire prevent us from checking suicidal 
ignorance.”45 
Fisher’s argument cast aside the struggle for workers compensation, to politically 
expedient effect. Public health provided a more unifying and less politicized basis on 
which to lobby for federal control. Because it did not address issues of liability or 
compensation it did not tread as heavily on private enterprise. Nor did the shift stray far 
from the goal of benefiting workers. By drawing a measure of public attention away from 
the role of the industrial workplace, the emphasis on public health depolarized the terms 
of the debate, but because the sanitary conditions that generated disease could be found in 
all domains, public and private, inside and outside of the factory, it opened space for the 
protection of workers. To Fisher’s understanding, the preventive effects of health work 
could be just as powerful in preventing poverty and preserving the national vitality as 
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workers’ compensation. For the economic good of the nation, the national vitality 
resultant from public health had better be preserved. 
 
The New Public Health 
The introduction of the germ theory of disease changed American medicine as 
few forces ever had, bringing new understandings and new techniques to the field, and 
also heralding the need for new responsibilities for the medical profession. Between 1864 
and the 1880s, the work of Louis Pasteur, Joseph Lister, and Robert Koch culminated in 
acceptance of the germ theory of disease, which stated that microorganisms played a role 
in causing communicable sickness. The insights prompted what seemed like a new age of 
medicine. As physician Harvey Cushing put it, “new discoveries were being announced 
like corn popping in a pan.”46 His contemporary, William T. Sedgewick, stated fondly, 
“We learned more about disease in those few years, or, say, in the fifteen years from 
1875 to 1890, than we had learned in fifteen thousand years before; and immediately we 
began to take up a new point of view.”47  Practitioners dubbed this period of scientific 
control of communicable disease the “new public health,” and celebrated the increased 
efficacy and prestige that it brought to the profession. 48 
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The capacity to observe causative organisms under a microscope introduced 
manifold opportunities to slow or halt the spread of disease. Being able to determine 
which person suffered from what organism allowed doctors to better monitor sources of 
exposure, to intervene in a more timely manner, and to be more certain when an 
individual had fully recovered from an active infection. The most important powers of 
this windfall were preventive. Bacteriologists became able to devise vaccines and anti-
toxins against scourges such as diphtheria, rabies, tetanus, and pneumonia. Other 
common infections, like tuberculosis and measles, proved more difficult to avert, but 
physicians could attenuate their effects by isolating contagious patients, and by relying on 
more specific diagnoses to offer appropriate treatment. They could also predict the kinds 
of conditions most likely to abet the spread of these diseases. Disease, noted the editor of 
one health bulletin, afflicted humanity not only because of insufficient hygiene, “but also 
because it is extensively fostered by harsh economic conditions and by wretched housing 
in congested communities.”49 The health burden of human beings could be substantially 
relieved by vaccines, antitoxins, soap, and better social organization. 
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Nearly all participants in the new public health agreed on one central necessity: to 
avert infectious disease, practitioners needed to get the word out that effective preventive 
techniques existed. The messengers of disease prevention struggled hard to teach the 
fundamentals of the cause. “The expert knowledge now possessed by our trained 
sanitarians and expert laboratory workers must be carried to every home,” stated the 
former health commissioner of New York State.50 Though seemingly simple, 
disseminating the lesson required enormous resources and the involvement of a wide 
range of actors, from individual citizens to legislators to architects and milkmen.   
The implementation of the new public health required the inculcation of a 
framework of risk and responsibility that could address the social, biological, and 
structural features that promoted the spread of disease. The imperative for clean air, clean 
water, proper nutrition, and rest expanded the interests of public health into the fields of 
social work and sanitation, tenement reform, parks maintenance, dairy farming, and 
more. Each of these new ventures required an expansion of educational efforts, as well as 
an assertion of authority within domains not necessarily associated with medicine and 
health. Such influence proved difficult to exert. Public health personnel struggled to 
convince municipal personnel, merchants, school boards, and others of the necessity of 
new hygiene standards, but in the absence of a central public health body the nation was a 
vast and nearly limitless place, with many corners that seemed difficult to reach at all. In 
far-flung towns and numerous cities, elected officials, homemakers, and business owners 
knew little about the new laws of hygiene, and their innocence was often compounded by 
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the number of doctors who were likewise uninformed. “Many of the people engaged in 
business in the smaller towns had never heard of food regulations and sanitary rules,” 
pointed out the president of one board of health. “There is another large class whose faces 
are turned to the past…” The work, he mused unhappily, was exceedingly slow.51  
To some, it seemed not only slow but futile. The avoidance of germs required 
changes not only in the built environment but in social customs, as well. Infants should 
not be kissed or fed with “unclean” or diluted milk, hemlines should be raised to keep 
skirts from sweeping along the floor, beards should be shaved, shared drinking cups 
banned, windows opened, utensils boiled – the list of prohibitions and mandates went on 
and on, and were not always sensical to the initiates.52 In a message to a national 
gathering, the president of the Louisiana Board of Health noted that true medical 
prevention “implies a change of mode of living, habits of thought and attitude of mind of 
the greater part of society. It means to go into the depths of the social structure and 
building anew the foundation.”53  
The foundation was not easy to build. The sheer number of individuals who 
needed to be informed of all these changes was massive. Dr. Eugene Porter expressed a 
level of enthusiasm common among public health personnel in 1910 when he proclaimed 
that the prevention of disease was “the crowning glory of our civilization” and that a 
campaign of education must be undertaken. But the United States in that year possessed 
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roughly eighteen million households. Though inspiring, the doctor’s words belied a 
daunting reality. Too many people remained outside the circle of information, 
prophylaxis, and diagnosis to significantly reduce the burden of ill health, and too many 
of the informed were uncooperative. 
Without the assistance of government suasion and legal authority, the apostles of 
the germ theory faced an uphill battle.  Many residents of the early twentieth century 
United States were unable or, it seemed, unwilling to follow the gospel. Public health and 
social work personnel gnashed their teeth at the sight of nuisances such as public spitting, 
overflowing privies, and food left out to the delight of flies, but they possessed little 
power over such conditions except to exhort and explain. Placards bearing simple 
admonitions such as “Don’t Spit” and “Swat the Fly” bore testimony to their frustration, 
even while they reinforced their messages. In the absence of a medical constabulary, it 
seemed the job of enforcing health codes might be better left to the actual police, or at 
least to an overarching federal power.  
It was becoming clear that in order to have the desired impact, public health 
workers would have to form alliances with other bodies that could expand their network 
of resources and power. Most importantly, they would need help in lobbying for the 
creation of a federal health agency. At the turn of the century, the United States Public 
Health and Marine Hospital Service was the only existing federal body endowed with 
authority over public health, and its jurisdiction was largely tied up in the regulation of 
ports and ships that might serve as entry points for infectious disease.  To have a 
significant and lasting impact on the health and longevity of Americans, the functions of 
the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service would have to be drastically enlarged, or 
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else the body would have to be replaced by one that would more directly coordinate 
efforts to promote preventive medicine. The creation of such a bureau required legislative 
clout, and obtaining it necessitated the cooperation of a variety of bodies and professions 
that, despite intersecting interests, were not always naturally aligned.  
 
An Incubator for Professional Alliances  
Perhaps no illness more frustrated medical personnel than tuberculosis, a disease 
that was notoriously intractable but also preventable, and it was on this illness that 
attempts to create and publicize a framework of structural and personal responsibility 
converged. Tuberculosis dogged patients with chronic low fever, weight loss, night 
sweats, and a cough that advanced into episodes of pulmonary hemorrhage. At the turn of 
the century, it was responsible for 10% of all deaths in the United States. No cure existed 
beyond the potentially health-boosting effects of rest, fresh air, and proper nutrition, but 
the identification of the tuberculosis bacillus under the microscope of Robert Koch in 
1882 suggested the possibility of prevention. It was a possibility that thrilled those 
accustomed to dealing with its depredations. If tuberculosis were a bacterial illness, then 
it was not a hereditary or inevitable fate; it was a communicable disease that ordinary 
people could guard against through improved nutrition, better ventilation, adequate rest, 
and careful hygiene.  Even those already infected could be helped to take measures to 
avoid spreading the disease, a suggestion of control that had been unimaginable in earlier 
years.  
 259 
Despite these insights, the public movement against tuberculosis proceeded at a 
glacial pace, one that must have proved ethically maddening to those physicians and 
reformers most dedicated to its arrest. In 1892, Dr. Lawrence Flick of Philadelphia 
founded the first association for the eradication of tuberculosis with high hopes. In fifteen 
years, however, the group’s efforts amounted to little more than the production and 
distribution of a handful of pamphlets, and the limited audience that received them met 
the subject with disinterest. The association argued strenuously for the passage of 
legislation that would create preventive standards of architecture and public hygiene, but 
their efforts fared similarly, attracting little attention from either legislators or the public. 
Even rank and file physicians gave the subject short shrift.54 It was an inauspicious 
beginning to a prevention campaign whose proponents had hoped to save countless lives 
from a terrible fate. Not withstanding the enthusiasm of a few dedicated professionals, it 
seemed that physicians lacked the persuasive savvy, the structural reach, or the political 
will to effectively promote the public health message of prevention on their own.  
 But the ravages and reach of tuberculosis kept the disease on the radar of social 
reformers and particularly social workers, who studied the structural patterns underlying 
poverty and hardship and noted the role of illness among the destitute. By the 1890s, a 
growing consensus held that the relationship between ill health and destitution was 
specifically causal: a brush with poor health was as likely to generate poverty as it was to 
coincide with it – moreso, in fact, considering the number of working families who 
managed to maintain an endurable standard of living until the illness of a member cast 
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them over the edge.55 Tuberculosis was archetypical among these diseases. Not only did 
the illness reduce the wages and devour the resources of the working class households in 
which it occurred, but the conditions of wage workers’ lives made it more likely to arise 
among them in the first place. The poor ventilation of homes and workplaces, and the low 
wages, long hours, and heavy exertions of working class life created ideal conditions for 
the spread of the bacillus. “Everything which makes the life of the workingman harder, 
everything which is attendant upon poverty, makes for the increase of this disease,” noted 
labor reformer Graham Taylor.56 It was an observation that bore out nearly everywhere 
that social workers looked, and which prompted the profession to consider tuberculosis as 
one of the menaces that threatened the stability of the industrial labor force.  
“Tuberculosis is a disease of the working classes,” pointed out Dr. Alice 
Hamilton, a respected physician and leading expert in the field of occupational health. “If 
one could have a map of the city showing the occupation and wages of the population, 
one could mark out with a fair degree of precision the parts of the city which would have 
the largest number of cases of TB.”57 The social picture such findings painted was 
simultaneously horrifying and inspiring. That tuberculosis was class-based amplified the 
disease’s injustice, but it also suggested the importance – and efficacy – of social reform. 
As a result, tuberculosis came to engross the energies of reformers in ways that few other 
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maladies had. Once referred to as the “captain of these men of death,” the disease became 
an incubator for professional alliances.  
Leaders of private charities engaged with figures from health-oriented groups, 
fostering collaborations that established a precedent for the force and potency of 
professional partnerships on behalf of public health. Their cause was furthered by the 
sheer number of professionals who came into contact with the disease, and who sooner or 
later found reason to combat it. Irving Fisher’s own father had died of consumption when 
the economist was an adolescent, reduced “almost to a skeleton” in the final week of his 
life.58 In 1898, at the beginning of his academic career, Fisher received his own diagnosis 
of tuberculosis, and hastily embarked for mountain air retreats in hopes of reestablishing 
his vitality. In 1902 he returned to New Haven in improved health, but his condition 
remained precarious, and for the next three years he reduced his teaching load and 
become involved, instead, in the local societies active in the crusade against tuberculosis. 
By the time Fisher officially resumed his full-time activities in 1905, he had risen to 
importance in the New Haven County Anti-Tuberculosis Association, served as a founder 
of the new Gaylord Sanitarium in Connecticut, and become superbly versed in matters 
pertaining to public health. “To spread the gospel of good health became his guiding 
fetish,” recalled his son, who had participated in family excursions to the Battle Creek 
Sanitarium.59 To evangelize healthfulness in the most efficient manner, Fisher joined the 
campaign for a federal department of health.  
 
                                                       
58 Fisher, My Father, Irving Fisher, 14. 
59 Fisher, My Father Irving Fisher, 148. 
 
 262 
The Political Economy of Public Health 
Social workers who took up the fight against germs faced similar challenges to 
those confronted by their public health colleagues and predecessors. Eager to reduce 
poverty, they highlighted one domain after another in which the power of prevention 
could improve health, preserve resources, and save lives. In 1908, the Russell Sage 
Foundation convened a Committee on the Prevention of Blindness, and in 1909 a 
coalition of reformers followed the example of the anti-tuberculosis movement in 
founding the American Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality.60 In 
that same year the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission launched its campaign to eradicate 
hookworm.61 Enthusiasm was not confined to infectious ills; in the spring of 1910, the 
American Association of Labor Legislation hosted its first annual conference on 
industrial disease, a scourge whose origins were as often the result of poor engineering 
and inert elements like dust as they were from dangerous bacteria. Such goals were 
exceedingly difficult to reach, however, in the absence of a federal public health body. 
By the early 1900s, advocates of the New Public Health had begun to engage in 
appeals to state-centered political economy, crafting arguments that established public 
health as a government responsibility. What was good for the citizens, they advocated, 
was good for the State, and on this basis they disseminated calls to action. Settlement 
worker and visiting nurse Lillian Wald, for instance, argued that the very ideology of the 
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Republic required state support for children’s health projects. As she saw it, government 
involvement in the development of young minds and bodies constituted an investment in 
citizenship – an investment that the state already recognized as a responsibility through 
its provision of public schools (the perfect site, she noted, for clinics and vaccination 
stations).62 To Wald, the importance of democracy, collaboration, and consensus in the 
American political process served as incentives for the expansion of state responsibility. 
Safeguarding the body politic protected democratic vitality.   
The capacity of public health to enable democracy became a rallying point for 
government involvement even for those already in public office. When the Charity 
Organization Society of New York (COSNY) celebrated its 25th anniversary, Mayor 
McClellan and Governor Charles Evans Hughes joined philanthropist Jacob Schiff and 
social worker Edward Devine in making speeches about the capacity of preventive work 
to “enable democracy to present itself by clearing away obstacles.”63 Their addresses 
reached a large and enthusiastic audience; the proceedings of the COSNY meeting took 
place in front of a packed audience at Carnegie Hall. In subsequent years, the language of 
state responsibility for health continued to spread.64 In front of an audience of insurance 
personnel, Dr. John Hunter, State Health Officer for Michigan, groused that a death from 
a preventable disease should be considered a state-wide crime.65 In 1910, Dr. Milton 
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Rosenau declared deaths from typhoid to be a “national disgrace.” It was a rhetoric that 
increasingly cast the presence of disease as a drain on national strength, and it proved 
effective. Not only did it arrest the attention of officials and laymen, it helped to harness 
an ideology of political economy that had been building support for sanitary measures 
and the state infrastructure they required in the United States for half a century. 
Early twentieth century reformers were not the first to call upon political economy 
on behalf of public health. The link between a healthy population and national prosperity 
was a valuable tool, and had aided the arguments of numerous predecessors.66 English 
economist William Petty used methods of “political arithmetic” in the seventeenth 
century to describe the financial value of a human, and when Adam Smith used 
mathematical terms for similar purposes in the eighteenth century, the legacy of political 
arithmetic was strongly embedded in the mercantilist philosophy then emerging in 
Europe, which placed social and economic life in the service of the state. The ideology 
elevated the importance of statistical analysis in governance, and created a foundation on 
which health and prosperity were closely related.67 
In the 1830s, as Britain began to face the urban misery brought about by its 
industrial revolution, reformers used available statistics to point to the economic utility of 
sanitary reform. Americans were slower to do so, in part because conditions in American 
cities remained salubrious for longer, but by mid-century the mortality rates of New York 
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City and Boston exceeded that of London, and Americans, too, made appeal to political 
economy.68 In 1850, vital statistician Lemuel Shattuck issued a Report of the Sanitary 
Commission of Massachusetts arguing that sanitary reform made sound economic sense, 
and providing the statistical evidence to demonstrate why it should be a feature of 
government. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that the laws of nature 
dictated the health of man, and that illness intruded only when rules of good hygiene and 
balanced living were disregarded. Instruction in the laws of cleanliness and morality, he 
asserted, constituted a valid function of the State.69  
Yet most governing bodies in the United States lacked the structures or authority 
with which to deploy an instructional campaign. If the federal or state governments were 
going to strengthen the economy by launching a public health movement, they would first 
have to be vested with the power and infrastructure with which to do so. In the decade 
before the Civil War, social reformers, a handful of physicians, and a growing corpus of 
middle class citizens frustrated with urban conditions and aware of British sanitary 
advances began to generate the political will on which an American public health 
movement could be based. In May of 1857, the first American conference to address 
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sanitary reform assembled in Philadelphia, reconvening each year until 1860. The group 
expressed enthusiasm for the potential of sanitary reform to improve health. One 
consulting physician from Massachusetts declared, “The day is rapidly approaching when 
clinical doctors will scarcely be needed, and when sanitarians will take their places, and 
when we shall not so much attend to the health of the human body as to the condition of 
the body politic.”70 Discussion centered on the need to expand government responsibility 
from matters of quarantine to issues of general sanitation, and the hundred or so delegates 
filled the minutes with recommendations for model laws that would establish state and 
local health agencies, sanitary regulations, and food and drug standards. Nearly all 
assembled agreed on the need to collect reliable vital statistics, a function, they noted, 
that could be best undertaken by the State.71 
 Though interrupted for a time by the events of the Civil War, a fundamental shift 
had begun to take place in American concerns about risks to health and the role that 
government should take in averting them. The attitudes of fatalism and rugged 
individualism that had marked an earlier era were receding. In 1873, one physician noted 
that rather than dictating inevitable ends, the laws of nature granted populations the right 
to appoint “an organized medical police” to prevent epidemics, since widespread disease 
constituted “a positive loss to state.”72 An 1883 article in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association proclaimed, “Sanitary science is a segment of political economy, 
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and should receive encouragement by the State as a wealth-creating factor – riches, 
indeed, to the whole people far above that of any other earthly value.”73 As the 
government should safeguard the creation of wealth, Americans increasingly moved that 
it assume a role in safeguarding the health of the body politic. The state had an obligation 
to teach the people whatever codes of behavior would be in their own best interests.74 
 By the turn of the century, the added impetus of the germ theory was helping to 
enhance the consensus that government had a duty to act on behalf of public health. The 
accord eroded some fundamental assumptions in American society about the scope of 
public authority, and it also introduced a conundrum of power already familiar to 
businesses such as the life insurance industry. The question of whether public health 
legislation ought to be passed was becoming moot. In its stead, a riddle emerged about 
what laws should be written, and by whom. The importance and authority of public health 
administration was coming to resemble that of business administration in prior decades, 
and both now faced difficult questions about how to safeguard the stability of their social 
power without running afoul of the democratic ideals of a free state. 
 
One Hundred for National Health 
In 1906, the creation of a federal department of health had become the question of 
the hour among a broad swath of sanitarians, academics, social workers, doctors, and 
others, and it received yet another infusion of urgency from Yale economist J.P. Norton. 
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In an address to  the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Norton decried the economic losses endured by the nation owing to preventable 
sickness and premature deaths, and his concern proved to be both motivating and 
infectious. Catalyzed by the paper, a heterogeneous coalition of economists, social 
reformers, and entrepreneurs created the Committee of One Hundred for National Health. 
The alliance included figures as diverse as Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, Charles 
Eliot, Hermann Biggs, and Thomas Edison, and its president, Irving Fisher, proved an 
adroit spokesman. To acquire backing for the creation of a national department, the group 
sought to engage the support of three powerful agencies: the press, insurance companies, 
and the government.75  
The Committee of One Hundred found a powerful ally in President Roosevelt. 
Already a champion of workmen’s compensation, Roosevelt harbored an abiding 
interesting in the politics of national efficiency, and was a receptive audience to the 
arguments linking human vitality and national strength. In a personal letter to Irving 
Fisher, Roosevelt agreed, “Our national health is physically our greatest national asset. 
To prevent any possible deterioration of the American stock should be a national 
ambition.”76 As the president organized his push for the conservation of national 
resources, he included the health of the body politic among the entities to be inventoried 
and preserved. In 1908, he selected Irving Fisher to compile a report for the National 
Conservation Commission chronicling the vitality of the residents of the United States. 
The report, which Fisher took three months to compile, calculated the financial loss to the 
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nation incurred by preventable disease. It was one of the first official documents to treat 
human longevity from an economic standpoint, and as such it opened a new area of 
economic research.77 It was also among the first treatises to link humanitarianism with 
national interest, making it a document of particular importance to welfare workers and 
advocates for public health.78 One pathologist at Columbia University dubbed it “the 
greatest medical step of the century.” Another reader called the document “epoch-
making.”79 Perhaps most significantly, it was a report that pushed unswervingly for a 
federal hand in issues of national welfare and vitality. 
In A Report on National Vitality, Its Wastes and Conservation, Fisher emphasized 
the economic importance of human longevity, and argued that human life ought to be 
conserved with the same vigor as the nation’s water, mines, and forests. He asserted that 
the complex and interdependent nature of industrial society created a need for state 
involvement in public health, as voluntary and local efforts were too weak to be effective. 
“It is both bad policy and bad economy to leave this work mainly to the weak and 
spasmodic efforts of charity, or to the philanthropy of physicians,” he wrote. The issue 
was of such magnitude and national importance that social interest overshadowed 
personal interest, he believed, and action was needed within the broad framework of 
national policy.80 As the Committee of One Hundred continued to maintain, this action 
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could best be taken through the establishment of a federal Department of Health, and 
Fisher’s report took a long stride toward achieving that goal. 
Political will for federal action blossomed as never before. The wider 
Conservation Commission assembled by the President enthusiastically agreed that public 
health had a place among the nation’s most vital resources. “Since the greatest of our 
national assets is the health and vigor of the American people,” reported the Commission, 
“our efficiency must depend on national vitality even more than on the resources of the 
minerals, lands, forests, and waters.” At the behest of Senator Robert Owen, the United 
States Senate approved several large printings of the report, which were circulated around 
the country in support of the movement for the National Department of Health.81 In his 
address to Congress in December 1908, Roosevelt adopted the program of the Committee 
of One Hundred into his administrative policy wholesale. Commenting on the 
“inadequacy of American Public Health legislation,” the executive added that the nation 
could ill afford  “to lag behind in the world-wide battle now being waged by all civilized 
people with the microscopic foes of mankind.” 82 Such a lag could cost the country much 
in its struggle to meet and surpass international competition. The idea that the United 
States might fall behind other nations if it did not meet the challenges of modern public 
health was sobering, and drew new avidity to the cause of promoting a federal 
department of health. 
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 Yet even when it had been seeded among the nation’s senators and the chief 
executive himself, political will for government leadership in public health was by itself 
not sufficient to ensure the creation of a new department. The expansion of government 
authority remained too thorny an issue, the details of the department’s creation too 
freighted, for the measure to pass with ease. Even President Roosevelt, the strongest ally 
of the Committee of One Hundred, backed away from support for the new department on 
the basis that the addition of a Secretary of Health would be too great an enlargement of 
the Cabinet. To turn the Committee’s goal into a political reality would require the 
assistance of the body politic itself. 
Obtaining the support of American voters, however, presented health department 
advocates with a paradoxical dilemma. A federal agency for public health was necessary 
because the task of educating the public on hygiene and health required the resources of 
legislative fiat. That legislative assistance, however, could only be gained by educating 
enough of the public on the importance of public health reform such that new measures 
could be voted into existence. Dr. Edward Trudeau, famed for his work to combat 
tuberculosis, stated, “When a state has once become well-educated, and not before, will 
the other requisites necessary to control of the disease be forthcoming.”83   
Trudeau’s experience was informative, as anti-tuberculosis societies had been 
among the earliest public health assemblage to press for federal health legislation. In 
1892, the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Tuberculosis had distributed 
pamphlets urging the passage of public health laws, and anti- tuberculosis workers 
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became steadily more insistent on this goal in the years that followed.84 If people 
understood how miraculous preventive work could be, they averred, they would demand 
legislation forwarding improvements in living conditions. Even the working class would 
do so. “I believe that if workmen were better acquainted with the dangers of industrial 
poisoning, they would in a spirit of self-defense use every occasion to have better factory 
conditions provided for them,” noted a colleague in a letter to C.-E.A. Winslow.85 But 
public education of the magnitude necessary to achieve this required leadership, 
organization and, most of all, money – resources which, for all their optimism, health 
reformers simply did not possess. In a monthly bulletin to the New York City Health 
Department, commissioner Hermann Biggs famously stated, “Public health is 
purchasable. Within natural limitations a community can determine its own death rate.”86  
His allies in the preventive health movement certainly agreed. Public health was 
purchasable – if only reformers could access the resources with which to obtain it.  
They struggled mightily to achieve this goal. In 1908, the Association of Charities 
and the Correction appointed a “publicity committee” whose sole focus was to investigate 
ways in which Americans could be made to understand the importance of preventive 
work, in hopes that the educated would then “exert the force to right wrongs.” “We hold 
that it is the duty of every social worker,” reported the chairman to the national meeting 
the following year, “to lend himself, and the particular service he is engaged in, to a 
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campaign of publicity.”87 Such a campaign, reported the committee, could take numerous 
forms. Charity workers ought to cultivate relationships with magazine writers, politicians, 
and publicists, and most of all they should seek alliances with newspapers, which 
influenced “all these opinion-making groups, and many others.”88 In addition, they 
should experiment with tactics rarely associated with health, welfare, or philanthropy, 
trying on the methods of commercial merchants and manufacturers to influence the 
public. 
John Kingsbury, the charismatic assistant secretary of the New York State 
Charities Aid Association, introduced a note of cunning when he exhorted the readers of 
Charities and the Commons to replicate the stratagems of commercial advertising. 
Messages, he insisted, should be as striking as possible. “We must get our facts before the 
public in such form that: Everybody will see them. Everybody will read them. Nobody 
can fail to understand them. No one can forget them. Nobody can be comfortable until 
wrongs are righted. We must make you need public health,” he added, “as much as 
Uneeda Biscuit.” The means for doing so extended from banners on delivery wagons to 
personal correspondence, follow-up letters, posters, placards, lectures, public meetings.89 
The ambitious plan contained one small drawback: it required enormous quantities of 
money and commercial expertise, a pair of resources that health reformers largely lacked.  
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Yet Kingsbury, whose position at the New York State Charities placed him in 
regular contact with those whose lives might be immeasurably improved by reform, 
placed little stock in budgetary priorities that did not foreground publicity. “If asked, 
How are we to accomplish all this in the field of public health?” he scoffed, “The answer 
is – Pay for publicity.” The return on the investment would be superb, Kingsbury pointed 
out, a lesson that commercial businessmen already knew. Merchants and manufacturers 
routinely received prodigious returns on money spent on publicity, and the returns for 
preventive work would be just as large. The first place to devote any available money, he 
advised, would be to hire the very same individuals who wrote advertisements for 
commercial firms. “Pay [them] a big salary if need be,” and send them off “to some quiet 
nook to write copy.”90 It was a prerogative he placed even ahead of spending money on 
services such as home relief and hospitals.  
 Kingsbury was not the first to suggest that resources could be gleaned from the 
tactics of commercial business. The forerunner in most innovations, the TB movement 
had established an appreciation among public health advocates for commercial methods -
- if not for the ethics then at least the savvy and financial power that businesses wielded 
in the shaping of public opinion. The health education campaign launched by tuberculosis 
reformers borrowed heavily from the emerging advertising culture of the early twentieth 
century, and bubbled with the fervor of a salesman eager to gain a customer, or even a 
passion bordering on religious.91 The apostles of health engaged an impressive array of 
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messaging techniques, producing films, posters, and pamphlets, and deploying speakers 
and traveling exhibits -- sometimes with the fanfare of their own private train cars.92 
Their activities had impressed those who heard the report of the Charities and Corrections 
Publicity Committee, including the former director of the United Hebrew Charities, Lee 
Frankel. “I fear that many of our great philanthropists and some of our social workers 
sometimes fail to have a proper regard for practical business practices,” he remarked. “In 
these days of big business organization, what factory forgets to plan for the marketing of 
its product?” According to Kingsbury, social work should never again be guilty of such 
an omission. Even the campaign against tuberculosis had been conducted by relative 
amateurs. What the field needed was the work of professionals “– a master in the art of 
publicity!” 
Irving Fisher’s Committee of One Hundred was strongly in agreement. Alert to 
the power of evangelism, the organization had agreed from its inception to forge alliances 
with agencies capable of promoting the goals of the association. The initial agenda 
prescribed the formation of bonds with the government, the press, and – a powerful 
commercial aggrandizer – the American life insurance industry. The idea of enlisting 
industry support had been utilized once before, when the National Tuberculosis 
Association requested insurance companies to donate money to sanatoriums treating their 
policyholders in 1904.93 The Committee of One Hundred, however, had larger aspirations 
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for the involvement of life insurers. Long recognized for their educational machinery and 
capacity to influence public opinion, notorious as a force in the political process, in 
search of redemption from scandal, and possessing a business structure that would itself 
benefit from the effects of health conservation, life insurance firms stood out as ideal 
collaborators for the Committee’s political goals. 
Fisher kept this potential collaboration in mind when Roosevelt requested the 
Report on National Vitality, and as he gathered data for the report he consulted with 
Hiram Messenger, the actuary of the Travelers Life Insurance Company, for statistical 
information on the costs and benefits to be gained by life insurance companies by taking 
part in the public health movement. Messenger calculated that if companies were to 
expend $200,000 per year, the resulting drop in the death rate (one eighth of one percent 
of insured persons) would lower claims enough for the companies to at least recoup the 
expense. And if firms were to collaborate to reduce American mortality by as much as 
1%, they would receive a net savings of $1.6 billion in claims, over 7 times the cost of 
the project.94 Fisher included these figures in the final report, concluding that insurance 
companies were “semi-public institutions with power to exercise prodigious influence in 
improving the public health,” and that if they were to join in the public health movement, 
the reduction in the death rate would prove a lucrative investment.  “While the financial 
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motive is sordid,” he wrote, “it should be utilized because of its tremendous power.” He 
expressed hope that the companies would collaborate to enact public legislation – “by 
Congress, state legislatures, municipal governments, and in numberless other ways.”95 
So determined was Fisher to boost the passage of public health legislation that 
even when Roosevelt embraced the agenda of the Committee of One Hundred before 
Congress in December, 1908, he did not slow his personal agitation for the cause. In 
search of further supporters, he went again to the Travelers’ home offices on January 7, 
1909, where he met with Hiram Messenger and the firm’s chief executive, Sylvester 
Dunham. Both insurance men supported the idea that the companies contribute money to 
the Committee of One Hundred. Dunham promised to speak the next day to the 
Executive Committee of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, a body of eight on 
which he served, with the power to issue an invitation to Fisher to present a proposal.96 
Though Fisher’s premise was to solicit a financial contribution, his goals for the industry 
were far greater than fiscal participation.  
 
An Essential Which no Money Can Purchase 
The most obvious asset of the life insurance firms was their financial resources, 
but the companies also harbored social capital of a type and kind available through no 
other sources, which made them invaluable as allies to the movement for social welfare 
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and public health. Their skills in leadership, image-making, opinion-making, bureaucratic 
management, and public education were unrivaled. In his address to the Association of 
Life Insurance Presidents, Fisher advanced a proposition that seemed to address all of 
these capacities at once, and did so in a way intended to flatter, entice, and worry his 
hearers into action.  
Fisher praised the companies roundly -- for their ideological probidity, for their 
scientific and financial expertise, and for their contributions to the national welfare. Life 
insurance, he noted, was a “beneficent business,” and while not a philanthropy, it could 
certainly gain from helping to lower the mortality rate and the prestige – and financial 
savings -- that such an accomplishment would confer. “It is the right, if in fact it is not the 
duty, of any business to reduce its cost,” he assured his listeners. If insurers were to join 
in the public health movement the companies would serve as trendsetters spurring others 
to action; the mere announcement of their intentions would be enough. “People are easily 
led by those whose opinions they respect,” reasoned Fisher. Life insurance involvement 
would convince millions of the importance of the movement, and spur officials and other 
firms to reform. “Every health officer, every food manufacturer, every milk dealer in the 
United States that heard of the intention of the insurance companies to improve health 
conditions would become ambitious to make a good showing.” The benefits showered on 
Americans would be tremendous. Longevity, vitality, efficiency, and happiness: such 
gains would be “far more precious to the nation than dollars.” If the firms collaborated 
with reformers, they would become benefactors not only of policyholders but of the 
national health. 
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Insurers could also help the movement more directly by helping along the passage 
of legislation – not through the lobbying efforts that had scandalized the Armstrong 
Committee, but by using their talents as opinion-makers to influence the voting patterns 
of their policyholders. Educating customers about the benefits of healthy living and about 
the need for public health statutes would create political support among members of the 
public. This would help to secure the passage of model health laws, and would also help 
to further the chief task of the Committee of One Hundred, “the creation of a powerful 
national organization of public health at Washington.” Fisher emphasized the efficiencies 
that could be achieved. The $200,000 that Messenger had suggested the companies spend 
would be multiplied several fold if it were used to help “induce the tax payer to do his 
share.” If the government were to allocate $20 on behalf of public health, the expenditure 
would constitute a 100-fold increase on the money set aside by the insurers. It was logic 
that company executives would perhaps find irresistible.  
The contents of Fisher’s speech were not all buoyant fawning toward the industry, 
however. The economist made numerous allusions to aspects of the wider political 
context that had been troubling to the industry. Without referring directly to either 
employer’s liability or workmen’s compensation, he intimated the progress of the 
national debate by making reference to the “ill-advised legislation hampering business to 
the detriment of both capital and labor.” This legislation, he noted significantly, might be 
avoided by instead passing bills that would aid labor by preventing avoidable morbidity 
and mortality. Fisher added that the fraternal societies had already undertaken the 
prevention campaign. “We have contributed our matter to their journals,” he remarked 
offhandedly, “and they have addressed out meetings.” Fraternal orders continued to 
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constitute the Industrial branch’s most formidable competitors. The insinuation that the 
commercial firms should join the movement or be left behind was hardly subtle. Vast 
political changes, Fisher pointed out, were already in the wind. During the recent 
presidential elections, three national platforms had included health promotion planks, and 
the new Chief Executive, President Taft, had expressed strong support for the 
preservation of national vitality. So had over a third of the members of Congress.  “There 
never has been a time more favorable for securing tangible results in improving public 
health than at present,” urged Fisher. All that was needed was positive public agitation, 
and the firms could do the honor of providing it by appealing to their customers not only 
as consumers, but also as citizens.97  
Fisher’s address touched a chord, both among the insurance presidents and among 
reformers familiar with the needs of the public health movement. When the Association 
met again, it devoted a full day’s proceedings to the “movement to prolong life,” inviting 
public health luminaries such as Dr. Walter Wyman, the surgeon-general of the national 
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, and Dr. Milton Rosenau, of Harvard’s 
Department of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene, to speak.  For approximately the next 
five years, the life insurance presidents were inundated with appeals from bacteriologists, 
sanitary workers, public health doctors, social workers, and numerous other professionals 
with a stake in social welfare and the prevention of disease. What the supplicants 
requested from the firms was not financial but mechanical: they asked to make use of the 
tremendous machinery developed by the firms for the sale of insurance.  
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Determined to implement a structural foundation for the new public health, 
petitioners recognized the potential contributions of the industry in the broadest sense. 
The statistical savvy, the army of agents, the bureaucratic infrastructure, the ease and 
familiarity with legislative processes, the persuasive advertising methods, the efficient 
business methods, and the astonishing nation-wide reach of the companies made life 
insurance firms the ideal instruments for the advancement of public health.  “Anybody 
can see that the wonderful machinery that you already possess,” declared MIT’s Chair of 
Biology and Public Health, “if it be turned in the right direction, can add to the length of 
life – can promote the public health, can help us to get better health officers, can educate, 
can organize, and can help in many lines, and we depend upon you to do it.”98  
A key component of that machinery was the human resources of the companies. 
Milton Rosenau referred to the firms’ personnel as a “public health militia” composed of 
“legions of doctors, armies of agents, and hosts of patrons.”99 One company employee 
noted that the firms could deploy a body of 100,000 men, “carefully selected, thoroughly 
trained,” at almost a moment’s notice. Such a contingent would be perfectly suited to 
passing along information about health due to their familiarity with medical selection and 
human vitality. “In all this number there is not an individual who is not daily, almost 
hourly, brought into contact with questions of health and sanitation, and there is hardly a 
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man among them to whom such questions are not daily referred.”100 Moreover, as several 
observers pointed out, the companies had already trained their personnel to be public 
educators. Agents worked tirelessly to instruct the public on “the principles of insurance” 
– whether or not that public wanted to learn. “You represent what is potentially one of the 
greatest educative forces we have in this country,” insisted Dr. Livingston Farrand, 
president of Cornell University, to the assembly of life insurance presidents, “and I say it 
with all seriousness, representing, as I do, what I consider to be the greatest educational 
force, the university and school world.”101   
In addition to being numerous and persuasive, life insurance personnel were 
nimble. The firms’ private business structure made it easier for them to organize and 
deploy their staff than could any professional organization or public agency. “[USPHS] is 
tied hand and foot in many directions for want of authority to act in certain obvious and 
useful public health problems,” griped Milton Rosenau to the insurance presidents, but 
the private sector “need not wait for the exasperating slowness of legislative 
machinery.”102The dealings of the private firms could be faster and more efficient than 
those engaged by the public weal. Ambivalent though many charity workers may have 
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been about effects of laissez-faire, most agreed – however reluctantly -- that work carried 
on by volunteer agencies, unorganized philanthropy, or even the state, was less 
economical than work that was based on business precepts “and managed scientifically, 
as other great enterprises are,” as one doctor noted.103 All told, the machinery of the 
commercial insurers was of higher utility than access to money itself. One public health 
worker noted that the life insurance firms constituted “a perfect organization which is in a 
position to co-ordinate in every locality of every State in the Union and every province in 
Canada.” This, she pointed out, supplied “an essential which no money can purchase.”104 
 If Fisher had opened reformers’ eyes to insurers’ ideal suitability as proselytizers 
for the gospel of health, he had also attracted attention to the firms’ avocational knack for 
legislative lobbying. For better or for worse, the companies had demonstrated a titanic 
capacity to interact with lawmakers and the public in the interest of influencing 
legislative processes. With or without irony, U.S. Surgeon General Walter Wyman 
confided to the body of life insurance presidents in that he could not think of any group 
capable of exercising more influence than they could: “You, gentlemen, have thousands 
of positions under your immediate supervision, and when bills are presented in the State 
Legislature for this registration area, if you could use your influence to have those bills 
passed you would be doing something very practical, very useful, very necessary, and all 
in the line of your own efforts also.”105 Three years later, Wyman’s successor, Dr. Rupert 
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Blue, also appealed to the life insurance presidents to influence legislative matters. 
Disparaging the lack of public support for public health appropriations, he urged the 
executives to “use their influence to achieve public will for these things. “Any State, any 
municipality, any nation, no matter what its situation or its climate, can have public 
health if it will but pay the price,” he pressed. “The price is adequate appropriations.”106  
Perhaps because the firms’ activities had been so notorious, few petitioners 
suggested that insurers introduce or influence legislation directly. Nearly all, however, 
suggested that the firms exercise their influence over policyholders to spur legislative 
change. Speaking shortly after Dr. Blue, Professor Sedgewick charged the assembled 
audience with the duty of bringing all the pressure that they possibly could upon the 
directorate for the appointment of competent people to state health commissions and city 
boards of health.107 In the language of petitioners, the assistance of the life insurance 
industry in raising awareness and support for public health constituted “responsible 
citizenship.” It was a contention that also held the promise – however faint – of 
redemption through public service, and few had forgotten how badly the industry needed 
redeeming.  
In the wake of the Armstrong investigation, the social position of the firms had 
reached an all-time low, and the creation of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents 
had been an effort to provide a tonic to the firms. Even the New York insurance 
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commissioner admitted that he had heard little good said of the insurance companies.108 
One company executive confessed to the assembled presidents that “many of us look 
askance at all conventions of special interests, fearing that something worse than that 
which we have already experienced may result from their deliberations. This Association 
is unique,” he added with relief. “It is not formed for the purpose of reforming others.”109 
The dark mood that settled on the industry seemed to indicate that the industry lacked a 
future altogether, having instead only a fate, but the proposition of reformers after 1909 
suggested otherwise.  
Petitioners framed their requests as a matter of duty for an old and noble industry. 
Invoking the rhetoric of trusteeship so frequently deployed by the industry itself, speakers 
called upon insurers in their own language to take up the gauntlet for public health. As 
one presenter suggested, the “official responsibilities” of insurance officers and managers 
should “compel them to view the matter in its practical application to their 
trusteeship.”110 Involvement in preventive work was the insurance executives’ “present 
duty, not only as citizens, but as trustees of large estates.”111 Happily, it was a duty that 
blended well not only with the firms’ role as financial guardians, but also with the 
responsibility they claimed for moral stewardship. Workers in the field of sanitation, 
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promised Surgeon General Blue, did more for the moral uplift of the nation than any 
other official agency.”112 Effective public health work, he stated, was a matter of progress 
as well as efficiency, and if life insurance companies could help to execute it they could 
fulfill their role as benefactors and principled guardians of the American body politic. All 
told, one speaker urged, the potential benefits for firms were threefold: humanitarian, 
economic, and commercial. However obliquely, the claims again hinted at redemption. If 
the insurance companies would commit even a small portion of their resources to work in 
social welfare, the gains in all three areas “would be so great as to place civilization 
forever in the debt of life insurance.”113 
 
An Engine for Public Health 
E.E. Rittenhouse, president of the Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, was 
an enthusiastic convert to the gospel of public health, and his objective in aligning with 
the interests of public health extended beyond repairing the image of the life insurance 
industry from the Armstrong investigation. Rittenhouse understood the broader social and 
political forces at work, as well as the economic incentive that would come from 
improving the nation’s mortality rates. A former state commissioner for life insurance, he 
had been hired by the Provident in 1908 to help repair the company from scandal, and he 
understood the wider context of the industry. “Anything,” he noted to the Association of 
Life Insurance Presidents, “that is likely to increase public respect and confidence in the 
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industry is worthy of consideration.”114 After Fisher’s introductory speech, Rittenhouse 
assumed the chairmanship of the association’s Life Extension Committee, and at the 
national meeting in December, he praised the movement and exhorted the other company 
presidents to assume a role in it.115 The executive strongly endorsed the contention that 
disease prevention initiatives would lower the mortality rate and help to lower the costs 
of the companies. He also supported the notion that assuming a leadership role in public 
health work would harness the nation’s political breezes. “The growth of the health 
conservation idea during recent years has been extraordinary, and is keeping pace with 
the general progress in other lines of human effort,” he told the Association of Life 
Insurance presidents. “This popular interest … has every evidence of permanency, and it 
seems to me that for business reasons the life insurance companies have a legitimate 
place close to the head of this popular movement.” 116 The officer was sincere in his 
thinking, and by the end of the year, his company boasted a health bureau that offered 
literature on disease prevention and free medical examinations to policyholders. To the 
press, Rittenhouse opined that the day had arrived when every firm in the industry would 
be engaged in efforts toward disease prevention. 
Among the most spirited participants in this effort was the Metropolitan Life, 
which over the next few decades came to be virtually synonymous with public health 
publicity. In February of 1909, it appointed its newest hire, social worker Lee Frankel, to 
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serve as manager of the Industrial Department. Frankel, who held a doctorate in 
chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania, had acquired an interest in social work 
while volunteering with the Baron de Hirsch fund in Philadelphia. He proved well-suited 
to the work, and when the United Hebrew Charities offered him the position of manager 
in 1899, he relocated his family to New York City to accept the post.117 Frankel was well 
connected within the circle of charity and welfare workers throughout Philadelphia and 
New York, a factor that contributed to his desirability to the firm, and he utilized their 
ideas and expertise along with his own considerable resources to build a series of 
programs at Met Life that quickly became nationally known. 118 His first initiative was to 
turn the company’s door to door agents into de facto social workers, who distributed 
pamphlets on health topics, relayed information between policyholders and social service 
agencies, and created liaisons with charity organization societies. From Frankel’s 
perspective, the agent’s weekly contact with wage-earning households placed him in a 
unique position to evaluate policyholders’ private circumstances and to offer advice or 
broker outside help. “All things which are today done by social workers in their contact 
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with families may and should be done by the Industrial insurance agent,” he declared.119 
When his long-time associate, Lillian Wald, suggested providing real nursing care rather 
than merely health advice, the two forged an alliance between the insurance firm and the 
Henry Street Settlement that grew into a nation-wide visiting nurse service on behalf of 
Metropolitan Life.120 To boost the firm’s scientific grasp of the needs and impact of 
public health initiatives, Frankel hired mathematician Louis Dublin to serve as the 
company’s statistician.121 Frankel also launched company-sponsored demonstration 
projects, provided support for outside groups such as the American Public Health 
Association, and activated the agency force to advocate for needed public health 
legislation. In short, Frankel fulfilled the vision of turning the machinery of a life 
insurance firm into an engine for advancing public health. 
The decision of Metropolitan Life’s leadership to become materially involved in 
public health initiatives stemmed from the insights of its chief executives, as well as the 
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firm’s specific needs in the first decade of the century – needs that encompassed but were 
not limited to the effects of the Armstrong Investigation. Compared to other industrial 
companies, the firm had weathered the investigation remarkably well. The leadership’s 
decision to sit out the tontine craze, and to embrace an attitude of service by paying 
claims rapidly and contesting fewer policies than did the competition served the firm 
well. After the hearings, newspapers and personnel at rival companies made accusations 
that Hughes had unfairly favored the Metropolitan, and that the New York Legislature 
had even drawn laws for the company’s special benefit.122 Unlike many other companies, 
officers at the Metropolitan did not find themselves compelled to take heroic measures to 
rescue the image of the firm. 
 Nevertheless, business at the Metropolitan suffered some from the tarnished 
appearance of the industry overall, and its forward-looking officers struggled to find a 
new corporate rhetoric that would separate the firm from other companies, help place the 
Armstrong proceedings behind them, and improve their position relative to the threat of 
state-sponsored social insurance. In the aftermath of the investigation, from 1905 to 1906, 
sales of new industrial policies dropped over 40%, and they continued their precipitous 
decline through 1907. And though the officers of the company had been far more 
compliant than those of other firms (many of whom fled the country to avoid testifying), 
at the conclusion of the hearings its president, John Hegeman, received an indictment for 
forgery and perjury in front of the committee. The allegations came as a blow to the 
image and esteem of the firm. Widely regarded for his personal grace and diplomacy, 
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Hegeman had served since 1891 as the public face of the Metropolitan. Vice President 
Haley Fiske assumed control of the company in his absence, a status he retained 
indefinitely, as Hegeman’s health broke down during the investigation and the President 
– though still the company’s figurehead – never recovered his strength.  
In yet another development, the newly appointed Insurance Commissioner of 
New York State, William Hotchkiss, singled the Metropolitan out for further 
investigation on behalf of all the industrial companies under his jurisdiction. The 
Armstrong Committee had been unable to reach satisfactory conclusions about the 
industrial branch, and had recommended that an in-depth inquiry be conducted into the 
business to settle the towering question of whether industrial insurance should be 
provided commercially at all, or whether it would be better-conducted under the auspices 
of state administration. The bulk of the investigation took place on the premises of the 
Metropolitan, and in the midst of the company’s depressed spirit, its recovery from 
disrepute, and the functional loss of its chief executive, Fiske had to navigate against the 
looming specter of social insurance.123 It was within this context that he hired Frankel 
and replaced the old slogans of investment and trusteeship with a new rhetoric of 
stewardship and service. “Insurance,” declared Fiske in an announcement to the 
policyholders, “not merely as a business proposition, but as a social program, will be the 
future policy of the company.”124  
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1909, The Insurance Press, 1. 
 292 
Frankel’s employment at the Metropolitan Life attracted powerful approbation 
from individuals in the field of welfare work and social reform. “The entrance of a man 
like Dr. Frankel into the insurance field is about as revolutionary a thing as was the 
Armstrong investigation,” rejoiced an attendee at the National Conference of Charities 
and Correction in 1909. Other conference-goers agreed. It seemed to many that through 
Frankel’s activities at the Metropolitan, life insurance firms were finally behaving as the 
moral guardians they had claimed to be all along. “The insurance companies,” declared 
social worker Franklin Sanborn, “are doing what in my opinion they ought to have done 
forty years ago.”125 Irving Fisher, too, was pleased. Although the Metropolitan Life had 
not donated money to the Committee of One Hundred, the firm’s initiatives under 
Frankel bolstered the overall goals of public health, and seemed destined to result in a 
lowering of the mortality rate.126  
Much of the approval directed toward the Metropolitan stemmed from the sense 
gleaned by reformers that the company had finally embraced a truly public identity, one 
whose purpose, as Sanborn noted, was “to protect the general community,” not to enrich 
itself. Frankel’s personal outlook helped to reinforce this interpretation. “A policyholder 
is not only a policyholder but a citizen as well,” he explained to his audience at the 
Conference. As such, the Metropolitan recognized its customers’ entitlement to municipal 
aid, and pledged itself to facilitating their access to help. With Frankel helping to guide 
                                                       
125 “Dicussion on Mr. Frankel’s Paper,” Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and 
Correction, Buffalo, NY June 9-16 1909. – read on June 11, 1909 
126 Conversation between Irving Fisher and Frederick L. Hoffman, relayed in a letter from Hoffman to John 
Dryden, 21 November, 1910;  Frederick L. Hoffman papers ; Box 1, vol 1, FLH Collection. 
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the company, life insurance was no longer a private matter, but was becoming a civic 
institution.  
This very attribute raised eyebrows for some, particularly those within the 
industry who were leery of his association with supporters of state insurance. To critics, 
his presence in the management of a life insurance company seemed not only 
incongruous but even dangerous. Frankel had long been interested in the role of insurance 
in aiding the working class, and his approval of the state-sponsored German system was 
widely known, as was his recent return from the European investigation for the Russell 
Sage Foundation. Given his political inclinations, it seemed possible that Frankel was 
some sort of interloper, less a social work ally than an infiltrator who might find a way to 
do damage to the firms from the inside. Frederick Hoffman claimed that Frankel was 
nothing more than “a well-paid agitator” who had accepted a high salary from an 
insurance firm in return for repudiating his former cause, an assessment he knew to be 
shared by former allies of Frankel’s, such as Louis Brandeis, Miles Dawson, and officials 
whom Frankel had recently interviewed on social insurance in Europe.127 Hoffman 
cautioned his employer about the “unworthy motives” of the “professional reform 
                                                       
127 Frederick Hoffman to John Dryden 16 February, 1910, Box 1, Volume 1, FLH Collection; During a 
1909 trip to Europe, Frederick Hoffman reported the apparent surprise of insurance personnel who had 
recently interacted with Frankel that the social worker had taken up employment with a commercial 
insurance firm. It was a change that at least one official “had noted with surprise and was unable to 
understand.” (Hoffman to John Dryden, 27 May, 1909   Box 2 Vol 6, FLH Collection) Like many, 
Hoffman assumed that Frankel and Dawson had had “a strong division of opinion” after their findings in 
Europe, and that Frankel had abandoned the actuary before the completion of their report to pursue a high 
salary at the Metropolitan. See Frederick Hoffman to John Dryden, 24 November, 1909, Box 1 Vol 1, FLH 
Collection.  
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element.” Frankel’s association with the Metropolitan, he warned, was “doing the cause 
of Industrial insurance more harm than good.”128 
Some members of the “professional reform element” were themselves surprised, 
and speculated in turn that the life insurance industry had co-opted one of their own -- or 
was trying to. Frankel’s association with the Metropolitan ended his direct involvement 
with the struggle for workmen’s compensation and state-sponsored social insurance, 
causing numerous observers to insinuate that Fiske “hired Frankel away” from a higher 
cause. Robert De Forest, head of the Russell Sage Foundation, sent a note to Frankel 
conveying his dismay at the social worker’s choice. “I could not respond to you and be as 
‘direct’ as I wish to be with all my friends,” he wrote, “without expressing my personal 
disappointment that you had decided to accept employment with the Metropolitan rather 
than be the one to carry out the recommendations of your report to the Sage 
Foundation.”129 De Forest’s note was private, but other critics were less discreet. 
Lamenting the industry’s bullying and misdeeds against the workingmen’s fraternals, an 
editorial in Chicago’s Western Review mourned the “perversion” of Lee Frankel, who 
had been a “one-time champion of cooperative benevolence” but was now “the special 
agent, with large powers of one of the big industrial companies.”130  
It is unlikely, however, that Fiske would have hired an agitator, or that Frankel 
would have consented to set his ideals aside for the sake of a corporate salary. The 
                                                       
128 Frederick Hoffman to John Dryden 19 May, 1908, Box 1 Vol 1, FLH Collection. 
129 Robert De Forest to Lee Frankel, 23 January 1909, Box 5, Folder: Miscellaneous Correspondence 1908-
1926, LFK Collection.  
130 Editorial. The Western Review April, 1910, found in Box 5, Folder: Insurance of Dependents, 1909-
1914, LFK Collection.    
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alliance between Frankel and Fiske was more likely the result of a pair of strangely 
matched opportunities than it was an arrangement of subterfuge by either party. For 
Fiske, adding Frankel to the company’s roster of executives helped to keep the company 
socially relevant. Known for his astuteness and his proactive approach to change, Fiske 
kept a finger close to the national pulse. “The problem for us is to… adapt ourselves to 
the public expectation and to the public necessity,” he had recently exhorted the field 
managers. “We must get into the current of the world’s thought.”131 In pursuit of that goal 
he had changed the company slogan in 1905 from “The lead industrial company in 
America,” to the more populist and patriotic “Company of the people, by the people, for 
the people,” congruent with the atmosphere surrounding the Armstrong Investigation.132  
Fiske kept a particularly chary eye on social attitudes regarding social insurance. 
Even when Hotchkiss’s report on Industrial Insurance concluded in favor of commercial 
involvement, Fiske did not relax his vigilance against the threat. Alert to social currents 
and political nuance, Fiske was aware of the vogue for resource conservation, including 
Roosevelt’s 1908 endorsement for the protection and improvement of national vitality. 
“Gentlemen, the influence of laws like those in Germany and England is bound to 
extend,” he predicted to a gathering of company superintendents, “I do not want the State 
                                                       
131 Quoted in Memo to Metropolitan Life staff, “The Metropolitan Makes a New Appointment,” 28 
January, 1909; Box 1, Folder: Biographic and Bibliographic Data, LKF Collection. 
132 This slogan ran prominently beneath the name of the company in the company’s regular 2/3 page 
advertisements in newspapers and journals. See volumes of The Insurance Press between the years 1903 
and 1910 for comparison.  
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to take over this function; but it is going to take it over unless the people insure 
themselves.”133  
Frankel wanted the benefits of insurance to be extended to as many people as 
possible, but was skeptical of the political feasibility of state insurance in the United 
States, an attitude which he expressed quite publicly.134 His time at the United Hebrew 
Charities had demonstrated to the social worker that scourges such as tuberculosis and 
the industrial accidents were all but intractable to the efforts of a single force. Poverty 
stalked the workingman through causes over which  he often had no control, and 
effective social action needed to be preventive, collaborative, and systematic.135 In an 
article explaining his endorsement of insurance, Frankel recalled his experience at the 
Charities. “There was the palsied old man who received a few dollars to help him through 
his miserable and hopeless old age; next came the widow who stood nursing her baby as 
she stood in line. There were the halt and the lame and the blind and all the dreary 
flotsam and jetsam of life’s wreckage.”136 The experience seeded Frankel’s interest in 
                                                       
133 Addresses Delivered at the Triennial Conventions and Managers’ Annual Banquets of the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company 1910-1928  48-49 Quoted in James. The Metropolitan Life, 180. 
134 Lee K. Frankel, “Cooperation and Health Insurance for Consumptives,” Reprint from the Proceedings of 
the Second New York State Conference of Charities and Corrections, November 1901 (Albany: J.B. Lyon 
Company, 1902). Frankel, Speeches & Writings, MLICA. 
135 This attitude, too, was public knowledge. Newspaper items announcing his appointment to the 
Metropolitan Life noted Frankel’s conviction that “very much of existing dependency is due to causes over 
which the individual has no control,” and his approval of insurance as a manner of obviating some of the 
risk of dependence. “Many Plans for 1909,” The Insurance Press, 3 February 1909, 1-2.  
136 Lee Frankel, “Why I Gave Up Philanthropy for Insurance,” The American Hebrew, (March 3, 1922), 
450-451. Frankel expressed misgivings about charitable giving almost from the inception of his time at the 
United Hebrew Charities. See Lee Frankel, “Common Sense Charity,” address delivered before the 
Philadelphia Section of the Council of Jewish Women, December 12, 1899. MLICA. See also Lee Frankel, 
“The Uses and Limitations of Material Relief,” Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and 
Correction, Spring 1901. 
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social insurance, which he felt could more adequately address the needs of the poor. On 
his return from Europe, Frankel expressed the point of view that the American alternative 
– commercial insurers – were not living up to their true potential to aid the affairs of 
wage-workers, and he proposed the establishment of a philanthropic organization through 
the Russell Sage Foundation that would meet the needs of industrial workers more 
efficiently than the commercial firms. It was a view he expressed at a forum on social 
insurance hosted by the National Civic Federation on December 15, 1908. “In Germany,” 
he noted, “insurance is no longer a business proposition, but a distinct social program.” 
Such possibilities should be pursued in the United States. Another of the speakers, Haley 
Fiske, heard the suggestion with interest.137  
Company lore maintains that Fiske approached Frankel after the session with a 
plain-spoken invitation. “I’m for everything you’re for,” he said. “Why don’t you come 
over to the Metropolitan and help us work it out.”138 The story is difficult to substantiate, 
but formal business correspondence from Fiske to Frankel on December 19 invited the 
social worker to assume employment with the firm at the rate of $10,000 per annum, to 
                                                       
137 Louis Dublin “In Memorium: Lee Kaufer Frankel, 1867-1931,” 43; Lee Frankel: Folder: Misc. Papers 
re:LFK Funeral, MLICA; See also James, The Metropolitan Life, 182-183, and James Weinstein, The 
Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918 (Beacon Press: Boston, 1968), 50. Weinstein notes that 
Frederick Hoffman, Louis Brandeis, and A.E. Piorkowski of the Krupp Company in Germany were also in 
attendance. 
138 Marquis James recounts this story citing Louis Dublin as his source, and the majority of scholars have 
utilized the James volume An alternative version contends that Fiske paid a call that December to the New 
York City Charities building to defend child insurance to social workers skeptical of the practice, and as he 
departed from his meeting he encountered Lee Frankel. As they made conversation, Frankel mentioned his 
most recent plans for the creation of a bureau of social service for his employer, the Russell Sage 
Foundation, at which point he received his serendipitous invitation. “In Memorium: Lee Kaufer Frankel, 
1867-1931,”  Lee Frankel: Folder: Misc. Papers re:LFK Funeral, MLICA; Fred Ecker “In Memorium: Lee 
Kaufer Frankel, 1867-1931,” 21 Lee Frankel: Folder: Misc. Papers re:LFK Funeral, MLICA. See also 
Oliver Zunz, Making America Corporate 1870-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 91-94. 
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pursue “the work we both have at heart.” In language remarkably similar to that which 
Fisher would put before Association of Life Insurance Presidents two months later, Fiske 
expressed his company’s desire to “cooperate with persons and associations interested in 
welfare, social and charitable work” in the hopes of cheapening the cost of insurance. If 
the Metropolitan could lighten the burdens of the ordinary workingman, their efforts 
might reduce the expenses surrounding industrial insurance, presumably by lowering the 
mortality rate.139 A meeting ensued between Frankel, Fiske, and Robert De Forest, the 
head of the Sage Foundation, and the Metropolitan president also invited Frankel to speak 
at the Metropolitan’s annual convention dinner in January. Both Frankel and De Forest 
were skeptical about the outcome of this contact, but the meeting or the dinner must have 
been felicitous, as Frankel accepted an appointment to the company’s Industrial 
department on January 26, and De Forest – who only that week had lamented Frankel’s 
choice -- was elected as a company director shortly thereafter.140 Fiske’s latest initiative 
in political capitalism was launched. 
The scope of Frankel’s career at the Metropolitan was not that of a man co-opted, 
nor was it the vitae of an intruder. The social worker’s rise through the ranks of the 
Metropolitan demonstrated a genuine commitment to the firm, a relationship that was 
transparently reciprocal. In the years following Frankel’s appointment, the social worker 
                                                       
139 Haley Fiske to Lee Frankel, 19 December 1908, Box Box 4, Folder: Miscellaneous Correspondence 
1908-1926, LFK – Haley Fiske, LFK Collection. 
 
140 Memo to Metropolitan Staff from John Hegeman, 28 January, 1909, Box 1, Folder: Biographic and 
Bibliographic Data; LKF collection AJHS.  If the company had seduced Frankel by offering a needed 
collaboration, it enticed De Forest with the same bait. Shortly after joining the board of the company, De 
Forest declared to a meeting of managers that, “the poor man in this country was better served by an 
insurance company of this type than by any other new form of organization.” Quoted in James, The 
Metropolitan Life, 184. 
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and the company president became close friends and collaborators. Warm and 
charismatic, Frankel had a remarkable capacity to inspire the personal and professional 
loyalty of those who surrounded him. Within two years of his hire, he received a 
promotion to Sixth Vice President, and a dozen years later he had become Second Vice 
President of the firm.141 When Frankel passed away in 1931, the company contributed to 
a lavish funeral, and even closed its home office for the day so that the staff could attend. 
If he had ever been considered an outsider to the firm, the taint was long since gone. 
Rather than stepping into a company snare, Frankel had demonstrably identified 
an opportunity for the collaborative efforts for which Fisher and other reformers would 
shortly come begging. Frankel proved intensely inventive in utilizing company resources, 
“and bending them to his purposes.” Among his first initiatives was to issue an invitation 
to charity organization societies, settlement workers, boards of health, anti-tuberculosis 
organizations, and social agencies of all kinds to call on the use of its agents “in any 
manner in which its machinery can be availed of.”142 Arriving at the firm with a vision of 
service, he turned immediately to the company’s far-flung field force. Remarkably, 
Frankel succeeded in short order to win over the support and enthusiasm of a corpus of 
men who had never conceived of themselves beyond the role of businessmen.143 “He had 
                                                       
141 Memo from Haley Fiske announcing decision of Board of Directors, 24 December, 1912, Box 4, Folder: 
Miscellaneous Correspondence 1908-1926, LFK – Haley Fiske, LFK Collection. 
142 “Industrial Insurance” Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, Buffalo, 
NY June 9-16 1909. – read on June 11 
143 Memorial Resolutions by the Board of Directors “In Memorium: Lee Kaufer Frankel, 1867-1931,” 49, 
Lee Frankel, Folder: Misc. Papers re:LFK Funeral, MLICA. 
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a great gift of making ordinary people see larger visions,” remarked Louis Dublin.144 
Agents and office employees quickly came to love him, cheering at his speeches and 
putting on elaborate follies in honor of his birthday and employment anniversaries.145  
The crux of Frankel’s animus was similar to Fisher’s. Stymied by political 
processes, Frankel sought to harness the machinery of the life insurance firm to further 
the goals of social reform. “I think perhaps there were times when Dr. Frankel was a little 
bit irked by state procedures,” noted the director of the New York State Department of 
Welfare. “He had such a large vision, his vision was so comprehensive, he could see so 
many things that the State Department should do and the influence it should exert in the 
lives of so many thousands of human beings that it irked him considerably that these 
could not be done immediately.”146 Like Fisher and the welfare workers who approached 
the insurance presidents at subsequent meetings, Frankel recognized the nimbleness and 
power of the private sector. It was a recognition that served him well. Within a few 
months of arriving at the firm, the company inaugurated a “welfare department” 
dedicated to the health and well-being of its policy holders, with Frankel at its helm. The 
                                                       
144 Dublin noted that Frankel easily communicated not only his plans but also the machinery necessary for 
their implementation. See Louis Dublin, “In Memorium: Lee Kaufer Frankel, 1867-1931,” 40, Lee Frankel, 
Folder: Misc. Papers re:LFK Funeral, MLICA. 
145 Members of the largely female office staff went all-out to celebrate one of Frankel’s anniversaries at the 
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146 Charles H. Johnson, Director NYS Department of Social Welfare, “In Memorium: Lee Kaufer Frankel, 
1867-1931,” 34, Lee Frankel, Folder: Misc. Papers re:LFK Funeral, MLICA. 
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department was unprecedented, and through it Frankel launched the programs that would 
make Met Life famous for its role in public health.  
 
“Farsighted” 
Rittenhouse had not been correct in assuming that every firm in the industry 
would join the movement.  “Life conservation” garnered strong rhetorical support from 
the life insurance presidents, and the majority of presidents spoke approvingly of a 
national public health campaign. Their material help, however, was less forthcoming, 
though many adapted the language of conservation and efficiency to their company 
rhetoric. When pressed to provide material support or to take significant action, many 
called for further evidence that their involvement would be efficacious. None offered a 
financial contribution, and only a handful of firms launched initiatives on behalf of public 
health. 
Among those that did, most of the programs were initiated by leaders who, like 
Frankel, had been brought in from outside the firm to head off social insurance and repair 
damage inflicted by public embarrassment. President Dunham of the Travelers (whose 
actuary had supported Fisher in his appeal to the Association of Life Insurance 
Presidents) had been hired laterally at the age of 65 from a career as a successful 
practicing attorney, an unusual move within an industry known to cultivate its officers 
from inside its own ranks. Dunham had a reputation linking him to social reform, and his 
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support of Fisher demonstrated his position.147 Rittenhouse, too, had been hired in 1908 
by the Provident Savings after a significant tenure as a state insurance commissioner. 
Wracked by scandal, the Provident had much to recover from, and the presence of a 
leader of impeccable standing provided a much-needed boost.148 In the post-Armstrong 
climate, the firms innovated a wide range of tactics to recapture the public’s regard, often 
beginning with a change in personnel.  
Undoubtedly, Haley Fiske’s decision to hire Lee Frankel and to initiate the 
Metropolitan’s engagement in public health work served in part to reinstate the firms’ 
social legitimacy, but the involvement of their personnel was more than that. As the 
rhetoric of resource conservation, physical vitality, and national strength caught on 
throughout the social discourse of the United States, Met Life became among the most 
precocious political “breeze-testers.” The company’s welfare department and its 
illustrious head succeeded in channeling rather than challenging the calls for social 
reform and the threat of state-sponsored insurance. In a 1913 report summarizing the 
condition of the life insurance firms in New York, the state investigator praised the 
insight and actions of the firm. “Having very promptly recognized what the public may 
rightfully require from institutions engaged in the Industrial insurance business … this 
company waited for no changes in existing law before striking out as a pioneer among 
insurance companies along the pathway of social service on a huge scale.”149 
                                                       
147 At a Metropolitan dinner in January, 1910, Frederick Hoffman reported having been seated between 
Rittenhouse and Dunham, at a table reserved, presumably, for insurance figures with an interest in public 
health. Frederick Hoffman to John Dryden, 24 January, 1910. Box 1, Volume 1, FLH Collection.  
148 Rittenhouse himself remarked that it was “an unusual thing to transform an insurance commissioner into 
an insurance president.” “Life Agents’ Banquet,” The Insurance Press, 24 February, 1909.  
149 1913 New York State Insurance Report, quoted in James, The Metropolitan Life, 185. 
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Superintendent Hotchkiss referred to the company’s employment of Frankel as 
“farsighted” and “pioneering.” By the mid nineteen teens, public health efforts received 
so much official commendation that they became a new point of competition among the 
firms. 
Nevertheless, the Metropolitan’s foray into public health and in particular the 
presence of Frankel among its officers continued to trouble certain critics, first and 
foremost Frederick Hoffman of the Prudential, who persisted in viewing Frankel’s 
employment as a ploy on the part of a competitor. Certain that Frankel had been hired as 
an act of placation, Hoffman considered the appointment to be an attempt to “relieve a 
serious situation,” but one that was likely to bring harm to the entire industrial branch. 
When the social worker addressed a gathering of the National Civic Federation in 
November, 1909, about government insurance in other nations, Hoffman remarked that 
the speech showed that Frankel “neither fully understood his subject nor its application to 
the subject matter under consideration.”150 Incompetent or not, however, a person with 
such views presented a threat in Hoffman’s eyes. Though Frankel no longer publicly 
advocated state-sponsored insurance, Hoffman discerned that the “very obvious 
conclusion” of his speech was that a state-administered model “should logically replace 
industrial insurance.”151 This was a resolution that Hoffman was unwilling to 
countenance. He refused as well to endorse the methods of a person who thought this way 
or the company that supported them. 
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Hoffman stood firmly among the insurance personnel who asserted the need for 
further proof that company involvement would be efficacious.152 More importantly, 
however, he desired evidence demonstrating that the support of men such as Frankel for 
the spread of social insurance was misguided. Such findings could perhaps be used to 
undermine Frankel’s prestige, but more specifically it could be used to build up the 
business of the Prudential, and to protect the Industrial branch against the intrusion of 
state-sponsored insurance. Though his relationship to the Metropolitan was adversarial, 
Hoffman shared the concern of the Metropolitan’s vice president that the fight against 
social insurance was far from over, and that further measures would have to be taken to 
prevent the practice from becoming law in the United States. In addition to his duties as 
Prudential Statistician, Hoffman continued to attend conferences on reform, welfare, and 
the social problems of the industrial worker. In 1896, Hoffman had succeeded in 
protecting the interests of his firm by publishing a report that influenced wider public 
thought about African Americans, much to the advantage of the firm. The threat of social 
insurance presented a wider risk, and one harder to control. The Metropolitan had 
responded with a strategy of adjustment to the new public ethos, stabilizing a place for 
itself in the nation’s political economy and reinvigorating its image by capturing new 
social legitimacy for its for-profit business. Meanwhile Hoffman preferred to protect the 
Prudential’s market by challenging the social context. With the permission of the 
                                                       
152 In a chance encounter with Fisher in November, 1910, Hoffman asserted that the Prudential would not 
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Prudential president, he embarked for Europe in the spring of 1909 to conduct a social 




CHAPTER 6: MORE THAN LIFE INSURANCE: THE METROPOLITAN LIFE  
            AND THE USES OF WELFARE CAPITALISM  
  
In the warm months of 1910, Metropolitan Life vice president Haley Fiske 
traveled from city to city to deliver his triennial address to the agency’s field force, 
informing the staff of 10,000 agents about the newest attitudes and goals of the company. 
Though the Metropolitan Life had finally achieved the status of being the largest 
insurance company in the country, Fiske claimed that the firm now understood its wealth 
in terms of human capital, not dollars. “They call us rich,” he told the staff. “But we are 
rich in policyholders and not in money.” And who, he asked the group, “are these seven 
or eight million individuals who hold weekly premium industrial policies with this 
Company?” Fiske described the policyholders to his audiences that summer as a force to 
be honored and protected. They were, he said, “the basis of the political fabric of this 
country, and the basis of the wealth of this country.” Policyholders carried elections by 
electing legislators, governors, and even the President. They governed and made laws. It 
was workingmen who extracted coal and metals from the nation’s mines, and wood from 
its forests; and workingmen who created civilization out of “a howling wilderness.” 
“Labor,” noted Fiske, “has made the wealth of the country,” an attribute that he believed 
imbued the Metropolitan with increased responsibility to safeguard the welfare of 
industrial workers. “Should the administration of such a Company sit idle, or should it be 
up and doing?” he demanded.  
Fiske regaled the agents with enthusiasm for the firm’s increased social 
responsibilities. Many of the nation’s industrial workers did not have knowledge of the 
laws of health, he pointed out. “We find among them the ravages of disease, and 
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particularly of consumption.” But the firm, he assured the agents, had embraced its duty 
to take care of the sick. It had developed a welfare division under the direction of 
prominent social worker Lee Frankel, and was building a sanitarium for company 
employees; it had affiliated with societies for the prevention of tuberculosis; it had 
distributed three million pamphlets on health to policyholders and other agencies. It had, 
in short, become a humanitarian institution, dedicated to service. The new duty of the 
insurance agent, Fiske told his staff, was to bring as many people as possible under the 
company’s protection. “The home office of this company never sleeps,” Fiske declared. 
Referring to the beacon at the top of the firm’s home office tower, he said, “I want you to 
think of this company as the “light that never fails.”1 The room erupted in applause. 
 The company’s new social program was not without its detractors. Rivals at other 
firms called its activities an “advertising gambit” and claimed that it constituted a 
corruption of life insurance principles, which required absolute prudence in the 
management of financial resources. The Metropolitan’s program of direct service 
incurred significant expenses, they noted, and it was not even clear that such activities 
were legal. The New York insurance superintendent ruled in 1909 that the sanitarium at 
Mt. McGregor was outside the lawful activities of a life insurance company, because it 
constituted a real estate purchase unnecessary to the business of the firm. Only by suing 
for permission in the New York Court of Appeals was the firm allowed to continue its 
efforts, although the scope of the work was restricted from policyholders to employees. 
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Even so, the Metropolitan made hay with the ruling, describing the decision as an 
endorsement and a mandate of the service ideal. “It is not only within the power of the 
corporation to take care of its sick employees, but it is the duty of the corporation to do 
so,” declared Fiske, appropriating the ruling as an indicator that welfare work was the key 
to corporate survival in the political context of the Progressive Era.  
 Perhaps he was right. Historian James Weinstein’s concept of “corporate 
liberalism,” (an expansion of Kolko’s “political capitalism”) provides a useful lens 
through which to consider the acts of the Metropolitan. “Corporate liberalism,” as 
Weinstein describes it, is the adoption of popular political ideologies by corporate leaders 
“to gain, and retain, popular support for their entrepreneurial activity.” Numerous 
businesses during the Progressive Era accomplished this goal by adapting the ideals of 
the social workers, reformers, and socialists who disparaged corporate methods, often by 
launching philanthropic initiatives or programs of “welfare work” that delivered services 
to their employees. Many hired clergymen, social workers, educators, or other 
professionals to run these programs, a strategy, notes Weinstein, that “appealed to leaders 
of different social groupings and classes by granting them status and influence as 
spokesmen for their constituents on the condition only that they defend the framework of 
the existing social order.”2  
 Manifestly, the decision to embrace social programs at the Metropolitan Life was 
a successful expression of this ideology. Fiske hired Dr. Lee Frankel, a respected social 
worker, to direct the firm’s new Welfare Department and to launch service initiatives that 
responded directly to the hardships faced by industrial workers. These programs were 
                                                




highly public, and they helped to stabilize and rationalize the existing political economy, 
and to defray the threats that loomed over the industry. If companies could demonstrate 
their capacity to mitigate risk by helping people stave off germs and lead longer, healthier 
lives, they could prevent government involvement in this and other forms of social 
protection – in particular the provision of social insurance. This display of business 
efficiency protected the economic interests of the firms from the encroachment of 
government control. Public health, like insurance, was a commodity that could be bought 
and sold.3 
 But to conclude that the Metropolitan’s activities were only an act of corporate 
liberalism would be to obscure the complexity with which actors such as Fiske and 
Frankel navigated between the priorities of business and the urgency of social reform, 
and may forestall a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which their programs 
shaped the development of American public health. The Metropolitan’s welfare bureau is 
most remembered for its visiting nurses and for the library of health literature it created 
and distributed among policyholders, a pair of initiatives that were targeted to the 
individual and did little to address the wider structure of social injustice that generated 
the problems of the working class. Historians have noted that as educational tools, these 
initiatives endorsed “privatized” solutions that relied on technical and engineering 
                                                
3 In some ways, this was not a corruption of public goals, but a conflation of the optimism of the “new 
public health” with the power of the commercial market. In 1910, New York Health Commissioner Herman 
Biggs had made the “purchaseability” of public health the motto of his department, but his goal was for 
government appropriations and authority powerful enough to tackle the city’s health problems, which 
appeared more tractable than ever before. Biggs’ outlook was largely civic; his comment was meant to 
drum up political will, not cession of the agenda as a financial issue. 
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approaches to develop remedies.4 Scholars have also remarked upon the ways in which 
the corporate structure and priorities of the company’s welfare work compromised the 
wider goals of the company’s non-profit partners, in particular the visiting nurses. 
Multiple sources have described the tensions that erupted between Frankel and nursing 
directors answerable to the Metropolitan over issues of cost containment, nursing 
ideology, and managerial control.5 These were, however, only pieces of a larger corpus of 
work launched by Frankel, who arrived at the Metropolitan with a well-developed vision 
of social reform. While the booklets instructed policyholders to wash hands and cover 
food, they also prodded readers to vote for protective labor legislation, and were 
delivered by agents who were themselves expected to model civic involvement. Frankel 
apparently recognized that in order to retain his employer’s backing, his activities needed 
to be aligned with the business goals of the Metropolitan Life, but within these 
parameters he sought to address issues of public health in the structural and cooperative 
manner consistent with his original ideals.   
This chapter will describe some of the activities undertaken by the Metropolitan 
in pursuit of its identity as a social institution, and explore their wider implications within 
the Progressive Era movement for social reform and public health. It was true that 
tuberculosis smote the working class, whose mortality rate for all causes was twice that 
                                                
4 David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, “The Early Movement for Occupational Safety and Health, 1900-
1917” in Numbers and Leavitt, eds, Sickness and Health in American: Readings in the History of Medicine 
and Public Health (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 507-521. 
 
5 Karen Buhler-Wilkerson No Place Like Home: A History of Nursing and Home Care in the United States 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Elizabeth Toon, Managing the Conduct of the 
Individual Life: Public Health Education and American Public Health, 1910 to 1940, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1998; Diane Hamilton, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Visiting 
Nurse Service, 1909-1953 Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1987. 
 
 311 
of ordinary policyholders. It was also true that industrial workers were a formidable 
political force, as demonstrated by persistent labor upheaval and clamor for reform. Both 
of these features contributed to the decision of the Metropolitan to embrace welfare work, 
though not entirely for the benevolent reasons that Fiske asserted, and not with the purely 
humanitarian goals that the vice president claimed. The seven or eight million 
policyholders “who cast the ballots for the election of Governors, legislators, Presidents 
and Congressmen” were capable as well of influencing the financial and political future 
of the Metropolitan life.  
Nevertheless, the welfare program that Frankel oversaw was in fact remarkable in 
reflecting the goals of the wider movement: it recognized and engaged the structural 
nature of poverty and sickness, targeting multiple sites and generators of distress, from 
workplace and tenement conditions to municipal sanitation to personal habits. It 
established lasting cooperation between private, public, and philanthropic bodies and 
pushed consistently toward federal involvement in public health, just as Irving Fisher and 
others had suggested. It also made use of the tremendous reach that Fisher and colleagues 
had asserted was possible for the life insurance industry, whose machinery outstripped 
the capacities of nearly any other agency in the nation. Between the 1910s and the 1930s, 
the Metropolitan’s welfare division created and distributed more than three billion 
pamphlets on health subjects, rivaling only the federal government in variety, volume, 
and scope.6 “Metropolitan’s health education programs were among the most substantial, 
extensive, and highly regarded of the interwar period,” notes historian Elizabeth Toon.7 
                                                
6 This comparison is complicated by the fact that federal actors often helped to distribute Metropolitan 
health literature. See Toon, Managing the Conduct of the Individual Life, 215. 
 
7 Toon, Managing the Conduct of the Individual Life, 202. 
 312 
By collaborating with figures in health departments, settlement houses, schools, 
municipal governments, and more, the company succeeded in creating a model program 
in public health.8 Perhaps the Metropolitan’s welfare work activities constituted a 
cooptation of the era’s social work goals, or perhaps they helped to extend them, or 
perhaps the placement of the firm’s financial power behind programs for social change 
constituted an elaborate mix of both. 
 
Benefactors of Benevolence 
The chief benefactor of early twentieth century welfare work was usually business 
itself. In a period marked by labor discontent of all kinds -- from insobriety to 
unionization to stoppages to sabotage –- businessmen understood the seriousness of the 
challenges they faced, on the one hand from discontented workers and on the other from 
an expansion of government responsibilities for the protection of industrial workers. 
Feeling wedged between the equally unappealing extremes of trade unionism and welfare 
statism, employers developed an alternative intended to mitigate the likelihood of either.9 
It was an attempt to turn amity to power, integrating workers into a corporate structure 
that offered a degree of welfare, while at the same time preempting the intrusion of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
8 The creation of model initiatives was an achievement attained by more than one corporation engaged in 
welfare capitalism. Though directed by company leadership, the planning and implementation of welfare 
initiatives was frequently accomplished by outside professionals in medicine, education, welfare, and 
sanitation hired for their expertise. The resulting programs proved to be exemplary, as for instance in the 
case of the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company. See Marlene Hunt Rikard, An Experiment in 
Welfare Capitalism: The Health Care Service of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company Ph.D. 
dissertation, The University of Alabama, 1983. 
 
9 While welfare statism represented the most serious form of government intrusion, firms utilized corporate 
capitalism to deflect myriad forms of regulation. Companies including Standard oil of New Jersey, US 
Steel, and International Harvester became more welfare-oriented after the passage of the Sherman anti-trust 
Act in 1890. Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), 17. 
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outside forms of control. James Weinstein notes that “from the beginning [welfare work] 
was entirely a businessman’s project.”10  Its basic impulse was defensive, intended to 
demonstrate to workers and the public that the corporate system was legitimate and 
viable.  
Welfare work (referred to as welfare capitalism since the 1930s) promised 
voluntary benefits to employees in the form of services and comforts that represented 
“something beyond wages.” Such measures assumed a wide range of forms, from 
company libraries, to sports teams and gymnasiums, to free or reduced-price lunches.11 
They implied a reciprocity and a mutuality that was intended to create a more immediate 
and direct relationship between employer and employee, one which would ease the 
tensions between labor and capital and enhance the political and economic stability of 
business.12 Employers touted additional benefits to the programs. They increased 
efficiency in the workplace by improving the health, spirits, and morals of employees. 
They reduced the turnover of staff by binding individuals more closely to the company. 
They also attracted higher caliber employees. Taken together,” remarked Gertrude Beeks 
of the National Civic Federation, “all the separate provisions that have been noted have 
                                                
10 Weinstein, Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 18. 
 
11 In 1919, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics described welfare work as “anything for the comfort and 
improvement, intellectual or social, of the employees, over and above wages paid, which is not a necessity 
of the industry, nor required by law.” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 250 (February 
1919): 8. 
 
12 Boston manufacturer and Corporate Liberal Henry Denison delighted in 1910 that labor and industrial 
leaders in attendance at Civic Federation meetings were “all finding the other fellow wonderfully human 
and surprisingly like [themselves] in essence.” Denison is quoted in Kim McQuaid, “Henry S. Denison and 
the ‘Science’ of Industrial Reform, 1900-1950,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 36:1 
(January, 1977): 79-98. 
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the effect of attracting to any establishment a higher and more constant class of labor.”13 
More than anything, however, they salved the voices of discontent.14  
When Haley Fiske conducted his triennial tour in 1910, the Metropolitan Life had 
already proved itself as one of the earliest and most extensive modern employee welfare 
programs. Launched in 1893 with the construction of a lunch roof for the home office 
staff, the firm expanded its initiatives to the building of a gymnasium (1894), a staff 
savings fund (1900), and to scrupulous attention to the details of lighting, ventilation, and 
hygiene throughout its offices on Madison Square.15 Over the next decades, the 
company’s attention to its staff extended to the provision of a free hot lunch to all 
employees, gym classes for men and women, an athletic association, a reading room, 
dancing classes, glee clubs, a dispensary, and even a dental clinic. By 1915 the firm 
offered paid vacations, a seven hour day, a sewing room, classes in stenography and 
typewriting, and an annual field day for which employees received a half-holiday.16 
                                                
13 Conference on Welfare Work. Held at the Waldorf-Astoria, NYC. March 16, 1904, Under the Auspices 
of the Welfare Department of the National Civic Federation (New York: Press of Andrew Kellogg Co., 
1904). 
 
14 The historiography of welfare capitalism is vast. This study calls in particular upon the two studies most  
national in scope, Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, and Andrea Tone, The Business of Benevolence: 
Industrial Paternalism in Progressive America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). A national (if 
cursory) examination is provided by Norman Wood, “Industrial Relations Policies of American 
Management 1900-1933,” The Business History Review 34:4 (Winter, 1960): 403-420. Among the more 
remarkable case study approaches, see Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in 
Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),Stephen Meyer III, The Five Dollar 
Day: Labor, Management, and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1981). The role of the Krupp company, which served as a model to would-be American 
welfare capitalists, makes Eugene C. McCreary’s article of interest: “Social Welfare and Business: The 
Krupp Welfare Program, 1860-1914, Business History Review 42:1 (Spring 1968): 24-49. 
 
15 The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: Its History, Its Present Position in the Insurance World, Its 
Home Office Building, and Its Work Carried on Therein (New York: The Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, 1908), 33-34. 
 
16 The welfare work of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: reports for 1914  (New York: 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1915). See also Haley Fiske, “Life Insurance Companies and 
Welfare Work: Work of the Metropolitan,” Address delivered before the Life Underwriters Association of 
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The feminine composition of the staff seemed to lend appropriateness to the 
programs. Sixty-four per cent of the clerks in the company’s home office were female, 
with an average age of 27.17 The low pay that women received ($9 a week for clerks and 
$11 for stenographers) precluded financial independence, and most lived with their 
families. Because nearly all resigned their positions immediately upon getting married, 
executives regarded their time with the company as a jejune period of young adulthood, 
and the extension of a fatherly interest in their well-being was seen as socially 
appropriate.18 Welfare policies, however, extended to the men of the company, as well. 
Algebra classes from the company actuaries established a path to career advancement for 
clerks, and the firm’s baseball, football, handball, and basketball teams provided 
recreational outlets.19 Particularly devoted to creating – and publicizing – its welfare 
initiatives, the firm seemed to establish programs wherever they could be found 
appropriate. Fiske’s triennial addresses to the field staff were themselves a feature of 
                                                                                                                                            
Canada, August 22, 1919. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA. It is worth noting that these 
programs were available largely to home office employees, however, and not to agents.  
 
17 Male clerks received an average of $22 per week. The welfare work of the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company: reports for 1914. 
 
18 Oliver Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
116-121. In an article on the development of economic welfare programs at General Electric in 1919, 
company president Gerard Swope noted that the directors of the firm believed that the company’s  16,000 
women “did not recognize the responsibilities of life and were hoping to get married soon and would leave 
us.” The company’s pension and insurance offerings, therefore, were initially targeted only toward men. 
(The firm’s policy underwent a change when 73% of female employees asked to become part of the 
insurance plan. By 1931 it had been found that “women seem to recognize their responsibilities to their 
families even earlier and more seriously than the men.”) Gerard Swope, “Management Cooperation with 
Workers for Economic Welfare,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 154 
(1931), 131-137. Andrea Tone notes that some employers reasoned that company welfare work would 
“transform today’s wage earner into tomorrow’s better wife and mother.” Tone, Business of Benevolence, 
12.  
 
19 Welfare work for employees, conducted by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York: reports 
for 1914.  
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welfare work, designed to strengthen the relationship with the workers furthest from the 
home office by making the firm’s vice president and de facto leader a more familiar face. 
Business leaders who undertook welfare work took a great deal of pride in their 
activities. The initiatives improved the public image of their firms, and offered proof to 
directors and executives that they were fulfilling their moral obligations of justice to 
humanity. For many, welfare work provided an opportunity to fulfill religious ideals. 
Haley Fiske, who attended church repeatedly on Sundays and numerous times during the 
week, was deeply religious. Heavily influenced by the social gospel -- which preached 
the utilization of Christian principles in everyday life, and the obligation to minister to 
the poor within the realities of industrial society – the vice president took seriously the 
duty of stewardship for the less fortunate.20 For Fiske and many like him, welfare work 
offered opportunity to express genuine humanitarian interests, and to exercise leadership 
in an ethical and honorable manner.21   
Few proponents of Welfare Capitalism, of course, interrogated the ways in which 
the laissez faire economic system or business itself contributed to the existence of social 
needs.22 Welfare work blended notions of idealism and enlightened self interest in a 
manner that allowed executives to display sensitivity to social unrest without taking 
                                                
20 Colleagues remarked frequently on his open-handed nature and genuine concern for human suffering, 
attributes that complicate and deepen his humanitarian goals for the Metropolitan Life. Helen Fiske Evans 
“My Father: A Portrait of Haley Fiske,” Officers, Directors, & Executives Biographical Files: Fiske, Haley, 
MLICA. See also The Intelligencer, 20:7 (1929). Officers, Directors, & Executives Biographical Files: 
Fiske, Haley, MLICA. Shortly after his death, the entire issue of this in-house production was developed to 
the life of Haley Fiske. 
 
21 Few historians have validated the veracity of this perspective, but a notable exception is the interpretation 
of Nevins and Hill, who describe the welfare work of the Ford motor company as a “bright dream. This 
study by is frequently cited as the most positive historical interpretation of welfare capitalism. Allan Nevins 
& Frank Earnest Hill, Ford: Expansion and Challenge: 1914-1933 (New York: Scribner’s, 1957). 
 
22 Morrell Heald, The social Responsibilities of Business: Company and Community, 1900-1960, 
(Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1970), 19. 
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responsibility for the factors that caused it. Southern manufacturers tended to be more 
forthcoming about the role of their own self interest in the cultivation of a stable, 
productive workforce than northern executives.23 Nevertheless, the activities of 
businessmen north and south exposed entrepreneurs to the social conditions brought on 
by rapid industrialization, and even the most seasoned capitalists were hard-pressed to 
ignore such suffering. Though primarily responsible for the practical concerns 
surrounding their own businesses, many executives genuinely hoped to redress the 
conditions they saw, and reached for the resources and talents available to them.24 Thus, 
the corporate leaders who expressed interest in social reform were rarely either paragons 
of understanding or calculating tycoons.25 Their motives were mixed, and the initiatives 
they supported tended to reflect a blend of compromise, hope, and pragmatism, whose 
benefits (and drawbacks) ran in all directions.  
Employers turned to the practice in increasing numbers. By 1900, corporations all 
over the United States had began to implement welfare programs, and in 1904 the 
National Civic Federation created its own Employer’s Welfare Department to serve as an 
educational clearinghouse for welfare ideas. Employers within the membership studied 
ways in which to allow their workers to feel less alienated from the interests of the firm. 
Employing metaphors of family and reciprocity, they encouraged employees to think of 
management as a patron and a friend, to whom they could turn for protection and 
guidance, and even to air their troubles. Properly conducted, welfare work could give 
                                                
23 Daniel Nelson and Stuart Campbell, “Taylorism versus Welfare Work in American Industry: H.L Gantt 
and the Bancrofts,” Business History Review 46 (Spring 1972): 1-16. 
 
24 Heald, The Social Responsibilities of Business, 1. 
 
25 Heald, The social Responsibilities of Business, 2-3. See also Thomas Cochran, “The Legend of the 
Robber Barons,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 74:3 (July, 1950), 307-321. 
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employees an opportunity “to be heard.” Supporters emphasized the philosophy that the 
measures were good for all parties, and constituted a morally responsible style of 
management that contained no element of demoralization. “[W]hatever makes the worker 
more human, more contented, more skilled, is a positive industrial asset in the business 
and is a large factor in industrial stability,” noted social engineer William Tolman in 
1908.26 The Welfare Department of the NCF swelled from 500 members in 1911 to 2500 
in 1914, attracting executive after executive who hoped that the remedy for labor 
radicalism could be achieved, perhaps, by providing a cure for ennui.27  
Yet ethics alone were a notoriously poor motivator for business practices, and as 
Andrea Tone has pointed out, the desire to act in a conscientious manner “does not 
explain why thousands of businessmen became sentimental all at once.”28 A more likely 
motivator was the increasingly fractious relationship between capital and labor, whose 
consequences were expensive and included soldiering, strikes, and slow-downs, as well 
                                                
26 William Tolman, Social engineering; a record of things done by American industrialists employing 
upwards of one and one-half million of people, (New York: McGraw Publishing Company, 1909), 2. 
 
27 Weinstein, Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 18-19. By the end of the decade, books, articles, 
lectures, and conferences had become readily available to all wishing to investigate the utility of welfare 
work. Economists Richard Ely and John Commons were among the first to report to the press about the 
boons of welfare capitalism. See Richard Ely, “Industrial Betterment,” Harper’s Monthly 105 (June 1902): 
39-45 and “An American Industrial Experiment,” Harper’s Monthly 105 (September1902): 548-553. See 
also John Commons “Welfare Work,” Harper’s Monthly 105 (June 1902): 79-81. By mid-decade, 
organizations such as the American Institute of Social Service began to serve as clearinghouses for 
information on industrial betterment, and helped to distribute literature such as the quarterly Social Service. 
See as well George Eads, “N.O. Nelson, Practical Cooperator and the Great Work he is Accomplishing for 
Human Uplit,” Arena 36:204 (November 1906), 463-481; Tolman, Social engineering. No passing fad, 
monographs on welfare work and industrial efficiency continued to emerge until the onset of the great 
depression. Daniel Bloomfield, Labor Maintenance: A Practical Employees’ Service Work (New York: he 
Ronald Press Company, 1920). Lee Frankel and Alexander Fleisher, The Human Factor in Industry (New 
York: MacMillan Company, 1920), P. Sargent Florence, Economics of Fatigue and Unrest and the 
Efficiency of Labor in English and American Industry (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1924), J. 
David Houser, What the Employer Thinks: Executives’ Attitudes Toward Employees (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1927). 
 
28 Tone, The Business of Benevolence, 3. 
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as damage to physical plants and public relations. Attempts to quell labor upheaval 
ranged from the hiring of guards and strike breakers to the company infiltration of unions 
through spies, to the activation of actual military units. Between 1875 and 1910, state 
troops were called out 500 times in response to strikes, a response that did little to resolve 
the violence experienced by both sides.29 The price tag associated with such conflicts 
could be enormous. In two years, the Pittsburgh Coal Company spent over $670,000 on 
“defense.”30 By contrast, the option of “crushing labor through kindness” offered an 
inexpensive, socially acceptable, and all-around more efficient approach to worker 
unrest, and employers turned to it as an enlightened answer to a pressing problem.  
At its crux, then, welfare work could be exceptionally anti-unionist, a feature that 
numerous historians have pointed out. Welfare measure, they note, tended to further the 
interests of the company far more than the well-being of the workers.31 Employers who 
embraced welfare capitalism often did so in attempt to forestall or supplant the efforts of 
organizers, often with the initiation of employee representation plans that offered workers 
an advisory voice concerning their plants’ working conditions. Such plans were said to 
allow workers a sense of importance in shaping the priorities of the firm, but participation 
forfeited workers’ option to strike, and employees often found that they could utilize their 
                                                
29Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1-3. With an average of 1470 strikes per year from 1881 to 1906, 
there were numerous opportunities for bloodshed.  See Houser, What the Employer Thinks, 5. 
 
30 Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 3. 
 
31 Irving Bernstein, who authored the first serious treatment of welfare capitalism, posited that the central 
purpose of the practice was to forestall trade unionism. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the 
American Worker, 1920-1933 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960, 1966). The view has been echoed by 
Robert Ozanne, A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), Milton Derber, The American idea of industrial 
democracy, 1865-1965 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), and David Brody, “The Rise and 
Decline of Welfare Capitalism,” in Change and Continuity in Twentieth Century America: the 20s, 
Bremner, Brody, & Braeman, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 147-178. 
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advisory power only regarding topics their employers were willing to discuss.32 As an 
exercise in pacification, employee representation plans and welfare work in general 
served as a popular means of preserving the social order both inside and outside of the 
factory. 
Haley Fiske felt the threat to the social order quite keenly. Having steered the 
company through over two decades of social upheaval, including the Massachusetts child 
insurance hearings and the Armstrong Investigation, he was alive to the power of popular 
protest. Fiske disliked unions, and was vocal in his skepticism that workingmen could 
ever be competent to handle affairs of management. “When it comes to real bargaining 
you cannot beat a workingman,” he remarked dryly in a 1908 speech to the National 
Civic Federation, explaining that the company never offered policy surrenders in cash, 
because “it is not right to put temptation in the way of a workingman.”33  
Yet Fiske, like many of his contemporaries, understood that if unions didn’t usher 
in changes, the government would do so. The push for workmen’s compensation laws, 
federal safety standards, and limits on maximum work hours reflected growing support in 
the United States for legislative solutions to the problems of labor. Nearly all 
businessmen in the early twentieth century maintained animosity toward social welfare 
and labor legislation, but the hostility of the life insurance industry was particularly 
fierce. The legislation following the Armstrong proceedings had brought home to insurers 
the capacity of government to shape the affairs of industry. One particularly odious law 
stipulated after 1906 that companies could not write more than $150,000 in new 
                                                
32 Wood, “Industrial Relations Policies of American Management,” 403-420. 
 
33 Haley Fiske. “Insurance by Private Companies” Address delivered before the National Civic Federation, 
Dec 15,1908. Reprint. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA, 
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insurance per year. The rule had been intended to halt the “battle for bigness” that 
underlay so much mismanagement of the firms, but executives surmised that the 
regulation provided proof that within the political culture of the United States, the 
insurance business “is not a private business but an affair of the State.”34 One executive 
claimed that the legislation was so intrusive that it made the business “a branch of the 
Government.” The spreading example of government insurance in Europe compounded 
the anxiety of American commercial insurers, particularly in 1911 when Lloyd George’s 
system became rule of law in England.  
“Since the new century opened, the whole world is hurrying as if its time were 
short and its end near,” remarked Fiske. “Our business has felt this energy both from 
without and within.”35 New forms of insurance had begun to proliferate, offering 
compensation for sickness and accident, and even unemployment and old age. New 
legislation stipulating forms of workmen’s compensation abounded. By 1915, over a 
dozen states had passed legislation enacting some form of compensation mandatory for 
employers. “Bills introduced into various legislatures show that the theory of 
compensation against sickness is gaining ground,” noted Frankel. “Industry is becoming 
rapidly socialized.”36 It seemed that the economic organization of American life was 
itself undergoing changes, prompting shifts to which insurers were acutely sensitive. 
                                                
34 Haley Fiske, “Life Insurance Taxation and Legislation,” Address delivered to the Association of Life 
Underwriters, February 9, 1909. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA. 
 
35 Haley Fiske, “Life Insurance Companies and Welfare Work,” Address delivered to the Life Underwriters 
Association of Canada, August 22, 1912. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA. 
 
36 Lee Frankel, “Corporate Welfare Work,” Reprinted from the Insurance Monitor, November 1913, Lee 
Frankel, Folder #7, MLICA. Frankel pointed out that the German insurance laws passed thirty years before 
had completely ignored the existence of private companies. “It is evident,” he warned, “that the insurance 
companies were found in a condition of unpreparedness, and that they had not had the social vision to see 
the light ahead.” 
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 The social climate led Fiske to conclude that it would be well to heed the 
reformers who solicited the commercial insurance industry, bringing the urgency of the 
industrial era directly to the doorsteps of the companies. Their suggestions, decided 
Fiske, could prove prescient. “Officers of a Corporation like this… have got to have their 
finger on the pulse of the public,” he noted. “It won’t do to conform to what we are 
required to do. It is our business to go ahead and meet a condition before it is felt… to 
look ahead to note what is to be required tomorrow, -- never to wait until it has been 
required.”37  Though untroubled by unions themselves, executives at the Metropolitan 
understood that if they did not look after the well-being of their own employees, the 
government might soon do so itself. Moreover, the political demand for state 
responsibility for the physical well-being of citizens made it likely that the state would 
soon assume responsibility for the needs of policyholders, a move which could threaten 
the very foundation of the commercial life insurance industry.  
Cognizant of these considerations, Fiske took the unprecedented step of extending 
welfare measures not only to staff but also to policyholders. For the Metropolitan, the 
distance between trusteeship and humanitarian aid was short, and easily crossed. By the 
summer of 1910, Fiske had seamlessly moved from the rhetoric of “conscientious 
trusteeship” to one of direct public service. As he addressed the gatherings of company 
agents, he declared the company to be “something greater and grander” than a 
corporation; it was now a humanitarian institution, “one that is administered for the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
37 Haley Fiske, “Address of the President to the Home Office Employees,” Delivered on four occasions 
between May 21 and May 28, 1914. Haley Fiske, Speeches and Writings, MLICA. 
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benefit of the people, because the people in the real sense, are the Company.”38 The 
corporation transformed by welfare work was no longer a private, commercial institution 
dedicated to generating profits. It was instead a humanitarian institution on which society 
writ large could depend. 
  
Building a Social Institution 
 The responsibility for converting the Metropolitan Life from an economic 
institution into a social one fell to Dr. Lee Frankel. A decade of experience as the 
manager of the United Hebrew Charities had endowed Frankel with an evolved 
philosophy regarding effective forms of social work. He came to the Metropolitan with a 
vision for how to implement them through the machinery of the corporate giant, and a 
wealth of resources with which to do so. His first task at the firm was to establish 
cooperative relationships with associations and persons interested in welfare, social, and 
charitable work, an assignment he fulfilled promptly.39 In the early weeks of his 
employment, Frankel mined his friendships with New York City’s leading social work 
professionals, exchanging ideas with Lawrence Veiller, director of the Tuberculosis 
Association, and Lillian Wald, director of the Henry Street Settlement.40 Aware of the 
utility of the social survey, he hired an old acquaintance, Dr. Louis Dublin to serve as a 
statistician evaluating the company’s welfare work. Frankel had worked with each of 
these people in the past and shared their familiarity with tenement conditions, as well as 
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39 Memo from Haley Fiske to Lee Frankel, 19 December, 1908. LFK Collection, AJHS . 
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their commitment to the institutional values of the settlement house movement.41 All 
believed in the necessity of building infrastructure within working class and immigrant 
neighborhoods to model and mentor social improvement. All endorsed the importance of 
education, and it was the intimacy of neighborhood teaching and one on one instruction 
that would serve as the cornerstone of Frankel’s welfare work among policyholders.  
At the time of his entry to the Metropolitan life, numerous reformers in Frankel’s 
circles had been experimenting with new methods of instruction to replace the lessons 
provided by traditional “friendly visitors.” Lillian Wald’s visiting nurses modeled 
sanitary practices during their medical visits to tenement apartments, a practice which 
worked well, but Lawrence Veiller determined to expand the work by sending an agent 
house to house to teach tuberculosis prevention, even where sickness had not yet 
occurred. Carrying circulars printed with instructions, the agents explained to residents of 
Little Italy that they should open windows, refrain from spitting, and eat wholesome 
foods, and telling them as well how to access local clinics, and where such facilities 
existed. Veiller was optimistic that the “sound advice” of the agent and the attractive 
Italian scene on the front of the circular and would convey the spirit of friendship. Even 
so, the project encountered resistance. When agents explained that the poster was “a gift 
from the Charity Organization Society,” some recipients refused to accept it, unwilling to 
become the subjects of charity. Other families struggled to understand the motives of 
strangers who would appear unannounced and uninvited in such a way, offering advice 
and a gift, and agents reported being the subject of ample curiosity. “By the time I get to 
                                                
41 Zunz, Making America Corporate, 92-93. Arriving as an immigrant as a young child, Dublin had grown 
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the ground floor a mob of children are after me,” recalled one agent. “They now all 
recognize me as the lady who goes around telling people to open their windows and not 
to spit on the floor.”42 Such impediments failed to trouble Veiller, however, who 
pronounced the program a great success, and pondered as to how to implement it more 
widely.  
 From his position at the Metropolitan, Frankel had access to a near-army of 
individuals far better suited to such a task, and he pressed them into service immediately. 
The company’s life insurance agents, he believed, could serve as the front line in 
educating policyholders about disease prevention and personal and household hygiene. 
Because they were already regular visitors to working class households, they would not 
attract the same hostility or bewilderment that other callers provoked, and their presence 
bore no stigma of either government or charity.43 In addition, company agents already 
had more knowledge about the lives of the working class families than any social worker 
possessed. Agents were notified immediately whenever a death occurred, and knew as 
well about family illnesses and births. On their weekly visits, they became intimately 
                                                
42 To avoid conveying the stigma of charity, agents began to refer to the circular as a “manifest,” a word 
that they discovered with delight caused the doors of newly arrived Italians to open with prompt deference. 
“This is something that was very familiar to the Italians, they having frequently received such official 
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cried after me.” Only Sicilians expressed open hostility. See Lawrence Veiller, “A New Idea in Social 
Work,” Charities and the Commons (1908), 563-569. 
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acquainted with the size, social status, financial situations, difficulties, and celebrations 
of the families from which they collected. From Frankel’s perspective, a diligent agent 
was in a position not only to teach the laws of sanitation and hygiene, but to help 
unemployed policyholders secure jobs, to advise mothers on how to access medical 
treatment for their children, and to refer tuberculosis patients to municipal health 
agencies. “There is no single phase of [social] work which might not satisfactorily and 
rightfully be undertaken by the agent of the Industrial insurance company,” the welfare 
director declared.44  
To begin the work, he collaborated with Louis Dublin in drafting a short pamphlet 
entitled “A War Upon Consumption” for distribution among policyholders.45 Well-
adapted to its audience, the booklet contained short, stylish prose accessible to readers 
with little education, and included positive portrayals of working class individuals. The 
suggestions it offered for inexpensive, “home made” innovations fell within the budgets 
of industrial policyholders. It was enormously well received, as were the subsequent 
booklets that the welfare division printed up. 46 By 1912 the company had produced 25 
health publications, many of them translated into languages commonly spoken by 
policyholders including Yiddish, German, Italian, Russian, and Polish. They ranged over 
subjects such as “Sanitary Maxims,” “The Service of Teeth,” “Dirty and Clean Milk,” 
                                                
44 Lee Frankel, “Industrial Insurance,” Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and 
Correction, Buffalo, NY June 9-16 1909.  
 
45 Agents received 3.5 million of these booklets for distribution in the first week of August, 1909. “Plans a 
Sanitarium for Policyholders,” The New York Times, 28 July, 1909, 6. 
 
46 See Elizabeth Toon’s comprehensive analysis of the Metropolitan’s health publications in Toon, 
Managing the Conduct of the Individual Life, Chapter 4, “Investing in Health,” especially pages 210-225. 
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and “Children’s Eyes.”47  Frankel took pains to select appropriate expert authors and to 
ensure that the booklets were printed in attractive, eye-catching colors. Many were 
targeted toward children, and their bright covers and colorful animation helped to 
guarantee an excellent reception.48  
In late spring, he launched a speaking tour to ensure the interest and cooperation 
of other promoters of public health. At the annual meeting of the National Conference of 
Charities and Correction, Frankel announced his plans to a room full of former 
colleagues. Aware of their skepticism about his role within the commercial firm, he 
opened his address by describing the positive potential of industrial insurance as a partner 
to social organizations. “In the last analysis it would probably be shown that the criticism 
[of industrial insurance] has outweighed the praise,” he admitted, but he assured the 
audience that the practices of the private companies were evolving, and would soon be 
free of the “misconduct and mismanagement of a few faithless teachers.” The institution 
itself, he assured the room, was without “any inherent evil.” In the meantime, the unique 
machinery of the firms should be utilized, beginning with the deployment of company 
agents to teach the basic tenets of public health.49 The welfare program of the 
Metropolitan, he seemed to imply, was not an act of cooption, but rather one of 
cooperation with reformers’ goals. The fact that he felt the need to make such an 
assertion reflected the potential depth of his contemporaries’ skepticism, yet unlike Fiske, 
                                                
47 For a more complete list see Haley Fiske, “Life Insurance Companies and Welfare Work,” 1912. 
 
48 The company soon augmented the publications with a quarterly magazine, The Metropolitan, which 
contained longer articles on health and which had achieved a circulation of 4.5 million by 1913. See Haley 
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49 Frankel, “Industrial Insurance,” 1909.  
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Frankel made the statement only occasionally, and at the beginning of his career with the 
Metropolitan. Either Frankel had little interest in defending his reputation, or his 
initiatives within the welfare division were sincere enough, and effective enough, that his 
candor was believed.  
What he asked of his audience was confederation. The agents of the company and 
its resources for publicity and promotion of health reform could be incredibly effective, 
and he wished to put them at the disposal of the social work community. It was an 
invitation that Frankel repeated again and again to charity organization societies, 
settlement workers, boards of health and anti-tuberculosis groups. In November he 
extended it to the American Public Health Association. “Owing to the fact that we are an 
Industrial company, we have the special ability to place our agents who visit our 
policyholders weekly at the disposal of health officers,” he stated. “In the name of the 
company, which I represent, I take this opportunity of extending whatever cooperation 
may be in our power.”50 The offer was open-ended, and Frankel reiterated it at intervals, 
highlighting his willingness to dispatch agents on behalf of any campaign that might 
improve health conditions, such as securing a cleaner water supply or better hospital 
facilities, or mounting disease prevention campaigns. In 1914, a series of reminders sent 
to the health officers of cities with populations of 20,000 that the services of agents could 
be utilized in this way resulted in 153 clean-up campaigns and a series of initiatives for 
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clean milk.51 If the field force was indeed a standing army, it was one over which Frankel 
sought to share command, and whose applications he wished to diversify. 
Frankel was less egalitarian in his dealings with the agents themselves. To inform 
the members of the field staff of their new duties, Frankel circulated a letter to the field 
superintendents explaining the Metropolitan’s latest goals. Haley Fiske, he informed 
them, had determined that a reduction in the mortality rate of policyholders would help to 
lower the cost of industrial insurance, and had set aside $100,000 for the campaign. 
Agents would have an opportunity to vastly improve the state of public health, while at 
the same time making money for themselves. Their new duties would involve the 
distribution of health literature to the families on their debits and the formation of 
alliances with charitable and social service agencies in their municipalities.52 A new 
Bureau of Information and Cooperation would soon be created to help.53  
The initial reaction of agents to their duties as health promoters is unknown, 
though it is likely that at the time of the announcement morale among Metropolitan’s 
underwriters was low. Sales of new policies reached a nadir during 1906 and 1907, a 
sluggishness that probably damaged agent earnings significantly due to the loss of 
commissions. Moreover, in response to the criticism of the Armstrong Committee that 
industrial insurance incurred exorbitant administrative costs, Haley Fiske dismissed thirty 
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52 Lee Frankel to Metropolitan Superintendents, 15 February 1909, Lee Frankel, correspondence. MLICA. 
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per cent of the company’s underwriters. By 1908, Fiske’s economies had reduced the 
operating budget of the Metropolitan by fifteen per cent.54 The remaining field force 
received an increase in wages, but their low spirits elicited a public rebuke from Fiske. “It 
is not your business to run your Company,” he chastised the attendees of a 1909 
Underwriters’ banquet. “It is not your business to criticize your superiors. It is not your 
business to say that you could do better than they, even if you think you could.”55 Fiske 
expected compliance from his employees, and if the Metropolitan agents disliked their 
new responsibilities, they were not invited to say so. 
In essence, Frankel had reformulated the job identity of the Metropolitan’s 
industrial underwriters from that of salesmen to that of educators, taking as its foundation 
a philosophy he had absorbed early in his social work career, that education was the best 
means of social uplift. Like many social reformers of the era, Frankel saw the poor as 
victims of their environments, and believed that the best form of assistance was education 
as to how to change that environment. In 1901 he had told a conference of charities 
workers that there was “no form of assistance we can render to our beneficiaries that is so 
productive of good results and so lasting in its effects as the educational one. The 
inculcation of the lessons of patriotism, of civic pride, the knowledge obtained through 
our public school system, are forms of relief which open up a wider horizon to the poor 
and make them nobler and better citizens.”56 It was a philosophy that he brought with him 
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to the Metropolitan, and which remained central to the programming he created, 
including his expectations of agents.   
Frankel understood agents to be teachers in the broad sense, and education about 
improved sanitary habits was only one component of his wider plan for public health 
reform. For the welfare director, it was as important that agents model civic participation 
as it was that they teach hygiene, and he therefore asked the field staff to take an active 
interest in civic matters, and to become identified with civic organizations. Agents 
responded positively to this request. In 1913, he sent a circular to the superintendents 
inviting them to report on the social and civic activities with which they were connected, 
and was delighted by the results. Many, he found, were identified with charitable and 
philanthropic institutions. Many others were members of chambers of commerce and 
boards of trades, or were officers of committee members of civic bodies.57 Frankel was 
particularly impressed with the activity of one enterprising agent who, discovering that 
the city in which he lived had no health dispensary, approached the municipality’s mayor, 
health officers, and prominent citizens to inquire about founding one.58 As the forward 
arm of an educational and civic army, the firm’s field force was capable of doing 
tremendous good.  
 
Doing Well by Doing Good 
The compliance (and even enthusiasm) of the company sales force with Frankel’s 
goals invites questions as to why a body of men accustomed to low social status and 
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wage exploitation should have embraced the welfare department’s agenda so firmly. 
Some of their willingness probably stemmed from personal appreciation of Frankel 
himself. Though firm in his requirements and expectations, Frankel cut a charismatic 
figure among colleagues and staff, and his company addresses provoked ample laughter 
and applause. In a typical triennial speech to the field force, he quipped about an official 
who had asked about the company’s Ordinary agents. “I told him we didn’t have any – 
that all of our agents were extraordinary agents.”59 The underwriters, like the 
Metropolitan office staff, developed a powerful liking for Frankel in a short period of 
time, and demonstrated ready acceptance of his leadership.  
They were even more pleased to accept the financial and social benefits that came 
with the adoption of welfare work, a willingness that suggests that among the lower-level 
staff, the motives for embracing humanitarian aid bore a greater resemblance to the 
enlightened self interest that moved the greater body of welfare capitalists. Though 
Frankel himself may have been dedicated to alleviating the plight of the poor, the agents 
who carried out the work required incentives that were more financial than ideological. 
While it is difficult to say whether and how much this difference in disposition impacted 
the results of the Metropolitan’s program, it is clear that the welfare duties assigned to 
agents offered excellent social and financial rewards. 
The role of health promoter generated the social authority that agents had long 
been lacking, and it improved their earnings by increasing their sales.60 The first 
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assignment issued to underwriters under Frankel included the distribution of the newly 
produced health literature. Agents discovered with delight that the booklets served as 
excellent door-openers and business-getters, turning underwriters from neighborhood 
pariahs to persons of knowledge and interest. An agent in Connecticut remarked that the 
pamphlets attracted inquisitiveness, allowing him to build an easier rapport with would-
be clients. “Therefore you do not need to open the conversation; they will do it for you.” 
One superintendent reported that the focus on health attracted both more and better 
customers.61 The new duties also allowed agents to take greater interest and pride in their 
own work, which in turn prompted a higher level of interaction between themselves and 
company leaders. “Our agents are constantly writing to us making suggestions for the 
development of our welfare work among policyholders,” noted Frankel.62 Agent turnover 
decreased considerably, and the lapse rate among policyholders decreased, as well. It 
seemed that welfare work among policyholders was fulfilling the same goals that 
employers hoped it would accomplish in factories: it was attracting a “better class of 
people” to the company, both as employees and as risks.  
Many of the new risks were children, or the parents of children reached through 
welfare work designed to draw newcomers through outreach to the younger generation. It 
was a tactic of influence that, depending on the benefits conferred (and to whom), might 
be perceived as either humanitarian or commercial. Among social workers and health 
reformers, it was well understood that efforts targeted toward children could be more 
efficient than those directed toward adults. Lacking ingrained habits and social 
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prejudices, children were faster adapters of new ideas, customs, and technologies, and 
were more likely to remain loyal to the new information. As they grew up, they would 
transmit the information to the next generation, and just as usefully, they might transmit 
lessons to the current adult generation, as well, by carrying information home and 
repeating the teachings to otherwise-reluctant parents. Whether or not the adults thus 
exposed adopted the new practices, they would at least have heard of them and seen them 
modeled. Efforts to better the lives of children had the additional benefit of attracting 
social and political approval, which came more slowly to projects directed toward adults 
and which helped to elevate the status – and fund-raising potential – of the entire 
operation. Settlement house workers, utilized this knowledge by establishing 
kindergartens, playgrounds, and children’s clubs, through which the offspring of 
immigrants could be taught lessons in housekeeping, hygiene, civics, and orderliness, and 
not incidentally be kept off the streets.  
Welfare capitalists launched similar programs for similar reasons, occasionally 
even hiring the settlement and Sunday School workers who had pioneered the work to 
continue it under corporate auspices. In 1904, the welfare secretary of the Solvay Process 
Company remarked that he had “almost abandoned trying to draw in the men ourselves… 
We think that if we can train the children in the way that they should go, we will improve 
our workmen. Of course, in many cases, the boys have better positions than their fathers 
had before them, and I have in mind now one young man who holds a confidential 
position in our office, whose father started as a laborer and is now a foreman.”63 Between 
1912 and 1924 U.S. Steel spent $22 million on playgrounds, clubs, schools, and gardens 
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for the children of its employees.64 Whether or not they ever worked at the firm, the 
investments made in such children proved valuable to the companies that undertook them 
by improving the firms’ public image. 
The Metropolitan undertook a children’s program of its own, and charged its 
execution, as usual, to the company agents, for whom the program required an enormous 
amount of energy, but was said to bring tremendous returns, even more so to the agent 
than to the children involved. In addition to pamphlets such as “Mother Goose” and “A 
Health Alphabet” designed for the education and edification of children, the company 
sponsored the Health and Happiness League, a club open to any child between six and 
fourteen possessing a policy, or whose parents held a policy in the Metropolitan. League 
leaders instructed youngsters on the rules of hygiene, honest living, and helpfulness in the 
community, and organized group activities and classes. At a typical organizational 
meeting in Elizabeth, New Jersey, the agent convened the session in a room that was 
“filled to overflowing with children of all sizes, some parents, two reporters, 8 or 10 
agents and 3 nurses.” Estimating that there would be 500 members by the end of the 
month, he organized the children into groups -- boy hikers, campfire girls, a sewing club, 
and a home nursing class – and set up a schedule for their activities. Before leaving the 
meeting, the children recited the Health Pledge, received a membership certificate and 
badge, and were given welfare literature to take to their families or to give to neighbors.65 
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Promising to help eradicate health menaces wherever they lurked, they pledged to 
become active missionaries for the betterment of community public health. 
They also, however, became active missionaries for the Metropolitan, a factor that 
served as a potent incentive for the agents who organized the club. On a quarterly basis, 
Health and Happiness Members championed their cause by distributing public health 
circulars to every home in their neighborhoods. The fliers contained the name and 
address of the life insurance agent, ostensibly so that interested parties could contact him 
for copies of health promotion literature, though even the Health and Happiness 
handbook remarked that the advertising value of this activity “can easily be recognized.” 
The manual went on to advise would-be mentors that their efforts would probably bring 
financial returns “ten times over for the expense incurred.” Securing a large enrollment of 
insured children would pique the interest of those who were not insured by the company, 
enabling the agent to write new business. Endorsements from agents supported the point. 
“In three weeks and two days since the organization meeting of the Health and Happiness 
League chapter on my debit,” testified one underwriter, “I have written 46 Industrial 
Applications for $5.66, … 3 ordinary applications for $5,000, distributed “The Child” 
and “Typhoid” publications, did not work very hard, and had a good time. My opinion is 
that the Health and Happiness League if used properly by agents is the best business 
getter he has.” The corporate gains in the long term would be valuable, as well. The 
children of today would grow into adulthood “with an appreciation for what the 
Metropolitan has done for them,” and someday as parents themselves they would insure 
their own children with the firm.66 The principles pledged by the children of the Health  
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and Happiness League were those of civic pride and public health reform, but the 
League’s greatest value was almost certainly derived by the agents, for whom it served as 
a superb marketing platform. 
 
Giving the Corporation a Soul 
Companies vulnerable to outside scrutiny made use of welfare work for much 
more than the satisfaction of employees; it was a valuable tool for gaining public 
approval, the importance of which could be paramount to the continued prominence (or 
even existence) of the firm. Companies besmirched by scandal or labor discontent had 
much to gain through a well-orchestrated display of ethical concern and munificence 
toward employees, as demonstrated by the work of National Cash Register and Standard 
Oil. Even in the absence of scandal, firms that produced consumer goods could favorably 
impress potential customers by cultivating a humanitarian public image. Perhaps most 
importantly, good works could garner support for the position that private reform efforts 
were superior to state involvement. By providing needed services, firms could integrate 
themselves into consumers’ daily habits, inducing private individuals to accept 
corporations as institutions central to modern life – perhaps, in some instances, even over 
the provision of the same service by government.68 A broad array of firms engaged such 
considerations, though it was a political mandate of particular concern for the life 
insurance industry.  
Naturally, the cultivation of public good will required that firms actively 
broadcast their good deeds, an undertaking that numerous companies tackled with gusto. 
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Companies offered tours of their plants to interested visitors and slide presentations and 
lectures to those who could not make the trip. They circulated pamphlets and reports 
enlivened by photos of a convivial workforce, displaying images of employees engaged 
in leisure activities such as exercising, socializing, and enjoying meals, poses meant to 
suggest not only well-being but also fun.69 The message delivered by such materials was 
clear: the corporation was not a callous institution run for profit and the enlargement of 
wealth; it was a social institution with a human face, and perhaps even a soul.  
At the Metropolitan, the creation and publicity of a benevolent corporate spirit 
was a cardinal feature of the welfare division, whose work ultimately promoted not only 
the improvement of American public health but also the sale of life insurance and, most 
signally, demonstrated that the insurance firm could perform health and welfare advocacy 
better than the state, and could be counted on not only to deliver the best and most 
modern methods. With the success of three separate mandates resting on the work of the 
division, it is little wonder that Haley Fiske offered the programs so much support. From 
its inception, the firm’s welfare division operated with a budget of over half a million 
dollars, more than five times the funds allotted to other forms of advertising work in that 
year, and twice again what the Prudential (in the absence of a welfare division) spent on 
its own advertising.70 The Metropolitan used these moneys to launch an enormously 
comprehensive campaign of services demonstrating the company to be more “mother” 
than firm, more indulgent than dictatorial, more instructive than manipulative. The more 
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effectively the company’s programs promoted a warm and human spirit, dedicated to the 
improvement of health and well-being, the better they fulfilled their role as the firm’s 
most concerted form of publicity. 
Paradoxically, it was a reward most easily reaped when the company made no 
pretense of advertising, though given the nature of activities this was often difficult to do. 
“The employer, it has been shown, should not pervert welfare work into an advertisement 
for his business,” instructed National Civic Federation secretary Gertrude Beeks. “This 
impugns his motive and discredits the plan.”71 Beeks warned that when publicity was 
inevitable, it should be treated in a “dignified manner.” Other welfare directors offered 
similar advice, noting that employees who saw welfare measures described and 
applauded in print became suspicious of their employer’s motives. One welfare secretary 
counseled: “When it is impossible to keep accounts out of the papers, steer the reporters 
as best you can. Ask them to omit any mention or any pictures of the managing men.”72 
Like many promoters of corporate welfare work, personnel at the Metropolitan 
attempted to follow this advice, with mixed results. The welfare division launched an 
array of ventures intended to demonstrate in the most charismatic possible way that 
policyholders, like employees, were “children” of the Metropolitan, and their well-being 
– and loyalty -- was important.  During the summer months, the company invited its field 
staff to host picnics that would instill a sense of inclusion, fun, and leisure among the 
firm’s policyholders, while incidentally perhaps demonstrating the importance of fresh 
air and recreation. Agents in St. Louis began in 1911 to run an annual summer field day 
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that included games and prizes, sports, and even a small amusement park. The 40,000 
policyholders who attended in the summer of 1912 nearly overwhelmed the city’s 
streetcar system. Company officials expressed their greatest pride in the rest station 
erected for lessons on the care and feeding of infants in the summer months, an important 
step in the reduction of infant mortality. Staffed by trained nurses and company doctors, 
the pavilion was “fitted up with refrigerators for the milk bottles, spring water for 
drinking purposes, and 25 cots with clean linens and mosquito-net coverings.” Well-
shaded and open to breezes, the rest station attracted the attention of hundreds of mothers, 
and provided infant care and first aid throughout the day. An ambulance and attendant 
provided by the local Health Department stood ready in case of more serious 
emergencies. By 1914, Metropolitan picnics had become rites of summer in nine U.S. 
cities.73  
All the while, Metropolitan personnel attempted to follow the injunction against 
advertising openly. Company health literature often bore no mention of the firm, except 
for a small insignia printed on a back cover or page.74 At the booths erected at fairs and 
exhibits, personnel were instructed not to talk about insurance with the visitors. Their 
forbearance improved both the Metropolitan’s reception and its credibility. “Permit me to 
say that the business men of this city had no idea of the extent that the Metropolitan was 
working the health question until last week,” reported one Missouri superintendent. 
“There was no one piece of literature distributed to these people which pertained to the 
subject of life insurance. No one in this booth was allowed to discuss the subject of life 
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insurance. We made it a pure health exhibit.”75 Frankel naturally found such stories 
gratifying. “We believe that continued effort along welfare lines will make policyholders 
realize more thoroughly than they ever did that even corporations have souls,” he 
remarked to a gathering of agents.76 
 As they were intended to, the entertainments drew appreciation and trust to their 
sponsor. The picnics, prizes, and infant care provided by the Metropolitan at fairs and on 
field days helped lend the commercial insurer the lost intimacy of the fraternals. Personal 
contact filled the void created by bureaucracy, creating a bond intended to erode mistrust 
and irritation. “I think you will agree with me that the policyholders who have attended 
these picnics feel a sense of obligation to the Company,” noted Frankel to an audience of 
agents, “that the tendency to lapsation on their part is distinctly minimized, and that the 
publicity that these policyholders give to this form of welfare work is distinctly beneficial 
both to them and to the Company.”77 Though presented as a community service, the 
Metropolitan’s activities conferred ample returns to the company in terms of public 
opinion and policyholder loyalty.  
Critics, however, remained briskly aware of the advertising uses of welfare work, 
and aired their annoyance over the company’s “open secret.” Frederick Hoffman at the 
Prudential found the company’s health exhibits to be transparently commercial, and 
remarked repeatedly that the rival firm’s exhibits struck him “largely in the nature of the 
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advertisement display.”78 “Dr. Dublin is merely repeating the same address at several 
conferences, followed by a film showing the industrial welfare work of the 
Metropolitan,” he complained.79 Even potential public health allies occasionally hesitated 
to collaborate with the company due to the implicit advertising nature of the firm’s 
activities. Negotiations with a prestigious physician to publish a list of his tuberculosis 
“Hints and Helps” nearly broke down when the doctor refused to allow the company the 
use of his name “fearing it might look like an advertisement.”80 No matter how much 
concern the company expressed for policyholder health or how simple or elaborate its 
exhibits were, the Metropolitan remained at base a commercial firm, and onlookers rarely 
mistook it for a truly humanitarian institution.  
 Nor did businessmen perform this elision. For reasons of business necessity, those 
who introduced welfare work usually emphasized its role in reducing production costs 
and increasing profits, and offered mathematical calculations of the profits returned from 
the practice. The president of the National Cash Register Company coined the slogan that 
“it pays,” in the 1890s, which became the justification of choice for welfare capitalists. 
Welfare provisions received the most support when they were said to be endowed with 
scientific virtue and managerial purpose. By the early decades of the twentieth century, 
pro-welfare businessmen regularly pointed to the efficiencies achieved through acts of 
corporate kindness, especially through the prevention of accidents and the amelioration of 
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labor discontent. 81 Improved working conditions were a paying proposition. Morally 
attractive as welfare work may have been, it did not supplant the importance of financial 
gain, and the preponderance of executives who embraced welfare capitalism freely 
broadcasted its financial merits, whether or not those gains conflicted with the mandate 
not to advertise.82 
In spite of their potential to taint the company’s “soul,” executives at the 
Metropolitan freely adopted financial rationales, utilizing the adage “health work pays” 
as a ready justification for the work. Haley Fiske seasoned his speeches with the slogan, 
and company statistician Louis Dublin reinforced it with a steady supply of inspiring 
figures to demonstrate the savings delivered by welfare programs. In 1920, Dublin 
reported that Metropolitan policyholders had undergone a decrease in mortality that was 
12% greater than that of the Registration Area. That is, the health gains of Metropolitan 
policyholders were 12% higher than those of the average citizen of the United States, at 
least insofar as the data were available. Some diseases, such as typhoid and tuberculosis, 
had fallen three times faster among policyholders than they had among the general 
population. Dublin estimated that the reductions in mortality saved the company $3.5 
million per year.83 With the passage of time, the good news continued to mount.  In 1928 
Dublin calculated that the activities of the Metropolitan had increased the average 
lifespan of the industrial policyholder 8.4 years, against 4.7 years for the general 
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population. “We calculate that there has been a total savings of 278,395 lives during this 
interval, above and beyond what would have been expected to occur from the 
improvement in mortality which has prevailed in the general population,” he noted. 
“Furthermore, this saving of life is equivalent to a saving to the Company of $64 million 
in death claims between 1911 and 1926.”84 That the savings could be calculated not only 
in dollars and cents but in policyholder lives vastly increased their appeal, and the 
speeches and publications of company officers reported them prolifically. 
 
The Uses of Industrial Citizenship 
Despite the welfare division’s mercenary uses, its director, Lee Frankel, retained a 
remarkably independent vision of the programs’ role in the greater movement for public 
health, a vision for which Haley Fiske allowed an unusual amount of freedom, and which 
ultimately set the work of the Metropolitan apart from those of any other company, 
extending if not transcending the motives of most early-century welfare work. In addition 
to the library of welfare literature, agents carried news from door to door about local 
health referendums and pending sanitary laws. The information was not merely advisory, 
but rather was part of a civic agenda built into the company’s welfare work from its very 
inception, and is not apparent among the goals or activities of other firms. If Fiske 
expected the welfare division to win public approval for the Metropolitan and bolster the 
stability of the existing political economy, Frankel expected it to promote civic action on 
behalf of public health, and endowed the work with a political and structural focus which 
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gave the program a different shape – and a different legacy – than the initiatives of other 
firms.  
In contrast to the Fiske’s profit-oriented declamations, Frankel never leant support 
to the idea that the Metropolitan’s welfare measures had by themselves achieved a 
reduction in the mortality rate and a subsequent savings to the company. Though he 
congratulated the work of the welfare department, he repeatedly reminded insurance men 
that the industry was but one constituent in a wider undertaking. “It should be noted here 
that the remarkable improvement in mortality which has taken place can only to a very 
slight extent be laid to the door of insurance companies,” he told a crowded hall in 
1917.85 Adequate public health required the maintenance of civic sanitation, and the work 
of the bacteriologists, physicians, chemists, physicists, engineers, health inspectors, 
architects, and others who kept the water and milk supplies pure, who disposed of 
sewage, who ensured proper housing, and who created vaccines and anti-toxins for the 
population.86 The strides that had been made were beyond the capacity of a single 
industry or firm, and regardless of his statements’ impact on the image of his employer, 
                                                
85 Lee Frankel, “Medical Insurance and Health Conservation,” Paper read before the Medical Section of the 
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Frankel never credited the Metropolitan – or any company – for a single-handed 
reduction in the mortality rate.  
Frankel urged his audiences instead to express their gratitude to local and state 
health officers, and to federal service employees, an admonition that reinforced the basic 
structure he had created within the welfare division itself.87 Though many of its efforts 
redounded to the benefit of the corporation, the activities of the Metropolitan’s welfare 
division were based on a central platform of political engagement. As early as 1909, 
when the city of Chicago considered the construction of a municipal sanitarium, Frankel 
dispatched agents with hundreds of thousands of ballots for distribution at the homes of 
policyholders, accompanied by person to person explanations of the legislation as they 
traveled door to door. When Cleveland considered a similar measure in 1910, Frankel 
activated the underwriters again.88 The canvassing work continued throughout Frankel’s 
tenure with the company, rallying considerable interest to the political cause of public 
health.  
Frankel made clear, in fact, that an overarching goal of the health promotion work 
was to inculcate a personal interest in health legislation among policyholders, as well as a 
desire to vote for it.89 “Through the activities of the intelligent agent,” he wrote, “…it 
                                                
87 Redirecting credit from the insurance industry to the public health infrastructure constituted a daring 
piece of rhetoric for a man who received a salary from a firm, but it was also a good way to strengthen 
relationships with the company’s allies, and it does not appear to have generated friction within the 
Metropolitan. 
 
88 Both measures passed by a wide margin and company executives received letters from public officials 
asserting that the work of the Metropolitan had made a substantial impact. See Fiske, “Life Insurance as a 
Social Programme,” 1913, 15. Also see Frankel, “Conservation by Life Companies,” 1913, and Lee K. 
Frankel, “Health Activity by an Insurance Company: It’s Work in Ohio,” Ohio State Medical Journal, 
August 1914. 
 
89 Although Frankel believed firmly in the importance of personal hygiene and the individual’s capacity to 
“cultivate the acme of physical condition” by eating and drinking moderately, exercising, and avoiding 
overwork, he noted that few industrial workers had access to or control over the types of immoderation 
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should be possible to educate policyholders along health lines and to make the latter an 
important influence in developing a public sentiment which eventually will result in 
needed legislation.”90 His goals in this respect were perfectly aligned with those of Irving 
Fisher, and unsurprisingly many of the welfare department’s first political initiatives 
targeted either tuberculosis or the creation of a federal department of health. In late 1910, 
Frankel steered the company to back the Owen Bill, which called for the formation of a 
federal department of health. The welfare department devoted an entire issue of The 
Metropolitan, the policyholder magazine, to articles endorsing the bill, and the agents 
were instructed to use the literature to show policyholders how desirable it would be “for 
their personal good to advocate such a department.”91 Although the bill failed to pass, the 
company continued to endorse the creation of a national health agency, for instance by 
authoring a 1912 pamphlet entitled “The Guardian Angel,” which described the ongoing 
need for a federal department of health. Like Fisher, Frankel never ceased to push for 
centralized public health administration, a goal more prominent and enduring among 
public health reformers than any other. 
Though rarely as overt as “the Guardian Angel,” numerous pamphlets contained 
information that Frankel hoped would arouse political action among policyholders. 
Previous historians have described the Metropolitan’s booklets as apolitical teaching 
                                                                                                                                            
likely to produce ill health. Wealthier policyholders in the ordinary branch had far more to blame on 
personal habits than industrial policyholders did. Lee Frankel, “Popularizing Health Conservation,” 1913. 
See also Frankel, “Science and the Public Health,” 1914. 
 
90 Frankel, “Conservation by Life Companies,” 1913. For examples of booklets backing state action, see 
“Why Have Playgrounds” and “Dirty and Clean Milk,” both of which pointed out the need for municipal 
support for health measures. 
 
91 Members of congress reported being deluged with letters from policyholders indicating support for a 
federal health bureau. Frankel, “Popularizing Health Conservation,” 1913; Fiske, “Life Insurance 
Companies and Welfare Work,” 1912. 
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tools that were designed to skirt the lines of controversy.92 In many instances this was 
true, but Frankel took a more confrontational position in regards to immediate hazards of 
the lived environment, such as tenement and workplace conditions, and alternately 
monitored and created opportunities to promote housing reform. Beginning in the 
nineteen tens he pushed the Metropolitan to create low-interest housing programs for 
workingmen. A pilot effort modeled on a system in force in Belgium and Germany was 
launched in Brooklyn in 1911, and remained a cause that Frankel espoused throughout 
his career.93 Unable for the most part to create new housing, however, the welfare 
director focused ample energy on using Metropolitan’s resources to advocate and enforce 
laws governing the improvement of existing housing stock. When St. Louis passed a new 
tenement house ordinance in 1913, Frankel directed the Metropolitan agents to distribute 
a circular to policyholders, “calling attention of tenants to their rights under law.” After 
circulating 100,000 copies of the flier, which included instructions on how to lodge a 
complaint, agents conducted a follow-up survey to see whether the landlords of  
                                                
92 Toon, Managing the Conduct of the Individual Life,  231-234.  Letters to the company from irritated 
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Front and back of the follow-up survey circulated in St. Louis to asses the impact of the 
tenement law.94
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policyholders had been responsive to the law’s new requirements.95 Impressed by the 
results, health officers in four other cities including Boston and Buffalo launched similar 
campaigns.96  
Firm in his assertion that the chief causes of high mortality stemmed from the 
environment of industrial policyholders, Frankel insisted as well on drawing attention to 
the role of the workplace in breaking down health. “Long hours of work, hazardous 
industries, overstrain, combined with insufficient recreation and amusement, 
unquestionably sap the vitality of men and make them die earlier than they should,” he 
observed.”97 In pamphlets dealing with industrial hygiene such as “The Health of the 
Factory Worker,” and others that spoke more generally about “Fatigue,” Frankel directed 
authors to include statistics about occupational mortality and warnings about the dangers 
of poor ventilation, dust, and overstrain. “It is desirable,” he noted, that industrial 
policyholders “be made acquainted with the conditions existing in establishments in 
which they work, so that they may guard themselves against disease, and what is of more 
importance, that they may become a power to have necessary reforms introduced into 
many factories, mills, etc.”98 Workers, he seemed to hope, would one day no longer be 
                                                
95 With over 407,000 industrial policyholders in St. Louis, Frankel estimated that the campaign might be 
able to reach a majority of the city’s working class population. Whether or not this was an overstatement, 
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Improve Individual and Public Health,” The Modern Hospital 3:5 (November, 1914.) 
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“creatures of their environment,” but would be able to take a hand in shaping the 
conditions in which they lived.  
 If the purpose of welfare capitalism, however, was to smooth the relationship 
between labor and capital so as to keep industrial workers from rising up, then Frankel’s 
promotion of political action seems not only counterintuitive but counterproductive, 
raising questions about why Fiske should have countenanced his work with the firm. One 
scholar suggests that Frankel intended to spark only peaceable interest in reform among 
policyholders.99 A more likely explanation is the resemblance that his civic orientation 
took to forms of welfare capitalism that inculcated assimilation and “industrial 
citizenship.”  
Nativist Americans had long associated class conflict with the disruptive 
influence of foreign agitators; such concerns became sharper in the crowded factories of 
the Progressive Era. For many, labor upheaval and “un-American” activities went hand in 
hand, particularly among the least assimilated and most impoverished immigrants – 
Slavs, Italians, and Jews – who since the 1880s had seemed to live as a class apart. Such 
ethnic groups constituted a visible majority of urban industrial workers and alternately 
seemed to endanger American institutions and threaten to dominate them.100 
The sheer number of immigrants who arrived to fuel the industrial economy 
awakened nervousness among many citizens and employers. One businessman in 1904 
wrote anxiously about the problem “of absorbing into a democracy millions of aliens… 
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unacquainted with our institutions and the spirit in which they were founded.” Though he 
praised the assimilation work conducted in American schools, he noted that too many 
children made an early departure from school to the workplace, truncating their civic and 
economic education. Such children contributed to the large pool of immigrants who 
required further training in the working of democratic institutions, without which, he 
advised, they could scarcely be expected “to realize their duties and responsibilities as 
citizens,” or to “fulfill their duties to the family and to the state.”101 To help Americanize 
the nearly ten million non-English speaking immigrants estimated to reside in the United 
States, large employers across the country initiated language classes, citizenship 
instruction, and assistance with filing naturalization papers. Manuals on welfare work 
included chapters on the importance of acculturation, stating that Americanization would 
help to “humanize” workers.  
Numerous welfare secretaries believed that lessons in civic participation tempered 
unruly workers by giving them a stake in an orderly society.102 Classes in the 
responsibilities of citizenship could Americanize the immigrant class, defraying a 
“foreign menace” which managers feared would quicken on the factory floor. One 
welfare handbook recommended that employers adopt a program of “industrial 
Americanization,” which, it explained, would “bring the immigrant to a better 
understanding of industry and to make clear his privileges, rights, and obligations in the 
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community – particularly in regard to his work.”103 Even the preparation and 
consumption of American foods could speed the process of assimilation, introducing the 
immigrant to a higher standard of living – for which factory discipline and wages would 
seem a reasonable price.104  
At the Metropolitan, assimilation assumed a high priority in the welfare 
department and throughout the company overall, as it influenced not only the habits of 
health but also the habits of commercial consumption. The purchase of life insurance was 
a commercial practice unfamiliar to many arriving immigrants, who were accustomed to 
turning to friendly societies and fraternals for protection against financial risk. To attract 
this segment of the market, industrial insurers worked to model commercial policies as an 
attractive – and necessary – feature of American commercial life, one that could confer as 
much American status on an immigrant as a modern suit of clothes or a new hat.105 For 
this they turned to agents, hiring foreign-born personnel to work among people of their 
own ethnicity so as to model the Americanizing potential of the market economy. Oliver 
Zunz has pointed out that foreign-born agents presented a “complex image” in the 
neighborhoods they worked. As salaried employees of a wealthy corporation, they 
represented a new ethnic middle class. They were, Zunz notes, “intermediaries and 
assimilators.”106 Their visits to immigrant households sent a powerful message that to 
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live like an American one should plan to die like an American, through the purchase of a 
policy of life insurance. The strategy was as pragmatic as it was time-worn; it alleviated 
mistrust and lifted language barriers, while opening a tremendous audience to industrial 
insurers.  
Assimilation also served as one of several dimensions in which the commercial 
priorities of the company and the humanitarian ideals of the welfare division overlapped, 
providing a point of compromise through which Frankel was able to launch his social 
programs. Sanitary habits that had been of little consequence in sparsely populated rural 
regions could be disastrous in crowded cities -- and urban landscapes in any case 
contained hazards unknown to many new arrivals.107 Milk and water supplies, for 
instance, were often contaminated in ways undreamed of by rural immigrants, who 
thought little of adding water to the baby’s milk.108 Teaching newcomers to revise such 
practices, however, could involve countering long-trusted wisdoms, and required ample 
persuasion. The two thirds of industrial agents who were themselves foreign born were 
instrumental in this process. They provided credible role models, and demonstrated both 
the “American way” of living and the “American way” of avoiding germs, often to a 
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population that looked to them directly as the nearest guides and mentors. If the company 
had appropriated their value to open a market for commercial insurance, then Frankel 
appropriated it, as well, by leveraging their power as role models to teach the tenets of 
public health, and to demonstrate American civic pride.  
As war approached, fears of political disloyalty brought American anxieties to 
new heights, and even employers reliant on immigrant labor expressed hostility toward 
recent arrivals, whom they feared might turn out to be “Bolsheviks” intent on seizing 
property and sparking revolution. Haley Fiske’s own oratory shifted in tandem with these 
preoccupations, and with the passage of the nineteen teens he increasingly elided his 
distaste for unions with the menace of foreign revolutionaries. Disparaging industrial 
workers on New York’s East Side (said to be a hotbed of bolshevism), he stated that the 
group “knew little of American Institutions,” but that their prejudices caused them to 
believe “that they have been oppressed, and that they have been oppressed by capital.” 
They themselves were Capitalists, insisted Fiske, because the money they paid for their 
insurance had been invested in the infrastructure of the United States. Fiske suggested 
that such deluded souls should visit the Plaza Hotel, “where according to their notions, 
the idle rich dine.” There they should congratulate the wealthy for paying the interest on 
the building’s mortgage, which was owned by the policyholders of the Metropolitan 
Life.109 “I have shown that American workingmen are the property-owners!” announced 
Fiske. “They are really the bourgeois upon which Sovietism makes war! Let Socialism 
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stay in Russia!”110 Dubbing the programs of the Metropolitan the “new socialism,” he 
insisted on the strategy’s superiority to the political movements of the working class.111 
Not all insurance Presidents were so pugnacious, but as war threatened, the 
rhetoric of executives across the industry shifted from guardianship of the body politic to 
themes patriotism, preparedness, and nation-building -- motifs that included the 
assimilation of immigrants. These discussions dovetailed with those of other businessmen 
desirous of contributing to the war effort. Fishing for mechanisms by which to 
demonstrate a service ideal, entrepreneurs found a new and patriotic mantle of welfare 
capitalism. Businesses, pointed out adherents, could thrive only as the nation did. The 
vision of the businessman therefore ought to include assistance toward less affluent 
fellow-citizens, whose betterment attended the advancement of the country.112  
The increased sense of nationalism persisted well after the end of the war, and 
found expression at the Metropolitan through the company’s support of the Smith-
Bankhead Bill, a piece of legislation promoting instruction in spoken and written English. 
The firm’s endorsement of the bill provides a telling example of the way in which the 
goals of Frankel and Fiske overlapped, even when their supporting ideologies were 
widely spaced. From his position within the welfare division, Frankel determined to use 
the bill as a tool to benefit public health. The inability of new arrivals to understand 
instructions, he noted, constituted a known factor contributing to the horrific accident 
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rate. Men who could not interpret warnings were more likely to be caught in explosions 
or gears, a tragedy that was described as often in investigative reports and welfare 
manuals as it was in the articles of muckrakers.113 To Vice President Fiske, the bill 
provided other benefits. Its asimmilationist goals promised to reduce the threat of the 
foreign agitators and socialists who increasingly haunted his rhetoric. It also held open 
the possibility of enhancing the earning power of the firm’s immigrant customers, which 
could in turn increase the company’s revenue. Fiske forwarded a memo from the office of 
the Secretary of the Interior to all of the Metropolitan’s superintendents, in which the 
Secretary estimated that illiterate and non-English speaking workers “brought within 
reach of the printed word” would earn at least $5 more per week.114 For the clients of an 
industrial insurance firm this was no small sum, and could dramatically increase a 
family’s standard of living – including its capacity to purchase insurance.  
In joint support of the bill, Fiske and Frankel addressed a flier to the company 
superintendents asking them to lobby their congressional representatives, as well as to 
recruit the support of their agency staff in promoting its passage. “So long as nearly ten 
per cent of the population of the US is illiterate, or unable to understand the English 
language, it will be impossible to carry on an adequate campaign for the protection of the 
health of the community. An illiterate and uneducated person transmits disease through 
his very ignorance,” they wrote. “He is, furthermore, the tool of designing exploiters and 
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through accidents caused by the inability of foreign-born workers to understand direction. 
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others who make for disorder and anarchy.”115 Frankel and Fiske wired telegrams to state 
health commissioners asking for their personal assistance in influencing necessary 
officials. They sent further correspondence to the field superintendents, who replied with 
reassurances that they were tackling the problem. “Every member of this Staff, agency 
and clerical force have addressed Senator Spencer demanding the passage of the Smith-
Bankhead Americanization Bill,” reported the superintendent of the company’s office in 
St. Louis.116 Whether either the motives of Frankel or the concerns of Fiske contained 
real promise was never discovered. The bill died, though not without every attempt by the 
Metropolitan to keep it alive. 
 
Visiting Nurses: the Soul of the Metropolitan 
Few allies of the Metropolitan’s welfare division proved to be better political or 
health promotion advocates than visiting nurses, whose power in reaching policyholders, 
teaching hygiene, promoting health measures, and serving as symbols of the New Public 
Health was unparalleled. Shortly after he formulated his plans for the field staff in 1909, 
Lee Frankel’s friend and associate Lillian Wald expanded on his vision by proposing that 
the company utilize the services of the Henry Street Settlement’s visiting nurses, who 
could provide accurate reporting, direction, and treatment in households where illness 
appeared.117 The suggestion proved to be invaluable. The Metropolitan introduced their 
                                                
115 Haley Fiske & Lee Frankel to Superintendents 13 Feb 1919. See also Herbert Kaufman, Special 
Assistant to Secretary of the Interior to Lee Frankel 26 Feb 1919 and Lee Frankel to GH Sumner, 
Commissioner of State Board of Health, Iowa 28 February 1919; all located in Box 15 Folder: Smith-
Bankhead Americanization Bill, LFK Collection, AJHS. 
 
116 T.A. Lynn to Halye Fiske, 3 March, 1919, Box 15 Folder: Smith-Bankhead Americanization Bill, LFK 
Collection, AJHS. 
  
117 Hamilton, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Visiting Nurse Service, 46. 
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services in New York City on a trial basis in June, 1909, and by year’s end had 
contracting with visiting nurses in six other American cities. In 1910, the company made 
nursing services available in 213 cities, and the following year it announced plans to 
extend the program across the entire nation. By 1914, nurses contracted with the 
Metropolitan visited patients in 1800 cities, covering an estimated 90% of the company’s 
industrial policyholders, a saturation that continued to deepen for another decade and a 
half.118  
The visiting nurses met the combined goals of Frankel and Fiske more effectively 
than any other program or innovation. The authority and competence they carried as 
teachers made them ideal vehicles for public health knowledge. The trust and respect they 
garnered from policyholders offered them untoward influence as role models and 
Americanizers, and their popularity in townships and cities made them – and the 
Metropolitan -- welcome wherever their services were established. They inspired 
appreciation for the company and political enthusiasm for the cause of public health.  
They were also among the most effective business-getters the company had yet 
employed. Though cautious about the initiative at first, within a handful of years Haley 
Fiske had joined Lee Frankel in his nearly unbounded enthusiasm for all that the nurses 
were able to accomplish. 
The premise of the nursing service was simple. When agents visited the 
policyholders on their debits, they notified the company if they observed sickness 
                                                                                                                                            
 
118 To prevent duplication, the company contracted with existing visiting nurse services wherever such 
organizations were already established. In cities with large populations, the Metropolitan assembled a 
nursing staff of its own. Buhler-Wilkerson, No Place Like Home, 148; Hamilton, The Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company Visiting Nurse Service, 59-63. Frankel, “Welfare Work for Policyholders,” 1915. 
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requiring bedside care among policyholders. The company, in turn, dispatched a nurse. 
Alternatively, the family could summon help directly by sending a postcard or having a 
relative come to the company office. When nurses arrived to tend the ill, they ministered 
to the patient, tidied the sickroom, and educated the family about the disease and its care, 
including lessons on cooking, cleaning, and fresh air. They also arranged for physicians 
to see the patients, and collected demographic data for their own records and for a report 
to the Metropolitan. For these services the Metropolitan paid the nurses fifty cents per 
visit, the sum calculated by staff at the Henry Street to best compensate the average cost 
of care.119  
At the inception of the service, some policyholders demonstrated reluctance to 
accept the ministrations of nurses, fearing that the cost of the visit would be subtracted 
from their insurance claims. Though agents reassured them that this was not the case, 
policyholders doubted their honesty, believing the offer to be too good to be true. In the 
early months of the service, the company received numerous postcards and phone calls 
from policyholders in fine health, who were simply curious to find out whether a nurse 
would come when summoned.120 As their fears abated, the nurses found themselves much 
in demand, as Frankel hoped they would be.  
The director of the welfare division understood the power of medical personnel to 
open doors that were otherwise closed to social workers. Since the late nineteenth 
century, charity workers had struggled to interest physicians in campaigns for poverty 
alleviation and social reform, pointing out the credibility they carried in front of official 
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audiences such as legislatures. “When we speak loudly of the need of open air schools, 
and medical school inspection, and play grounds, we are not always believed,” confided 
social worker Frederick Almy to an audience of medical men. “You can say the same 
thing with authority.”121 In addition, physicians and nurses received an unrivaled 
welcome in the homes of the poor, where they were often admitted even when lady 
bountifuls and friendly visitors were not. “A nurse has opportunities that come to no 
other friendly visitor,” remarked on settlement nurse in 1905. “The self-respecting poor 
will allow her to know and help because of the friendly relation.”122 Consistent with 
settlement house philosophy, they were familiar faces in the neighborhood, already 
known, respected, and trusted by the population they sought to assist. The visiting nurse 
learns, remarked one settlement house staff member, “as a friendly neighbor learns that 
small Mary is at home from school because her only frock is at the pawnshop, that the 
babies are in bed because the last shovel of coal has been burned.”123 They were also 
thought to be more familiar with the customs of immigrant households, a feature said to 
enable them to more easily persuade their charges to a change of habit.124  
Visiting nurses would thus be able to serve as uncanny emissaries for the 
company. The strong interpersonal skills required for successful nursing placed the nurse 
                                                
121 Frederic Almy, “The Inter-Relation of National Organizations Working in the Interest of Health” 
American Journal of Public Health 1:1 (1911): 21-27. 
 
122 Harriet M. Johnson, “The Relation of Visiting Nurses to Public Philanthropies,” The American Journal 
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123 Johnson, “The Relation of Visiting Nurses to Public Philanthropies,” 1905. 
 
124 “With a knowledge of the background, habits, and superstitions of the workers in their homelands and a 
clear insight into the essentials of wholesome American family life, the visiting nurse is, according to the 
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Florence Swift Wright, Industrial Nursing: For Industrial, Public Health, and Pupil Nurses, and for 
Employers of Labor,” (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), 71-2. 
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in a closer relationship to her patients than doctors, who the poor often experienced as 
brusque, and offered some exemption from clients’ suspicions that as an outsider she 
planned to exploit them.125 A competent nurse paid attention to the environment and 
personhood of her patients, not merely the pathologies that needed treatment, and in so 
doing acquired an excellent opportunity for teaching. A fundamental piece of her 
effectiveness centered on the curiosity provoked among persons otherwise uninterested in 
matters of health and hygiene as they watched the nurse perform her tasks. With her 
“feminine touches” of patience and tact, patients came to feel that the nurse’s deeds were 
genuine acts of concern. “In this way a bond of friendship is established between the 
company and its policyholders,” remarked Frankel, “a bond which we hope will be 
lasting and permanent, if any effort on our part can make it so.”126 The work of visiting 
nurses improved the company image and increased policyholder loyalty. More than any 
other branch of the staff, she was capable of administering the friendship and nurture 
promoted by the metaphor of the corporate “family.”127 In a 1928 article in the insurance 
journal, The Intelligencer, Fiske referred to the nurses as the “soul” of the Metropolitan 
Life.128  
                                                
125 Nurses regularly testified that a charismatic personality served as the key to entrance to the home. “If 
she shows a kind, warm-hearted interest in the family and can show that it is with a well-intentioned 
mission that she comes, she is not only received the first time but, on every future visit, is welcome.” 
Adelia Steel, “Neighborhood Nursing,” American Journal of Nursing, 10:5 (February 1910): 340-342.  
 
126 Frankel, “Popularizing Health Conservation,” 1913. 
 
127 The role of the visiting nurse in fact resembled that of the corporate employee welfare manager, both in 
activity and in disposition. Like a welfare secretary, a visiting nurse must possess high levels of tact, 
executive talent, and common sense. She must also have patience – enough to endure what could be a very 
slow realization of the best laid plans – and must be familiar with the local jealousies and sometimes with 
racial prejudices” of her charges. Each of these attributes was enumerated as a necessity by attendees of the 
NCF’s first conference on welfare work in 1904. Conference on Welfare Work, vii. 
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It was an animus that received frequent recognition. Letters poured into the home 
office from policyholders and social work personnel sending thanks and warm regards for 
the visiting nurses. And pleased executives at the Metropolitan shared the missives as 
evidence of a job well done. 129  Haley Fiske made a habit of including anecdotes about 
life-saving care and excerpts from the grateful letters of policyholders in his public 
addresses, impressing the audiences with the power and efficiency of the company’s 
social program.   
The old man doesn’t get up in the morning. He is feverish, groaning, throws his 
arms about, tosses the bedclothes, upsets the pillows and is miserable; and the 
wage earner stands there puzzled. “What can I do? I cannot leave the old man; 
he is sick; and then I cannot stay because I must earn my bread for him and for 
me. What shall I do?” And then his eye falls on the mantel and he sees the card 
and he fills it out; in comes the trained nurse of the Metropolitan; her cool hand 
passes over the fevered brow; her deft fingers arrange the clothing; she says the 
comforting words; she gives the soothing draught, she sees if there is anything 
serious the matter so that the man can call for his Doctor. She leaves comfort 
where there was misery.130 
 
For Frankel, the letters helped to demonstrate the value of a service that he disliked 
promoting through quantitative measures. His sentiment that progress in public health 
resulted from interdependent, not individual, initiatives, was loyal to his wider vision but 
made the use of statistics problematic. As a result, he tended to express the utility of 
visiting nurses in qualitative and philosophical terms, informing observers that nurses’ 
work was “part of an educational propaganda” and that its general success would become 
                                                
129 Many of these letters were written in the labored hand of policyholders with few resources and little 
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evident “in the long run.”131 The addition of personal stories helped to bring human 
pathos and urgency to descriptions that might otherwise be milquetoast and 
unconvincing. For business audiences that absolutely required hard data, Frankel 
forwarded the service’s records to the statistical department for analysis by Louis Dublin. 
In nearly every other context, he abided by descriptive means to illustrate the efficacy of 
the visiting nurses.  
Only in one respect did Frankel regularly utilize a numerical means of calculating 
the achievements of the nursing staff, and that was the issue of cost containment. Like 
most of his initiatives, Frankel paid careful attention to the capacity of the nursing service 
to serve as a demonstration project. Though its immediate success enhanced the 
reputation of the Metropolitan, Frankel’s higher goal for the program was that it serve as 
a model for other bodies – preferably municipalities or even state and federal agencies – 
to adopt nursing programs of their own.132 For this to occur, Metropolitan’s nursing 
program needed to remain as inexpensive as possible. “Municipal visiting nurse service 
will probably be limited in its extension unless the cost can be kept within bounds,” 
Frankel brooded.133 If the expenditure exceeded fifty cents per visit, Frankel doubted that 
it could ever be extended to a larger audience within the working classes. With this in 
mind, he struggled to keep the Metropolitan’s outlay for the nursing program to an 
absolute minimum, a consideration that antagonized many of the company’s nursing 
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managers, but did succeed in containing costs.134 Between 1913 and 1914, the bill for the 
Metropolitan’s service increased only around $3,000, though the number of patients 
cared for and visits made continued to mount.135 Though reluctant to brandish statistics 
claiming reduced mortality and associated savings, Frankel pushed to at least demonstrate 
that, if properly managed, nursing expenditures could remain within the budget of any 
interested association. 
Louis Dublin, whose job it was to present data showing the financial advantages 
of the program, provided the optimistic figures that Frankel avoided. In 1920, the 
statistician estimated that nursing visits had averted $18 million in death claims.136 A 
decade later he observed that the decline in mortality among Metropolitan policyholders 
was twice that of the general population, and asserted in the company’s statistical bulletin 
that the positive results were “clearly a measure of the effectiveness of the efforts of the 
company in health education, the nursing of the sick, and the other measures which have 
been instituted.”137 His impressive figures were frequently repeated by those who 
supported the program, though not all observers were credulous. In 1933, the director of 
the Jewish Family Welfare Association of Boston, Maurice Taylor, pointed out that the 
death rate of Metropolitan policyholders was in fact higher than that of the clients of the 
                                                
134 Buhler-Wilkerson interprets the cost-containment pressures exerted on the nurses by Frankel as part of a 
power struggle over management questions and professional authority. While in some instances this was 
likely the case, Frankel’s ambition to scale up the nursing service by keeping it financially accessible 
should not be overlooked.  See Buhler-Wilkerson, No Place Like Home, 146-164. 
 
135 The service cost approximately $525,488.71 in 1913, and  $527,861.64 in 1914. Lee Frankel, “Welfare 
Work for Policyholders,” in The Welfare Work of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Reports for 
1914 (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1915), 3; 7. 
 
136 Hamilton, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Visiting Nurse Service, 63. 
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Prudential, which did not offer visiting nurses.138 Taylor was a proponent of visiting 
nursing, and offered assurances that the results of the service could not be measured in 
the aggregate.139 His conclusions, in the end, were similar to Frankel’s, and folded the 
gains of the nursing service into the interdependent mix of initiatives to improve 
American public health.  
Whether or not nurses reduced the mortality rate, their availability could – and did 
– reduce the policyholder lapse rate, and it dramatically increased the company’s flow of 
new business. From an Armstrong-era high of over 50%, the lapse rate of industrial 
policyholders at the Metropolitan dropped to 28% by 1920, an unheard-of success in that 
branch of the business.140 The Metropolitan officially prohibited agents from using the 
nursing service as an advertising device, but the economic realities of industrial life and 
the importance of care made the provision an obvious temptation for working class 
patrons, and had a visible impact on sales.141 A handful of fraternal orders provided 
physician or nursing services to members, but “lodge doctors” offered notoriously shabby 
care and lacked the polish and reliability of Metropolitan nurses. The offer of care was 
                                                
138 This may have been the result of a higher policyholder rejection rate on the part of the Prudential. The 
Metropolitan, for instance, continued to insure African Americans even after Hoffman’s publication of  
Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, which the Prudential used in order to vindicate its 
exclusionary practice. Hoffman’s tract was egregiously flawed, but the high mortality rates were a 
distressing reality. Nevertheless, by 1915, policies on African Americans constituted 13% of the 
Metropolitan’s new business, suggesting that the company not only insured but actively solicited business 
in black communities.  
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such a clear sales incentive that agents whose territory did not yet include nursing 
services agitated to receive them.142  
Though less than keen to have their services co-opted as an inducement to sales, 
nursing managers recognized an array of incentives of their own in forming an alliance 
with the Metropolitan. The affiliation with the Metropolitan provided a steady revenue 
stream to a service that often functioned on shoestring budgets of donations and small 
remittances from paying patients. It also leant scientific credibility and professional 
prestige to a young and female-dominated vocation, which was, as Lillian Wald pointed 
out in 1909, “fully recognized by comparatively few in the community in [its] distinctive 
professional capacity.”143 Most centrally, however, the aspirations of the Henry Street 
Settlement and of visiting nurses in general were in fundamental alignment with the 
social work goals and methodologies that Frankel brought to the Metropolitan.  
Nurses shared in prioritizing prevention as a goal for the helping professions, and 
agreed on the importance of bringing health messages directly to those who could benefit 
most yet were hardest to reach. Lillian Wald observed that the vast majority of the Henry 
Street Settlement’s clientele were untouched by ordinary channels of education. “They 
have very little experience with the printed word, are not responsive to lecture appeal. 
Many of them are tenement dwellers, or inhabitants of remote rural sections, uneducated 
and still clinging to old-world traditions. To them, the health message must be brought 
                                                
142 Hamilton, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Visiting Nurse Service, 55; A large proportion of 
Metropolitan policyholders fell into what is today referred to as the middle class “donut hole” in health care 
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directly.”144 Like Frankel, however, visiting nurses also understood that the biggest 
challenges to health were structural, and required more than individual ministrations and 
useful advice. The problems of the poor, one nurse lamented, were seldom self-made, and 
could not be remedied by those who cheerfully believed “that with a few lessons about 
germs, boiled water and sterilized milk the dwellings of poverty can be transformed 
under the nurse’s hand into happy little bowers of thrift and neatness.”145 To be truly 
efficient, nurses needed to be knowledgeable about the legal codes governing housing 
standards, school access, labor laws, and any other element that could be used to improve 
a patient’s quality of life. “The nurse shares with other social workers the opportunity for 
cooperation in the direct work of remedying existing conditions by the enforcement of 
present laws, and in forming public opinion to demand better and more effective 
legislation,” remarked one nurse in 1905. “We have no right to confine our work to 
technical lines.”146 Frankel shared this sentiment robustly, and cautioned against 
recruiting nurses as mercenaries or inadvertent allies in a cause they did not share. A 
nurse for the Metropolitan, he enumerated, must have force of character and excellent 
training, but most importantly, “she should have social vision.”147 In order to be truly 
effective, a Metropolitan nurse should not merely participate in the company’s social 
work goals, she must see and share them, as well.  
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Competition from the Prudential 
 Not all quarters appreciated the policyholder welfare work of the Metropolitan. 
The Armstrong investigations had left some insurance personnel with an abiding sense 
that the best path for the life insurance industry was the sale of reliable life insurance 
policies – and nothing else. Chief among the company’s critics was the statistician of its 
principal rival, the Prudential. Highly conservative in his approach to the business, 
Frederick Hoffman recoiled from the work of the Metropolitan, insisting that the 
provision of social programs diluted the purity of the insurance ideal. “In its final 
analysis, Industrial insurance is no more and no less than a contractual relationship,” he 
insisted, “and a broadening social purpose must be kept within reasonable limits. It seems 
little short of absurd to attempt, on the part of a business corporation, to reproduce the 
fraternal and social relations of a friendly society or a lodge.” Insurance institutions, he 
insisted, existed for the payment of claims and the execution of contractual obligations, 
not the creation of social programs. The activities of the Metropolitan constituted a 
misuse of welfare work, “inimical to the development of a sound business 
administration.”148 The Prudential – which was committed “to a traditional policy of 
radical conservatism,” -- should not become involved. 
But the welfare work of the Metropolitan cast a long shadow, and the Prudential 
soon found itself confronted with a formidable competitor and a changing set of public 
expectations regarding the responsibilities of an industrial insurer. The Metropolitan’s 
efforts on behalf of public health generated influence among New York’s social 
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powerbrokers, including its politicians, and won approval from wide segments of the 
general public.149 Its activities attracted enough popularity that they were quickly 
becoming normative, and clients and onlookers made assumptions that the Prudential 
would adopt similar practices. By the beginning of 1913, the expectation was 
unmistakable; welfare work had become so accepted as a feature of life insurance that 
personnel at the Prudential found themselves questioned for not engaging it.150 To 
successfully compete with the Metropolitan, the Prudential would have to take a hand in 
ameliorating disease and social conditions. 
Frederick Hoffman took it upon himself to suggest alterations to Prudential’s 
public policy. As the head of the statistical department, Frederick Hoffman was not, 
strictly speaking, one of the firm’s chief executives or decision-makers, but he had gained 
the ear of the company’s president early in his career, and when John Dryden passed 
away he became a chief advisor to his son and successor, Forrest Dryden. Noting the 
increase in popularity (and sales) enjoyed by the Metropolitan, Hoffman warned that the 
company would need to mount a vigorous response. “The very aggressive position of the 
Metropolitan,” he urged Dryden, “suggests on our part unceasing vigilance and increased 
activity in public health matters, so that the enviable position which we have gained by 
nearly twenty years of effort, shall not be lost by the clever advertising methods of that 
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company.”151 But formulating an appropriate competitive identity for the Prudential was 
no simple task. Hoffman rejected life conservation work as too risky (as its short-term 
benefits were too difficult to quantify), and frowned as well upon the Metropolitan’s style 
of lobbying for public health legislation, as he believed that the low odds of successfully 
pushing public health statutes through to law did not justify the expense.152 Hoffman also 
felt that such work constituted a significant conflict of interest for a commercial firm, an 
opinion that resonated with one of the chief points of rancor from the Armstrong 
hearings: the use of policyholder funds for campaign contributions.153 “However worthy 
the object may seem, it is contrary to our democratic form of government for a 
corporation, even though a life insurance company, to exert itself actively in behalf of a 
particular measure, with regard to which decided and well-founded differences of opinion 
may prevail,” he cautioned.154 To outfit the Prudential with a “welfare” initiative of its 
own, Hoffman turned to new applications of an older marketing tool: the prestige and 
authority of science. An emphasis on science would distinguish the Prudential as a 
disinterested authority, free of the commercial motives that plagued the Metropolitan. 
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Perhaps not coincidentally, it would also propel Hoffman’s own research and career into 
the central identity of the firm.  
An insurer of the laboring class, the Prudential housed a data set unavailable to 
most American researchers. Its records covered the mortality experience of hundreds of 
thousands of industrial workers, and were capable of yielding valuable insights into 
trends and correlating factors for numerous diseases, particularly those that affected the 
laboring class. Hoffman, who served as the head of the company’s statistical department, 
had been building up a prestigious scientific reputation for himself through frequent 
publications and presentations that interpreted the company’s statistical experience.155 
Augmenting the data available to him through the Prudential with investigative trips of 
his own, for instance, he became one of the first Americans to document the statistical 
prevalence and scope of the nation’s industrial disease crisis. Among his earliest findings, 
the statistician noted that the staggering rate of lung disease found among metal miners, 
grinders, polishers, and other workers in the “dusty trades” was not solely the result of 
tuberculosis, but was also caused by exposure to the dust itself. The workers’ ailments 
were separate from the bacterial illness but just as destructive.156 Predating the interest of 
most public health researchers in workplace conditions, Hoffman’s findings presented 
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scientific evidence of the need for reform of industrial hygiene, attracting accolades from 
scientists and scientific organizations, as well as from social reformers.157 
Hoffman prodded the chief executive of the Prudential to utilize the firm’s 
growing reputation for scientific inquiry as a tool with which to enhance its public 
standing – or at least to challenge the Metropolitan. In a report entitled “The Scientific 
and Welfare Work of the Prudential,” he articulated a policy – and a history – for the 
Prudential by using its role as a provider of scientific information to establish the firm as 
a chief contributor to American public health. Where the Metropolitan had chosen direct 
service, he claimed, the Prudential had distinguished itself for its “strictly scientific 
attention” to social conditions, health, and disease. Citing the firm’s participation in 
conferences and expositions as evidence, Hoffman declared that the Prudential “was the 
first life insurance company to undertake in a systematic manner the nation-wide, and 
even world-wide, agitation of the more pressing problems of preventive medicine.”158  
In lieu of a welfare division promoting hygiene and sanitation, Hoffman 
recommended the creation of a Division of Public Health and Medical Research that, 
under the management of the company’s Medical Director, would maintain responsibility 
for all medical matters affecting the company, its policyholders, and the general public. 
                                                
157 Hoffman himself, however, was no social agitator, and in setting a welfare policy for the Prudential he 
consistently steered the company away from Metropolitan’s “policy of drift,” by which he referred to its 
direct service components and its structural approach to social reform. Uninterested in plumbing the 
differences between capital and labor, Hoffman endorsed measures for improved safety standards and 
better records-keeping. The Prudential could offer sturdy support for such work by making contributions 
along statistical lines, conducting careful analyses of injury incidence and drawing attention to points in the 
production process with an elevated rate of accidents. Relief, Hoffman declared was not a right; prevention, 
on the other hand, was a duty. Frederick L. Hoffman, “Accidents and Industrial Diseases,” Publications of 
the American Statistical Association 11:88 (December, 1909): 567-603. See also Bouk 252. 
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The competitive challenge presented by the Metropolitan was intense, and despite 
Hoffman’s misgivings about social action, numerous features of the proposed division 
were similar to those of its rival’s welfare branch. Its personnel would be responsible for 
carrying on an “active propaganda for improvement in local health conditions,” 
particularly with regard to preventable diseases and accidental death, and they would 
cooperate with public health authorities throughout the country.159 But Hoffman placed 
particular emphasis on original scientific research, which he claimed that the 
Metropolitan did not conduct. He suggested that the company become involved in 
investigations of local sanitary conditions and medical and bacteriological inquiries into 
the underlying causes and conditions of disease.160 Such research, Hoffman proposed, 
would differentiate the company from its rival, and would make a contribution to science 
and progress that would be far more lasting than the semi-philanthropic work of the 
Metropolitan.  
The division never materialized -- ultimately, perhaps, because it was not needed. 
The high-profile work of the statistical department, and Hoffman’s own mounting fame 
as a research scientist had already set the firm apart as a leader in scientific and 
educational work, and Hoffman had quite successfully converted his own career into a 
distinctive feature of the Prudential itself. Well-regarded since the 1896 publication of 
                                                
159 The Prudential mimicked its opponent in other ways, as well. The company introduced a health column 
to its quarterly magazine, The Prudential, as well as one-page health leaflets for distribution with each new 
policy. It also introduced a series of leaflets that closely resembled three of the Metropolitans most popular 
booklets. The Prudential’s publications, “Care of Children During the Summer,” “Consumption: 
Suggestions for its Prevention,” and “Flies: A Plague of Plagues” bore a close resemblance to Frankel’s 
pamphlets, “The Child,” “A War Upon Consumption,” and “Just Flies.” These publications are mentioned 
in Hoffman’s report, “The Scientific and Welfare Work of the Prudential,” submitted to Forrest Dryden 17 
November, 1913 Box 3, Vol 13, FLH Collection. 
 
160 Hoffman was particularly interested in researching the physiological systems that caused the greatest  
mortality among life insurance policyholders, including the circulatory, urinary, and respiratory systems. 
Frederick Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 19 September, 1913, Box 3, Vol 13, FLH Collection.  
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Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, by 1910 Hoffman’s scholarship on 
mortality trends had begun to draw crowds of interested listeners. He received regular 
invitations to present before scientific, university, and public health audiences, and busied 
his assistants sending reprints of his work to those who requested them. In 1911, Tulane 
University offered him an honorary LL.D.161 Hoffman, who professed a fidelity to “the 
straight treatment of topics of practical importance,” had succeeded in building a 
reputation for himself as a man of science, and suggested this avenue as a potent source 
for the Prudential’s corporate identity. “I cannot conceive of any better way than this to 
bring the Company before the public as a scientific welfare institution,” Hoffman 
suggested to President Dryden. Contributing statistical research to the knowledge base of 
public health, Hoffman believed, would serve to capture the political breezes while still 
preserving the Prudential’s conservative approach. To compete with the Metropolitan the 
company need not become a social institution; it could instead become a scientific one.162  
Forrest Dryden approved the plan, allowing his statistician to advertise the 
statistical department – and therefore the company -- as a clearinghouse for statistical and 
sociological information. The tactic yielded remarkable success. Much of Hoffman’s 
initial work in this capacity involved circulating reprints of his own articles, though his 
growing skill as a researcher and the benefits of the Prudential’s vast resources had help 
to make his investigations truly groundbreaking. In 1912, for instance, Hoffman engaged 
the statistical department in a collaborative analysis of the medical records of Johns 
Hopkins Hospital, a project that constituted the first thorough study of the experience 
                                                
161John Dryden to Lee Frankel,  May 10, 1911, Box 26, Misc. Letters to FLH 1900-1929, FLH Collection. 
 
162 Frederick Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 15 July, 1913,  Box 3, Vol 13, FLH Collection. 
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data of an American medical institution. It received positive reviews in the medical and 
scientific press, and Hoffman speculated that it had established a model for statistical 
work by other institutions, which would ultimately help to improve the state of American 
statistics. “[I]t may be said,” he boasted, “that few important changes are made by the 
Government, the states and municipalities, which have not, in some way, the benefit of 
our office’s advice.”163 The claim was bold, but it contained an element of truth. Few 
personnel outside of the life insurance industry were as well trained in statistical analysis, 
and few outside of the Prudential engaged in collaborations across institutional lines.164 
At the time of the Johns Hopkins collaboration, the statistical department at the 
Prudential was indeed alone on the cutting edge, and it set new standards and a robust 
example for other institutions in the handling of data.165 
The statistical department’s excellent stewardship of data and its growing research 
authority attracted a steady flow of data queries from outside bodies, further promoting 
the firm’s identity as a scientific institution.166 By mid-decade, the company had become 
                                                
163 With the help of the Prudential’s statistical staff, hospital personnel embarked on a study of 4500 
autopsy records to determine the accuracy of the clinical diagnosis, and to record facts about normal and 
abnormal anatomy. Frederick Hoffman, “Annual Report of the Statistician’s Department for 1913,” Box 4, 
Vol 13A, FLH Collection. 
 
164 Hoffman’s closest counterpart, Dr. Louis Dublin of the Metropolitan, had only begun work with the firm 
in 1909, and his initial projects served mainly to back the activities of the company’s welfare division. Only 
in 1911 did the Metropolitan develop a dedicated statistical department, and while it would eventually 
contribute lasting and decisive studies, in 1912 it had only begun to operate. 
 
165 During the same period, Hoffman received high regard for a comprehensive study on the prevalence of 
cancer. An expanded version of the project brought attention and cooperation from more than fifty foreign 
governments, a hundred municipalities, and several large hospitals. The published study brought together 
an enormous amount of information on behalf of the medical profession. It demonstrated an unmistakable 
rise in the cancer rate, and it also manifested a rise in the scientific prestige of the Prudential. Frederick 
Hoffman, “Annual Report of the Statistician’s Department for 1913,” Box 4, Vol 13A; Also Frederick 
Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 18 November, 1913, Box 3, Vol 13; also Frederick Hoffman to Forrest 
Dryden, 11 July, 1913, Box 13, Vol 13, FLH Collection. 
 
166 Hoffman, who had all but free reign within the company’s statistical branch, generated studies on a 
profusion of topics, including mortality in the western hemisphere, American public health, insurance 
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well known to American federal, state and municipal governments, and to scientific 
institutions throughout the world, many of which submitted their own statistical 
experience to the company’s growing database. The burgeoning library expanded the 
firm’s research capacities, as well as its prestige. In time, Hoffman declared that the 
firm’s national and international network had become so thorough “that nothing of real 
importance, or even remotely affecting our interest, fails to reach our library within a 
reasonable period of time.”167 “In a general way,” he noted, “we are called upon to an 
increasing extent to render advice and assistance to public health departments, scientific 
organizations, healthy-promoting agencies, students, and individuals interested in the 
scientific aspects of insurance, mortality, etc.”168 In early 1916, the statistician coined a 
new title for the research and data monitoring activities with which the company was 
aggrandizing itself: scientific welfare work.169  
The Prudential, however, was not alone in the field. Hoffman’s studies had 
provided the firm with cutting edge research work that set new and exacting statistical 
standards, but by early in the decade the Metropolitan was already conducting research of 
its own. Launched in 1911 to provide backing for the company’s welfare work, the 
Metropolitan Statistical Department advanced in the middle teens to conducting sickness 
surveys and health demonstration projects, and by late in the decade had taken up 
                                                                                                                                            
history, tropical medicine, and crime statistics. The requests for reprints were so regular and so diverse that 
the statistician requested that the company print extra editions as a form of “public health work.” 
 
167 Frederick Hoffman, “Annual Report of the Statistician’s Department for 1913,” Box 4, Vol 13A, FLH 
Collection. 
 
168 Frederick Hoffman, “Annual Report of the Statistician’s Department for 1915,” Box 4, Vol 13A, FLH 
Collection.  
 
169 Frederick Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 11 January, 1916, Box 5, Book 20A, FLH Collection.  
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scientific research in a purer form not unlike the Prudential’s. The initial surveys – of 
cities including Rochester, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Trenton, Boston, and the 
neighborhood of Chelsea in New York City – involved the use of company agents to 
collect data on elements such as disability and unemployment. In Rochester, for instance 
members of the field force contacted 7,638 families (34,490 people), a sample 
constituting 14% of the total population. The company compared these findings to those 
of Trenton and Boston, hoping that an estimate of the total cost of sickness and disability 
within various communities would shed light on improved measures for alleviation.170 
The Framingham Health Demonstration, begun in December, 1916, was even more 
ambitious, and sought to create a model health community out of the entire town of 
Framingham, Massachusetts. Enlisting the help of local health authorities, clubs, 
churches, voluntary associations, and extensive participation from the Metropolitan’s 
own field staff, nurses, and medical personnel, the firm established a census of the town’s 
health status and launched an intense campaign of publicity, health interventions, and 
medical assistance with the goal of reducing the mortality rate from tuberculosis. The 
project, which succeeded in lowering the death rate at twice the rate of control 
communities, and in increasing the per capita spending for health programs from forty 
cents to $2.40, became a model for such work all over the nation.171  
                                                
170 Lee Frankel and Louis Dublin, “Community Sickness Survey, Rochester NY, September 1915.” Reprint 
no. 326 from the Public Health Reports, February 25, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1916). See also “A Health Census of Chelsea Neighborhood,” (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, 1917). 
171 Marquis James, The Metropolitan Life: A study in Business Growth, (New York: The Viking Press, 
1947), 214-219. When the Metropolitan ceased its operations in the town in 1923, the United States Federal 
Public Health Service assumed responsibility for the study. Framingham continues as a site of research and 
investigation to the present day. 
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From his post at the Prudential, Hoffman followed the rise of the Metropolitan’s 
statistical work with a mix of caution, admiration, and alarm. Dismissing the firm’s early 
research as without originality or value, he nevertheless noted that the statistical 
department had been granted wide latitude and a considerable budget. With a staff of 63, 
the Metropolitan’s department boasted more than twice the personnel of Hoffman’s own 
research division, and, he remarked warily, it seemed to be “gaining ground” on the 
Prudential.172 Having contributed the data from its sickness surveys to the Public Health 
Service, the Metropolitan’s rise in prestige was significant and real; even Hoffman made 
use of its figures.173 “It is a foregone conclusion,” he noted at the eve of the Framingham 
study, “that the company will establish for itself in this field a claim to priority of real 
value in support of its contention that it is rendering a substantial service to the public at 
large.”174 By the summer of 1917, the forecast had become real. Although the Prudential 
had been the first, Hoffman noted, it was no longer alone in its scientific field. Hoffman 
urged his employer to strengthen the firm’s competitive response. [We] must further 
improve our own methods of scientific research and welfare work,” he advised, “so as not 
to fall behind but to lead in the future in directions obviously legitimate to our interests, 
as we have in the past.”175 One possibility for out-distancing the Metropolitan could 
involve the implementation of an advisory medical service for Prudential policyholders, 
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FLH Collection. 
 
173 Hoffman even offered personal kudos to Dublin for rendering a “national service of far-reaching 
importance… in this rather new field of statistical inquiry.” Frederick Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 21 May 
1917, Box 6, Vol 21, FLH Collection.  
 
174 Frederick Hoffman to Forrest Dryden, 16 December, 1916, Box 5, FLH Collection.  
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 381 
consisting of local infirmaries staffed with a physician and a trained nurse. Hoffman felt 
sure that such a resource would prove more valuable than the visiting nurse service.176 
Aetna instituted exactly such a plan in 1918, but the Prudential never acted on the 
suggestion.177 Hoffman’s attention became divided, as other, more pressing 
considerations intervened.   
The guiding spirit behind Hoffman’s interest in corporate welfare work had been 
that of competition. The Metropolitan’s policyholder welfare work had given the firm a 
tremendous competitive edge, and Hoffman -- who saw himself as a man of business as 
well as a man of science -- struggled to boost the Prudential’s supremacy. By mid-
decade, the Metropolitan had been so successful in its primary goal of reformulating the 
relationship between risk and life insurance that policyholders had come to expect 
“responsible” firms to mitigate not only the financial hazards of modern life, but the 
physical hazards, as well. No firm that hoped to remain profitable could afford to sit this 
development out, and Hoffman had counseled his company’s executives to stay off the 
sidelines.  
But the same social and political atmosphere that had led the Metropolitan to 
assume its own policy of welfare work continued to evolve in the American political 
economy. The inequalities and inefficiencies of industrial labor, continued to fuel a crisis 
in industrial labor, and in addition to calling for social justice and an end to wage cruelty, 
reformers continued to point to individual well-being as an asset to the state itself. The 
ongoing success of European programs of social insurance offset a rising popularity for 
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health and accident insurance within the United Sates, as Americans struggled to 
innovate acceptable ways to manage risk. The Metropolitan’s health and welfare 
programs had successfully introduced the concept of service provision through 
commercial insurers, but it had not silenced the national debate about social insurance. 
The tide of reform was high, and to some in the private life insurance industry it still 
seemed possible – even likely – that it would wash over the companies’ welfare work if 
allowed to continue unopposed.  
Hoffman, who made a practice of monitoring social and political developments of 
interest to the life insurance industry, had remained active on committees devoted to 
social insurance investigation, and abreast of the national debate. In the mid-nineteen 
teens, developments in the political arena began to reclaim his attention.  Even while he 
continued to comment on the competition posed by the Metropolitan, and to suggest ways 
in which to meet it, he became increasingly alarmed over the nation’s political 
atmosphere, which he felt was becoming dangerously radical. After attending a social 
insurance congress in January, 1914, he sent a disquieted letter to President Dryden 
proclaiming that that agitation for social insurance was assuming “serious proportions.” 
“I feel strongly that I should give as much time as possible to these matters,” he fussed, 
“and if necessary, discontinue my efforts in connection with other and less pressing 
public activities.” Hoffman meant what he said. He immediately tendered resignations to 
the Committee of Dusty Trades, the Committee on Industrial Hygiene, and the 
Committee of Fifteen on Public Health Activities, re-prioritizing the direct fight against 
social insurance over the “less pressing activities” of accruing social esteem through the 
promotion of public health. Hoffman urged Dryden to make changes, as well, pushing 
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him to create an office committee to consider social insurance in detail, and to be ready, 
if necessary, to alter the company’s entire policy of business in order to conform to the 
“changed order of things.” After many years of monitoring the progress of social 
insurance, Hoffman suddenly believed the changes to be imminent, and while he 
continued to make suggestions he put less and less energy into promoting the Prudential’s 
welfare capacities. The policyholder service bureau would not become a reality, but a 
direct, vitriolic, and ultimately successful fight against the introduction of American 









When Frederick Hoffman travelled to Europe in the spring of 1909 to investigate social 
insurance, he initially liked what he saw. The program appeared to have done everything the 
Kaiser and others had hoped. The interests of capital and labor had been harmonized, the welfare 
and security of the German working class had been improved, and the suffering wrought by 
industrial distress had been vastly alleviated.1 “There is no dissenting opinion,” he reported home 
in May, “even on the part of life insurance managers, that Government insurance has resulted in 
far-reaching reforms, that it has been of vast benefit to the people and to the nation at large, and 
that it has come to stay.”2 He concluded as well that the state-based provisions were hardly 
insurance at all, and would pose no threat to private firms. Instead, Hoffman observed, they 
constituted merely a form of poor relief with which commercial insurance could easily compete. 
“I am fully convinced that government insurance (so-called) is not opposed to our interests,” he 
declared.3 Hoffman was so sure of his own findings that he submitted them nearly verbatim to a 
public report on social insurance. “[A]ll with whom I have discussed the subject are but of one 
mind,” he wrote – “that the effect on the whole, has been decidedly for good.”4 
A week later, the Prudential statistician reversed his position. “The fact remains that it is 
a system of social betterment in the name of insurance,” he warned, “which is unquestionably a 
serious menace to insurance based upon the theory of contract and equitable contractual relations 
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between the parties concerned.” He stated that the European method was to distribute subsidized 
life and burial insurance policies, and that private firms would fare badly where it thrived. 
“Industrial insurance,” he noted, “as we understand and practice it, has only a small chance of 
success [against social insurance].”5 Hoffman never again spoke well of state-based insurance, 
and by 1913 he had come to  devote a substantial proportion of his energies to denouncing the 
practice, ‘lest it become law in the United States. Hoffman, in fact, waged a full-fledged attack 
on the idea, which he conducted through the printing presses of the Prudential, through scientific 
and trade journals, from lecterns, and through covert organizations such as the New York League 
for Americanism (a front organization operated by insurance companies to oppose health 
insurance proposals). It was an offensive that contributed much to the defeat of the first 
concerted attempt to pass socialized insurance in the United States, which occurred between 
1916 and 1919 through the auspices of the American Association for Labor Legislation, and it 
predicted a political struggle that would recur in the United States approximately every fifteen 
years through the present writing.  
Scholars of American attempts to pass government health insurance have described the 
nineteen teens as the time that Americans were “almost persuaded” to vote such legislation into 
law. Between 1910 and 1914, the American social climate was on the whole favorably disposed 
toward social insurance, and legislative reform seemed to many to be a part of the nation’s 
inevitable social progress. In 1912, when the AALL convened a committee “to study conditions 
impartially, to investigate the operation of existing systems of insurance, to prepare for needed 
legislation, and to stimulate intelligent discussion,” the group determined that compulsory health 
                                                       




insurance for wage workers constituted “the next great step in social legislation.”6 The all-out 
campaign launched by the committee in support of state-level health insurance bills initially had 
the support of the American Medical Association, organized labor in many states, and all three 
political parties. The European example received favorable reports from those who investigated 
it, particularly as it was practiced in England, and a 1916 state-by-state attempt to push model 
insurance bill seemed to its sponsors to have been largely successful. Though no legislation was 
passed, state medical societies allowed the measure to develop unopposed, and hopes remained 
high that state-administered insurance would soon become a reality in the United States.7 
Less than a year later, the success of the campaign turned. The position of medical 
societies soured. The outbreak of World War I unleashed a tide of anti-German feeling among 
Americans that quickly turned to nativist hysteria turned to all things “Kraut,” including so-
called German insurance. The timing coincided with action on the part of the AALL to introduce 
a new model bills in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois that received a bitter response from 
physicians and a series of anti-insurance resolutions. When an anti-German witch hunt began in 
1918 within the ranks of the AMA, it helped to solidify medical opinion against state-based 
insurance. Americans began to refer to compulsory coverage as the “Prussianization of 
America,” and even the federal government turned against the practice, mobilizing -- among 
other initiatives -- the Creel Committee on Public Information, whose mission to “mobilize 
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hatred against the enemy” included opposition to social insurance.8 By 1920, the movement in 
favor of a state-based system had been soundly defeated.  
Behind many of these activities sat the power of manufacturers and large insurers and, 
most specifically, the work of Frederick Hoffman. As self-appointed advisor to the chief 
executive of the Prudential, Hoffman’s watchful eye on the progress of insurance legislation 
became an active hand by 1913, and, reporting faithfully on all of his endeavors to the company 
head, he maintained a presence in most theaters of the debate. From that year through 1916, he 
served on the AALL’s Committee on Social Insurance, a position from which he challenged the 
main tenets of the model bill, especially its inclusion of a $50 burial provision and the 
Committee’s decision to exclude commercial insurers as carriers. When the bill was introduced 
in three states containing these clauses, Hoffman resigned from the Committee in disgust, 
continuing his opposition from other platforms. At conferences on social insurance he attacked 
the model bill as “actuarily unsound, politically unwise, and economically unnecessary,” and in 
articles he claimed that the committee members had conducted a biased inquiry full of “reckless 
utterances,” “broad allegations,” and “fatuous reliance on foreign experience.”9 As a paid 
spokesman for the Creel Committee, it was Hoffman who framed social insurance as an 
autocratic invention of the Kaiser, a position he modified in 1919 and 1920 to re-describe the 
system as a Bolshevist threat and a menace to democracy.10 Hoffman also maintained an active 
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presence in the New York League for Americanism and the Insurance Economic Institution, a 
pair of front organizations supported largely by industry whose purpose was to suppress the 
movement for national health insurance without drawing attention to the commercial firms. In 
sum, a striking quantity of the material published in opposition to social insurance during the late 
nineteen teens can be traced back to Frederick Hoffman, whose work was instrumental in the 
opposition mounted by commercial firms.  
Though only a handful of histories of the nation’s first attempt to pass national health 
insurance discuss the role that private industry in its defeat, it is difficult to improve on the 
account provided by Beatrix Hoffman in 2001. Hoffman observes that, like the practice 
established in Europe, the compulsory system proposed by the AALL targeted low-income 
workers, who were the primary purchasers of industrial policies. Insurance firms with industrial 
departments recognized the substantial threat this posed to their economic well-being but, as 
Hoffman notes, public opposition based on economic grounds would have appeared to be too 
brazenly in insurers’ self-interest to attract popular sympathy. The firms needed to keep their 
resistance discreet, and find alternative methods to erode support for the legislation that did not 
draw attention to their financial stake in the debate. On these grounds, Hoffman notes, 
commercial insurers engaged a multifaceted campaign that included the appearance of public 
cooperation through membership on social insurance committees, covert attempts to frustrate it 
such as membership in the IES and the NYLA, and a strategy of involvement with medical and 
public health campaigns across the United States that would remove the occasion for state-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
have never attempted to disguise the fact that social insurance was of considerable material benefit to the German 
people at that particular period, but I was limited in my opportunities and possibly under the influence of the 
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upon my mind.” See “Discussion on Papers of Lapp and Hoffman,” The Pennsylvania Medical Journal 22 (March 




sponsored insurance.11 “The movement for compulsory health insurance,” notes Hoffman, 
“became a catalyst for insurance industry involvement in health protection.”12 If industry could 
efficiently meet the growing demand for medical and public health provision, it could preclude 
activity by the state.  
On this basis, the welfare work program of the Metropolitan received enduring support 
from company executives, and competitors such as the Prudential soon launched efforts of their 
own. By the late teens, Aetna and John Hancock (also industrial firms) had initiated nursing 
services and welfare programs, as well. As public interest in social insurance became more 
pronounced, the firms stepped up their health protection efforts to include disability benefits 
(Aetna, 1916, Equitable 1917) and, at the Metropolitan in 1921, health insurance.13 Not only did 
these actions help to diffuse calls for state coverage, they established the private firms in a new 
and lucrative market. Manufacturers, who condemned the idea of being forced to pay more for 
the maintenance of their workforce, encouraged these innovations, often by buying into the 
newly available group insurance policies offered by the firms. Hoffman notes that the 
combination of these efforts granted employers and private insurers a long-lasting victory: 
“private health plans today are still voluntary on the part of the employer, not a right of workers 
guaranteed by the state.” They are also still the domain of the private sector.14  
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It was in this context that the methodological and ideological transfer between the 
insurance industry and the emerging public health movement took place. The details of the 
AALL’s attempt to pass social insurance and the fight by the insurance industry to crush the 
legislation are fascinating, and despite Hoffman’s excellent telling, much more research remains 
to be done. What is significant to this study, however, is not the ultimate defeat of the measure in 
late 1919, but the events and concerns that informed the collaboration between insurers and 
health promoters that facilitated the conquest.  
Schooled in the ways of political capitalism, and simultaneously motivated and hampered 
by their damaged public image, insurance companies maintained a public position of concerned 
and decorous skepticism, while conducting substantial efforts beneath the popular radar. 
Repeated visits to Europe by emissaries from the Metropolitan and the Prudential kept the largest 
firms abreast of the practice’s impact on the Continent, and close alliances with reformers and 
social scientists at home informed them of its potential for passage within the United States. 
When the companies mobilized their new image as institutions of public health and protectors of 
national strength, they proved to be formidable opponents to the passage of the legislation. The 
web of oratory, for instance, woven by Metropolitan vice president Haley Fiske, projected a 
vision of an American political economy in which commercial insurance had served to build the 
nation, unify the people, and above all safeguard he national vitality. Like the preponderance of 
ideology adopted and deployed by the life insurance industry, it was remarkably effective. It 
dealt the death blow to the American movement for social insurance – at least for the time being.  
For American public health, the story may be one of short-term gain (in the form of 




become law during one of its most likely political moments), however it is complicated by the 
impact of the ideology of some of its internal players, an aspect worthy of much greater study. 
The social workers who helped to design and promote the insurance firms’ welfare work brought 
with them a decidedly structural approach to reform, which they believed required multiple sites 
of intervention and the cooperation of heterogeneous actors. This was not a goal that they readily 
abandoned, in spite of its disharmony with the “privatizing” philosophy of the commercial 
insurance industry. Lee Frankel, for instance, remained focused throughout his career at the 
Metropolitan’s welfare division on promoting a national model of public health. In the absence 
of a federal health body, he mobilized the welfare division to agitate for needed legislation, 
including the formation of an omnibus health agency. The health demonstration projects 
launched through the division were calculated to inspire interest from government institutions in 
assuming responsibility for disease prevention and health research. For over half a century, what 
centralized health administration existed in the United States was heavily influenced by methods 
incubated in the Metropolitan’s welfare division, which sent two presidents to the American 
Public Health Association (Lee Frankel and Louis Dublin), and which fostered a central Public 
Health Database until 1932. Only in 1953 did the nation create a federal agency, establishing a 
cabinet-level Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The impact of the social workers 
who operated in alliance with the life insurance industry through that time was highly complex, 
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